Well, what does constitute social action or interaction? Is it simply behavior which involves people? Is it what we do to, towards, or with others? To answer such questions and understand the nature of a social act qua other kinds of behavior or events, we must examine the constituents of social acts, their foundation in our psychological field, and their characteristics, components, and patterns.

There are three constituents of social acts: agents, vehicles, and meaning. The agents are the actor and object of a social act, the one behaving and the other who is the object of that behavior; the vehicle is that physical condition, aspect, movement, or activity of the agents which has meaning for them. For example, the physical motion of scratching our head with our forefinger during a conversation is a vehicle conveying perplexity to another. The configuration of facial muscles and body postures are vehicles conveying happiness, sadness, surprise, and so on through the range of human emotions. And, of course, sound is a vehicle of language. Such vehicles only exemplify the obvious fact that physical objects are a medium of our sociocultural world. Traffic lights, a flag, a cross, a courthouse are all vehicles of meaning to us.¹ I only mention this point to note that my use of the term vehicle extends beyond social interaction and embodies a fundamental characteristic of culture itself.

Besides agents and vehicles, meanings are a constituent of behavior.² The relevant meanings stimuli can have were discussed in the previous chapters. In reference to behavior, there are the common or public meanings which interpret and define specific behaviors, such as sitting down, raising a hand, turning one's head, blinking, and so on. Then there is the complex of behaviors whose meaning constitutes a field of expression, a whole unified through the perception of intentions, causes, or reasons. This understanding of meaning provides a key to differentiating behaviors.

In sum, then, every "process of meaningful human interaction consists of three components, each component, in turn, being made up of many elements that determine its concrete forms. These components are (1) thinking, acting, and reacting human beings as subjects of interaction; (2) meanings, values, and norms for the sake of which the individuals interact, realizing and exchanging them in the course of the interaction; (3) overt actions and material phenomena as vehicles or conductors through which immaterial meanings, values, and norms are objectified and socialized" (Sorokin, 1969, pp. 41-42).

So far I have used the term behavior in a general and undifferentiated fashion. Behavior has involved any physical activity of ours, or lack thereof, such as a twitch, a yelp of pain, a conversation, a yoga position, a swim, or a smile. Even inaction can be behavior, as when a person fasts, ignores another, or remains perfectly still to avoid being heard.

The term behavior clearly subsumes a variety of activities that must be separated if we are to make useful sense out of social interaction and fields. First, behavior includes that which is directed by a our will, our conscious purposive or rational behavior, and our unconscious reflexes. A cry of pain, a sudden exclamation ("My God!), a twitch of an arm, a look of surprise, and so on are such reflex behaviors. Their meaning is entirely causal; they are simply the biophysical effects of some internal or external stimuli.

Now, let me put reflexes aside and deal with behavior directed by reasons or intentions, as exemplified in borrowing Mead's The Philosophy of the Act from the library. First, I leave my office and walk across campus to the library. Next, in the library I look in the card catalogue, find the correct stack and number, and search the proper shelves for the book. If it is there I fill out a card and take this with the book to the checkout desk so that the loan can be recorded. Finally, on leaving the library I show the book to a checker to prove that I have in fact borrowed it. Each of these activities is itself a cluster of determinable behaviors. Just the leaving my office phase of walking to the library involves getting up from my desk, moving around it, walking towards the door, closing it behind me, telling my secretary where I will be; and each of these activities again is separable into clusters of behavior. Simply getting up from my desk is a complex of coordinated and determinable separate movements.

Clearly, all these diverse behaviors are unified by "going to borrow a book." If someone asks what I am doing and I say "I'm going to borrow Mead at the library," no matter where in the process, my behavior at that moment makes sense to the other and he can predict my subsequent behavior to the point where I actually check the book out.

Consider another example. If anyone asks me what Joan is doing in cutting some meat on a plate in front of her at a restaurant, I will answer that "she is eating." But is she really? Is she not just cutting meat? Yes, at one level the complex of activities she is involved in comprises the behavior "cutting meat," and we could say that this was her intention. Yet, from the total field of expression consisting of Joan in a restaurant sitting at a table with food and implements before her and from the image she projects, we infer that the intention to cut the meat is really part of a whole intentional process we call eating.

We can therefore divide nonreflex behavior into two kinds: that associated with the process of achieving some intention and that describing the intention itself. As does Alfred Schutz (1967), I will call actions those behaviors leading to the accomplishment of some intention; the behavior describing the intention itself I will call the act. Thus, Joan's eating is the act, her cutting meat is an action; my borrowing Mead's book is an act, my leaving my office to do so is an action. Similarly, trying to get a college degree is an act, going to classes, taking exams, and so on pursuant to that degree are actions; weakening a government is the act, calling and going on a general strike are the actions; stabilizing nuclear deterrence is the act, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the Soviet Union and the United States are the actions.

What is act and actions will of course depend on context. At the most comprehensive level, most behavior can be considered actions towards the act of achieving, maintaining, and enhancing self-esteem. This act itself integrates a variety of other intentions associated with roles, sentiments, needs, and attitudes. Thus, we can say that to develop our self-esteem we go to church, study for a college degree, and take a part-time job. Similarly, each of these separable acts unifies a lower cluster of acts, such as going to the library, buying Sunday clothes for church, and driving to work. Thus actions at one level of intentions can be acts at another. What is act and action depend on the perspective we as actor, social scientist, or percipient bring to bear on it:

"What are you doing?" we ask.

"Going to buy some steaks at the market," Mary responds.

"But I thought you couldn't afford steak."

"I know, but my husband got promoted and I want to celebrate."

"But, steak?"

"Well, I want him to feel good."

"But, steak?"

"Look, if I can't spend some money once in a while regardless of cost, what's life worth anyway?"

To this point I have argued that the meaning of behavior consists in whether it is reflex, action, or act; that is, in whether behavior is causal or intentional. What about following the rules of chess, shaking hands, putting a napkin on one's lap, deriving a mathematical theorem, standing up for one's rights, doing one's duty, and so on, which are behaviors explained by reasons? For these I will use the term practice.

Practice will refer to behavior that is customary, conventional, habitual, rule following, normative, or moral.³ One may ultimately construe such behavior as being controlled by will and thereby directed to doing what is right and proper. But generally such diffuse intentions are latent, to surface only if pushed by a "But, why are you doing this?" question. Rather, practice is usually routine, without thought. A bowl of soup and a cup of coffee are drunk differently because . . . , well, they are.

So far, then, our perspective is a dynamic field consisting of perceived situation, personality, expectations, and behavioral dispositions. And our manifest behavior is a resultant of the relationship between our personality and situation on the one hand, and expectations and behavioral dispositions on the other. This analysis is insufficient to define the social act, however, since behavior is too broad a concept, covering physical reflexes, habits, custom, actions, and so on. Therefore, behavior itself must be analyzed for the socially relevant distinctions that will enable me later to define the social act and social interactions.

First, behavior has been treated as any activity of ours or lack thereof. Second, such activity or inactivity can be meaningfully understood in four ways, corresponding to the meanings the perceived field of expression of another can have. These kinds of behavior and their meanings are laid out below.

Reflex:

(causal meaning) that behavior which is the effect of some previous discrete event, such as a startled jump caused by a loud noise.

Act:

(intentional meaning) that behavior describing some intention, aim, plan, and so on, such as campaigning for mayor.

Action:

(intentional meaning) that behavior directed towards the achievement of some intention, aim, plan, and so on, such as giving speeches because one wants to be elected mayor.

Practice:

(rational meaning) that behavior which follows rules, custom, habit, norms, or morality, such as being honest because that is the right thing to do.