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If there is a determining spatial dimension to the units being analyzed, that dimension is not territoriality and the units are not disjoint. Instead, the determining spatial dimension our discussion suggests is a behavioral one, where space is thought of as that which acts as a reference point for behavior, which both distinguishes units through differentiation and associates them by contiguity. Propensities, functional interdependencies, and issue-type define behavior spaces; it is these which distinguish and associate states; and within such spaces, units are interconnected and memberships are overlapping. ---- Ruggie, 1972: 87 |
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Expanded Contents | Figures | Tables 1. Perspective And Summary 15A. Phasing Propositions and Their Evidence on International Conflict Vol. 1: The Dynamic Psychological Field
Democratic Peace page |
Ironically, it is when international behavior becomes most organized, most intense, most deadly, that it tends to lose its social character. Such is war. For war often escalates to the application of force--of physical power--to overcome, rather than coerce, other wills. This is not to deny that war can be or should be an extension of politics--communist leaders have become contemporary masters of this as evidenced by the Vietnam War
Whether war or otherwise, manifest international behavior is infinitely divisible. Simply an international negotiation over a trade agreement can be fragmented into a multitude of different behaviors; the movement of one tourist across an international boundary comprises diverse behaviors (stopping at a border post, exchange of greetings with a border official, answering questions, presenting a passport, more questions, presenting baggage for inspection, and so on). This diverse behavior is given meaning and unity by its underlying intention, rational meaning, or causation.
Intentional behavior comprises acts or actions. Acts are behavior given meaning by an underlying plan, aim, purpose; actions are behavior toward achieving the act. Thus, negotiating a treaty is an act, the negotiations the actions; alliance the act, a state visit the action. Of course, what is action in one context may be an act in another, although some behaviors are usually only of one kind or another. For example, violence is generally action--it is to achieve some act (victory, independence, equality, and so on); diplomacy likewise is action toward some goal (containment, détente, peaceful coexistence). However, tourism, migration, and trade are generally acts, although they may sometimes be encouraged or manipulated by the elite to achieve particular goals, such as détente.
Acts and actions are meaningfully unified by their intentions. Reflexes, however, are given causal unity. They are cause-effect, stimulus-response, action-reaction behavior. Prick a person with a pin and he will yell "ouch"; let a mob attack another country's embassy and a diplomatic protest is certain; raise the duties on another nation's goods, and one's own will suffer a similar imposition; go on a military alert against another, and their alert will follow as though governed by some social Newtonian law.
Reflexes are caused by specific changes, events, behaviors. They are not behaviors chosen as part of a larger plan, or to achieve a larger goal. They do not define intentions beyond that of responding to the cause. As an "ouch" is simply a cry of pain, an automatic signal to others that one has been hurt, so a diplomatic protest is often a cry of concern, an automatic warning that a country's interests have been stung.
Finally, there are international practices--behavior that is habitual, customary, rule or norm following, or moral. It is procedural, proper, the right thing to do, the moral way to behave. Rule or norm following behavior is indicated by passports and visas, diplomatic rituals, air transport requirements, world health regulations, exchange rates, customs of the sea, and so on. Moral behavior is partially defined by international law, but also by the moral consensus of the age. In our time, behavior that is internationally good is antiracist, antimilitaristic, antiright (or antifascist), antiaggression, antigenocide, or antinuclear proliferation; and prodevelopment, pro-Third World, proindependence, prosovereignty. proenvironment, or proequality. International society is interwoven with practices. They form a structure of expectations within which actors can mutually predict behavior and pursue their individual concerns.
Practices are done because of . . . ; they are behavior determined by reasons.
Moreover, besides its meaning and direction, international behavior may be intense (strongly felt, emotional, single minded) as in war or migrating to another country, or superficial (trivial, minor, common) as in buying a postcard in Rome, or for President Carter to send a congratulatory message to Fiji upon her tenth year of independence. It may be extensive, wide ranging, involving many activities, as in maintaining national security or an alliance; or narrow as in exporting copper to Belgium. It may be of long duration, as in the Marshall Plan which involved extensive activities over many years, or short in time as in a 15-minute meeting between the French Ambassador and New Zealand's Prime Minister. Finally, it may be organized as in covert intelligence operations, or relatively unorganized as in the movement and choices of foreign students.
Thus, the diverse, multitude of interstate, intersocietal, and interpersonal behaviors can be characterized as act, action, practices, or reflexes; as solidary, mixed, or antagonistic; as intensive or superficial; as extensive or narrow; as of long or short duration; or as organized or disorganized. International behavior is a combination of these characteristics, of course. A behavior may be a short, superficial, unorganized, antagonistic act, as a mild warning of the American Ambassador against Japan raising the duty on American television sets. A behavior may be a long, intense, organized, solidary action, as in President Carter's military and economic aid to Israel. Or, a behavior may be a short, intense, organized act, as in the Chinese military shooting down an American reconnaissance plane.
Although international behavior may combine these characteristics in various ways, there are recurring patterns of behavior, particular combinations which can be identified. In general, these combinations can be categorized as familistic, compulsory, or contractual. Familistic behavior are acts, actions or practices that are solidary, tend to be of long duration, intensive in feeling and extensive in scope. Such familistic behavior has largely characterized the relations between England, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, for example. Compulsory behavior, however, is consistently antagonistic acts, actions, or reflexes. It may or may not be intense, extensive, organized or of long duration, and usually involves coercion or force. American and Soviet relations between the Berlin Blockade of 1948 and Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 were characterized by such antagonistic interaction, or Cold War. And then there is contractual behavior, or that which is limited in the range of behaviors involved and in duration, which is mixed solidary and antagonistic in direction, and which involves primarily actions and practices. Examples of this combination of behavior are treaties, contracts, executive agreements, and understandings.
The familistic, contractual, and compulsory types are the most general theoretical components (latent functions)
This behavior space-time defines the behavioral repertoire of international actors; it delineates their potential behavior. At the most general behavioral level, an international actor is some combination of familistic, contractual, and compulsory components towards other actors. He can cooperate, negotiate, aid, threaten, sanction, attack, protest, exchange, bargain, discuss, visit, and so on. But each act, action, practice, or reflex will have consequences, and how each actor actually will behave depends on his behavioral dispositions and expectations of these consequences, as will be described more fully later.
Two examples, however, will be helpful at this point. An American tourist may be disposed to visit the pyramids in Egypt (a personal act which would necessitate a variety of international contractual actions having to do with the visa, transportation, hotel accommodations, touring the pyramids, and the like), but because she is Jewish and concerned about her reception in Egypt and anti-Jewish terrorists, she chooses instead to tour Buddhist Temples in Japan, which are also of interest to her and which seem to involve no personal risk. Or, Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng may be disposed toward a hard line (compulsory action) on China's border disputes with the Soviet Union, but because of growing Soviet strategic power and American weakness, a hard line may provoke Secretary Brezhnev to take military action. Thus, Hua chooses instead to be conciliatory, to signal a more pragmatic policy, and to renew the Sino-Soviet border talks (contractual actions).
What do we find empirically if we systematically analyze international behavior? I have quantitatively analyzed several dozen international behavioral variables to determine their underlying components. These involved interstate relations (such as aid, threats, treaties, military actions, and alliances), intersocietal relations (such as trade, nonintergovernmental organization memberships, and investments), and interpersonal relations (such as tourism, student movements, and migration). These involved all such dyadic
Moreover, the analysis altogether involved 48,230 behavioral datum defining the manifest diversity of international relations, 1950-1965. They reflect the potential behavior and behavioral dispositions of international actors. Their common variance mirrors the structure of expectations guiding behavior. And their underlying, common components delineate the empirical, behavioral space-time.
The appropriate method to determine the common components is factor analysis and several such analyses were done on the behavioral data, with the results shown in Table 4.1. The technical details and data have been presented elsewhere (Rummel, 1979) and are omitted here.
What do these eight empirical components show? First, they show that international behavior is highly patterned in definable ways between different actors.
These last two points deserve expansion. In interacting, actors establish, as in all social systems, an integrated structure of informal understandings, rules, norms, contracts, and treaties regulating their relationship. At its core, this is a status quo which defines who owns and gets what, and reciprocal duties and obligations. This structure enables actors to anticipate each other's behavior, to predict the consequences of their actions, and thus to define a social order. It encompasses systems of reliable expectations between actors, and for this reason I call it a structure of expectations.
There will be diverse structures of expectations in society involving different interests and a division of labor. Some structures will be nested, some will overlap, all will be within an overarching structure bonding the society together, defining the overall meanings, values, and norms of society, and the status and class of actors. These different structures will be manifest through patterns of covarying familistic and contractual behavior.
Across society as a whole, then, the largest distinct structures of expectations will be defined by the empirical components of behavior, for these will each reflect a different intercorrelated cluster of cooperation.
One involves transactions, largely at the intersocietal level. It is a cluster of behavior reflecting a structure of understandings, norms and contracts governing intersocietal relations, and involving such behavior as exports of books, comemberships in NGOs, economic aid,
As a component of behavioral space-time, transactions reflects the broadest structure of expectations. It involves a variety of intersocietal behaviors, as well as that which is related interpersonal and interstate; overall it encompasses more behaviors than any other structure (or conflict component) to be mentioned. This component is what students of international relations often refer to as cooperative or integrative behavior; it is what I am calling familistic. Although some contractual behaviors are involved, such as tourists (which take place within a contractual framework), the general sense of this large pattern of behavior is solidary in direction, and tends to be enduring, extensive (it does involve many behaviors), and intensive in feeling.
Transactions is the only major familistic component. Three independent contractual components also exist, as shown in Table 4.1, each reflecting an underlying structure of expectations. The first is mainly of relative exports, or a pattern of exports to specific nations which tends to dominate over all other exports and the exporter's economy. Such is relatively true for the exports of Brazil and Israel to the United States, and Cuba and Poland to the Soviet Union, for example. The second is primarily of foreign students, involving also treaties, IGOs (intergovernmental international organizations), and state visits.
And the third is of international organizations, whether IGOs or NGOs. All measures of IGO or NGO comembership are involved in this pattern; and it is independent of all other forms of behavior. And well it should be. This is the structure of expectations comprising international government, overarching international behavior and promoting the state-self regulation of many kinds of behavior, and thus not specifically correlated with any one.
The familistic and contractual components reflect the major structures of expectations: transactions, relative exports, foreign students, and international organizations. There are thus four major kinds of order; four separate patterns of interrelated international behavior.
These expectations develop out of a balancing of powers between actors, an engagement of their interests, capabilities, and wills. This is a conflict of desires, abilities, and determination. And it establishes a working balance of powers
Conflict behavior and cooperation are therefore complementary. Conflict behavior is a mechanism for establishing a balance, a structure of expectations between actors. And this structure enables these actors to interact cooperatively, to behave contractually and familistically.
While conflict and cooperation are part of the same process (the conflict helix),
And this is what the empirical components show. As can be seen from Table 4.1, the compulsory (conflict) components are independent of the familistic and contractual. Indeed, no hostile behavior is even moderately correlated with any familistic or contractual component.
To focus now on the separate empirical, compulsory components, each measures a tendency for particular conflict behaviors to go together; each corresponds to a pattern of behavior in the process of balancing powers, forming structures of expectations.
The first of these compulsory processes shown in Table 4.1 is alignment, a pattern of defense treaties associated with the Cold War, 1950-1965, and voting agreement and disagreement in the UN General Assembly. It mirrors the major bloc conflict to cut across the international system during these years. It reflects the balancing of powers--the stabilization of a new international post-World War II order between the U.S. and Soviet Union and their allies.
The second compulsory component involves both verbal or written interstate negative communications, such as accusations, protests, threats, warnings, and denunciations; and negative behaviors, like boycotts, embargoes, severance of diplomatic relations, expulsion of diplomats, and the like. This component clearly manifests coercive balancing involving warnings or threats and sanctions, and has been named negative behavior.
The third compulsory component is of military violence. This is either the preparation for such violence through alerts, partial or full mobilization, cancellation of leaves, troop movements, reinforcing frontiers; or the actual involvement in military actions, border clashes, or wars. This component manifests the pattern of violence associated with balancing coercive power and force.
Finally, there is a compulsory, interpersonal component of antiforeign behavior. This is a pattern of unofficial violent and nonviolent demonstrations and attacks on the property, citizens or officials, and symbols of another country. It reflects public antagonism and hostility, either covertly organized by the government or political groups, or spontaneously arising from particular events. In any case, antiforeign behavior is a distinct pattern of conflict in the process of forming a balance of powers.
Overall, then, there are a number of common and independent, empirical components that are compulsory, contractual, or familistic; and which span the international behavior space-time. These mirror either the distinct major structures of expectations existing between nations or the process of their formation or disruption.
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Table 4.2 presents the results of an higher-order factor analysis of the components in Table 4.1.
The second and third higher-order components wholly define conflict. The first of these (compulsory I) is a pattern of alignment and negative behavior--a pattern of nonviolent conflict behavior. The second (compulsory II) involves both military violence and antiforeign behavior (which also comprises antiforeign violence). This is primarily a pattern of "saber rattling" and actual violence, with high tension and hostility mixed in. This is a pattern quite apart from the other compulsory component.
These empirical results support the theoretical analysis.
The familistic and contractual patterns (empirical components) reflect the separate structures of expectations between actors, the distinct orders; the compulsory patterns manifest the conflict process associated with the formation and disruption of such structures. Cooperation and conflict are in theory complementary, each a separate stage in the functioning of international society. In theory, conflict behavior should be independent. In fact, this is found true.
Conflict is a generic term and refers to the opposition of social powers, as defined in Chapters 26 and 27 of Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix. Conflict may be latent or manifest, it may be structure, situation, or the balancing--confrontation--of powers. Conflict, therefore, does not necessarily mean overt behavior. When behavior is involved, however, as in "Conflict Behavior," then this means that behavior manifesting the process of balancing powers.
Now, such powers may be coercion or force, but may also be intellectual, exchange, or altruistic, among others. Conflict Behavior, therefore, need not be antagonistic, and may well take place between allied or friendly states.
Cooperative behavior in contrast, refers to one of three types of behavior. There is that behavior comprising flows (e.g., tourists, exports, mail) between states, or structures (e.g. comembership in international organizations, diplomatic recognition), as discussed in Appendix II. Flows and structures are manifest behavior within a structure of expectations.
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The third type of cooperative behavior involves events (e.g., signing a treaty, offering aid, granting concessions) which are usually part of Conflict Behavior--the balancing of powers--and indeed, in Chapter 12 below, such cooperative behavior is defined as an independent conflict path.
Here I have also introduced the terms solidary, mixed, and antagonistic behavior; and familistic, contractual, and compulsory behavior. How do these logically relate to conflict and cooperation? Table 4.3 and 4.4 provide the answer.
In Table 4.3, cooperation is shown to combine both the familistic and contractual components. In other words, cooperation is of solidary acts, actions, or practices of long duration, and intensive, as well as mixed solidary and antagonistic actions or practices of limited duration and range. Conflict Behavior is then of antagonistic acts, practices, or reflexes; or mixed solidary and antagonistic action or practices of limited duration and range. Lower case conflict behavior restricts the term to simply compulsory--antagonistic--behavior.
Table 4.4 shows this meaning of cooperation and conflict behavior in relation to other uses. The terminology delineated therein will be followed throughout this Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix and should help avoid confusion.
* Scanned from Chapter 4 in R.J. Rummel, War, Power, Peace, 1979. For full reference to the book and the list of its contents in hypertext, click book. Typographical errors have been corrected, clarifications added, and style updated.1. I am using social behavior in the sense developed in Part III of Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix. The analysis therein and the logic of that volumes Chapter 33 underlie this whole Chapter.
2. For the doctrinal expression of this in communist military strategy, see Milovidov and Kozlov (1972). Regardless of the dominant political and psychological aspects of communist strategy in Vietnam, the final victory was won by a conventional force. Moreover, the Soviet invasions to defeat the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the Czechoslovakian "Spring" in 1968 were, after attempted coercion, pure force.
Force is the application of physical power to others in spite of their wills; coercion is the use of threats or sanctions to get another willfully to do or stop doing as demanded. Force works on another's body, resources, or capabilities (such as by killing soldiers, destroying air fields, or bombing factories); coercion on the mind (such as to establish credibility, or to bring another to negotiate, or to concede territory). Of course, no war is pure force or coercion. All are mixtures of social powers. But wars are dominated by one type of power over another. For example, American leaders fought for unconditional surrender by Japan and Germany in World War II, and made that war primarily a test of force.
3. Each of these concepts is developed in Chapter 8 of Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix.
4. In analyzing 598 diplomatic protests of the United States, McKenna (1962: 195-196) found that the American government "has usually shown an unfortunate inclination toward afterthought rather than forethought ... action has followed a stimulus-response scheme, based either on a standing policy--requiring, for example, quick protest to defend petroleum interests abroad--or on a deeply ingrained reverence for the law."
5. For example, one gets a passport because it is required; a new ambassador follows a particular ritual in presenting his credentials to another government because that is the way it is done; airline tickets from Paris to Rome cost a certain amount because that is the internationally agreed on price; Nixon cancelled the American ABM program because of the SALT I, U.S.-USSR Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems; French fishermen do not fish closer than 200 miles off Brazil's shores because that is Brazil's fishing zone.
6. Clearly, practices are implicitly intentional in the sense that they are implicitly chosen because of a rule, custom, and so on. In mailing a letter abroad we pay the proper postage, and do so intentionally. We choose to follow the rules. Thus, in returning home after my classes I choose to drive on the right side of the road and this practice enables me to get home safely. Practices, once established, relieve us of making overt choices, of deciding what to do in a particular circumstance, of how to decide anew everything at every moment.
Acts and actions, however, directly result from decisions made between alternatives; they are overtly intentional. Thus, to attend a conference in Japan is an intentional act, and to fly there by Pan American is an intentional action. Both involved new decisions; neither involved following a rule, norm, or custom.
7. What about the outcomes of bureaucratic processes? A particular behavior may not be what anyone would choose or desire, and it may not accord with any international rules of agreements, but be the outcome of compromises and concessions--a composite of bits and pieces of what different elite with different intentions would do. Is not this behavior reflexive (the effect of multiple bureaucratic causes), therefore? Not necessarily. Rarely does anyone behave as he is so disposed. We often must make cost-gain calculations and compromise among competing and sometimes contradictory interests. And often, we settle for the second or third most desirable behavior. Simply as family members, for example, our behavior reflects many compromises with the interests of others. If we thus go with our family to visit relatives rather than to a football game, is the visit any less intentional?
Similarly, in interstate relations some official must always behave on behalf of the nation. And this behavior is no less intentional if it is decided on through bureaucratic compromises. The crucial distinction is not between intentional behaviors and bureaucratic outcomes, but as to whether the behavior is an act, action, practice, or reflex in its meaning.
8. The concept of latent function is basic. I see reality as a manifold of potentialities, dispositions, determinables, and powers, which comprise latents underlying reality's specific and ephemeral manifestations. These latents themselves combine in intricate overlapping ways, but nonetheless are reducible by us to patterns of meanings and values that enable us to make sense of our perceptions, to give order to the world, and to predict the consequences of our behavior. These patterns comprise latent functions, or components of our psychological space (see Part II in Vol. 1: The Dynamic Psychological Field).
9. To be clear, dyadic behavior means that of one actor with or towards another, as in United States and France joint membership on the Security Council or U.S. exports to Japan, and symbolized by the right arrow in United States
France, or United States
10. This paragraph condenses the logic of Chapter 33 of Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix. Note that there I am describing a space of sociocultural attributes, while my concern here is dyadic behavior.
11. The results are given a nontechnical description and explanation (especially related to the assumptions of détente) in my Peace Endangered (1976a: Chapter 5).
12. Technically, empirical components will be delineated for any data matrix, even random numbers. It is not the existence of the components themselves that shows meaningful order in the data, but their size--the percent of variance they define. These eight common components account for 42% of the total variation among 53 behavioral variables. For common factor analysis (in this case, the common factor model called image analysis was applied) this is a respectable percent of variance for eight common components, and far greater than what would be found for random data. For the clarification of these technical details, see "Understanding Factor Analysis".
13. The structure of expectations is developed as a concept in Section 29.4 of Chapter 29 in Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix. What I mean by a structure of expectations is well captured by Luard (1968: 43):
Each of these codes (practices, conventions, morality, law] creates norms of conduct, of varying degrees of precision and persuasiveness. The effect of these is to set up expectations in the minds of the members of the group that, in given types of situations, a particular type of response is demanded. They thus come to modify the motives deriving from other sources, innate drives, experience from the past, and others. They establish rules, to regulate conduct, by setting up regularities of behavior. Such rules provide the main instrument of government among all societies. By reducing insecurity and unpredictability, they provide the stability essential to a harmonious and well-balanced existence for each individual member. They contain the essential element of impartiality and objectivity which personal rule in its arbitrary and subjective character may lack. And even apparently coercive authorities depend in practice largely on principles of this type to maintain their power. It is rules, rather than rulers, that everywhere exert ultimate authority.
Luard's work is an excellent treatment of expectations in international relations, especially regarding conflict behavior.
14. I am concerned only with components that are rotated to fit intercorrelated clusters of behavior, as are those in Table 4.1.
15. In National Attributes and Behavior (1979) the correlation of economic aid with transactions is ambiguous, but in the Field Theory Evolving (1977) studies aid is generally related to it.
16. Russett (1968: 379), for example, found "surprising continuity" over a 25-year period in trading groups. He concludes that trading "relationships are rooted in long-term habits, preferences, and expectations." Such is my view.
17.
The primary focal area [for world mail flows] centers around the North Sea in Northwestern Europe. Within a five hundred mile radius of Brussels are located the capitals or major [urban centers] of eleven postal countries which, combined, dispatched 40 percent of the world's mad in 1952 and were involved in approximately three-fifths of the world's total mail exchange. This small part of the earth's surface is the principal fountainhead and focus of the flow of international mail. The United States constitutes a secondary world focal area for mail interaction, about an eighth of the world's international mail flow being involved with this one postal country.
---- Taylor, 1956: 15
18. Mail and foreign investments were not included in National Attributes and Behavior (1979) analysis, but were found correlated with transactions in the analyses reported in my Field Theory Evolving (1977).
19. For example, the largest number of treaties is between emigration and immigration states. See Dahl (1968: 348-349, n44).
20. The greatest volume of transactions is among Anglo-Saxon, commonwealth, and common market societies, between whom special bonds of culture, religion, and history exist. The volume of transactions of the United States with Canada and the United Kingdom dominates over that among all other dyads, and it is especially between these states that we talk of a special relationship, of enduring bonds, of--in my terms--familistic behavior.
21. Regarding my pluralization of power in "balance of powers," power is a family of powers (Chapter 21 of Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix) and any balance is some combination of these powers, such as the coercive, bargaining and authoritative. Yet, to many a balance of power connotes wholly a balance of force or coercion. For this reason, in these volumes of Understanding Conflict and War I refer to a balance of powers.
22. The conflict helix was the major focus of Section 29.6 of Chapter 29 (Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix). See also the Helix Proposition (18.1) in Appendix 18A, the discussion in Chapter 18, and Figures 18.1, 18.2, and 18.3.
23. This is subsequently asserted as a proposition. See the Cooperation-Conflict Proposition 18.2 in Appendix 18A.
24. Many additional small components exist in the dyadic data which are not shown in Table 4.1. Moreover, were a more extensive collection of behavioral variables included, other components would no doubt emerge, but probably not alter the major components shown in the Table. The reason for this confidence ties in the different number of analyses underlying the results, the wide choice of behavioral variables, and the nature of the technique.
25. See Sections 33.3 and 33.4 of Chapter 33 in Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix) and the Cooperation-Conflict Proposition 18.2 in Appendix 18A for the logic involved.
26. See Chapter 34 in Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix.
27. See the Cooperation-Conflict Proposition 18.2 in Appendix 18A for the evidence.
28. See Rummel (1979: Chapter 6).
29. These compulsory components reflect phases or subphases in the conflict process and balancing of powers. For the development of this perspective, see Chapter 13. Appendix 15A presents the empirical evidence.
The compulsory components presented in Table 4.1 are defined in the context of familistic, contractual, and Compulsory behavior, and are therefore highly aggregative. Those conflict components presented in Table 15.1, however, are delineated when conflict behavior is analyzed alone, and are therefore more specific. The dependencies between the two sets of components are as follows (with the components of Table 15.1 given in parentheses next to the component of Table 4.1 on which they are dependent): alignment (alignment not shown in Table 15.1), negative behavior (negative communications; negative actions/ sanctions), military violence (preparations; low-level military violence; high-level military violence), antiforeign behavior (antiforeign behavior).
As explained in Section 4.6 and Chapter 15, conflict behavior also involves cooperative events along the components shown in Table 15.1. To my knowledge, data to measure such components have yet to be included in the overall analysis of international behavior, and thus no relevant components are included in Table 4.1.
30. This was labeled negative communications in Rummel (1979). However, by virtue of the correlations of negative sanctions with the component, it is better to use a more general name here.
31. Technically, the components are oblique rotated dimensions of an image analysis.
32. Used is many senses, the concept of independence is a source of constant confusion. Here I mean independence between components in the algebraic sense--as no one component being a linear function of all of the others--as nonperfect correlation. Statistical independence, however, would mean that all the components are mutually and perfectly uncorrelated. On correlation itself, see Understanding Correlation.
33. The higher-order components are the orthogonally rotated (eigenvalue-one cutoff) dimensions from a component analysis of the correlations between the components of Table 4.1.
34. I describe the methodology of higher-order factor analysis in Chapter 18 of my Applied Factor Analysis (1970). See Figure 18-3 therein for the picture of what is being described here. Each of the different first-order clusters can be considered a separate structure of expectations encompassed by a unifying second-order set of expectations.
35. The empirical basis of this conclusion rests not only on the analyses presented in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, but also on that for Proposition 18.2 in Table 18A.2, such as: Sang-Woo Rhee's (1977) analysis of 7,296 cases of the dyadic behavior of Chinese actors towards as many as 112 other states for the years 1960 and 1965; on Chang-Yoon Choi's (1973) analyses of 4,592 cases of the dyadic behavior of U.S.S.R. actors toward 82 states for 1960 and 1965, and of 4,592 cases of the dyadic behavior of American actors towards the same states for the same years; of Edward Schwerin's (1977) analysis of 1,908 cases of the dyadic behavior of American actors towards 106 nations in 1963; and finally of my analysis (1972a) of 1,539 cases of the dyadic behavior of American actors towards 81 nations in 1955. Although not dyadic, the various results described in Rummel (1972) provide additional evidence. All these studies uniformly found familistic and contractual components independent of compulsory ones.
