Whether in fact conflict displays the theoretical, behavioral dynamics shown in Figure 12.1 is a question yet to be answered. There are two sides to such an answer. One is whether this dynamic model is consistent with these proposed by others. And the second side is whether systematic, empirical analyses of Conflict Behavior confirms the dynamics. This Chapter will consider the former question, leaving the empirical one to the next Part of this book and Chapter 14.

Studies of the outbreak of war abound; analyses of war causation are even more numerous. But few inquiries have been published on the stages, process or dynamics of conflicts involving or threatening war,¹ apart from military strategy. Of those which have been published, the ones by Barringer, Northedge and Donelan, Wright, and Kahn are especially relevant here.²

Barringer sees war ("hostilities") as one of many policy options introduced into an ongoing dispute and viable only after some "military mobilization and preparedness" has been undertaken (1972: 16-17). Once the possibility of war is being considered the dispute may still be settled nonviolently, but the character of the dispute has been fundamentally changed.

In Barringer's words, conflict is "the subset of all disputes between parties capable of waging war in which the military option has been introduced, and at least one party perceives the issues at stake in partially, if not wholly, military terms." (1972: 17) A dispute is a "felt grievance by a party capable of waging war that, in its eyes, demands some more tolerable accommodation with another party than presently exists."

A dispute, then, turns into a conflict when a military option has been introduced, and the conflict turns into hostilities when war has, de facto, been initiated.

Before moving on to his other phases, note first that a dispute is a latent and initiating phase (a "felt grievance") in which no manifest conflict behavior may occur. It thus corresponds to the conflict situation of the conflict helix (see Section 10.3). Second, he defines a prehostilities phase in which the war option has been introduced and which involves preparations thereto. This is similar to the situation of uncertainty of the helix (see Section 11.2), in which the will has made the decision to confront the other and undertaken preparations of various sorts, and in which manifest conflict behavior short of violence therefore may occur.

Third, Barringer is focusing on the process entailing at least the option of war. His dynamic model is not meant to delineate the generic phases of all social conflict (in my terms), but only those phases of interstate disputes in which a resort to war is being considered. Thus, his model does not apply explicitly to a dispute between husband and wife, General Motors Corporation and the Department of Justice, or Eritrean separatists and the Ethiopian government--as the conflict helix is so generalized (see Part VIII of Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix).

And finally, at the interstate level, Barringer collapses coercive and negative, nonviolent, behavior by parties not considering a war option into his dispute phase. Because this behavior may involve boycotts, embargoes, severance of diplomatic relations,⁵ accusations, and so on, his dispute phase is overloaded. It involves a felt grievance, which may be latent without manifest behavior, and actual and perhaps quite antagonistic conflict behavior.

Moving on to Barringer's third phase, it involves "the organized and systematic violence ... undertaken by the armed forces of any party to the dispute as a purposeful instrument of policy." (1972: 20) Within this phase may occur two subphases (see Figure 13.1 ): escalation and deescalation, depending on "a gross change in the existing rules of the game governing the conduct and limitation of hostilities." (1972:20)

The final, fourth phase is the termination of organized hostilities between the parties, although the dispute "is as yet unresolved and is perceived in military terms by at least one party and could generate renewed hostilities either immediately or after a prolonged period of cease-fire and renewed preparations for combat." (1972: 20) The model thus allows for conflict to iterate or cycle around hostilities or even return to the dispute stage.

Of course, hostilities or escalation could lead directly to the settlement of the dispute by "some form of accommodation between the parties, annihilation of one or more of them, loss of saliency, or other means." (1972: 20)

The model also allows for disputes that could lead directly to settlement without conflict (in Barringer's terms), and a settlement of a conflict might be achieved without hostilities.

In addition to the previous comparisons with the conflict helix the following are significant. Barringer does not distinguish between stages of coercion and force, but only between levels of physical violence correlated with the "rules of the game." But "rules" about such limits as sanctuaries and weapons within a conflict may change as the war escalates, without a change in the form of power involved. That is, the intent still may be to coerce, not overcome, another's will.

Moreover, status quo testing, coercive means short of violence, and noncoercive means are not part of his process.

Overall, then, Barringer's model is concerned with the objective transformation of a dispute--its changes from a psychological to physical character and back again. Thus, the dispute (psychological) is transformed into a conflict (psychological and physical) to hostilities (physical) to escalation (physical) to deescalation (physical) to termination (physical) to settlement (psychological).

By contrast, the balancing of power phases in the conflict helix are all psychological; they are defined by psychological factors and distinguished by forms of power. Conflict situation (psychological) is transformed into the will to conflict involving preparations (psychological) to status quo testing (psychological), to coercion or noncoercion (psychological) to force (psychological)⁶ to accommodations (psychological) to a balance of powers (psychological). Of course, the psychological phases may involve physical elements, as in preparations or blockade, but they are epiphenomena of shifts in the psychological field of the actor.

In their analysis they separately consider "origins" and "development." They do not articulate a flow model of disputes, as does Barringer, but their discussion clearly defines stages in disputes and enables their underlying model to be constructed.

At the outset, Northedge and Donelan distinguish between dispute and situation, where a situation is "a state of potential conflict, where all the ingredients of a dispute exist but where the dispute has neither been formulated nor crystallized" (1971: 2). A dispute is then "a formulated difference of opinion as to matters of law, fact or justice arising in the mutual relations of states." (1971: 2-3)

As a "diffuse condition of tension or potential tension," their situation defines the structure of conflict within the conflict helix (see Section 10.2). It is a latent stage in which parties are aware of each other, there is an opposition of attitudes, friction exists, but the conflict is uncrystallized. Interest have yet to become focused, the lines of cleavage sharp. The dispute is then the crystallization of differences. In my terms, it is the generation of opposing interests, which is the situation of conflict in the helix (see Section 10.3).

Now, these differences among states in a dispute are of particular kind. They "are essentially a clash of convictions about 'ours' and 'theirs'." (1971: 40) They are, therefore, about the status quo, in both Northedge and Donelan's words and my own.⁸ And in the helix it is conflict over the status quo that carries the potential for violence (see Section 12.1).

A manifest dispute⁹ begins with a demand or response ( 1971: 136)¹⁰ to which a state's leaders must reply. They cannot ignore an issue of rights because to ignore it is first to concede the other's claim or argument, and second, to weaken credibility for protecting one's own (1971: 137). Therefore, the challenge elicits a response and the dispute is manifestly joined.

This leads to the first stage (phase) of a dispute: diplomatic argument. Both sides make their case, either "implicitly or explicitly, they indicate to each other the possible costs of an unyielding stand and of a protracted conflict." (1971: 137)

The dispute may then be settled immediately, it may drift, or it may escalate to "heights of bitterness." Which way it goes depends on the importance of interests engaged, whether honor is involved, the impact on credibility ("reputation for power"), and whether the parties are competitors or enemies.

If the dispute deepens, the next stage is denunciation and propaganda (1971: 148)--negative communications, in my terms. After this, comes tile stage of negative behavior, the behavioral expression of condemnation, which may involve a breach of diplomatic relations, refusal to recognize a government, a breach of commercial relations, boycotts, sanctions, and the attempt to enlist third parties to intervene (1971: 149-152). The dispute may then escalate to the next stage of force (in their terms), after which the dispute may terminate, be settled, or drag on for many years until it lapses.¹¹

Figure 13.2 summarizes their stages.¹² A dispute may move from a diffuse conflict situation, to formulated opposition (dispute), to manifest confrontation (demand, challenge), to debate (diplomatic argument), to hostile (negative) communications, to hostile (negative) behavior and nonviolent coercion, and to military action (force). Termination can occur, of course, at any stage.

Once a dispute has surfaced, the emphasis is on the type and intensity of behavior between the parties, as with Barringer. Thus, military action is a final stage, whether coercive or pure force, or whether really a probing, status quo testing behavior. Northedge and Donelan sequence their development of a dispute in terms of physical manifestations, rather than in terms of psychological phases and forms of power, as in the conflict helix.

He begins by pointing out that in a "broad sense" conflict between states "may be divided into four stages: (1) awareness of inconsistencies, (2) rising tensions, (3) pressures short of military force, and (4) military intervention or war to dictate a solution." (1965: 434) Conflict is latent during the first two stages and corresponds to the structures (Section 10.2) and situations (Section 10.3) of conflict within the helix.

In the "narrow sense" (1965: 435) conflict involves the last two stages, when conflict is manifest in opposing actions. In focusing on manifest conflict, Wright expands these two stages into four, which he articulates in a pair of reaction equations developed from Richardson's arms race model.¹⁴ Wright's equations are

Equation 13.1:

dx/dt = (Nx + Fy) - (Cx + Wx) + (Px - Py) - (Vx - Vy),

dy/dt = (Ny + Fx) - (Cy + Wy) + (Py - Px) - (Vy - Vx),

where

x, y = states x and y;

dx/dt, dy/dt = growth rate of hostility for x, and for y;

Nx, Ny= perception of its national interests by x, and by y;

Fx, Fy = perception by x of forces immediately available to x, and by y;

Cx, Cy= perception by x of costs of hostilities and preparations, and by y;

Wx, Wy = perception by x of world pressures for peace, and by y;

Px, Py= perception by x of its and y's long run power position, and by y;

Vx, Vy= perception by x of its vulnerability to destruction, and by y.

The stages formulated in the equation has been succinctly expressed by Wright:

Figure 13.3 graphs Wright's equation for one party x. Wright is clear: the stages in a conflict are characterized not by activity, but "by the degree of attention likely to be directed to the future and to the ultimate outcome." (1965: 436) As in the conflict helix, the process is psychological, not physical. Wright emphasizes this: "the important variable in determining willingness to escalate or to negotiate is the perception of the situation by the decision-making authority, not the objective reality." (1965: 437)

But unlike the conflict helix in which overt conflict subphases are distinguished by transitions in intentions (forms of power), Wright's stages are shifts in the salience of particular variables to the perceived outcome. These shifts are shown at the bottom of Figure 13.3. The process moves from national interests and perception of resistance, of costs and world opinion, of long-run relative power, to the perception of relative vulnerability to destruction, and finally to the perception of the outcome and future.

Wright tested his equations against the stages of 45 international conflicts, beginning with World War I. Although his measurements were subjective (but often statistical data were taken as a starting point) and admittedly "educated guesses," (1965: 441) the equations do have "considerable predictive value when applied to situations which have come to an end." (1965: 441)¹⁵

Kahn's escalation ladder contains 44 rungs, as shown in Figure 13.4. It is "a linear arrangement of roughly increasing levels of intensity of crisis. Such a ladder exhibits a progression of steps in what amounts to, roughly speaking, an ascending order of intensity through which a given crisis may progress." (1965: 38) In actual conflict, rungs of the ladder may be bypassed or the parties may go down as well as up. (1965: 40)

The ladder stands on a base of disagreements and cold war. Kahn does not pay much attention to this base, but from the context of his brief discussion this appears a latent situation of conflict, an underlying disagreement of interests and perspectives. In Kahn's terms, "the environment is such that any disagreement could easily result in either a slow or rapid climb up the ladder." (1965: 53)

In this situation a disagreement can turn into an ostensible crisis, an actual exchange of warnings and threats, and an attempt on both sides to make them credible. This is the first rung of the ladder. The second rung involves various negative actions designed to put pressure on the other, such as recalling an ambassador, launching a vigorous propaganda campaign or denouncing a treaty.

The third rung follows with solemn and formal declarations that thereby embody a credible commitment and resolution. It is a clear communication that one party is willing to escalate further, if the other so chooses. This is a watershed rung. After it, the crisis becomes deeper, war becomes a distinct possibility, and each side competes in the manipulation of the risk of war. (1965: 62-65)

The fourth rung is then an hardening of position, a confrontation of wills. Negotiations "take on a much more coercive than contractual character." (1965: 67) Both parties have "locked in," which may be manifested by more extremes of negative communications and actions.

The next rung is the actual show of force, a direct or indirect communication of one's willingness and capability to use military force through, say, well-publicized military movements, maneuvers, or overflights of a disputed area.

The sixth rung comprises a significant mobilization, usually beginning with a cancellation of leaves and discharges, and the calling up of important reserve units. Other measures may also be involved whose purpose is to harden one's actual fighting capability and show resolve.

This may be followed by a seventh rung, legal harassment--retortions. These are actions one can take against the citizen or property of the other party to show (or as a manifestation of) extreme hostility. Blockades, embargoes, boycotts exemplify such actions.

The eighth rung moves from nonviolent, legal harassing acts to illegal or violent ones. "Unofficial" bombing against the other's property may take place, mob attacks on his embassy, violations of the other's territorial sovereignty by war planes, support for terrorism, a border intrusion, and the like. Although Kahn does not particularly emphasize this rung (1965: 73-74), I should note that a fundamental threshold has been crossed. Illegal acts (within international law) and especially military violence form a mutually recognizable boundary to conflict, a mutually understandable barrier to further escalation. As long as manifest conflict is kept within this barrier, there is a clear stopping place for escalation, as a river is a natural division between opposing armies. But once illegal actions and violence have been initiated, quantitative escalation may easily take place until a new qualitative barrier is reached, such as in terms of types of weapons (e.g., tactical nuclear weapons), natural geographic boundaries, military personnel (introduction of uniformed soldiers), and so on. Parties to a conflict will not escalate to this rung unthinkingly and easily.

The following ninth rung involves dramatic military confrontations. A full military alert in a contested area or across a border may occur, with both sides instantly prepared to fight on command. Or this rung may involve a strategic alert by the major powers in a deepening crises. Regardless of whether the confrontations are local or global, they "are direct tests of nerve, committal, resolve, and recklessness. They are also dramatic enough to make all the participants and observers take note of what has happened." (1965: 74) These confrontations indicate to both sides that war is thinkable and possible.

The following 10 rungs (see Figure 13.4) define an intense crisis. They move from a provocative breaking of diplomatic relations through super-ready status, large conventional war (or actions), large compound escalation, declaration of limited conventional war, barely nuclear war, nuclear "ultimatums," and so on. There is no need here (although clearly important in another context) to deal with all these rungs. For the purpose of comparison, we can collapse the escalation rungs after super-ready status into war and subsequent escalation.

What about deescalation or termination? Kahn is careful to point out (1965: 230-231) that deescalation may not be a simple descending of the escalation ladder, because actions and signals may be involved which have no escalatory counterpart. And he spends a chapter discussing aspects of deescalation, including the means the parties can use to escape the costs of further conflict while insuring themselves against further escalation or loss of important values. Clearly, deescalation is part of his model.

Kahn conceives of his escalation ladder as most applicable to a. U.S.-Soviet crisis. Deescalation appears therefore a return to the normal situation of conflict--an end to the crisis, but not conflict. Escalation and deescalation have, therefore, no termination, no accommodations, no settlement (nor do such words appear in his index).

Figure 13.5 summarizes Kahn's relevant crisis dynamics. His stages are differentiated by the intensity and scope of actions and their role in communicating the intensity of mutual threat and resolve. Kahn's metaphor of a physical ladder is apt: each rung is a higher physical level of intensity and communication.

Kahn's ladder differs significantly from the conflict helix in two respects. First, the balancing of powers phase in the helix is a general process and its subphases are meant to apply to all crises, engagements, confrontations, and so on. The subphases are therefore more abstract and less refined than Kahn's ladder, which is specialized to a U.S.-Soviet crisis. Second, Kahn's dynamic framework nonetheless emphasizes physical shifts in intensity rather than psychological transition points. Status quo testing is of course involved in Kahn's lower rungs, but does not clearly differentiate them; coercion, bargaining, and force (in my usage) are involved in later rungs, but not as clear stages or separate, dynamic lines of development.¹⁷

A careful study of Table 13.1 and Figure 13.6 should bring out the important, detailed differences and similarities. About these note the following.

• Except for the conflict helix, the models are of interstate conflict involving the threat or actuality of military violence. They are not meant to be applicable to processes of conflict within states, groups, or between individuals as in the conflict helix.¹⁹ Some of the differences between the conflict helix and the other models are explicable simply on this basis.²⁰

• All models begin with some conception of latency, a situation out of which conflict behavior develops.

• The dynamic elements differ between models. For the conflict helix, they are psychological, involving shifts in forms of power. They are also psychological for Wright's model, comprising the perception and salience of different variables (interests, costs, power, and so on). For Northedge and Donelan, the process is in forms and intensity of behavior, as it is for Barringer and Kahn. Overall, the basic distinction is between psychological and physicalistic models.²¹

• The conflict helix uniquely involves a separate line of development involving noncoercive powers, such as bargaining and persuasion. Of course, cooperation within a conflict process is discussed by the others and Kahn is particularly concerned with the tacit rules of the game the parties establish and their implicit and explicit bargaining, but these behaviors are not treated separately from the stages and are not considered an alternative conflict route.

• The helix uniquely distinguishes force from coercion. The relevant dividing stages for the other models is between nonhostilities, hostilities, and escalation ("force" in the Northedge-Donelan model means military action); they move from low-intensity action to high-intensity action, from (to measure this) no killed to some killed to many killed. But in the helix, the later state (force) might actually involve as much or less intense hostilities. It may be more costly in immediate physical terms to persuade the other party to concede or compromise than to destroy their ability to resist.

• Only in the helix is a clear outcome in terms of a balance of powers considered a part of the process. Within the helix conflicts terminate or are resolved such that a new cooperative relationship, a new structure of expectations, is established.

• Finally, only in the helix is the conflict dynamics explicitly part of a larger process of establishing order, rebalancing expectations. That is, the dynamics of conflict behavior is linked to stability, peace, harmony, order. In short, conflict and cooperation are tied together.