



SAVING LIVES ENRICHING LIFE

R.J. Rummel





**Saving Lives,
Enriching Life:
Freedom as a
Right
And a Moral
Good***

To promote freedom for
everyone is to promote a
better life for all
----This book

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am especially indebted to Judson Knight, who with great care and good humor edited a draft of this book. I had no intention of writing this book when he contacted me about this web site, and the resulting interaction between us finally led to what you read here. I hasten to add that I alone am responsible for whatever misdeeds appear here, especially since it is several versions beyond that which he edited.

PREFACE

What is This Book About?

Overview

Humanity now has a practical cure for foreign and civil war, genocide and mass murder, famine and mass hunger, mass impoverishment, and gross gender and economic inequality. Our accumulated scientific and scholarly knowledge, and the results of vast social and economic experiments involving billions of people over three centuries, now enable us to claim, with even more confidence than saying that orange juice is good for you, that we can create perpetual peace, long life and secure lives, abundant food, wealth, and prosperity.

This is no dream, no utopian claim. This is the well-established fruit of the free market and human rights, of democratic freedom. The knowledge of this exists among economists and political scientists working on these problems, and even some of the highest officials, such as former President Clinton, knew of, and acted on, the

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most surprising claim that freedom is a cure for war. However, as incredibly important as this knowledge is, it is widely unknown by the public, including the major media, and most professionals outside the relevant research areas.

In Saving Lives, Enriching Life: Freedom as a Right and Moral Good I intend to communicate this knowledge to the public in a way that they not only assimilate it, but understand why they have a right to freedom, and why freedom is so powerful in saving lives and enriching life.

I have packaged the various threats to human life against which the freedom of a people protects them by the idea of human security. Human insecurity then involves:

- poverty and economic insecurity,
- economic and gender inequality,
- malnourishment and famine,
- poor health and disease,
- domestic turmoil and civil war,
- foreign war,
- genocide and mass murder.

Though the various chapters of this book and an appendix providing new systematic statistical analyses of 190 nations for over 70 variables, I will show that freedom is a solution to all these threats, that democratic freedom produces human security

What Themes Run Through This Book?

There are several themes on which the chapters will focus and that I will repeat through out the book. These concern the power of freedom to end or lessen threats to human security and to drive human and economic development. These are:

- Freedom is a basic human right recognized by the United Nations and international treaties, and is the heart of social justice ([Chapter 2](#)).
- Freedom-free speech and the economic and social free market-is an engine of economic and human development, and scientific and technological advancement ([Chapter 4](#), [Appendix](#)).
- Freedom ameliorates the problem of mass poverty ([Chapter 4](#), [Appendix](#)).
- Free people do not suffer from and never have had famines, and by theory, should not. Freedom is therefore a solution to hunger and famine ([Chapter 4](#)).
- Free people have the least internal violence, turmoil, and political instability.

[\(Chapter 5\)](#)

- Free people have virtually no government genocide and mass murder, and for good theoretical reasons. Freedom is therefore a solution to genocide and mass murder; the only practical means of making sure that "Never again!"

[\(Chapter 6\)](#)

- Free people do not make war on each other, and the greater the freedom within two nations, the less violence between them (**[Chapter 7](#)**)
 - Freedom is a method of nonviolence-the most peaceful nations are those whose people are free (**[Appendix](#)**).
-

Chapter 1

Life Without Freedom

Power kills and impoverishes life.
----This web site [Appendix](#)

Billions of people live without freedom, as shown in Table 1.1, below. In the worst of these countries, they live in fear and insecurity. They are literally slaves, bought and sold, or the effective slaves of their governments. They are hungry, starving, or diseased. They live in primitive refugee camps; are suffering under torture or the immediate threat of death; are diseased and soon to die without treatment. They are prisoners, concentration camp inmates, or in death camps. They are soldiers subject to the most barbarous treatment or involved in lethal combat. They are children performing dangerous forced labor. They are civilians cowering under bombing and shelling. They are women who are second-class citizens and cannot leave their home without completely covering themselves, the permission of their husband, and the presence of a male relative. They are the aged and infirm that barely subsist under dangerous environmental conditions. Even those who escape all this and manage to feel happy and safe for the moment still live under the realistic threat that war, revolution, disease, famine, extreme poverty and deprivation, or a dictator may destroy their lives, or those of their loved ones. So they live in fear of arrest and prison, of disappearance forever, of forced labor, genocide, mass murder, and an unnatural death.

Even in countries that are partially free, they may still be arbitrarily arrested, subject to torture, executed without a fair trial, spied upon, and denied even basic rights because of their race,

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religion, or nationality. Criticize the government and especially, its dictator or leader, and death may follow.

Table 1.1
How Many people were Free in 1999?

Rating*	World's Population		
	Nations	Total (Bil.)	%
Free	85	2.34	39
Partially Free	59	1.50	25
Unfree	48	2.10	36

* From Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org)



All this is abstract--simple words. Yet such abstractions are ultimately personal. Sudan, a nation larger than the United States (see [map and statistics](#) for Sudan and [world map](#)), is a case in point. Witness what happened to Acol Bak, a member of the Dinka tribe who lived in the southern village of Panlang . Arabs attacked her village, killing her father, and though her mother escaped, they seized her and her brother. Carrying on their heads the goods stolen by their captors, without food and only able to drink from filthy ponds along the way, they were forced to walk north for three days to the village of Goos. Their captors then separated her and her brother and sold them separately to different Arabs--yes, sold them, as people were sold in the sixteenth century slave trade She would never see her brother again. Her Arab master had a wife and daughter who forced her to work from morning to evening: in Acol's words, "I was the only slave in that house. If I said I was tired, I was beaten by all of them." She bore the scars of those beatings, and had her arm broken. Her accommodations were simple--outside and without bedding. Though she was only eight years old her Arab master had her circumcised, in accord with Muslim tradition, and with no anesthetic.

But unlike so many slaves, Acol was in luck. A foreign Christian group, who secretly entered the Sudan for this purpose, bought Acol with 248 other slaves and set them free. Although this policy of buying the freedom of slaves is controversial and may encourage more slavery, she did not care. She was free. She could return to her village where her mother was waiting.¹ This happened in our modern age--not in the seventeenth or eighteenth Century, but in the 1990s.



Sudan	
Area	2,505,810 sq km--slightly more than 1/4th of the U.S.
Population	35,079,814 (July 2000 est.)
Ethnic groups	black 52%, Arab 39%, Beja 6%, foreigners 2%, other 1%
Religions	Sunni Muslim 70% (in north), indigenous beliefs 25%, Christian 5% (mostly in south and Khartoum)
Languages	Arabic (official), Nubian, Ta Bedawie, diverse dialects
Life expectation	56.55 years
Literacy	46.10%
Purchasing power parity	\$940 (1999 est.)
Government	transitional - previously ruling military junta; presidential and National Assembly elections held in March 1996; new constitution drafted by Presidential Committee, went into effect on 30 June 1998 after being approved in nationwide referendum
Freedom rating	among most unfree (1998)

Not all these poor people forced into slavery were children. Soldiers raped one forty-year-old woman, Akec Kwol, and took her north to a slave market, where they sold her like an animal. Her slave owner also tried to circumcise her, but she resisted and got herself slashed with a knife and scarred. Had she not submitted finally, she later explained, "They would have killed me. Because I was a slave, they had the right to do whatever they wanted to me."²



Akuac Malong, 13, left, is hugged by her mother Abuong Malong for the first time in 7 years in Madhol, southwest of Khartoum, Sudan, December 1997. Akuac, taken from her village and enslaved by an Arab in northern Sudan, was freed when an Arab trader sold her for about \$100 to a Swiss-based charity which buys freedom for slaves (AP photo/Jean-Marc Bouju)



When slave raiders attacked, these boys hid—500 other boys and girls were taken, and 36 were drowned in a nearby river

And then among the thousands of other slaves, there was Victoria Ajang, a Sudanese now living in the United States. She testified before Congress regarding her escape from slavery: "On a summer night, the government militia forces suddenly swooped in on our village. We were at home relaxing, in the evening, when men on horses with machine guns stormed through, shooting everyone. I saw friends fall dead in front of me. While my husband carried out our little daughter Eva, I ran with the few possessions I could grab. All around us, we saw children being shot in the stomach, in the leg, between the eyes. Against the dark sky, we saw flames from the houses the soldiers had set on fire. The cries of the people forced inside filled our ears as they burned to death. Our people were being turned to ash."³ She and her family escaped by jumping into a nearby river.

Buying and selling slaves in the Sudan is, ironically, a free market. There is no monopoly or government control over prices, which vary according to supply. In 1989, for example, a slave cost \$90, but within a year, the increase in slave raids caused the price to plummet to \$15. This is about equal to the cost of pruning shears at my local hardware store.

How can such slavery exist in this age of the internet, and space exploration? It is part of a civil war between the Arab Islamic North, ruled by a fundamentalist Muslim dictator, and a majority black South. This war began in 1989 when Lt. General Omar Hassan Bashir and the Arab-led

Sudanese People's Armed Forces overthrew the democratic government in power at that time and imposed strict Muslim law and faith on the whole country. Sudan's population is about 34 million people, of which Muslims are about 70 percent, mainly in the North. Some 5 percent of the population, mostly southern Blacks, is Christian. The rest of the six million living in the South are animist who attribute conscious life to nature and natural objects. The South had a protected and special constitutional status under the democratic government, but with its overthrow and especially with the effort of the new regime to impose Muslim law throughout the country, the South revolted and a bloody civil war resulted.



Sudanese slaves await redemption in Madhol, Sudan, in December 1997. An Arab trader sold 132 former slaves, women and children, for \$13,200 (in Sudanese money) to a member of Christian Solidarity International. (AP photo)



This man lost his wife and children to government raiders who attacked his village. Malnourished and distraught by his loss, he may have died after this photo was taken.

possessions.

To defeat the South and motivate its Arab tribal militia to fight, the North made slaves part of their compensation, along with whatever they could loot, and gave Arab soldiers carte blanc to commit rape. Of course, old people did not fit into this scheme, since they are good neither as slaves nor for rape, so they were beaten up, if not killed. Young men, however, were usually marched off to slavery, unless for some reason they were unworthy of this: then they also were killed. According to the Muslim faith, all non-Muslim southerners, whether man or woman, old or young, are infidels. They have no rights, even to life. They may be killed as a matter of course, enslaved, raped, and all deprived of their

In this civil war, bombing from the air killed many of those who lived in heavily populated areas of the South; even schools were bombed and children killed. Hospitals did not escape. There were many bombing attacks on the Samaritan's Purse, the largest hospital in southern Sudan. Bombers often attacked other medical facilities as well, sometimes with cluster bombs. Even more monstrous, the North bombed the wells that provided southerner's water, as well as sites with foreign relief supplies, including food for the starving southerners. All this, in addition to the regime's socialist economic policies, has contributed to a massive famine.



A victim of famine in southern Sudan

But because they live under a fundamentalist Muslim regime, even northern Sudanese far from the civil war enjoy few human rights. For example, the government harasses and monitors women for correct dress, forbidding even slacks. Women who dare to defy the law risk arrest, conviction by an Islamic court of immoral dressing, and flogging, as recently happened to nine women



Famine in Sudan, which has the richest soil in Africa

students. Women also cannot hold any public office that would give them authority over Muslim men, nor can they marry a non-Muslim.

Both men and women have no freedom of speech or religion--all must accept the Muslim faith. Also, police can arrest any commoner and imprison them for up to six months without trial. And while detained suspects can expect as a matter of course that officials will torture them. To further this religious rule, the government appoints only Muslims to the judiciary. Worst of all, a Muslim dare not convert to another religion, for the punishment for doing so is death.

In addition to 20,000 to 40,000 people enslaved, the Sudanese population includes nearly 4,000,000 displaced from their homes and villages--the largest number for any country. Many more Sudanese simply gave up on the country. By the beginning of 1999, 352,000 had fled, escaping the fate of some 1,500,000 to 2,000,000, who died from the war, famine, or disease, or were murdered in cold blood by Muslim forces or rebels.



Children are a large part of the southern armed forces

But Sudan was a country at war with itself, and inflicted with government-created famine and disease. What about a country at peace like Saudi Arabia (see [map and statistics](#), and [world map](#))? Would not life be better for you than in Sudan? It is, in that there is no war, rebellion, or famine killing hundreds of thousands of people. But as in Sudan, Saudis still suffer

MIDDLE EAST



Saudi Arabia

Area	1,960,582 sq km -- slightly more than one-fifth the size of the US
Population	22,023,506
Ethnic groups	Arab 90%, Afro-Asian 10%
Religions	Muslim 100%
Languages	Arabic
Life expectation	67.77 years
Literacy	62.80%
Purchasing power parity	\$9,000 (1999 est.)
Government	Absolute monarchy
Freedom rating	among most unfree (1998)

one kind of repression or another. There is no freedom of speech in Saudi Arabia. Police may arrest Saudis for the most minor criticism of the monarchy that rules the country, the Saudi King or any royal personage, or the Muslim religion. People live in fear of saying or doing something innocent that would land them in prison, get them tortured, and have them flogged. Through no fault of their own, the authorities might even cut off their head.

Even trying to be honest can be dangerous. One poor fellow, Abdul-Karim al-Naqshabandi, apparently refused to help his employer by giving false testimony. In retaliation, his well-connected employer had him framed and arrested for a crime he did not commit. To get a confession the police tied him up like an animal, and beat and tortured him. He finally signed a confession to end the misery and get someone outside to hear his case. Even then, the police allowed no one to visit him in prison. And although he could present considerable evidence proving his innocence and provide the names of defense witnesses, the court would not give him the right to defend himself. He was sentenced to death and executed in 1996.

King Fahd Bin Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud's power is absolute. There are no elections, no legislature, and no political parties. All are illegal. The country's constitution, by the King's decree, is the Koran, Islam's holy book. Its precepts are law. What this means for the average Saudi is that they had better be Muslim and of a particular type, called Sunni (minority Shiite Muslims are always at risk of arrest and detention), and they must obey religious law. They dare not change their Muslim religion or, by law, the courts can have them executed. They must keep their mouth shut about any questions they may have about the Muslim religion or the monarchy.

Just consider the two Sunni Moslems, Sheikh Salman bin Fahd al-'Awda or Sheikh Safr 'Abd al-Rahman al-Hawali. Simply for their "extremist ideas" and to make them repent, the police arrested them in September 1994. Security forces worked them over year after year, until a court tried them in June of 1999, virtually five years later.

But life is easier for Muslim man. This near totalitarian, religious rule especially enslaves women, roughly half the population. The Committee to Prevent Vice and Promote Virtue, the Mutawaa'in, or religious police, watches over every women's behavior for violations of religious law, which they strictly enforce. This has created a harsh and rigid apartheid system against women. In public, they must wear an abaya, a garment that fully covers their body and can be of any color, as long as it is black. They must also cover their head and face, on which the religious police keep a close watch.

The unfortunate case of Nieves, a Filipino maid, provides one example of how these religious police work. She accepted a married couple's invitation to a restaurant to celebrate a birthday. By chance, a male friend of the couple also joined the celebration. Then, happening by and spying on the group, the religious police arrested Nieves on suspicion of being there to meet the male. A clear immoral act. While under arrest she denied this, but since she could not read Arabic, authorities tricked her into signing a confession she thought was a release order. This gave the court enough excuse to convict her of an offense against public morals and to sentence her to sixty lashes and twenty-five days in prison.

Then there was the Filipino Donato Lama. The police arrested her in 1995 for possibly committing the unpardonable crime of preaching Christianity. In a revealing letter about her later beating and confession, she wrote, "I was at my most vulnerable state when the police again pressured me to admit or else I would continue receiving the beating. 'We will let you go if you sign this paper. If not, you may as well die here.' Badly bruised and no longer able to stand another beating, I agreed to put my thumb mark on the paper not knowing what it was I was signing."⁴ The court sentenced her to 70 lashes plus 18 months in prison.

Women cannot travel abroad or even on public transportation without the permission of a male relative. Even then, they must enter buses by a separate rear entrance and sit in the women's section. The government forbids them to drive a car, or even walk outside by themselves. Their husband or male relative must accompany them, or for so "offending public morals the religious police will be arrested." Nor can women play any role in the King's government. Most important, the police ignore the frequent violence against women, especially by their husbands. Even harder to believe, severely injured women must still have the permission of a male relative to enter a hospital. The testimony of one man in court is worth that of two women. Men can divorce women without cause while women must give legal reasons. In school, women may not study many subjects restricted to men, such as engineering and journalism. In the words of the feminist Andrea Dworkin writing in 1978 and still applicable today,

women are locked in and kept out, exiled to invisibility and abject powerlessness within their own country. It is women who are degraded systematically from birth to early death, utterly and totally and without exception deprived of freedom. It is women who are sold into marriage or concubinage, often before puberty; killed if their hymens are not intact on the wedding night; kept confined, ignorant, pregnant, and poor, without choice or recourse. It is women who are raped and beaten with full sanction of the law. It is women who cannot own property or work for a living or determine in any way the circumstances of their own lives. It is women who are subject to a despotism that knows no restraint.⁵

In their treatment of women and non-Muslims, as well as the enforcement of religious rule over male Muslims, Saudi Arabia is the norm among the Sheikdoms of the Middle East. We also saw this religious absolutism in fundamentalist Sudan. And Algeria and Iran share it to a certain extent. Even in the non-fundamentalist Muslim countries like Egypt and Pakistan, governments deny human rights and women are second-class citizens. The Taliban regime of Afghanistan,



Farzana Kauzar with her three children. They were reportedly arrested on 8 October 1997 at their home in Dhahran by members of al-Mabahith al-'Anuma and held as hostages in order to force the father to return to Saudi Arabia from abroad.

however, has even exceeded Saudi Arabia in its harsh and barbaric application of the Koran, denial of human rights, and savage suppression of women. The courts can sentence them to death for even adultery, as was the woman simply identified as Suriya by Taliban-run Radio (the Taliban are a fundamentalist Muslim force that now controls most of Afghanistan). Convicted of adultery in April 2000, officials took her to a sports stadium and stoned her to death in front of thousands of spectators. There are few other ways the Taliban could have picked to execute a person that is more cruel, inhumane, and prolonged. There was no word on what happened to the man involved in the affair, if anything.

The best label for the lives of all women in these Muslim countries is pseudo-slavery. The only difference from real slavery is that the government does not allow men to buy and sell them. Otherwise, women are under the complete control of the government, their fathers, and their husbands.

While the fear, insecurity, and risk of daily life that common people experience in the Sudan and Saudi Arabia exists in many other Muslim countries, life can be even worse in some non-Muslim ones, such as Burma (Myanmar). This country in South Asia (see [map and statistics](#), and [world map](#)) is 89 percent Buddhist, and is ruled by a socialist military regime. Life here is hellish, due to the military's savage repression of dissent, and its barbaric response to the rebellion of nearly a dozen ethnic minorities.

In the nine villages of Dweh Loh Township, northeast of Rangoon and near the Thai border, the Karen ethnic group has long been fighting for independence. During harvest time in March 2000, military forces attacked the villages, burned down homes, and destroyed or looted possessions. By sheer luck, some of the villagers managed to flee into the forest, leaving behind their rice and possessions and risking starvation--starvation made almost inevitable by the military's burning crops and rice storage barns. Soldiers even torched the cut scrub, needed to prepare the soil for planting. And they killed those who remained in the village, or seized them for forced labor or portering, or pressing them into the military. That done, they mined all approaches to the village to prevent villagers from returning.

Soldiers kill any male suspected of being a rebel. These are not all easy deaths. Sometimes soldiers gruesomely torture the victim and prolong their death to cause as much agony as possible. Women or young girls are only marginally better off: the soldiers "only" rape them. Then they marched them, along with the children and whatever village men left alive, to work sites to build barracks, defensive works, roads, railroads, or fences, or carry bamboo and firewood. Alternatively, the soldiers force them to porter ammunition and military supplies like mules. This is the most dangerous form of forced labor and many die from it.

Even the children do not escape this. Soldiers routinely make them do such arduous labor, or even soldier. Worse, the military sell the girls into prostitution in Burma or into the Thai sex market across the border, which already exploits the bodies of 40,000 Burmese girls. Worse still, the military has forced children to walk ahead of soldiers to trigger mines. No military have used



Burma

Area	678,500 sq km -- slightly smaller than Texas
Population	41,734,853
Ethnic groups	Burman 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, Mon 2%, Indian 2%, other 5%
Religions	Buddhist 89%, Christian 4% (Baptist 3%, Roman Catholic 1%), Muslim 4%, animist 1%, other 2%
Languages	Burmese, minority ethnic groups have their own languages
Life expectation	54.91 years
Literacy	62.80%
Purchasing power parity	\$1,200 (1999 est.)
Government	military dictatorship
Freedom rating	among most unfree (1998)

human bodies to clear mines like this since World War II, when the Soviets often compelled prisoners to sweep minefields with their feet.

Aside from those made to do forced labor and portering, the general condition of Burmese children is disastrous for their future and that of the country. Even children living outside the civil war zones are unlikely to go to school. No more than one out of five get even as much as four years of primary school. They are more likely to be working at some job to help their family survive, as are, according to UN estimates, about one-third of all children 6-15 years of age. Anyway, a child is simply unlikely to survive to adulthood, since half of all those that die each year are children.



Refugees attempting to rebuild their village after it was burnt down by the regime

In the civil war zones, for children and adults alike, people routinely live on the edge of death. For example, anyone living in the township of Dweh Loh that contained the nine villages I mentioned, had an equal chance of doing forced labor, being looted, or suffering extortion by soldiers on the one hand; or of fleeing into the forests on the other. Those living in other townships throughout this area probably escaped to the forests and were barely surviving there on whatever food they could grow. Were soldiers to find these refugees, they might shoot them or make them porter under threat of death.

Life was no better for those living in the Nyaunglebin District to the west. They had to beware of hand picked execution squads of soldiers searching for rebels or their supporters, and operating off and on in the area. If these soldiers even suspected a villager of most minor contact with the rebel forces, even seen talking to someone suspected of being a rebel, they usually would cut his throat. Sometimes they also would decapitate the victim, and mount their head on a pole as a warning to others. This would have been an easy death, however, compared to what soldiers did to three men they captured in Plaw Toh Kee, as reported by a villager there.⁶ No matter that these were simple farmers and cattle breeders, thought good men by the villagers and the village head. The soldiers suspected them of working for the rebels and that was enough. They forced them to stand against trees for days without food or water, beat and punched them in the face because they could not answer any questions about the rebels, and then systematically made one inch slices all over their bodies. Then the soldiers cut out their intestines, pushed the mess back into their stomachs, and kept these poor souls this way until the soldiers finally killed them.


This is only one atrocity story that I could multiply many times as this civil war takes its toll on unarmed and peaceful villagers living in one civil war zone or another. There are around sixty-seven different ethnic groups in Burma, each with their own language and culture, many of which have rebelled and are fighting the military government.



Burmese refugees on the run

With more or less ferocity, these rebellions have been going on since 1948, with a death toll of 200,000, or even possibly 400,000, Burmese. Both sides have also murdered outright an additional 100,000 to 200,000 Burmese. Moreover, rebellion, fighting, and brutal military pressure on the Burmese people have caused 500,000 to 1,000,000 of them to be displaced within the country, many of whom the military has commanded to live in inhospitable forced location zones. Others have escaped relocation for bare subsistence in the forests without a home or village. Still 215,000 others have fled abroad and are formally listed as refugees by international refugee organizations. An added 350,000 Burmese are without refugee status and subsist in refugee-like conditions in neighboring Thailand.

The vast majority of Burmese, however, live far away from the civil war zones and are not members of the rebelling minority ethnic groups. But they have other things to fear. Burma is a military dictatorship, and this regime is willing to use its weapons on unarmed people who protest or demonstrate. When students demonstrated against the regime on July 7, 1962, soldiers shot 100 of them to death. On August 13, 1967, soldiers similarly shot over 100 demonstrating men and women, and even the children that accompanied them. And so on and on, from demonstration to demonstration, until the worst of them all.



**On left: students marching in 1988
On right: soldiers preparing for crackdown**

On August 8, 1988, doctors, students, teachers, farmers, musicians, artists, monks, and workers took part in peaceful, pro-democracy demonstrations in all major cities. The military demanded that the demonstrators disperse, and when they would not, soldiers fired round after round into the crowds. They massacred an incredible 5,000 to 10,000 unarmed people simply trying to express their desire for democracy. Soldiers and police then arrested hundreds of those escaping this bloodbath, and tortured them in prison. Many thousands escaped to border areas, leaving their loved ones, homes, and possessions behind.



On Left: Officer directing soldiers to shoot
On right: A body riddled with bullets



One of thousands of
students killed in 1998

Burmese who stayed home, avoided demonstrations, and aroused no suspicion, might still be conscripted by the military for forced labor or porter duty. Socialists in mind and spirit, the military has been ambitious to build railways, roads, airports, and so on. And to do so, they simply draft civilians. For example, those who lived near the route of the 110 mile e-Tavoy railway, built by the military in southern Burma, were among the 200,000 people that soldiers forced to work on the project for fifteen days a month without pay. Then there were the 30,000 the military conscripted for the Bassein Airport extension. Those who missed this, might have been among the over 920,000 the military compelled to labor on the Chaung Oo-Pakokku Railroad.

Then the soldiers came to my house and poked my wife in the side with a rifle butt. They kicked her hard in the stomach, and she vomited blood. Then they kicked my baby son down into the fire, and all the hair on his head was burnt. They slapped my 7-year old son in the face and he cried out. They beat them because I had escaped.⁷

For those living close to the soil,

wholly dependent on what they can grow and eat, time is food. The days the military forcibly take without pay often makes even bare survival difficult. The only choices for many are to flee or shirk work. But then, the military's punishment for not doing the work can be even worse. As reported by one refugee:



Those who do the forced labor have to sleep at the work site, guarded, and without much shelter--sometimes none. The ground is their only bed. To go to the toilet they have to get permission from a guard. Their only food is what the workers themselves can bring. And they have to be sure not to be injured, because there is seldom any medical care. They also can die, as many do, from sickness or exhaustion. If they try to escape from the work site and soldiers catch them, and if they are lucky, the soldiers will only severely beat them. Just resting without permission can get them beaten and killed by guards. This happened to Pa Za Kung, a man from Vomkua village in

Chin State's Thantlang Township, doing forced labor on a road from Thantlang to Vuangtu village.

But portering is even worse. We have already seen that the military makes those living in war zones porter for them. Since they need as many as two porters for each soldier to move much of their supplies and equipment, they conscript people living outside the war zones. And portering is worse than forced labor. Porters suffer from hunger, malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion. Rebel fire kills them, they step on mines, or soldiers shoot them because they cannot force their bodies to work any longer. Or soldiers simply abandon them with no medical care, no food, no help, no way home. All told, this is another form of slavery suffered by millions of pitiful Burmese.



**Chained
Photo by Damien Lewis**



Aung San Suu Kyi, standing in front of portrait of her father, Aung San

Burmese generally have no rights other than to serve the military. This might have changed in 1990, when the military caved in to considerable international pressure resulting from their 1989 massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators, and held real democratic elections. And were shocked when the democratic opposition, under the leadership of 1991 Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, won 82 percent of the seats in the new Parliament. The military then refused to yield power, and have held Aung San Suu Kyi under virtual house arrest ever since. They also arrested and

tortured thousands of her supporters and members of other political parties, and have killed or disappeared thousands more. They even arrested hundreds of those elected to parliament, with harsh prison conditions causing some of their deaths. Member-elect Kyaw Min, for example, died of hepatitis caused by his imprisonment.

Having learned its lesson about the power of the democratic idea, the military no longer allows political activity or criticism. There is no freedom of speech or association. Even in this Buddhist country, the military keeps a watch on Buddhist monks and prevents them from being involved in political activity. It also restricts the leaders of other religions. There can be no unions. Just

having a computer modem can cause arrest, torture, and a fifteen-year prison sentence. Having a fax machine may even mean death, as it did for the Anglo-Burmese San Suu Kyi, who was honorary Consul for the European Union. No independent courts exist, and the law is what the military command. The military monitors the movements of common citizens, searches their homes at any time, and takes them forcibly from their home to be relocated, without compensation or explanation.

Nor are Burmese free to start a business or invest. Since 1962, when the military overthrew the democratic government, the military has pursued a "Burmese Way to Socialism." This has left little room for private businesses and a free market, and companies run by the military dominate many areas of the economy, leaving as the most vigorous sector of the economy the heroin trade. This alone may account for over 50 percent of the economy.

The economic result is what one would expect. Among all countries, Burma has plummeted to near the bottom in economic freedom, possibly only better than communist North Korea. And the country is nearly bankrupt. However, maybe having learned from this economic disaster, the military is now trying to liberalize their economic control and have invited foreign investment. Still, the average Burmese earns only about \$300 per year.

Burma is a small country, tucked beneath the mass of China to the north. With more than 1.26 billion people, China has about 20 percent of the world's population (see [map and statistics](#), and [world map](#)). You therefore were more likely to be born in China than in any other country. And would life have been better than in Burma, Saudi Arabia, or Sudan? This depends on when in the twentieth century you were born there. If a decade or so ago, yes. But anytime before then, no. Chinese were then at great risk of dying from disease, or starvation, or of soldiers killing them in one of the hundreds of battles war lords fought back and forth over the country. And with the communist takeover of the whole country in 1948, Chinese were murdered by the millions in the Communist Party's national campaigns, such as Land Reform, "Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries," Three and Five Antis, Collectivization, and the Cultural Revolution. The Party eventually murdered tens of millions in cold blood. And those who survived this monstrous bloodbath could well have starved to death in the famine caused by the Party's "Great Leap Forward" industrialization campaign, and collectivization of all peasants into communes and factory-like farming. This famine happened in the late 1950s through the early 1960s and was the world's worst ever. As many as 40,000,000 Chinese might have starved to death or died from related diseases. This alone is over twice the 16,000,000 killed in combat during World War II for all combatants, including Germany, Soviet Union, Japan, China, United States, and Great Britain. All this I have detailed in my book on [China's Bloody Century](#)

Life is better now for the average Chinese. Relatively. They are especially freer to pursue a business or invest. The Party now largely leaves peasants alone to farm as they see fit and sell their food. The Party is trying to liberalize the economy and give greater reign to private ambition and foreign investment. What was a deeply impoverished country in the 1960s, possibly even worse than Burma, is now rapidly developing its economy. Moreover, Chinese are freer from Party controls, rules, intervention, and especially Party attempts to remake their lives and



China

Area	9,596,960 sq km -- slightly smaller than the U.S.
Population	1,261,832,482 (July 2000 est.)
Ethnic groups	Han Chinese 91.9%, other nationalities 8.1%
Religions	Daoist (Taoist), Buddhist, Muslim 2%-3%, Christian 1% (est.); Daoist (Taoist), Buddhist, Muslim 2%-3%, Christian 1% (est.) Note: officially atheist
Languages	Standard Chinese or Mandarin (Putonghua, based on the Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghaiese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects, minority languages
Life expectation	69.6 years
Literacy	89.90%
Purchasing power parity	\$3,800 (1999 est.); U.S. is \$33,900 (1999 est.)
Government	communist dictatorship
Freedom rating	among most unfree (1998)



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culture.

Though with a milder and more tolerant hand, the Communist Party still controls all aspects of government--it *is* the government. It is supreme and shares power with no legislature, courts, military, or any other group. No one elects high Party leaders, which arise from a struggle for power within the Party. And except for those parts of the economy, culture, and family over which its policy is being liberalized, there still is little that Chinese can do without Party permission. It allows virtually no freedom of speech or association. Nor does it permit the Chinese to protest or demonstrate. And whatever their religious faith, the Party tightly controls it or makes it illegal.

Look at what happened to practicing members of the Jesus Family, a Protestant sect of which the Party does not approve. In 1992, a mass of police surrounded and arrested sixty-one members attending a monthly commune service in Duoyigou, Shandong Province. The police destroyed their village, and confiscated all Church belongings. A court eventually sentenced some of the members between one and twelve years in prison for, among other things, taking part in an "illegal" religious meeting. The court gave the sect's leader and his sons the heaviest sentence of all for "swindling" because they were so bold as to collect contributions for the Church's annual Christmas celebration. Even if church members had avoided prison, the police might harass them years later. After these people rebuilt their village, police sealed it off and those entering or leaving had to pay five yuan. Yuan Hongbing and Wang Jiaqi, two legal scholars, believed this was unjust and tried to help the sect take legal recourse, which only resulted in the police arresting them as well.

One religious story these days is the Party prosecution of the Falun Gong sect. This sect (to members it is not a religion) combines Taoism and Buddhism, along with mediation and martial arts techniques, into a spiritual melding of mind, spirit, and body. There are as many as 100,000,000 adherents in China, while the Party claims that no more than 2,100,000 belong. Clearly, however, leaders can bring together many members quickly. On April 25, 1999, for example, a mass of 10,000 followers stood quietly in front of the compound housing the top Party leadership in Beijing.

Even Catholics have suffered repression and many can only practice their religion underground. The party considers Catholicism a "foreign, imperialist" import and has tried to keep it under tight control. Bishops and priests have been arrested and their churches burned, and in some places churches are disguised as factories so that Catholics can pray at secret services.

Police are likely to arrest any Chinese that practice Falun Gong, as they have already done to over a hundred of its leaders and thousands of its adherents, for what until recently the Party labeled a "counterrevolutionary crime," and has renamed in less political terms, a "Crime Disturbing Social Order." The Party now holds over 35,000 Falun Gong members under detention or in prison and has tortured many. And it has sent an additional some 5,000 to labor camps without trial. From all this mistreatment by the Party, at least 89 Falun Gong have died.

Though this number is small and seems irrelevant in such a huge country, for each of the 89 and those who loved them it was terribly real. Sixty-year old Chen Zixiu is a case in point. She

traveled to Beijing to request that the Party lift its restrictions on the Falun Gong. The police arrested her, then beat and tortured her. Her aging body could not take it, and she was dead in four days. When her family collected her corpse, they found it bruised all over, teeth broken, and dried blood in her ears. Another woman, Zhao Xin, a professor at Beijing's Industry and Commerce University, died from a beating she received after her arrest for practicing Falun Gong breathing exercises in Beijing park.

The Party even cannot leave alone even that which most people regard as superstitions or simply good health exercises. There has been a crackdown on one such group of Qi Gong practitioners, for example, of who over 21,000 have been arrested for nothing more than fostering breathing and meditation exercises.

Action against unapproved sects or religious groups is simply an example of the Party's continuous campaign to suppress any association, speech, unions, movements, and the like, of which it does not approve. In China, there can be no association without permission of the Party, no nonprofit organization without registration. The Party must license all newspapers, magazines, and other publications. Censorship is common, and no book can be published without Party approval. There are even Party guidelines for publications, such as requiring that newspaper stories be 80 percent positive, 20 percent negative. Disseminating or selling unapproved literature can get one a long prison sentence. In the case of two Beijing bookstore owners, sisters Li Xiaobing and Li Xiaomei, for example, the police arrested them for selling Falun Gong publications, and a court sentenced them to six or seven years. The police even arrested the environmental journalist Dai Qing, who justifiably criticized a mammoth dam building project on the Yangtze river, which will create the world's largest hydroelectric dam and displace one to two million people. A court sentenced him to ten months in prison and forbade him to publish in the future. Even for simply making a list of those convicted of protest-connected offenses--just a list--a court sentenced one fellow, Li Hai, to nine months in prison. After all, convictions are a "high-level state secret."

Arrest, prison, labor camp, psychiatric hospital, forced drugging, brainwashing, psychological torture, physical torment, execution, and a simple beating, are all Party tools. Their purpose is to control the Chinese population, advance Party policies, and maintain Party power. There is no humanity in any of this. Note how the prison authorities treated the 42-year-old woman Cheng Fengrong. They beat her while handcuffed to a tree, made her stand in the snow barefoot while they kicked her, and finally they poured cold water over her head, which ran down her body and turned to ice at her naked feet.

Aside from the Party's great concern over what Chinese say and whom they associate with, there is still more reason why you would not want to be born in China. The Party also deems restricting population growth to be vital. It therefore forcibly intrudes into the core of a family's soul--the desire to have children. Since 1979 the Party has dictated who will have no more than one child, a policy largely applied to Han Chinese (comprising 92 percent of the population) living in urban areas. To prevent women from having a second child, the Party might sterilize them, or if pregnant, force them to undergo an abortion. If in some area there are many pregnant women, or just to ensure that there are no second children, Party officials might enforce a local "Clean Out the Stomach Campaign" involving house-to-house examinations and forced abortions. If a woman still somehow manages to have a second child, officials would likely fine the couple, and

the child would be discriminated against and not allowed to attend better schools.

What happened to the owner of a small clothing store is an example of the trouble a second pregnancy might cause. I will name her Women x, since she is now a refugee and fears harm if the Party knows her name. After she had her first child, officials ordered her to use an intrauterine device to prevent another pregnancy. She did so for a while, but because of connected health problems, secretly removed it--and got pregnant. When they found out about this, Party officials fined her, and forced her to undergo an abortion. The fine was too much for her meager resources to cover, and she could not pay it. Officials then seized her store. Penniless and distraught, she borrowed what money she could from relatives and fled alone, deserting her husband, child, and mother.

The result of the Party's one-child policy was predictable in an Asian, male-oriented society. If a Chinese woman believed her first fetus to be female, she might well abort it. The second try might yield a male. If a female were born, the mother or her husband might murder or abandon it. Infanticide is naturally prevalent, and sometimes even encouraged by Party authorities. The result is that there are about 119 males born for every 100 females. It has led to playgrounds with a mass of boys, few girls, and no siblings.

For traditional Chinese families, there is an even worse result. Who will take care of the old parents? The result of all this has been a Party reconsideration of the policy. One resulting reform is to permit families to have two children, if both parents are from single child families.



One of freedom's heroes.



Goddess of Democracy erected by demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, 1989


With the liberalization of some controls, a much freer market, and less emphasis on remaking the society and culture, the Party now executes far fewer people that it did decades ago. Still, the numbers are very high by international standards. As expected, how many people the Party executes or otherwise kills without a fair trial and for political or religious "crimes" is unknown and difficult

to estimate. Going by what the outside world knows, however, in just the one year of 1996 the Party executed at least 4,367 people. With a little more than 20 percent of the world's population, and going only by documented executions, the Party performs about 75 to 80 percent of all known judicial executions in the world.

Executions are the result of official court sentences, but Chinese also die "off the record" from beatings, torture, or other mistreatment by authorities in prisons or labor camps. Even the Chinese press sometimes reports these deaths, as it did of a worker who suspected of embezzlement, died after being beaten and tortured for 29 hours. Chinese who simply demonstrate for democracy can be killed. Of those involved in the, nonviolent, pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, in 1989, soldiers, armored vehicles, and tanks slaughtered possible 10,000 demonstrators.



Student murdered in Tiananmen Square massacre 1989



Run over by a tank--Tiananmen Square massacre 1989

Nor can Chinese expect a decent burial if

executed. As they lie on the ground dead after being shot behind the head, doctors brought there for this purpose will likely cut the organs out of their still-warm bodies and rush these to a hospital. This, without the prior consent of the executed or their families. At the hospital, doctors will transplant the organs into well-paying foreigners or the elite. Or doctors will prepare organs for shipment, and the Party will sell them in the international transplant

market for much-needed hard currency. An American Chinese-language newspaper even advertised such organs for sale--one negotiated price was \$30,000.⁸

There is more to what life would be like were you a Chinese living in China. Those who escape execution or prison might still be sentenced to a forced labor or re-education camp. Life in either case can be worse than prison, however, and even death might seem preferable. It did for human rights leader Chen Longde. Beaten by guards with clubs and electric batons; tortured by other inmates who were promised reduced sentences if they got him to confess; suffering from associated kidney damage, he finally jumped from a window. He survived, perhaps unfortunately, with two hips and a leg broken.

The Party forces inmates to fulfill a work quota or meet certain "reform" standards. Failure to meet a quota or spout communist dogma can be lethal. Camp officials may simply deny them

benefits, but more deadly, they may beat these poor souls, starve them, or put them in painfully tightened leg irons or handcuffs for long periods. The quotas are not easy for inmates to fill, and could require them to work overtime with little sleep, sometimes for no more than three or four hours. Moreover, camp authorities might combine work with required communist study, making it even harder to meet quotas. In some camps, guards routinely beat and harass inmates to force them to do more work. Of course, guards beat prisoners in other countries as well. But in China these beatings are not the idiosyncratic behavior of sadistic camp guards. They are the Party's method to ensure work output and proper brainwashing. Overall, the Party admits keeping 1,200,000 prisoners, including detainees. This total is probably far under the actual number.

China is not the worst abuser of human rights in Asia, however. You have already seen what life is like in Burma. And east of Burma and to the south of China is Laos, in which the treatment of its people by the Laotian Communist Party that controls the country can be best described as Stalinist. Then to the east of Beijing, China, is communist North Korea, now the very worst place in the world to live. I can only describe this country as a border-to-border, horrid slave labor camp, as I detailed in [Death By Government](#). The North Korean Communist Party owns and dictates everything. There is no life, even in the innermost recesses of one's family, independent of the Party. Its rule is absolute, uncontested, and above all, the dictates of one psychotic man, Kim Jong-il. This is the only past or present communist country in which the dictator has *inherited* supreme power. He is the son of Kim Il-sung, who Stalin put in charge of the country when it became formally independent in 1948, and who ruled with no less an iron and bloody fist than his Soviet mentor.

Party command over all, even over what farmers' plant and harvest in the fields and when, has involved mass incarcerations, mass deaths, and mass starvation. The country has been bankrupted while Kim Jong-il continues to squander most of its resources on the military. Any North Korean might well be executed or die in one of the many forced labor camps (really, sub-camps, since the whole country is one prison); or they might die from starvation or disease, as have millions.

There are many other countries with their own awful tales and practices of the day. In Rwanda in 1994, Hutu soldiers and armed civilians killed hundreds of thousands of Tutsi, and armed Tutsi retaliated by murdering Hutu. By the end of this genocidal slaughter, Hutu and Tutsi had massacred as many as 1,000,000 Rwandans within a few months, as [Chapter 6](#) will report in full detail. Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein gassed Kurdish women and children in the North and the destroyed over 3,000 of their villages., and massacred Shiite men, women, and children in the South. And in 1971, as I also detailed in my [Death By Government](#), the West Pakistan military murdered by the hundreds of thousands its East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) Bengalis and Hindus. And there are tens of millions more whose murder I will discuss in [Chapter 6](#).

Here I mention this only to make the point clear. In such countries, and given what we know about life in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, and China, the lives of the people have been filled with disease, starvation, forced labor, slavery, beatings, torture, and death. Their rulers have absolute or near-absolute power. And for those with absolute power, their whim is law, their fantasy a

command, their wish a campaign. They do not see people as living human beings, each a self-conscious person with a human soul. Citizens are rather their ruler's bricks and mortar for building a paradise on earth, expendable pawns with which to fight a war, or robots to be programmed with a religious text.

Still, by what right can one criticize the lack of freedom in these countries? Why should one be free? Is one's personal enjoyment or desire for freedom sufficient to justify it for others? Really, what do we mean by freedom? And what are its consequences of such freedom for people or society as a whole?

NOTES

* Written for this web site. I am indebted to Judson Knight for his careful editing and helpful comments on a draft of this chapter.

1. Linda Slobodian, [*The Slave Trail*](#), 1947.
 2. Karin Davies, "[Slave Trade Thrives in Sudan](#)".
 3. Nat Hentoff, "[Our People Were Turned to Ash: A Sudanese Women Tells Her Story](#)".
 4. [Amnesty International](#).
 5. Andrea Dworkin, "[Take Back The Day](#)," 1978.
 6. An Independent Report by the [Karen Human Rights Group](#), March 31, 2000.
 7. "[A Comprehensive Response To Burmese Refugee and Displaced People Problem](#)," *The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade*, October 5, 1994.
 8. [The Laogai Research Foundation](#).
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Chapter 2

Why Should You be Free?

**A free society is a most socially just one.
---This web site**

Yes, you want to be free, but should you be? Should those living in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, and China be free? Why? There are two ways of answering this. One is to prove that the benefits of people being free so overshadow any negative consequences as to be justified. That this is true I will show in later chapters. The second way is to show that everyone has a right to be free regardless of the consequences, that freedom is moral and just in itself, and that it is immoral and unjust to deprive people of freedom.

That this is so may seem obvious, but it is not in much of the world. As clear from the previous chapter, the dictators of many nations obey no law. The law is what they command it to be, and their subjects must obey or suffer severe consequences. They

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have no way of voting these dictators out of power, and to demonstrate or protest against them is risk imprisonment, torture, and death. Yet these dictators and their supporters often justify their rule as moral, or as socially or religiously just.

This very belief is why some dictatorships came into existence in the first place. Large and powerful enough groups believed that this way of governing is necessary, as for Singapore, which assures law and order and clean streets and parks. They may have such faith in their own religion and its teachings, as many do in Muslim countries, that they militantly demand that their church and governments should be one. They may think their nation needs a dictatorship that can

deal with its poverty and promote economic growth. They may be convinced that government must assure the economic rights of the people to a job, social security, and health, before concerning itself with so-called Western human rights. They may be traditional monarchists who embrace a hereditary, authoritarian government that would maintain the great traditions and customs of their people.

Even those who know what life is like for people who have no freedom in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, and China might still claim that believing they should be free is intolerant of different values, morally wrong, unfair, or ungodly. And fascists or communists are still around, though in the last half-century what we have learned about life under these isms has virtually discredited them. In my teaching I have known professors and students, for instance who, persuaded by Marxism-Leninism, the philosophical foundations of Twentieth Century communism, and believing it more socially just, were willing to replace their democratic freedoms with communist totalitarianism.

If people wish to live under a dictatorship, that is their choice. But what about people who have no choice, who dictators deprive of any freedom with the force of their guns? Do we have a right to say that Burmese or Chinese rulers, or those of any other nondemocratic country, should free their people and democratize? Do those trumpeting such freedom ignore an Asian or African way, for example? What about God's way? Are not the holy teachings of the Bible or Koran above the selfish desire for freedom?

To answer, we must recognize that freedom is a general term, like liberty, independence, autonomy, and equality. In reality, freedom cannot be absolute; no

one can be completely free. Your talents, family situation, job, wealth, cultural norms, and laws against murder, incest, burglary, and so on, constrain and circumscribe your choices. And then there is the freedom of others that necessarily limits yours.

Broadly speaking, your rights, whatever they may be, define the limits to your freedom. In the Western tradition of freedom, these are your civil and political rights, including your freedom of speech, religion, and association. Some philosophers see these not only as morally justified rights in themselves, but also as means for fulfilling other possible rights, like happiness. The opposing position is that such rights have no special status unless granted by government to maintain tradition, as does an absolute monarchy like Saudi Arabia; pursue a just society, as the Communist Party of China claims; protect a holy society, as by a Muslim government like Sudan; or economically develop a country, as attempted by a military government like Burma.

The internationally popular justification for your freedom is by reference to *human rights*, those due you as a human being. The term "human rights" is recent in origin: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt first used it in a 1941 message to the United States Congress, when he declared that you have four human rights--freedoms of speech and religion, and freedoms from want and fear. Since 1941, there has been a vigorous international affirmation of these and other human rights. Many a nation's constitution has included them, and they now are part of an International Bill of Rights. The latter comprises Articles 1 and 55 of the 1945 United Nations Charter; the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly; and the two international covenants passed by the General Assembly in 1966, one on civil and political rights and the other on economic, social,



Mrs Roosevelt holds a Universal Declaration of Human Rights poster on its adoption by the UN General Assembly in December 1948

and cultural rights. There is now a United Nations Human Rights Commission that can investigate alleged violations of your human rights, and receive and consider your complaints. In our nation centered, international system, this is a momentous advance for the human rights of all people.

The conventions and declarations of regional organizations have further strengthened these human rights. To mention a few examples, the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Human Rights, and European nations now have the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights. The Organization of American States adopted the American Declaration on Human Rights, and the American states have created the Inter-American Convention and Court on Human Rights. The Organization for African Unity has created the African Charter of Human and People's Rights. Moreover, there have been many formal conferences among states and interested international government organizations on human rights, such as the 1993, 183 nations, Vienna World Conference on Human Rights.

Human rights have also been the concern of many private organizations. These have sought to further define and extend your rights (like to a clean environment); observe the implementation of your rights in all nations; publicize violations of your rights by governments (for instance, the right against torture and summary execution); or pressure governments to end their violations. Some of the many such organizations include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Anti-Slavery Society, Amnesty International, the International League for Human Rights, and the International Commission of Jurists.

Even warfare or rebellion is no excuse for dictatorships such as Sudan or Burma to torture or arbitrarily kill their people. Nations have agreed to moderate their warfare to preserve certain human rights, as exactly defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its 1977 Additional Protocols.

All this international activity on human rights has multiplied the list of rights. You now have at least forty rights listed in the basic international documents on human rights, which are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that on Civil and Political Rights, and that on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The most basic of all these rights are those defining what governments cannot do to you. We can list these from those stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These include your right to

- life, liberty, and personal security;**

- **recognition as a person before the law, equal protection of the law, remedy for violation of your rights, fair and public trial, and the presumption of your innocence until proven guilty if charged with a penal offense;**



Peruvians march with the signatures of 8,000 people committing themselves to the defense of human rights-- to be presented to the heads of governments during celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Paris

- **leave any country and return, and seek asylum from persecution;**
- **the secret ballot and periodic elections, and freely chosen representatives;**
- **form and join trade unions, equal access to public service, and participation in cultural life;**
- **freedom of movement and residence, thought, conscience and religion, opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and association, and as a parent to choose your children's education;**
- **freedom from slavery or servitude, torture, degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest or detention or exile, arbitrary interference with privacy or family or home or correspondence, deprivation of nationality, arbitrary deprivation of property, and being compelled to join an association.**

In effect, these human rights define what many mean by democratic freedom. Your freedom of thought, expression, religion, association, is basic, as are the secret ballot, periodic elections, and the right to representation. In short, these rights say that you have a right to be free.

Therefore, if you condemn the lack of freedom in, for instance, Sudan, you are not imposing *your* values on another culture. *This is not a matter of value relativity.* Demanding human rights, and thus freedom for the slaves in the Sudan--or Chinese political prisoners, or the women in Muslim countries, or Burmese forced laborers--is simply demanding that their rulers obey international law, itself based on general treaties, international agreements, and practices.

This law is universal. You and every Arabian, Chinese, Rwandan, and so on for all the world's peoples, have the internationally defined and protected human rights listed above. No rulers can violate these rights of their people without risking mandated sanctions by the United Nations Security Council. Many nations now even include human rights monitors or representatives within their foreign ministries so that a foreign dictator who denies the human rights of his people can be publicly exposed and diplomatically pressured to recognize them. For example, the United States Department of State has a Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs run by an Assistant Secretary of State. The Bureau publishes an annual review of human rights around the world.

True, there is much hypocrisy here and with so many dictatorships in the world the skeptic may feel that these rights are just words. Even some governments who signed the human rights documents allow few rights to their people. Note, however, that they felt compelled to sign them. This shows the sheer power and legitimacy of the idea of human rights. These human rights documents lay down a marker. They define what should be, what is right, the moral high ground. It is those who deny such rights that now must defend their policies, not those who grant these rights. Indeed, any violation of a people's human rights by their rulers, as when the Chinese police arrest and torture people for practicing their creed or religion, is now a breach of *international law*. Unfortunately, the United Nations cannot automatically command sanctions or military intervention against governments for this. It is a problem of international and domestic politics, power, and interests, however, no longer of what are your human rights.

Again, look at Sudan. Slavery and genocide against the southern black Christians continue to this day without foreign intervention to stop it. This is because Sudan is a distant country, with little trade, few foreign embassies, hardly any foreign journalists, almost no tourists, and no cultural affinity with the world's most powerful countries. Moreover, intervention probably would disrupt sensitive diplomatic arrangements within the region, including the relations of the Muslim countries with Israel. It also might mean a local war, perhaps with Libya or even Iran providing the Sudanese rulers military aid, which the democratic peoples of the world lack the interest and will to fight. If every day, however, they were to see on

television images of the starving children and the scars of slavery, and to hear the stories of those tortured, then they would demand that their leaders do something.

Such was the case with the United Nations-supported, American-led coalition that militarily intervened in Somalia (see [map and statistics](#), and [world map](#)). The Somali government had collapsed into clan wars, and people were starving by the millions, with about 500,000 already dead. When the world's television screens and newspapers showed picture after picture of starving Somali children, these horrified the American public. They demanded action, and finally pressured President Bush into doing something. Acting under a United Nations Security Council resolution, the United States intervened in December 1992 with 25,500 American troops. Their goal was to protect international famine relief efforts and end the political chaos. But soon after the Clinton Administration came into power in January 1993, its support for this intervention collapsed when the Somalis killed eighteen Army Rangers trapped into a firefight. President Clinton then reduced American forces, and the whole operation was handed over to a United Nations force of 22,000, which finally withdrew in March 1994. Journalists and politicians believe the operation was a failure. It did not produce a prodemocratic government, assure the human rights of Somalis, or end the civil war. Still, it did save possibly a million people from starvation, which may be justification enough.



Somalian famine victim

Even if international sanctions and intervention to protect human rights are difficult, the international community has moved more than one-step forward. It has clearly articulated the law protecting everyone's rights. It does pinpoint the behavior of a government that is morally wrong. And if the international community cannot sanction the dictators who trample on their subject's rights, or intervene to stop them, at least they can now be subject to moral pressure by the United Nations and international organizations. The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, makes this clear by stating that human rights are "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every



Somalia

Area	637,657 sq km; slightly smaller than Texas
Population	7,253,137
Ethnic groups	Somali 85%, Bantu, Arabs 30,000
Religions	Sunni Muslim
Languages	Somali (official), Arabic, Italian, English
Life expectation	46.23 years
Literacy	24%
Purchasing power parity	\$600 (1999 est.)
Government	none--war lords rule
Freedom rating	unfree

individual and every organ of society . . . shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance . . ."

In sum, your human rights well define your freedom. Regardless of how others may want you to live because of their ideology, religion, or moral code, wherever you live or your culture, no matter what government you live under, the following principle applies to you.

Your freedom--your human rights--is justified by United Nations certification, international treaties, agreements, and international law.

To return to the original question, does agreement on human rights, even if the international consensus shown above, define just rights? Because a majority, even an overwhelming majority, says something is a right, is it a moral, a just right? In other words, we still must ask why a right is a right.

There is one philosophical school called *legal positivism*, much influenced by the seminal work of John Austin (1790-1859), that does not accept internationally defined human rights as fundamentally moral or just. These philosophers separate law from morality, and argue that the rights of all people are only those that the world community has agreed to in their international deliberative assemblies, organizations, and by their treaties. Although for international law the positivist position is dominant among lawyers, judges, and academics, among philosophers it is a minority position. By this standard, human rights are international legal rights, as described, although not necessarily moral or ethically right.

Philosophers have debated much about how to justify rights; especially about what used to be called your *natural rights* or the *rights of man*. These rights are a particularly Western idea that grew out of the medieval concern for the rights of lords, barons, churchmen, kings, guilds, or towns. One of the great documents promoting the rights of all subjects was the Magna Carta signed by King John of England in 1215. He promised thereby to govern according to the law, that all have a right to the courts. It established that no person, not even the King, was above the law.

With the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment and a growing faith in human reason,

philosophers began to grapple with the meaning of a right and whether people generally had any. What emerged was the idea that all people have natural rights. These are what people think, with reason and without emotional prejudice or personal bias, are the rights everyone should have as human beings. For example, two such rationally grounded natural rights that all people share with each other are their rights to life, and to equal freedom.

This philosophical conception of natural rights has been one of the most powerful ideas in history. It has been the force behind many revolutions and constitutions. For example, the philosopher John Locke, in his influential *Second Treatise of Government* (1690), wielded this idea like a sword, claiming that by your birthright you have a natural right to freedom, equality, and property. He directly influenced the American Declaration of Independence, which almost a century later (1776) declared that "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." Some years later the French National Assembly approved the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in 1789, which proclaimed that the purpose of political association is the preservation of your natural and inalienable rights to liberty, private property, personal security, and resistance to oppression.


The Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States, further defined your natural rights, among them your freedom of speech, religion, and assembly. Nations now recognize these rights as human rights, as I have pointed out, and they have become part of the constitution of one nation after another.

A variant of this natural rights approach is to claim that you have only *one natural right*, and it is *self-evident*: you exist, you are human, and therefore, you have an absolute right to equal freedom with all other humans. No more, no less. Then, treating this like an axiom in Euclidean geometry, you can only justify any other right if it is a derivation of, or implicit in, your right to equal freedom. This thereby establishes the right to your freedoms of religion, assembly, and speech. Otherwise, what you allege to be a natural or human right, such as to a job, welfare, or clear air, is only what you want or need, and you must find other arguments to justify it. You do not have a right to what someone else is compelled to secure for you.

But regardless of approach, philosophers can only justify these natural rights by their abstract reason, as though doing a mathematical proof. Nonetheless, using their logic and reason they still disagree on what rights you have--for instance, to abortion, social security, and a minimum wage. This problem of defining what is reasonable is universal, and has encouraged philosophers to chase less subjective justifications of


rights.

One favored solution among thinkers, such as the Eighteenth Century British theologian William Paley, jurist and philosopher Jeremy Bentham, and philosophers James Mill and John Stuart Mill, is their appeal to *utility*--what promotes the greater happiness of all is good. According to the utilitarians, you can justify only those rights that assure the greatest happiness of the largest number of people. Utilitarians argue that this criterion provides an empirical measuring rod for what is to be your right. On balance, does it cause more happiness than pain? If so, then it is a right. If not, then it is not a right. I believe that in their hearts, this utilitarian argument has been the dominant justification for human rights by activists, and especially by diplomats from the democracies who negotiated the human rights agreements. They believed that by promoting human rights they were furthering human happiness in the world.



Jeremy Bentham 1748-1832

Finally, I will give you my argument for your rights. I will base this on a hypothetical social contract, a favorite conceptual tool of political philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Baron de Montesquieu. They used this idea to define a just society, and the power and limits of government. Imagine, as Hobbes did in his *Leviathan* (1651), that in the original state of nature life was primitive, brutal, and short. People, therefore, saw the absolute need to secure their lives and property, and therefore all (hypothetically) agreed upon a social contract among them that would do so. This was to form a central government, and to grant it the power to protect their lives and property in exchange for each pledging to obey its laws. This social contract then defined the reciprocal duties of citizen and government. Violate the contract and government may justly punish you; conversely, if the government violates the contract, as for example by not protecting your lives



Thomas Hobbes 1588–1679

from criminals or it preying on you, then you may justly overthrow it. This idea of an implicit social contract between the people and their government contributed to the writing of the American Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States

This approach has much in common with that of the positivists, who stress international agreements as the source of your human rights. After all, if universal in scope, thereby defining the rights of everyone, these agreements are akin to a general social contract.

To be clear, when philosophers use a hypothetical social contract to justify your rights in a state of nature, they are trying to determine those rights that all people would agree should be guaranteed by government. To make this social contract objective and unbiased, philosophers assume that in their agreement on it, people are ignorant of their wealth, status, race, talents, or other attributes. They thus have no idea as to how their choice of a social contract--of rights--would benefit them personally, which makes these rights just.

As I did in Part 2 of my [*The Just Peace*](#), I will use a revised version of this social contract approach to more fully explore whether people would generally, regardless of their religion, ideology, or culture, agree on certain rights. I also want to broaden this contract to consider also the connected principles of governance. Rights do not exist in a vacuum. Some possible rights in their very definition assume that government will or will not have certain powers. For example, among your human rights mentioned above are those to free association (one-party governments are then out), freedom of religion (so much for government by the Koran or Bible), or to vote in free elections (which assumes a democratic type government). However, this is not a one-to-one relationship between rights and governance. Monarchies and some dictatorships, for example, may allow freedom of religion, domestic movement, and immigration. There is, however, a close relationship between the rights people might want and how they should be governed to assure those rights, and I want to make this association clear.

It is also critical that rights agreed to in the social contract and associated principles of governance be just--that is, they should define what is *social justice*. But this demands that the social contract satisfy certain requirements.

First, for the rights and principles to be morally just, they must be universal--they apply to everyone. It is hardly just if your neighbor has the right to be a Buddhist while you are not free to practice Judaism. Therefore, whatever people agree to in their social contract applies to all people, anywhere, at anytime.

Second, to be morally just, the rights and principles must be practical. You must be able to live by them. People can hardly judge you immoral for not doing something that is impossible to do. We could not obey, for example, a moral injunction against sexy dreams, if it is claimed that such are immoral. Preventing these dreams is beyond our ability.

Finally, a just right or just principle also means that it is fair, evenhanded. Two more requirements can assure this. . One is that nearly everyone has a chance to discuss, debate, and finally agree upon the rights all will have and on their associated principles of governance. The other requirement is that the agreement is objective. This can be achieved by making everyone hypothetically blind to his or her self-interests. A good example of this is the sculpture of a Greek goddess (possibly Themis) holding a scale of justice in the left hand and a sword in the other, which is found on the wall of many courthouses in the United States. So that her judgment will be uncorrupted and unbiased, she is blindfolded to hide from her whether the defendant is rich or powerful, young or old, man or women, black or white.

The rights these requirements define should not only be just, they also should be well considered and vital. This can be achieved by making sure that people will have the

TABLE 2.1
Requirements of the Principles
of Social Justice

Universality
apply to all
Practicality
can do
Fairness
agreed to by nearly everyone
objective
people blind to personal
interests

strongest motivation to seek, propose, and weigh such rights and the related powers of government. It would be easy enough for you to say that you should have a right not to be discriminated against, but is this a right that you would passionately support, even at the risk of death? If a right can be agreed upon that meets the above requirements, then it is truly a basic and just right.

Those rights and related principles meeting all these requirements will define social justice and just governance.

Now, to have a little fun: assume that the following happens to you. Suddenly, you hear a voice in your head. You look around, but no one is talking, or if they are, the inner voice overrides what they are saying. You get anxious, wonder if you are going crazy, but, the voice has a soothing quality, and you soon are told what it happening: the inner voice is being sent to you telepathically from aliens in a spaceship near earth. They are galactic conservationists from another star system giving you the following message.

People of earth, hear us. All your lives are at risk. Your planet will be passing through a lethal, galactic warp storm in two years, and the resulting radiation will exterminate all life on earth. As conservationists we are dedicated to protecting all intelligent life forms in the galaxy and are here to save your species from death.

To do this we have found a habitable planet orbiting a distant sun. It has no competing intelligent life, and we can teleport all of you to it. However, according to the laws of our galactic federation, we can make such a transfer of intelligent life forms only if virtually all of you agree among yourselves on what rights you will have in your new world, and the related principles of government under which you will live. If you reach a strong consensus on this, we will then teleport you to this New World.

But our galactic federation also commands us to inform you of one technological problem. Our teleportation equipment for transferring alien life forms is not perfect, and we cannot promise that our equipment can keep your mind and body together: some or many of your minds may end up in different bodies, but without physical harm or loss of intelligence or faculties.

So that you may debate and agree on your rights in, and the principles

governing your New World, we will set up in two months, telepathically, a Convention of Minds. In the Convention all of you will be able to propose the guiding principles and human rights of your New World, debate them, and vote upon them.

This hypothetical Convention of Minds and possible transfer to a New World meets the requirements set out for defining your just rights. All people would take part and the resulting rights and principles, if they get a consensus vote, would be universal. Second, you would not know what body your mind would end up in after the teleportation, and you must make your judgments independent of your race, ethnicity, nationality, sex, age, handicaps, and other physical characteristics and skills, as well as your wealth, power, and prestige. This would assure your objectivity. And the fact that you, your loved ones and friends, and all humankind would be wiped out unless nearly all of you agree on the principles, provides the important motivation to some universal solution.

Imagine now that the aliens convene the Convention of Minds, people make proposals, and the debate begins. What will the patterns of these proposals then be? Surely, they will reflect the variety of the world's ideologies, religions, and cultures. Democratic individualists, democratic socialists, state socialists, fascists, militarists, monarchists, and the few remaining Marxists and Maoists will offer their idea of rights and governance, as will Buddhists, Catholics and Protestants, Shiite and Sunni Muslims, Confucianists, and pantheists. And surely, the variety of secular humanists, nonpolitical atheists, advocates of nonviolence, environmentalists, feminists, gay activists, and many, many others will make their views known. Then there are the cultural differences between races, ethnicities, and nationalities that surely would influence, if not predetermine, the choice of rights and government.

Could everyone agree on one set of rights and principles? I do not believe so, and simulations of this convention that I have set up in my classes over the years have all confirmed this. Even if the survival of our species were at stake, people across the globe would not be able to agree on their rights and the associated principles of governance. They hold their beliefs so deeply, and for some so fanatically, that they would be willing to die for them. Thus, human history has seen people volunteer for suicide bombing and terrorist attacks, and to fight and possibly die in guerrilla wars, violent revolutions, and even war itself. To therefore expect, for example, a practicing Catholic to accept that he and all Christians should have only the right to obey the Koran, and live under a Muslim's principles of governance, is unreasonable. Nor do I believe a liberal democrat would accept communist principles; nor would a communist or socialist accept capitalist ones. I say flatly: the Convention of Minds would achieve no agreement on rights and governing principles. It would be

deadlocked.

But there would still be a solution. The debate at first would be over the rights everyone would have to live by and principles governing all. Each would assume, naturally, that if everyone agreed on the socialist principles of government ownership of the means of production and its enforcement of relative equality in outcomes--the same wages, benefits, advantages, and goods for all--these would have to be the principles operating universally and at all levels of government. If you were not a socialist, you surely would not agree to this. If you are militantly antisocialist, envisioning what happened to people under communism in the Soviet Union and Maoist China, then you might even prefer death to living under these principles.

But *death*? As you realize this dilemma, you are like a watermelon seed squeezed between two fingers. You are squeezed hard on one side by the prospect of not only your personal death and that of your loved ones, but of all humankind. Pressing hard from the other side is your logical and emotional inability to agree on many proposed rights and principles. These opposing mental forces, I contend, would pop your debate to a higher, transcendent level.

And at this higher level, a *metasolution* would break the Convention's stalemate. Before going into this metasolution, three examples may help clarify what "metasolution" means. If you have a plumbing leak in your house, you and your mate can debate how the plumbing is to be fixed, or you can hire a plumber to fix the plumbing as they see fit. The choice of plumber is a metasolution to the leak. As another example, imagine trying to divide farmland equally between two sons. You can divide the land between the sons, but nothing is ever equal and one or both may accuse you of being unfair. So, a metasolution: let one divide the land and the other chooses which half they want. Finally, rather than continually try to choose who among your two children who gets what goodie or does what chore, assign the children to take their bath first on alternate weeks, and then simply give whatever to the child who takes their bath that day. Who gets to sit next to the window in the car on this trip? Why, the one who takes their bath first. Another metasolution.

And the Convention would propose such a metasolution, and even the fanatics of one principle or another would see the advantage of agreeing on it. This metasolution would follow the well-known argument: "Well, if we can't agree, let's agree to disagree and do our own thing." That is, the metasolution upon which there would be a consensus, I argue, would involve two simple rights. The first, a *free choice* right, would be that

People have a right to form their own communities.

And second, the *free exit* right,

People have a right to leave any community.

Together, these rights would give you and all others the right to organize with each other a community governed by your own principles and with whatever rights you all want, as long as you do not force this community on others and anyone is free to leave it.

Surely you and others in the Convention would realize that in the New World, these two rights would need to be enforced, and the resulting communities protected from aggression by their neighbors; therefore I believe the metasolution would also involve a single principle of governance.

A limited, democratic, federation of all communities would govern the New World.

Its basic job would be to administer, guarantee, and protect the Free Choice and Free Exit rights.

By demand, no doubt, the Convention would give each future community an equal vote in the federation's legislature. But also, those who see that their community might be among the larger ones would equally demand that the Convention protect them against rule by a majority of tiny communities. They would argue for a second legislative chamber of the world federation that would give each community votes proportional to its population. Moreover, even the most confirmed authoritarians or absolutists would settle for some mechanism to check the domination of this world government so that it does not unduly intervene in the affairs of their community, and so on.

However these articles of the future constitution would work out, the basic principle and associated government is clear. It would be a liberal democracy, as defined in the next chapter, except that the democratic civil liberties and political rights would refer to *communities* and not individuals. All communities would have a right to vote for their representative to the world government in fair and periodic elections, all would be equal before the law, all would have the freedom to organize, the freedom of speech, and so on. And as the Convention would see necessary, I am sure, it would limit the power of the federal world government to guaranteeing and protecting the Free Choice and Free Exit rights. This would be the only type of government that

would allow you and others to do your own thing consistent with all having the same right.

Finally, if a vote of all people in the world were to be taken on the just Free Choice and Free Exit rights and democratic principle, then I believe that in the Convention a huge majority of the world's people would adopt them. For whether you are a monarchist, fascist, communist, liberal democrat, Muslim, whatever, if you could find enough others to agree with you on forming your own community, then you would have the right to do so. You could live under whatever government you want, even an utterly totalitarian one. Just one qualification: you must allow any of your community members to leave, if they so wished.

In short, you would *be free to be unfree*, and this is part of what democratic freedom means. Indeed, I would argue that the human or natural right to be free implies the Free Choice right. Free speech does not mean that you have to speak out. You can say nothing if you wish, or join a group in which this freedom is strictly circumscribed or is totalitarian in governance, such as in the military or a monastery. Freedom of religion means that if you so desire you can form a group in which only one religion is legitimate, and you keep out those with other religions, as in a Catholic nunnery. And within liberal democracies today, you usually can support and participate in antidemocratic political parties and movements. The communist party, for example, is legal in the United States and most other democracies.

We will get into this more in the next chapter, but here I might note that *democracy is a metasolution to the problem of diversity*. It provides a way of uniting under one government people who are vastly different socially, culturally, and philosophically. And as in the Convention of Minds, democracy solves this problem by saying "Govern yourself, but do so in a manner consistent with the same right of others." Democracy does not lay down a template for your life, as do other types of government. Rather, as a metasolution it is a method of governance that prevents possible bloody conflicts over rights and principles for the greater society.

Yes, you have moral, just rights. They are universal, and what people would choose to live under were they given the chance. And they are socially just. But all this is justified through a bizarre science-fiction tale. Quite rightly, you might want a more direct and realistic reason for accepting these two rights. This is given by the evolution of international relations and its legal principles.

Throughout eons of human history, through the growth and collapse of clans and cities, nations and states, civilizations and empires; through the many human disasters and catastrophes, wars and revolutions; through the growth and decay of religions and creeds, philosophies, and ideologies; and through the countless day-by-day interactions of billions of people has evolved a system of world governance based, in effect, on the two hypothetical rights emerging from the Convention of Minds. The most basic right you have in the modern international system is that of self-determination for your country or national group, with its allied international legal principle of state sovereignty.

The idea of self-determination has had tremendous power in international relations. In the Twentieth Century it was the force behind demands for independence by the former British, French, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish colonies. Against the cries for self-determination, these nations could no longer justify their undemocratic and remote imperial rule. In a few decades after World War II, much of the world was decolonized, and by the end of the Soviet empire, no more than a few small and scattered colonies remained.

A corollary to the principle of sovereignty is that no other nation has a right to intervene in your nation's domestic affairs. The principle, really a metaprinciple, of sovereignty legally allows your community to govern itself with great freedom. Although by their agreements and treaties nations have placed certain restrictions on this sovereignty, as to the right to carry out genocide or slavery, and obligate all governments to respect certain human rights, your nation still is nearly free to govern itself.

Why, for example, has not the United Nations or a powerful coalition of democratic countries invaded Burma, Sudan, or Saudi Arabia, to stop their killing and denial of human rights? Of course, it is partly a matter of the costs involved and the apathy or ignorance of democratic peoples about what life is like in these countries. It is partly that the media does not constantly pound us with images of the horrors going on in these countries, as already noted. But more important, the sovereignty of these countries protects them. It is a very high legal and political hurdle to jump over for those who want intervention. Especially, each country that might approve such an intervention has to wonder whether it is setting a precedent for itself. Nonetheless, such intervention has happened. This is shown by the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo, and I mentioned before the intervention in Somalia. But such interventions to protect or assert human rights are done with extreme reluctance and much delay, and are very rare.

Second, although this is not respected by all countries, international law gives you the

right to immigrate and, particularly, to political asylum. This is, in effect, the Free Exit principle.

And third, The United Nations has become a very limited global, democratic, federal government. It has a head of government, a legislature, an administration, and a judicial system. It only lacks a monopoly of force over the world, but such monopoly is not a defining characteristic of government. In operation the United Nations meets the constitutional principles needed to guarantee and administer the Free Choice and Free Exit rights. The major and deep remaining difference from what the Convention would decide is that since it has no military force of its own it must depend on military contributions from member nations, as in its peacekeeping operations or to implement a Security Council resolution. But the direction of change is toward a stronger and more capable United Nations and even eventually, its own very limited military capability.

We find, therefore, that through our many millennia of civilizations, empires, city-states, nations, alliances, wars, and revolutions, the world's peoples have slowly evolved a metasolution to their vastly different societies and cultures, as a species evolves in response to its environment. This real-world metasolution has globally institutionalized the Free Choice and Free Exit rights, along with a federal, democratic world government.

A final argument supports the outcome of the hypothetical Convention of Minds. The Nazi government increasingly discriminated against Jews living in Germany in the 1930s, and many had relatives or friends the Nazis had imprisoned in concentration camps. This was still before the Holocaust, which began in 1941. Although immigration was legal and Jews could thereby escape from the Nazis, most still wanted to live in Germany. After all, it was where their ancestors were born, and where their friends and relatives lived. They could not easily pull up their roots and leave, and anyway there were many knowledgeable Jews arguing that the Nazi regime would change for the better, or that at least things would get no worse. So they stayed--and most died.

Before this horror happened, however, some perceptive Jewish families did not want to take any chances with their children and wanted to send them to school abroad. But where? In what country would they have the greatest opportunity to realize their potential? Generally what they choose for their children was a country democratically free, such as Great Britain, Canada, or the United States. These families made such a choice under circumstances similar to those of the hypothetical Convention of Minds. They sent their children off to a different world, not knowing what their children would be like, ultimately, and therefore how they would benefit.

They thus chose a nation in which their children would have the greatest freedom of choice, which was under a democratic government.

I began this chapter by discussing those human rights that you have by virtue of you being a human being. There has been much effort by nations to define what these rights might be and foster their fulfillment. I pointed out the United Nations and international agreements now well describe your human rights, and in sum mean that you have a human right to be free. This is your right because nations have agreed that this is so, and have so formally agreed in a way to give this right the force of international law. And from this human right you now have flows other rights, such as your freedom of speech, association, and religion.

Though nations have agreed that your freedom is a right, there is the question whether philosophers can justify this right. After all, by their practices and agreements, nations once accepted slavery. Turning to philosophy, I pointed to several arguments that philosophers make to justify freedom, and then provided my own argument based on a hypothetical social contract.

We would find, I argue, that virtually all people, blind to their personal benefits, and acting through a hypothetical Convention of Minds, would agree to a social contract giving each other the right to choose how they live, and to leave any community in which they live. And the circumstances of this decision make these socially just rights. We also find that millennia of human evolution have produced similar rights among nations, specifically the right any people have to sovereign self-determination and free immigration.

Legally, morally, and by the practice of nations, then, you should be free. And to further and guard this freedom your country should be democratic.

NOTES

*** Written for this web site. I am indebted to Judson Knight for his careful editing and helpful comments on a draft of this chapter.**

Chapter 3

What is Democratic Freedom?

Liberal democracy is the institutionalization of human rights--it is the most practical solution to the freedom of each being compatible with the freedom of all.

----This web site

Whatever freedoms you have cannot exist in a political vacuum. There must be some way of assuring and protecting your rights--your freedom, and government is the answer. Even libertarians generally accept this, although they are the most ardent proponents of the maximum freedom, and believe that while government is evil, it is necessary or inevitable.

But not just any government will do. It must be one that not only commands your obedience to its laws, but one that in its very organization embodies what being free means to you. This is democracy. As a concept, "democracy" has not only developed many meanings since its first use by the ancient Greeks, but also meanings once well-established have changed.

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- [Chapter 8. "What is to be Explained?"](#) (on the nature of societies and political systems)
- [Figure 8.1: "The Political Triangle: Societies and Associated Political Regimes"](#)

You may define democracy by its inherent nature and by its empirical conditions. As to its nature, Aristotle defined democracy as rule by the people (Greek *demokratia*: *demos* meaning people + *-kratia*, *-cracy*, meaning rule or governing body) and this idea that in some way the people govern themselves is still the core sense of democracy. In the ancient Greek city states and the early Roman Republic democracy meant that people participated directly in governing and making policy. This was possible because of the small populations of these cities, hardly ever more than 10,000 people, and the exclusion of women and slaves from participation. Although limited to free males, this idea of the direct participation of the people in government was the central meaning of democracy up to modern times, and now is usually known as pure or direct democracy.




John Locke 1632–1704

Philosophers of the Enlightenment, such as Immanuel Kant and John Locke, disliked direct democracy, although otherwise they favored freedom. For one thing, it was impractical for nations of millions of people, or even for cities of hundreds of thousands. Clearly, a representative system was necessary. For another, they felt that democracy, as so understood, was mob rule,

government by the ill informed who would simply use government to advantage them.

This distrust was evident in the eighty-five essays of *The Federalist Papers* (1787-1788) written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay on the proposed Constitution of The United States. They assumed that people behave to fulfill their self-interest and were generally selfish, making a direct democracy as a means to achieve justice and protect natural rights dangerous. Nonetheless, they believed strongly in the "consent of the governed," and argued for a republican form of government in which elected representatives would reflect popular will. This was a general view among the authors of the Constitution, who believed that by establishing a republic they would institutionalize the central ideas of their Declaration of Independence (1776):



. . . We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That, to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. . . .

Constitutionally, therefore, the founders of the United States established a republic, not a democracy--as political philosophers then defined democracy. A republic is based on the consent and will of the people, but through a buffer of elected representatives and indirect election, as by the President and Vice President of the United States whom an electoral college elects, with the electors chosen by the voters of each state and their number depending on the number of senators and representatives each state sends to Congress.

That the United States was created as a republic and that we now call it a democracy has caused considerable confusion. In the writings on my web site I refer to the United States as a democracy, and therefore have received well over a dozen e-mails informing me that it was not a democracy, but a republic. The problem is that in the Twentieth Century the understanding of democracy as the direct participation of



"The Signing of the Constitution of the United States" By Howard Chandler Christy, Courtesy Architect of the Capitol: Copyright 1985 United States Historical Society

citizens was transformed to mean any government in which the people elect their representatives. Democracy now generally means a republican or representation government.

With this contemporary understanding of the term democracy, what are its characteristics. One necessary and sufficient set of characteristics involves the electoral system through which people choose their representatives and leaders, and thus give their consent to be governed and communicate their interests. The manner in which democracies conduct their elections vary from one to another, but all share these characteristics: regular elections for high office, secret ballot, a franchise including nearly the whole adult population, and competitive elections.

Having a near-universal franchise is an entirely modern addition to the idea of democracy. Not long ago, governments that were called democratic excluded from the franchise all slaves and women, as did the United States through much of its history (former American black, male slaves got the right to vote after the Civil War; women did not get this right until 1920, when Congress passed the Nineteenth Amendment), as well as all non-slave males who did not meet certain property or literacy requirements. We now consider it perverse to call democratic any country that so

restricts the vote, as did the apartheid regime in South Africa that limited voting to minority whites. Real competition in the elections is a key requirement. Many communist nations had all the electoral characteristics mentioned, periodically electing legislators hand picked by the Communist Party, and who simply rubber-stamped what the Party wanted. Competitive means that those running for office reflect different political beliefs and positions on the issues. If they do not, as in the communist nations, then the government is not democratic.

Table 3.1
Freedom = Liberal Democracy

Characteristics of Liberal Democracy

Electoral

secret ballot
regular elections for high office
competitive elections
near universal franchise

Human Rights

organize political parties/groups
open government
freedom of speech/free media
freedom of religion
freedom to form unions/businesses
fair trial/rule by law

Besides its electoral characteristics, one kind of democracy has characteristics, which while neither necessary nor sufficient for democracy to exist, are crucial to your freedom. These involve the recognition of certain human rights discussed in the previous chapter. One is the freedom to organize political groups or parties, even if they represent a small radical minority, and for the party to nominate their members to run for high office. Another right is that to an open, transparent, government, in particularly knowing how one's representatives voted and debated. Also there are the rights to freedom of speech, particularly the freedom of newspapers and other

communication media to criticize government policies and leaders; freedom of religion; and the freedom to form unions and organize businesses.

One of the most important of these rights is to a fair trial and rule by law. Above the state there must be a law that structures the government, elaborates the reciprocal rights and duties of government and the people, and which all governing officials and their policies must obey. This is a constitution, either as a single document as for the United States, or a set of documents, statutes, and traditions, as for Great Britain.

If a democracy recognizes these rights, we call it a *liberal democracy*. If it does not, if it has only the electoral characteristics, but suppresses freedom of speech, leaders put themselves above the law, representatives make and vote on policies in secret, then we can call it a *procedural*, or better, an *electoral democracy*.

For American readers particularly there is conceptual confusion over the term "liberal." In the mid-seventeenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, political philosophers emphasized the root meaning of liberal, which is from the Latin *liberalis* for free man and the French *liber* for free. It stood for an emphasis on individual liberty--on the freedom of a people versus their government. A liberal slogan of the time was "the government that governs least governs best." It was hammered out in England's Glorious Revolution of 1688, the French Revolution, and the American Revolution, and articulated in the works of John Locke, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill. This emphasis on freedom from government regulation and controls we now call classical liberalism, and presently are reflected best in political philosophy of American conservatives. Libertarians also trace their philosophy back to classical liberalism, but this is true only regarding the classical liberals emphasis on economic freedom and human rights. Classical liberals, but unlike modern libertarians and liberals, believed that the government had a strong moral role. Conservatives show their affinity for this moral role by their support for laws against dope, prostitution, and gambling

In modern times liberal has evolved to mean a belief that government is a tool to improve society and deal with the problems of poverty, discrimination, and monopolies, among others, and to improve public health, education, social security, the environment, and working conditions. There is no less an emphasis on human rights, a dedication which is shared by Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and modern liberals, but the liberal today no longer accepts minimum government, nor sees the government as the danger classical liberals perceived it.

In "liberal" democracy, however, it is the root definition of liberal that is meant, and

not its modern sense. A liberal democracy then means that a people rule themselves through periodic elections of their highest leaders in which nearly all adults can participate, for which offices they are eligible, and under the rule of law which guarantees them certain human rights.

In sum, then, democracy now means a republican form of government,

which may be only electorally representative in its characteristics, or also liberal. Table 3.1, above, summarizes these two kinds of democracies.

Table 3.2
Electoral and Liberal Democracy
<u>Characteristics of Electoral Democracy</u>
secret ballot
regular elections for high office
competitive elections
near universal franchise
<u>Characteristics of Liberal Democracy</u>
An electoral democracy
Plus:
freedom to organize political parties/groups
open government
freedom of speech/free media
freedom of religion
freedom to form unions and businesses
fair trial/rule by law

So far, all I have given you about democracy is concepts and abstractions, which may roughly connect to your experience. It is time for an example that well illustrates the nature and working of liberal democracy. Such is the impeachment and trial of William Jefferson Clinton, the President of the United States, in 1998 to 1999.

The Clinton impeachment was a deeply divisive, partisan political battle, and most Americans developed strong opinions supporting or opposing it. After all, this was a

matter of whether the nationally elected President of the United States would be fired. As I will review events leading up to the impeachment and the impeachment itself, my only interest is in what Clinton's presidency says about liberal democracy, not in arguing for or against the President, the impeachment, or his two campaigns for the office.

To begin at the beginning, Clinton was born in Hope, Arkansas, in 1946, a few months after his father died. When he was two years old, he lived with his grandparents in Hope while his mother studied nursing in New Orleans. Two years later his mother married a car salesman, and Clinton joined the new family. His stepfather was hardly a good role model for the young boy: he physically mistreated Clinton's mother and was an alcoholic.



Baby Clinton



Boy Clinton

While Clinton was fourteen, he joined a youth program to learn about government, and as a delegate was part of a group that went to Washington, D.C. While there, President John F. Kennedy invited the group to meet with him in the White House. This was an unforgettable experience for teenage Clinton, who was very much impressed by Kennedy. He even shook his hand; more important for the future was the fact that the experience decided young Clinton on politics as a profession and sparked his ambition to be president.

Clinton was an excellent student, and much involved in student politics. He completed high school, got a degree in international affairs from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and won a two-year Rhodes scholarship to Oxford University in England. On his return to the United States he attended Yale Law School and received his law degree in 1973. During this whole period, from the time he attended Georgetown to getting his law degree, he tried to learn politics firsthand. He worked in the office of Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas, and in the presidential campaign of Senator George McGovern in 1972. He also took part in demonstrations against the Vietnam War.

Note several things about Clinton's rise so far. One is that his humble beginnings did

not prevent him from actually meeting and shaking hands with the President of the United States--not only the highest office of the country, but also the most powerful in the world. Second, he could obtain work in the office of an American senator and take part in the law making of America's highest legislative body. In addition, without fear of retribution or any negative consequences, he was also able to help Senator McGovern wage his election campaign to defeat that of the incumbent, President Richard M. Nixon.



Clinton meets President Kennedy

Most revealing about liberal democracy, Clinton felt free to join public demonstrations, even in England, against a war his country was conducting. As exemplified in the first chapter by Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, and China, in many parts of the world this could get you arrested, tortured, and even executed by the regime on your return to your country, as well as it retaliating against your family and even killing them. In some other countries, this would cause your harassment by authorities, and possibly the end of any possibility of future political office. But living in a liberal democracy, Clinton had nothing to fear from a secret police. He could learn the art of politics from personal experience and prepare himself for running for political office, while also exercising his right to public protest.

After receiving his law degree, Clinton worked on the staff of the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, and then in 1974 the University of Arkansas appointed him to their Law School faculty. In this year he began his formal political career by running for Congress as a Democrat, and lost. But in 1976, he decided that he would be more successful if he worked up from a lower rung on the political ladder, and was successful campaigning for the office of the Attorney General of Arkansas. He then used this position to run for the highest state office, and at age thirty-two, the people of Arkansas elected him Governor.

However, he had yet to learn the democratic limits of this high office. Because of his reform policies, along with a tax he had imposed, Arkansans kicked Clinton out of office in the 1980 elections. Yet, he had learned well how to manage democratic politics. After Clinton showed public remorse for his "mistakes" in office (and after running a carefully calculated campaign), Arkansans returned him to the governorship in 1982. They also reelected him three more times.

To Clinton this was all preparation to run for president. He had passed up the opportunity to do so in 1988 because of rumors about his womanizing, but in 1992, he felt that he stood a good chance of being nominated by the Democratic Party. Much stronger candidates for the nomination had refused to run, believing that the huge popularity of President George Bush

resulting from his victory in the 1990-1991 Gulf War made his reelection to the presidency certain. Clinton thought, however, he could stress poor economic conditions, the "Reagan-Bush deficit," and the need for change. And to the surprise of many who did not see him as a national figure, he did win the nomination. Then, with the motto, "It's the economy, stupid," he won the presidential election with 43 percent of the vote. Both sides to this election used their freedom of speech to the maximum, with Clinton's opponents focusing on his womanizing, his taking part in anti-Vietnam War demonstrations while in England, and his alleged draft dodging along with a subsequent cover-up.

What is also noteworthy about this election is that out of nowhere, a very rich business executive, H. Ross Perot, was able to capture public attention as an independent, even running ahead of President Bush and Governor Clinton in popularity at one point in the campaign. He finally got 19 percent of the presidential vote. Had he not made several missteps in his campaign and been politically inexperienced, he might have even won the three-way election.

Since democratic campaigns are a running test of a candidate's character, experience, strength, and capacity for office, those who try to run for the highest offices without prior political experience seldom succeed. Nonetheless, sometimes they do, as did Jesse Ventura, a professional wrestler, actor, and talk show host, who on less than \$400,000 won a three-way election campaign for governor of Minnesota. In liberal democratic elections, outsiders are a constant threat to established parties and candidates, as it should be when the consent of the governed rules.



Chief Justice William Rehnquist administers the oath of office to President Bill Clinton 1993

Who you elect is a matter of your perception and interest; how well off you are in your job and income; and your judgment about the candidate's character and promises. And you are free to exercise your judgment, no matter how biased, anywhere along the campaign trail, whether in voting for the candidates in caucuses or party conventions, or in voting for the final nominee, or in running yourself as a party nominee or an independent.

During President Clinton's 1996 reelection campaign, economic conditions were good, and Clinton and his supporters ran an excellent public relations and political campaign against Republican Senator Robert Dole and independent candidate Perot. Fearing a voter backlash over excessive negative campaigning, and misreading that the public already was upset by several scandals surrounding Clinton and his White House, Republicans did not capitalize on them. Near the end of the campaign, public opinion polls made clear that these scandals would play little role in the coming election, making Dole cry out in frustration, "Where's the outrage?" Moreover, Republicans made some disastrous political mistakes, the worst of which was to allow Clinton and his supporters to establish in the public mind that the Republican-dominated House of Representatives had shut down the government in an argument with the President over the budget. They also allowed the Democrats to convince the public that the Republicans had no compassion for working families, children, and the elderly. Clinton easily won reelection in 1996 with 49 percent of the vote.

While the Clinton story gives us insight into the nature of liberal democratic elections and the public's participation in, and determination of, who governs them, it is President Clinton's second term that provides a key understanding of this kind of government. These would be tumultuous and most historic years for the country. Even in his first term, President Clinton's opponents forced him to respond to allegations of wrongdoing committed while he was Governor of Arkansas, involving investments that he and the First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton, had made in the Whitewater Development Corporation, an Arkansas real estate development firm. Revelations and questions about this, and associated affairs having to do with a savings and loans firm, Madison Guaranty, eventually led to an official federal investigation by an Independent Counsel, Robert Fiske.

Because of the Nixon Watergate scandal, Congress had established this office of Independent Counsel. Presumably the Independent Counsel would be free from the assumed conflict of interest a Justice Department would have in investigating the President or members of his cabinet, since the President appointed the top people at Justice. Besides the Fiske investigation, the House and Senate Banking committees also held hearings on the Whitewater affair.

Notice that democratic leaders cannot escape the law, even regarding what they might have done before being elected or appointed to office. Prosecutors may investigate their past and present activities, force them to testify before a grand jury, indict them, and even bring them to trial. This contributes to what keeps democracies limited, which is their checks and balances system. This means that the executive leaders, legislature, and courts are in constant competition against each other for power and influence, and watch each other for opportunities to gain advantage or weaken one another. This balancing is particularly true when there are political parties close in power. If, as during all but two years of the Clinton presidency, the opposing party controls the legislature, it acts as an ever-vigilant watchdog over the executive. Scandals play a major role in this, and provide the opposition with ammunition to weaken their opponents. This would become particularly clear in the later impeachment of the President. All this contributes to keeping democratic leaders responsible, prudent, and limited in their power.

However, where one political party dominates a state, controls the legislature, executive, and courts, and has a sympathetic media, then there usually will be political corruption. When there is a strong opposition party to exploit the corruption of the governing party for electoral gain, incumbents will be more careful about obeying the letter and spirit of the law. Moreover, when democratic states have a dominant party controlling all government bodies, with only a weak opposition to appeal to public outrage over high taxes and government intervention, they tend toward Big Government. Such, for example, has been the case with Hawaii, which Democrats have wholly governed in the last four decades with hardly any meaningful Republican opposition.

Clinton did not have it so easy. He has always faced a strong Republican Party, and in all but two of the years of his two terms, they controlled both the House and Senate.

As mentioned, there were several scandals involving the President and his White House during his first term. Although these did not prevent his reelection, they helped create a dominant view among conservatives that he and his administration were politically corrupt, and that he was engaged in a systematic abuse of power. The first White House scandal occurred when his aides suddenly fired seven long-term employees of the White House travel office in 1993. This firing was done in a rush, with unjustified and later disproved accusations of fraud made against the White House employees, and the FBI used to investigate them. Apparently, these accusations and the investigation were only an excuse to cover the wish to replace them with Clinton friends and supporters. The First Lady officially denied any involvement in this, although there was evidence to the contrary. Because of the possibility that she was lying and that the presidential aides had misused the FBI, Attorney General

Reno requested that a three-judge panel appoint Independent Council to investigate. This turned out to be Republican Kenneth Starr, a name that in a few years would become almost as well-known as President Clinton's. Judge Starr had served in President Reagan's Justice Department, had been a federal judge, and had served as Solicitor General under President Bush. A three-judge panel had already appointed him to replace Independent Counsel Fiske in the investigation of Whitewater. Years later, he would clear both the President and First Lady of indictable wrongdoing in this.

Another scandal involved the apparent suicide of the Clinton's close friend and Deputy White House Counsel, Vince Foster, who had handled the Clinton's taxes and Whitewater matters. Upon his suicide, Clinton's aides removed files from Foster's office before it police could search and seal it. This raised the question about a serious cover-up of Whitewater wrongdoing. As though Independent Counsel Starr did not have enough to investigate, the three-judge panel also asked him to determine whether Foster's death was a suicide and whether White House aides illegally removed files from his office. In his report to Congress on his investigation, Starr affirmed that Foster had committed suicide and that the President and First Lady had not carried on a cover-up.

Yet, another scandal was the discovery that the White House had requested from the FBI, and had been holding without official justification, as many as a thousand secret FBI files, many on top Republicans and opponents. Controversy, especially in 1996, swirled around how the White House used these files and who was responsible for this. A three-judge panel also turned the matter over to Independent Counsel Starr to investigate. The result was that after several years he cleared the President and First Lady of any responsibility for this matter. Nonetheless, that these files were under White House control and that aides possibly exploited them in their campaign against President Clinton's opponents helped feed the outrage that later would lead to Clinton's impeachment.

Further scandals intensified the feeling among conservatives that the White House was politically corrupt, but the one that finally led to impeachment involved Paula Jones, a former clerk in the Arkansas State government. Encouraged and surrounded by President Clinton's opponents (called "Clinton-haters" by President Clinton's supporters), she alleged that while he was the Governor of Arkansas in 1991, one of his State Troopers invited her up to the governor's hotel room, and that when she was alone in the room with the governor, he dropped his pants and asked her for oral sex. The White House and Clinton supporters responded aggressively to these charges, and tried to undermine her credibility. James Carville, a Democrat political

consultant credited with guiding Clinton's presidential election campaign to victory in 1992, and his chief defender against all accusations of abuse of power, called Jones "Arkansas trailer trash."

Angered by the personal attacks on her, she filed a civil suit of sexual harassment against President Clinton, and demanded \$700,000 and a personal apology. Working through his lawyers, Clinton appealed the suit, and asked for a delay until after his term was over. But the Supreme Court ruled that the suit should go ahead. After more legal twists and turns and appeals, including Paula Jones upping her demand to a million dollars, President Clinton settled the case in 1999 by sending her a check for \$850,000, and with no apology.



Paula Jones

Notice first that no matter how powerful the President is, no matter how much support he has, a lowly citizen can sue him in court. But as important, despite the power the President has, the sources of the White House at his disposal, his small army of lawyers, his broad support in the media, and his popularity, the courts can force the President to defend himself in court according to the law. Keep in mind that in military terms he was the most powerful head of any country in the world. Moreover, he, his lawyers, and his supporters, used the major media that were on his side, every technical legal device ever written into the law, and any possible wayward interpretation of the law, to claim that Jones had no right to sue him. This is to be expected from any high official caught in such a sexual scandal. The absolutely critical point here is not what Clinton and all did, but that it all was to no avail. In a liberal democracy the law rules. In this case, no matter his twists and turns, the law came down against the President of the United States and on the side of this unknown clerk from Arkansas.

While this suit was in process, Clinton began an eighteen-month affair in the White House and his Oval Office with 22-year-old Monica Lewinsky, a White House intern. Although President Clinton disputes that he had sexual relations with Lewinsky, she did give him oral sex, a fact later proved by a DNA test of the semen on a blue dress she wore during one of these meetings.

Lewinsky confided details of this affair to a friend, Linda Tripp, who began to secretly tape their telephone conversations. Tripp later explained that she did this because Lewinsky had asked her to lie in a deposition for which Trip had been



President Clinton hugging Lewinsky

subpoenaed
in the
Jones
suit.
Jones
lawyers
were
trying to
show that
what
allegedly
happened
to Jones



Monica Lewinsky

was but a pattern of sexual misconduct by President Clinton, and had subpoenaed Lewinsky, who told Tripp she would lie to protect her lover. Tripp had worked in the White House, and there had seen Kathleen Willey, a White House volunteer, shortly after Willey left an Oval Office appointment with Clinton in 1993. Willey told Tripp that Clinton had kissed and fondled her, and therefore Tripp was important to the Jones defense; but if she told the truth in the deposition, she believed, the White House would try to ruin her credibility.

After she gathered twenty hours of tapes of Lewinsky, she turned them over to Independent Counsel Starr, whose investigative load was already heavy. Judge Starr took this information to Attorney General Janet Reno, who then asked the three-judge panel responsible for appointing independent counsels to appoint Judge Starr to investigate the Lewinsky affair. There is nothing in the law against sexual affairs in the White House, but the President might have broken several laws on other matters, including possible sexual harassment of Lewinsky, asking her to lie in court, and bribing her to keep quiet.

By decision of the Supreme Court, President Clinton also had to give a pretrial deposition in the Jones suit, with all of it being videotaped. In January of 1998, with Jones sitting across from him, Jones's lawyers then questioned him for six hours. He had no idea that they knew about his affair with Lewinsky, and was quite surprised when they brought it up. Given a broad definition of sexual relations, approved by the judge sitting in on the deposition, President Clinton denied under oath that he had sexual relations as so defined with Lewinsky, and claimed that he did not remember ever being alone with her in the White House.

Within days, news of the Lewinsky affair and the deposition swept the country. For weeks commentators, analysts, and politicians of all flavors discussed, argued,

dissected the news. Some top commentators thought President Clinton would have to resign within week or so. The media exploited the slightest rumor, and bit players in the scandal, no matter how remotely involved, had their fifteen minutes of fame before television cameras. No two lawyers seemed to agree on the law covering this affair or possible impeachment, and sometimes directly contradicted each other. It seemed that the law was a mess. But the law allows interpretation, and often the expertise of different lawyers differs. All this is subject to partisanship, and nothing arouses partisan passions more in a democracy than a dispute over whether the head of government should resign or the people should fire him.

Meanwhile, President Clinton denied to his supporters and White House staff that there was any sex involved with Lewinsky. And, of course, Clinton's defenders, especially those in the major media, tried to muddle the investigation by constantly claiming this was an investigation of sex, rather than of perjury or abuse of power. Within days Clinton tried to defend himself and on television, wagging his finger, made his now famous declaration that we all have seen a thousand times: "But I want to say one thing to the American people. I want you to listen to me. I'm going to say this again: I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky. I never told anybody to lie, not a single time--never. These allegations are false. And I need to go back to work for the American people."



President Clinton's speech to the nation: "I did not have sexual relations...."

In July the Independent Counsel finally gave Monica Lewinsky full immunity for testifying against President Clinton, and she gave him her blue dress with President Clinton's semen stains. Before Judge Starr's Grand Jury she provided details about her sexual relations with President Clinton, but also claimed that he had not asked her to lie, or to keep quiet about their relationship.

Shortly thereafter, President Clinton also had to answer questions before the Grand Jury. Independent Counsel Starr did this by a closed-circuit television hookup to the White House, which he also videotaped. President Clinton answered many questions on the Lewinsky affair and information she had provided, but would not answer any questions about sex. However, after President Clinton finished his testimony, he went on national television and admitted an "inappropriate relationship" with Lewinsky

and that his comments and silence had given a "false impression." Then, in lieu of an apology, he said: "I deeply regret that."

In September 1998, Independent Counsel Starr gave his report on this scandal to the House of Representatives, as required by law. It was, in effect, a 453-page indictment of President Clinton, listing eleven allegedly impeachable offenses. The House almost immediately released the full report to the public, along with thousands of pages of evidence soon thereafter. Within days, the House Judiciary Committee also made public the full videotape of President Clinton's testimony before the Grand Jury.



Judge Kenneth Starr

This openness well illustrates the transparency of a liberal democracy. Opponents or proponents will disclose all that is politically important, including dirty laundry, about some politician, legislation, or policy. This is a crucial role of the opposition, and the reason why having a strong opposition is a basic ingredient of liberal democracy. They want to embarrass and weaken the party in power so that they can turn into law their favored legislation and win the next election. Even supposedly secret testimony, conversations, and reports are exposed this way--as is a mass of trivia. Surely, partisans on all sides will spin whatever is disclosed to show its best or worst side. But it is public, and people are free to make of it what they will.

The public release of the Starr Report, as it became known, was a serious blow to President Clinton's prestige and changed a partisan political conflict into a super-charged political fight over President Clinton's future. Over a hundred newspaper editorials eventually called for his resignation; he was publicly mocked; television and the Internet covered the affair day and night; cartoonists never had it so good; late night comedians made constant fun of him; and Clinton joke after joke made the rounds through e-mail and the Internet.

Political humor and jokes play an important function in a democracy. Although meant to be funny, they express public dismay and point to what high behavior about officials is of special concern. In a democracy it is better for a politician to be criticized by professors of political science than have well-known comedians earn their popularity at his expense.

What saved President Clinton was the loyalty of Democrats, who circled Party wagons around him, and a politically astute offensive by the President and White

House aides. Judge Starr became a target of constant demonizing attacks, as by the accusations that he was "sex crazed, and a extreme right wing zealot"; and by legal action against him, as for leaking Grand Jury testimony (later dismissed by the courts). While polls gave the President a job rating above 60 percent, that of Judge Starr's was in the 20s. Other opponents, such as Linda Tripp, were no less demonized. President Clinton's supporters were vehement--"It's only about sex, and nobody's business," "President Clinton told the truth; this is a conspiracy of Clinton haters," and so on. It was all, the First Lady claimed, a "vast right-wing conspiracy." Meanwhile, the other side claimed that "Clinton always lies, and is deceitful," "what he did in the Oval Office is a disgrace to the presidency; he has systematically abused power" while in office, and so on. President Clinton's previous scandals were revisited, and Arkansas State Troopers were even brought out of obscurity to be interviewed regarding their claims of helping him in his sexual escapades while Governor.

And the President's supporters made a concerted effort to uncover sexual affairs of major Republican supporters of impeachment in the House, perhaps for revenge, but surely to show that "everyone does it." They forced Speaker-designate Bob Livingston to confess to an extramarital affair and resign, even as the full House was to begin their deliberations on the articles of impeachment. They also made public a decades-old affair by Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman of the very House Judiciary Committee to consider the President's impeachment.



Representative
Henry Hyde

When the Republican-controlled Judiciary Committee began consideration of a resolution calling for a formal impeachment inquiry, the fight was now formally joined and in deadly earnest, but still constrained by the Constitution and House rules. This began the long, complex political process for removing President Clinton from office. Other than wartime, this legal process of removing a democratically elected chief executive in midterm is the most dramatic theater people in democracies experience. Everyone soon knows almost everything public and private about the cast of characters; the acting is superb; the speeches and exhortations moving; and the appeals to mind and heart well studied. Each day is a new scene, the plot is clear, and only the end is in doubt.

A successful impeachment by the House is like an indictment brought by a prosecutor before a court. It describes the particulars of an alleged wrongdoing. Then before a

judge a court holds the trial on the indictment, with both prosecutors and defense lawyers presenting evidence and arguments. For impeachment, the court is the Senate.

The Constitution specifies "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors" as the grounds for impeachment, but what high crimes and misdemeanors are is subject to considerable legal interpretation. Only a majority vote of the House is enough to approve articles of impeachment, and this had only happened once before, in 1868 against President Andrew Johnson. Impeachment was also considered in 1974 when the House Judiciary Committee approved three articles of impeachment against President Richard Nixon, but before the full House could debate them the audiotapes on President Nixon's conversations in the Oval Office were released. They were the "smoking gun" evidence that he had participated in the cover-up of the Watergate affair; soon his support collapsed in the House, and he resigned.

Once the House votes on impeachment, the Senate holds a trial on the impeachment articles, as noted. All senators sit as the jury, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides over the trial. The senators hear witnesses and can ask them questions, and at the end of the trial, they vote regarding removal of the President. Two-thirds of the Senators must approve removal for it to occur. Were this to happen, the Chief Justice would swear in the vice-president as the new president. The Senate vote on Andrew Johnson's removal was one vote short of two-thirds.

The House Judiciary Committee reported to the full House on its recommendation to investigate the impeachment of President Clinton, and in October 1998, the Republican House voted to conduct this investigation. Hearings by the House Judiciary Committee on impeachment began soon afterwards and were fully televised. A variety of witnesses gave testimony before the committee, including Independent Council Starr. He came down hard on President Clinton, claiming he intentionally deceived. Opposition to impeachment came from a variety of sources, most of them claiming that what Clinton did was not impeachable, though morally reprehensible. Many legal and constitutional scholars argued that his behavior did not meet the Constitutional basis for impeachment. Some argued that yes, he lied in his civil deposition, and yes, the Independent Counsel can (and some said should) indict him for this after he left office, but that it was not an impeachable offense. Chairman Hyde also sent President Clinton eighty-one questions to answer in place of direct testimony.

At the end of the hearings, the Republican members presented the committee with four articles of impeachment, claiming that the President committed perjury before

the Grand Jury, perjury in the Jones case, obstruction of justice in the Jones case; and provided false responses to the eighty-one questions. The Committee approved the articles on December 11 and 12. All Republicans voted for three of the articles, all but one voted for a fourth; no Democrat voted for any. The Committee then passed the approved articles to the full House for debate and a final vote.

This American drama did not paralyze international relations and foreign adversaries, in particularly Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq against whom an American-led coalition fought the 1990 Gulf War. Possibly seeing a weakened President, Saddam refused to allow any further weapons inspections by the UN in his country, inspections he had agreed to when he was defeated in the Gulf War. Coincidentally or not, President Clinton launched air strikes against Iraq in retaliation just when the full House scheduled the opening debate on his impeachment. Republicans questioned the timing of this, and the Democrats demanded that the House put off considering impeachment until the President ended military action. But the Republicans were in control, and the continuing raids did no more than delay House proceedings for a day.

On December 18, the full House began an acrimonious debate on the impeachment of President Clinton. The next day, the House passed 228 to 206 the first Article of impeachment, perjury before Independent Counsel Starr's grand jury. It also passed the Third Article, obstruction of justice related to the Jones case,



House Democrats briefly walk out of House Chambers to protest Republicans blocking a vote on impeachment

with the vote of 221-212. The other two articles failed to pass. It was now up to the Senate to determine whether these two articles were enough to remove the President

from office.

The Senate trial began on January 7, 1999, and was televised throughout. As dictated by the Constitution, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, William H. Rehnquist, presided over the trial, and the trial started with a reading of the charges. Then the Chief Justice swore in the Senators, and each signed an oath book promising to do "impartial justice," going one at a time to the front of the chamber to do so. There was 55 Republican and 45 Democratic Senators. If all Republicans voted for removal, 12 Democrats would have to join them to get the 67 votes required.



Thirteen Republican House members, headed by Chairman Henry Hyde, prosecuted the case for removal. In sum, they accused President Clinton of "willful, premeditated, deliberate corruption of the nation's system of justice through perjury and obstruction of justice." Charles Ruff, main White House Counsel, led President Clinton's defense with a team of seven lawyers. Their main argument was that the Republicans provided no more than "an unsubstantiated, circumstantial case that does not meet

the constitutional standard to remove the President from office."

Both sides presented their arguments and evidence in three days, and the senators had two more days to ask questions. As the trial progressed, Democrats and Republicans used one partisan maneuver after another, although with less bitterness than in the House debate. The Democrats tried unsuccessfully to dismiss the case, and both sides fought over whether there would be witnesses, how many witnesses there would be, and who they would be. They argued over whether the witnesses would give testimony in the Senate chamber or by deposition. Most important, this partisan struggle ended in a Senate vote not to hear Monica Lewinsky's testimony in person, as the Democrats wanted, but by video clips of a deposition she gave under questioning by House prosecutors. They also voted to question other witnesses by deposition.

Finally, on February 8, this twelve-month historic political crisis in American politics was almost at an end. Each side had three hours to present their closing arguments, then for three days the senators debated behind closed doors. And on February 12, in the Senate chamber and before television cameras, the Senate voted. All Democrats

and 10 Republicans voted President Clinton not guilty on alleged perjury, 55 to 45. On alleged obstruction of justice the vote was split, 50 to 50. President Clinton would remain in office.



You cannot isolate the House impeachment and this Senate trial from the national day-by-day, 24-hour discussion and debate over the fate of the

President. All this provided Representatives and Senators with an amazing input of knowledge, insights, legal opinions, and interpretations. In this way,

witnesses were almost redundant. Most important, as the impeachment approached conclusion in the House, and then as the Senate trial progressed, public opinion not only continued to support President Clinton, but his numbers actually improved. During Senate deliberations, some polls showed over 70 percent support of the President. Moreover, polls showed that the people wanted to get this over with as fast as possible; felt that the Republicans were unnecessarily delaying the proceedings; and intended to punish Republicans in the next election if they removed President Clinton. Generally, answers to specific questions in the polls showed that arguments supporting President Clinton persuaded more people than those demanding his removal. The Senators were, after all, politicians, and doubtless were influenced in their votes by all this. Indeed, David P. Schippers, Chief Investigative Counsel for the House Judiciary Committee for the impeachment, claimed in his book *Sell Out* that due to the overwhelming public support for Clinton, the Republican Senate leadership had decided against trying to fire Clinton, and had organized the trial to get it over with as soon as possible.

What does this vivid example of the nature and working of one democracy tell us about liberal democracy itself? It is self-government. It says what you have read about the Clinton campaigns, scandals, and his impeachment. Throughout the history of the Clinton Presidency, as an adult American you could have campaigned and voted for Clinton or his opposition in the Presidential elections of 1992 and 1996. You could also have campaigned and voted for the Representatives and Senators that voted on his impeachment and removal. Regarding his scandals and impeachment,



you could have made your voice heard by writing letters to the editors of newspapers, posting your opinions for or against him on the internet, or telephoning a radio talk show. You could have set up a web page to express your view or have done so through internet chat groups. You could have organized demonstrations or participated in them, built an organization to work for or against him, and contributed money to one side or the other.

Note also that there is a democratic culture involved. This dictates that compromise and negotiation will settle disputes with a tolerance for differences. If the conflict is profound and the stakes very high, if there is no solution other than one side will lose and the other side will win, then democratic procedures must be used that are within or dictated by the law. Such was the impeachment and trial of President Clinton. But consider. The President had vast public and secret resources at his disposal, such as the secret service, the FBI, and the CIA. As Commander-in-Chief of all American military forces, he had them at his command. Could he not have used this power, if he so desired, to have the Army surround Congress and the Supreme Court and dictate the outcome of their impeachment proceedings? That this was not even thought of by anyone in the media, that there was not the slightest rumor of this, that even his most extreme political enemies never thought this a possibility, shows the strength of this liberal democracy.

But still, consider. Say that the President did issue such orders. What would happen? There is no doubt about the answer: he would be disobeyed. His orders would have to go through the military Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, and then down the command structure. The respect for the Constitution is so deeply ingrained in the military and those who are appointed to high office, democratic norms and customs so unconsciously held, that instead of obeying the President, his very attempt to use the military unconstitutionally would be reported to Congress and become an article of impeachment. Alternatively, suppose that he had secretly plotted with a group of generals or colonels to use their troops in a coup against the Constitution. If anything like this had been launched, it would have been soundly defeated for three reasons. First, this junta could only have been a very small group, and thus militarily outgunned. Second, even ordinary soldiers would not have obeyed the commands of their officers, because this would too clearly be an utterly monstrous and treasonous antidemocratic action. And third, even if this were successful, the people would rise up in rebellion against this totally antidemocratic usurpation of power.

One more example is the outcome of the year 2000 American presidential election. It is worthy of even more extended treatment than that I gave to Clinton's impeachment, but it was only concluded within two days of this writing. The

Democrat candidate, Vice President Albert Gore, got a majority of the national vote and came within a couple of hundred votes of winning Florida's electors, which would have given him the 270 electoral votes needed to become President. As it was, with Florida's slim margin giving the Republican candidate, Governor George Bush, its electoral votes, he won the presidency by only 271 electoral votes. Because of the importance of the Florida electors and the very slight margin of victory for Bush, Gore refused to concede the election and he, his supporters, and the Democratic Party waged a public relations and legal onslaught on the ballots cast in Florida, particularly in highly democrat counties. They argued that all the ballots had not been counted, the voting machines had malfunctioned, or that the ballots were too complex for many voters.



"I have decided to contest this inaccurate and incomplete election"



Judge Robert Burton recounting ballots in Palm Beach County, Florida

I need not go into the legal and political victories and defeats in this campaign to overturn the Bush's victory, except to note that we all learned a new vocabulary about machine ballots, including chads, pregnant chats, tri-chads, hanging chads, swinging chads, dimples, etc. Suffice to say that after two Florida Supreme Court victories for Vice President Gore and two United States Supreme Court decisions vacating or overturning them, Gore finally lost hope in getting the recount of ballots that he wanted. Over a month after the election, Gore finally and graciously conceded the election to Bush.

This was the closest election in American history. And yet, and this is the point to this example, in spite of the heated partisan rhetoric, the claims that the election had been stolen, there was no violence. There was no violent demonstrations, no riots, no necessity to call out the army, and no coup. The decision of the Supreme Court was accepted; law had triumphed over the desire for power. This is almost unbelievable, considering that this election was to determine who would be the most powerful leader in the world, and which economic and social policies would dominate the country. But it is the way liberal democracy

functions.

This type of government stands in sharp contrast to the alternatives, such as rule by a king, as in Saudi Arabia; dictator as in Sudan; the military, as in Burma; or an elite, as in China. It is inconceivable that any of these rulers would be questioned by a court, undergo examination by the people's representatives over some scandal, stand trial while in office, or stand aside and let some other person rule because of a court decision. It is not possible that in these countries or others like them you would be able to criticize or demonstrate against your rulers without serious and possibly lethal repercussions. The police or security forces might even arrest and torture you and your family if they find in your home papers, documents, letters, or e-mail that criticizes the government. It is not only likely, but does happen in such countries that when the people threaten the power of their dictators, the dictators use tanks and machine guns against them.



All this being understood, so what? Are not there only a small number of democracies? Are there not even fewer liberal democracies like the United States, almost all being in Western Europe? In fact, is not my characterization of liberal democracy too Western, hardly fit for nations in Asia, South American, and Africa?



The answer is no to each of these questions. As listed in [Table 3.3](#), out of 192 nations in 1999, 120 were democratic and contained 58 percent of the world's people. This number of democracies is a sharp increase from the sixty-nine that existed in 1985, and well shows that the world is becoming increasingly democratic. Democracy is now the world's dominant form of government, and with the death of fascism through World War II, and of communism with the end of the Cold War, democracy has no real competitors for hearts and minds. Were you born today, the odds of you being born in a democracy are slightly greater than 50 percent.

As the [Table 3.3](#) shows, thirty-five of these democracies were only electoral, some so marginal as to make it a tossup whether we should call them democracies. All thirty-five, including Columbia, Turkey, Brazil, Ukraine, and Russia, restrict some of the basic rights against government that characterize a liberal democracy. An impeachment like that of President Clinton might still take place in most of them, but not with the same vigor, concern for the law, and intimate involvement of the public.

TABLE 3.3. Democracies and Nondemocracies in 1999*

Free Democracy		Partly Free		Not Free
Liberal		Electoral		
Andorra	Lithuania	Albania	Antigua/Barbuda	Afghanistan
Argentina	Luxembourg	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Algeria
Australia	Mali	Bangladesh	Bosnia-Herz.	Angola
Austria	Malta	Brazil	Burkina Faso	Bahrain
Bahamas	Marshall Is.	Central African Rep.	Comoros	Belarus
Barbados	Mauritius	Colombia	Côte d'Ivoire	Bhutan
Belgium	Micronesia	Croatia	East Timor	Brunei
Belize	Monaco	Djibouti	Ethiopia	Burma
Benin	Mongolia	Georgia	Gabon	Burundi
Bolivia	Namibia	Ghana	Jordan	Cambodia
Botswana	Nauru	Guatemala	Kuwait	Cameroon
Bulgaria	Netherlands	Guinea-Bissau	Lesotho	Chad
Canada	New Zealand	Haiti	Malaysia	China (PRC)
Cape Verde	Norway	Honduras	Mexico	Congo (Brazzaville)
Chile	Palau	Indonesia	Morocco	Congo (Kinshasa)
Costa Rica	Panama	Kyrgyz Republic	Peru	Cuba
Cyprus (G)	Papua New Guinea	Liberia	Senegal	Djibouti
Czech Rep.	Philippines	Macedonia	Singapore	Egypt
Denmark	Poland	Madagascar	Tanzania	Equatorial Guinea
Dominica	Portugal	Malawi	Togo	Eritrea
Dominican Rep.	Romania	Moldova	Tonga	The Gambia
Ecuador	St. Kitts and Nevis	Mozambique	Uganda	Guinea
El Salvador	St. Luda	Nepal	Yugoslavia	Iran
Estonia	St. Vincent/Grenadines	Nicaragua	Zambia	Iraq
Fiji	Samoa	Niger	Zimbabwe	Kazakhstan
Finland	San Marino	Nigeria		Kenya
France	São Tomé/Príncipe	Paraguay		Korea, North
Germany	Slovakia	Russia		Laos
Greece	Slovenia	Seychelles		Lebanon
Grenada	Solomon Islands	Sierra Leone		Libya
Guyana	South Africa	Sri Lanka		Maldives
Hungary	Spain	Suriname		Mauritania
Iceland	Sweden	Turkey		Oman
India	Switzerland	Ukraine		Pakistan
Ireland	Taiwan	Venezuela		Qatar
Israel	Thailand			Rwanda
Italy	Trinidad/Tobago			Saudi Arabia
Jamaica	Tuvalu			Somalia
Japan	United Kingdom			Sudan

Kiribati	United States		Swaziland
Korea, South	Uruguay		Syria
Latvia	Vanuatu		Tajikistan
Liechtenstein			Tunisia
			Turkmenistan
			United Arab Emirates
			Uzbekistan
			Vietnam
			Yemen

*Based on the Freedom House 1999-2000 Survey of freedom in the world (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>)

In these countries your freedom of speech or religion or association may be under pressure or even compromised.

Just to mention some of their problems with human rights in these countries, in Columbia the courts tend to be corrupt, and extortion is common. Colombian drug lords have considerable influence, and may even have dictated some of the laws. Violence is endemic; all sides commit atrocities, including the murder of officials and activists.

In Turkey the military has undue influence, and security forces have often killed those suspected of terrorism or of supporting a Kurdish rebellion. The government limits freedom of speech. You may not, for example, insult government officials. Government organized groups, or sympathizers have attacked and threatened human rights activists. They may even be responsible for the murder of journalists and newspaper owners or their disappearance. Appeal to the highest court over politically sensitive judgments may be useless, and the courts themselves seem to be under military control.

In Brazil, the courts are weak also, and the government is riddled with corruption. Moreover, lawlessness is widespread and violence against women and children is common, while the police and courts do little about it. Ranchers in some areas are free to force rural laborers to work against their will. Indians are discriminated against, violence against them is common, and some of their leaders or supporters have been murdered.

In Ukraine government corruption is widespread as well, and bribery a way of getting or preventing government action. Consistently, political pressure on the courts and intervention in their process is common. Starting and running a business is often difficult, since you must compete with an in-group of present and former members of the political establishment. The government limits freedom of speech. You cannot, for example, attack the honor and dignity of the president.

And in Russia (see [map and statistics](#), and [world map](#)), the election of Vladimir Putin to be president showed that there is a regular and contested election system through which opponents may challenge the top leadership, and possibly replace them. Many political parties were active in the election, including the Communist Party. There is also a national parliament with representatives elected similarly in fair and competitive elections. The diverse political parties represented, such as Liberal Democrats, Agrarians, Communist Party, Democratic Choice, and Home-is Russia, well show how competitive the election was.



Russia

Area	17,075,200 sq km; slightly less than 1.8 times the size of the US
Population	146,001,176 (July 2000 est.)
Ethnic groups	Russian 81.5%, Tatar 3.8%, Ukrainian 3%, Chuvash 1.2%, Bashkir 0.9%, Byelorussian 0.8%, Moldavian 0.7%, other 8.1%
Religions	Russian Orthodox, Muslim, other
Languages	Russian, other
Life expectation	67.19 years
Literacy	98%
Purchasing power parity	\$4,200 (1999 est.)
Government	electoral democracy
Freedom rating	partly free

However, government subsidies to newspapers, their ownership by those well connected to the government, along with local political pressures, compromise the independence of the press. The government also restricts religion. It legally favors only those religions that have existed for more than fifteen years and have nationally organized themselves. Moreover, the government recognizes only political parties that have at least 100 members and forbids parties that would use violence, seek independence for any Russian republic or territory, or promote hatred of ethnic, racial, or religious minorities. Of particular importance, presidential and legislative pressures influence the courts, and the treatment of prisoners before and after trials remain disgraceful. And the new FSB, the government's security arm that replaced the KGB, continues to exercise excessive power in domestic affairs. Corruption in government and business is pervasive, perhaps the worst among democracies. Mafia-like, criminal organizations seem to operate with impunity, and the protection of private property and the independence of businesses are spotty. People are free to move within the country, but they must register with the government within seven days of moving to a new local to work and live.

All this restricts and compromises basic human rights. In short, like the other countries mentioned above, Russia is not yet a liberal democracy. Nonetheless, aside from the serious human rights problems of these countries, as a citizen of any of them you still could vote regularly by secret ballot in competitive national elections. You could vote the top leadership out of power. This is why these countries are still democracies, although only electoral ones.



Eighty-five of the democracies listed in [Table 3.3](#) are liberal democracies. These comprise 44 percent of all countries and 39 percent of the world's population. This shows that the institutionalization of freedom in liberal democracy is not rare, nor is it limited to Western European states. Liberal democracies span the globe. Among them are Barbados and Jamaica in the Caribbean, the Marshall Islands and Micronesia in the Pacific, South Korea and Mongolia in Asia, Thailand and the Philippines in Southeast Asia, India in South Asia, Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, Israel in the Middle East, Botswana and Namibia in Southern Africa, Mali in Western Africa, Malta in the Mediterranean, Bulgaria and Hungary in Eastern Europe, and Cape Verde in the Atlantic. This variety of cultures, races, ethnicities, and geography should dispel the notion that liberal democracy is a peculiarly Western type government that the West is trying to push on the rest of the world.

Of course, freedom is an ideal, and even liberal democracies imperfectly fulfill it, although they do much better than other types of government. After all, with all their biases and prejudices, human beings govern liberal democracies; and voters are often poorly informed and sometimes demagogues mislead or exploit them. Sometimes and

more than you like, officials do step on your rights; and they pass laws and rules that in one way or another limit your freedoms. But when this happens, you have the power to do something about it. Your freedoms remain more than paper constitutions, political pronouncements, and strutting flag-waving. If you doubt this, consider again the impeachment of President Clinton. This impeachment and associated political fight could not have happened in the way it did unless citizens of this liberal democracy already had and could exercise the human rights defining their freedom.

Even in those democracies that were more or less socialist economic systems, such as in Denmark, Norway, India, and Israel, their governments protect these rights. Look at Sweden, for example, which sometimes is called "The People's Republic of Sweden," a play on what communist parties call their own nations, to depict Sweden's socialist policies.

Like the United Kingdom, Sweden (see [map and statistics](#), and [world map](#)) is a constitutional monarchy, with a democratically elected parliament. The people also elect its Prime Minister to Parliament, and he is usually the head of whichever party gets the most parliamentary seats. King Carl Gustaf XVI has no formal political power and only a ceremonial role. Sweden has an extensive and comprehensive national welfare and national health insurance system. Doctors work for the government and hospitals are government run, with health care covered by taxes. If you are sick or must stay home to take care of sick children, the government will make up for most of the income lost. Bear a child and get a year of government mandated leave from work with pay. You will also get government allowances for your child and support if your children continue their education after they are 16 years old. You and your employer also must contribute to your retirement benefits, which you receive when you are 65, and which is supplemented by added employee fees.

Sweden has an industrial policy that sees the government as necessarily involved in and in some ways directing the economy. There are stiff laws covering the hiring and rejection of job applicants; and if hired, their firing. Government closely regulates, subsidizes, and sets price ceilings on the purchase of a home or renting one; it strictly enforces regulations on home building. And it stimulates investment, and provides special tax benefits to steer businesses in the government-desired direction. Also, as part of its industrial policy, the Swedish government favors and encourages very strong unions, and large centralized business associations. This has led to the economic dominance of large corporations and unions.

Because of government welfare policies and involvement in the economy, people pay

EUROPE



Sweden

Area	449,964 sq km; slightly larger than California
Population	8,873,052 (July 2000 est.)
Ethnic groups	Swedes and Finnish and Lapp (Sami) minorities; foreign-born or first-generation immigrants: Finns, Yugoslavs, Danes, Norwegians, Greeks, Turks
Religions	Lutheran 87%, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Baptist, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist
Languages	Swedish; small Lapp- and Finnish-speaking minorities
Life expectation	79.58 years
Literacy	99% (1979 est.)
Purchasing power parity	\$20,700 (1999 est.); U.S. is \$33,900 (1999 est.)
Government	liberal democracy--constitutional monarchy
Freedom rating	free

over an average of 50 percent of their income in taxes, while businesses could pay as much as 65 percent. One measure of the cost of government regulation, and the opportunities people and businesses lose because of it, is that about 35 percent of all workers were working for government in 1992. An even better measure is that the government alone creates one-third of the market value of all Sweden's goods and services. Another third value results from government redistribution of income, such as by its national welfare policies and national health program mentioned previously. This shrinks the private economy's value to only a third of all Sweden's products and services. By contrast, this value is about two-thirds for the United States.

Regardless of Sweden's welfare statism and its reputation for socialist policies, as a liberal democracy the government protects your freedom--human rights--to speak out, protest, demonstrate, and organize against these policies, and vote out of power those who support them. As a Swede, you even would enjoy a fair amount of economic freedom. Among 123 countries whose economic freedom was ranked for 1999 by the Economic Freedom Network, Sweden ranks in economic freedom about 22 out of 111 nations, and the Network rates it with 8 out of 10 possible points. The United States is ranked 4, with 9.1 out of 10 points. In further comparison with the countries I described in Chapter 1, the Network ranks China 87, and places Burma at the bottom among all 111 countries in economic freedom. The Network did not rank Sudan or Saudi Arabia.

The case for democratic freedom is strong, as I have tried to show in this and the previous chapter. But I can make an even stronger case. In the following chapters, I will show that freedom is not only a human or natural right, certified by international agreements, and supported by moral reasoning, that it is not only a socially just metasolution to human diversity, but that it is also a moral good. This means that the social and political consequences of freedom are such as to make it a supreme value in itself.

NOTES

* Written for this web site. I am indebted to Judson Knight for his careful editing and helpful comments on a draft of this chapter.

Chapter 4

Freedom Promotes Wealth and Prosperity

The more freedom a people have, the greater their health, wealth and prosperity; the less their freedom, the more their impoverishment, disease, and famines.
----This book's [Appendix](#)

Your democratic freedom is your right, as previous chapters have established. This is in itself just and to deny you your freedom would be unjust. And as a just right, no one can morally deny your freedom to you for whatever the ends, as has happened to billions of people. For example, some rulers and their supporters deny their people freedom by arguing that this is necessary to develop the country economically, achieve national glory, promote racial or ethnic purity, or create a communist paradise. This is to make of a your freedom a tool that those in power can manipulate or ignore, depending on the job they want done. This is a destructive premise that for too long intellectuals have allowed dictators and their supporters to assume. Your freedom is not a tool; it does not have a utility attached to it that justifies government in granting it or taking it away. In this sense, democratic freedom is a *moral good*, something that is to be sought or held for its intrinsic moral value, and for no other reason.

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Yet, amazingly, there are actually consequences to freedom that are also important moral goods. When we compare what happens to an economy and society when people are free and democratic versus unfree, the results of freedom are often the very ends that some dictators try to fulfill by repressing freedom. So stressing that freedom is a moral good is not erecting a firewall against any negative consequences, for the consequences are not only positive, but moral goods in themselves. It is like eating fruit, which is tasty and filling, inherently good, but which also reduces the probability of getting cancer, a stroke, and a heart attack.

One of freedom's desirable consequences is to promote unrivaled wealth and prosperity; it is an unbeatable engine of technological and economic growth. As an example of how freedom can have this miraculous result, look at the life of William (Bill) Gates, who could not have created the computer software he did other than in a free society, and which software has contributed greatly to our prosperity.

Born into an upper middle-class family in 1955, Gates' mother taught school and was a regent of the University of Washington, and his father was a prominent lawyer. Gates went to public elementary school, then to the private Lakeside High School in Seattle, where he learned about computers and soon became fascinated by them.

By 13 years of age, he and his best friend, Paul Allen, were already programming computers, and spent as much of each day as they could on the school's main-frame computer--playing with it, causing it to crash, rewriting its programs, and writing new ones themselves. In those days, computer time was costly and had to be rationed; because of their excessive use of it, the school finally had to ban them from the computer for short periods. Gates and Allen had become so good at using it, however, that a computer business, the Computer Center Corporation, hired them and two other hackers from the school to solve some problems with their computer, for which they were paid with unlimited computer time. Now Gates and Allen could work on a computer day and night., while also reading computer manuals and picking the brains of other employees. This ideal life did not last, however, for in 1970 the company went out of business.



Bill Gates

Gates and Allen's next break was when Information Sciences hired them to program the company's payroll. This gave the two free computer time--probably more important to them than whatever money they made. The company also paid them royalties for any of their programs it sold. Encouraged by all this, Gates and Allen made their own small computer for measuring traffic flow, and started a little company, Traf-O-Data, to sell it. This earned them about \$20,000. By now, though he was only a high school student, Gate's computer skills were becoming more widely recognized. His school asked him to program a scheduling system for them, and he and Allen wrote the program together.

While they were seniors, the defense corporation TRW was having difficulty with bugs in its computer programs. Impressed by what they heard about Gates and Allen's successes, company officials hired them to debug TRW programs. This was another big break for the two. This job not only helped them further refine their software writing skills, it started them thinking about setting up their own software company.

In 1973, both graduated from Lakeside. Because of Gates excellent grades, recommendations, and achievements, he was able to get into Harvard University, where he chose to study pre-law. After all, his father was a lawyer and there was no such field then as computer sciences. However, he soon found Harvard's computer center, and all else was lost. He would work at night at the center and sleep in his classes. He did not forget his friendship and work with Allen, however, and soon the latter moved close to Gates so that they could continue to develop and work on their ideas. After finishing his freshman year, Gates and Allen got programming jobs at Honeywell Information Systems. They still were working for others, however, and Allen particularly wanted to set up their own company. Gates, however, was reluctant to drop out of Harvard to do this.

Then, in December 1974, a sheer chance event led to the start of Microsoft. Accounts disagree on how this event came about, but a popular version is that on his way to see Gates, Allen happened to stop to look over some magazines. On the cover of *Popular Electronics* he saw a picture of the new MITS Altair 8080, the first microcomputer. He bought the magazine, took it to Gates, and after both had read it, they saw what an opportunity the Altair was. This was a most propitious time to be interested in computers. The IBM room-sized mainframe dominated the computer market and most computer specialists were interested in mainframe hardware or programs. Personal computers (also to be called desktop or microcomputers) for the general market had yet to be made, but Gates and Allen recognized that small personal computers were the future for businesses and home computing. And each of these computers would need system software to run them, as well as separate software for specific needs.

Stories also vary as to what happened next. One version is that Gates called MITS and claimed that he and Allen had written a program they called BASIC for the Altair. The

company expressed interest and wanted to see it, but Gates had lied. There was no such program, yet with the company's expressed interest, he and Allen raced to write it. One problem: they had no Altair at hand. So, while Gates focused on the writing of BASIC, Allen developed a way of simulating the Altair chip using one of Harvard's computers, the PDP-10. In about eight weeks they finished, and Allen flew to MITS to demonstrate their new BASIC on the Altair, a computer he had yet to see or touch. The gutsy test was a success on the second try, and MITS bought the rights to the program. This victory finally convinced Gates that the personal computer market were set to explode, and more important, that they had the skills to share in it.

In 1975, Micro-soft, later to be Microsoft, was born, and Gates soon dropped out of his junior year at Harvard to devote himself to the new business. Its initial product was the BASIC system Gates and Allen had written, and several large companies were eager customers. At the time, I was also writing computer programs for my research, and can attest to one overwhelming principle of computer life. It is cheaper to buy a good program than to write one yourself or hire programmers to do it. This was one of the main reasons for Microsoft's early success.

By 1979, Microsoft had sixteen employees, and Gates moved the company from Albuquerque, its first home, to Seattle, Washington. The company continued to grow and create new products. It produced a spreadsheet program, which later would become the MS Excel spreadsheet we know today. And it produced the first version of what is now the overwhelmingly popular MS-Word.

Paul Allen, who had been instrumental in so much of Gate's early work and then in the growth of Microsoft, had to resign in 1983 because of Hodgkins disease. Eventually he would successfully fight off the disease and as a very rich man with his Microsoft shares went on to form his own software companies. He also bought the Portland Trailblazers basketball team.

What made Microsoft so dominant in the computer marker, however, and what has mainly contributed to Gate's wealth, was a deal he made with IBM in 1981, when Microsoft had only grown to about thirty people. With great foresight, Gates had bought an operating system, which he rewrote into what he called MS-DOS (Microsoft



disk operating system). The operating system is the software that runs a computer. It interfaces between the computer hardware, such as the computer processor, memory chips, hard disks, floppy drives, CDs, monitor, and so on, and the applications, such as word processing or spreadsheet programs. At that time IBM, the dominant force in the computer market, was preparing a new line of personal computers, and needed a good operating system for them. They were in negotiation with a more established company, but Gates impressed them, and Microsoft got the job to write the operating system for IBM's new computers. This was an amazing deal for this small company. Within years IBM began to turn out personal computers like McDonald's turns out hamburgers, and each one ran with a rewritten MS-DOS.

This was not enough for Gates, however. He had always been interested in making the computer more graphically oriented so that the user could see better on their monitor what they were doing with the computer, such as when trashing a file or transferring a file out of one folder to another, and he began the development of such a program in 1982. This evolved into a graphically oriented, pseudo system program that operates on top of MS-DOS. Finally shipped in 1985. it was the first version of Windows. In its ninth incarnation as Windows 2000, it is now used on virtually all IBM computers and compatibles in the world.

In 1986, Microsoft successfully went public with its stock offering of \$21 a share, and by 1995 Microsoft had 17,801 employees. Gates had realized his dream. He has played a dominant role in making personal computing available to everyone, and his products have continued to dominate the field. I do my work on a Macintosh computer with an Apple Corporation operating system that competes with Windows--and personally I think Apple's system software is better. Yet because of their quality, I use Microsoft's Word and Excel, as well as its Internet Explorer browser.

In recognition of his contributions, President Bush awarded Bill Gates the National Medal of Technology in 1992. Bill Gates also has been more than amply rewarded financially. On May 22, 2000, his wealth, tied partly to the near 141 million shares of Microsoft that he owns, was \$72,485,700,000. This made him the richest man in the world. Not even the wealthiest of monarchs, with jewels and gold bars piled at their feet, can beat Bill Gates' worth. According to one rumor, he is so rich that when he got the bill for his \$50 million manor built on Lake Washington, he turned to his wife, Melinda, and asked her to get his wallet. If he had worked ten hours a day, every day of the year,



And wife Melinda

since the founding of Microsoft in 1975, I calculate that he earned about \$1.3 million per hour.

How can one man become so rich? Surely, Gates was lucky in being at the right place at the right time, with the right friends, when the personal computer revolution was just beginning. Supportive and affluent parents played a role in his success, as did his naturally deep interest in computers, a proclivity for the



Gates' 97 million dollar, 66000 sq. feet home

mathematics of it, and a willingness to work hard. But most important, he was free to follow his star. He needed no government approval. Personal computers and related hardware and software were a new market, and there were virtually no government regulations telling Gates what programming he could and could not do. Of course, Gates and Allen had to satisfy certain government registration requirements when they set up Microsoft, and there were more regulations covering Microsoft going public in the stock market. But it was entirely up to Gates how hard he worked, what he produced, and what he charged for his products.

You may believe that I am exaggerating the role of freedom, and that Gates' talent and initiative were more important. Then consider what his life would have been like in a country that allowed no freedom, such as the former Soviet Union, which I will cover in some detail later. This is a good example at this point because the Communist Party that ruled this country placed the strongest emphasis on economic and technological development, and thus you would think someone with Bill Gates abilities and interests would prosper there. First, however, for Gates simply to survive without going to a labor camp or his death, he and his parents could not question the Party line, and neither his parents or grandparents could have been connected to the previous royal government, or be bourgeoisie. Presuming, then, that Gates was clean of any such "counterrevolutionary" taint, he might have succeeded as a scientist or engineer. But he could not have produced any great jump in software development.

The Party strictly limited the use of computers, all of which it owned. For over a decade it kept computers under lock and key and they could be used only with Party permission. Gates, therefore, would not have had the free usage of computers that

enabled him to develop his programming ability and to eventually write the programs he did. Anyway, since all private businesses were illegal, there could be no Microsoft to design personal computers or write software. Such could only be done within some Party-run shop. If in such a shop a Gates had written useful software, it would be the property of the Party, to dispose of as the Party bureaucracy wished.

There is a slight taste of such a statist attitude in the American Justice Department taking Microsoft to court in 1997 for monopolistic practices. Specifically, it accused Microsoft of making its Internet Explorer part of Windows 95, and thus stifling competition with other Internet browsers, such as Netscape. In April 2000 a federal judge ruled that Microsoft did violate antitrust laws, and in June issued a final judgment ordering Microsoft to be broken up. However, this order was stayed later in the month pending resolution of an Appeal by Microsoft that will go to the Supreme Court.

This case reflects an anti-free market attitude towards competition, big business, and success; and likely some envy of Gates' wealth. More important, this action by a Democrat administration probably shows the power of political contributions or their lack. Gates had naively refused to make any large contributions to the Democrat Party or President Clinton's two presidential campaigns, while Microsoft's chief competitors had done so. It was their complaints about Microsoft that brought action.

Many of the commentaries on this case saw capitalist greed as Microsoft's, and especially Gates', primary motivation. Indeed, this view reflects a general criticism of free-market capitalism itself as the incarnation of greed. These critics see entrepreneurs and business people as only out to make a profit--that is, money--and economic competition as nothing more than capitalists climbing on top of each other's bodies to profit from the poor. Such critics instead want an economic system wherein each tries to help others and provide for their needs, rather than people trying to get rich at each other's expense, a view that lies at the root of much leftist, and even socialist thought today. Even many that strongly support a free market see greed as its driving force. This not only gives ammunition to the enemies of this freedom, but also mischaracterizes it altogether by reference to something that is an aspect and not its central, psychological dynamic.

Imagine this utopia. In it people are highly motivated to provide services and fulfillment to others, usually perfect strangers. They see this as in their own self-interest. Many of these people also spend sixty to seventy hours a week trying to provide such services. Also imagine--unbelievable as it may seem--that in this utopia some of these people spend their life savings and borrow huge sums of money to discover or provide new things that they believe other people might want. That is, in this society *the chief preoccupation of people, something to which they may sacrifice virtually all their time and*

resources, is to satisfy the wants of others or to determine how they might do this, and do so with the least expense to those getting the services or goods. Such an unbelievable other-directed society does seem utopian. But if we could have such a society, would it not be inherently moral? Is not this the dream of many communitarians, philosophers, and theologians that people spent their time, energy, and resources to provide others with what they need and want?

Yet, this Utopia does exist. It is the free market. Lawyers, doctors, teachers, intellectuals, writers, authors, journalists, computer programmers like Bill Gates, movie stars, business owners, financiers, stock owners, and all other individuals making up the whole population comprise the free market, as do all large and small businesses. The automobile repair shop, the computer discount house, the Italian restaurant, the Chinese laundry, the small Catholic college, the mom and pop grocery store, and so on and on, exist to give people a particular service. If this service is unwanted or the business charges too high a price, then it goes bankrupt. Moreover, entrepreneurs are constantly trying to invent new businesses or services that will fill some need or want not yet recognized by others. If no such want exists or the fulfillment of the want is not worth the cost, the businesses fail. Such working and striving to satisfy others is a moral ideal. That this is the essence of the free market is unappreciated.

Again consider what Bill Gates and Paul Allen did. They spent unbelievable hours of their own time learning about computers and how to program them. This they were doing out of sheer interest in the subject, not because of greed. When they had learned enough, they began to satisfy the needs of others, particularly in helping to debug mainframe computer programs, and in writing their own programs to fill needs that others had expressed. When they started Microsoft, they wanted to sell software and make money, to be sure. But to do this, they had to speculate on what kind of software would most benefit the users of computers, and they had to make an initial investment of time and resources in writing it. If they were wrong, they lost what they put into the program. If they struck out enough times, Microsoft would have gone bankrupt. Microsoft succeeded, however, more than anyone dreamed was possible, and the simple reason for this is that Gates and Allen, and then Gates alone, saw what people needed most, and worked to satisfy that need.

Years ago I wanted a good word processor to write my books with, and a spreadsheet program with which to do my analyses. Microsoft foresaw my need with very good software, and I bought their Word and Excel. I thereby contributed to Gates' wealth, to be sure, but I did this freely and received in return two programs I could not write, and which have made me far more productive.

Bill Gates and Microsoft are participants in a technological revolution that began in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, one that was really a revolution in freedom. As

government loosened its stranglehold on national economies and foreign trade, as it allowed creative and enterprising people to produce new things, there was a takeoff in new inventions, new businesses, and the earnings and wages of the poor. Before this revolution, laws tied workers to a farm or manor and forced them to live the most basic and poorest of lives. They often faced the threat of starvation if a harvest were meager, if they lost or broke their tools, or if they were dispossessed of their land by the force of government, or feudal lords. And they would wear the most basic and plainest of clothes and eat the simplest and cheapest food. What the revolution of freedom did was to liberate these poor from this kind of servitude, assure them of a basic wage, and enable them to improve their consumption. Much to the complaint of the upper classes, which saw this as putting on airs, the poor began to dress more colorfully in better clothes and to eat a greater variety of foods.

All of us are the inheritors of this freeing of the market and resulting technological revolution. The automobiles you drive, the television you watch, the movies you see, the telephones you answer, the planes you fly, the cars you drive, and-- exemplified by Microsoft--the computer you use, all owe their development and availability to the free market. At a more basic level, you can see the operation of the free market best in the availability of an amazing variety of cheap foods for the poor and lower middle-class. An

American supermarket is a cornucopia of agricultural wealth, with choices of fruits, vegetables, meats, cereals, breads, wines, and so on from many areas of the United States and countries of the world. Similarly with a department or hardware store, which shelve, hang, and display a rich variety of goods. For you to see the results of freedom is to shop in any of democracy's stores.

Just to focus on new inventions and innovations, for example, freedom promotes a continuous reduction of the cost of goods compared to the average wage, such that even the most complex and advanced products are available to the common person. An example of this is the rapid evolution of the handheld calculator. When I was a graduate student and had to calculate statistics for my M.A. thesis in 1960, I used a large, desktop, Monroe mechanical calculator. I had to punch the numbers into it, move some switches to do a specific calculation, and physically crank it (like starting an old car) to



1946 ENIAC—one step away from the true compute

1967




Jack Kilby, who developed the first truly hand held calculator. Would replace one released a year earlier that weighed 55 lbs and cost \$2,500

get the results. By computer standards today, this Monroe was painfully slow and clumsy, but still better than doing the arithmetic by hand. I could calculate sums, cross products, and correlations, but it took me about two months and a sore arm to do all the calculations needed. My university paid about \$1,100 for the machine then, or about \$14,000 in current money.

By the early 1970s, I could pick up a handheld Hewlett Packard electronic calculator that would do all these calculations and many more, such as logarithms and trigonometric functions, store one figure or calculation in memory, and function on a small battery. It cost about \$400, or about \$1,700 in current prices.


Now one can get such a handheld calculator for \$10, and paying slightly more will get one a calculator that will do much more than the obsolete Hewlett Packard. And for about \$800 I now can buy a personal computer, for example an iMac with monitor, keyboard, modem, CD drive, and an internal hard disk, that has a capability undreamed of a mere decade ago and on which I could have done all the needed calculations for my M.A. thesis in seconds, not months. It is as though the free market, through innovation and competition, were to bring the price of a new automobile in 1960 down to the cost of a new shirt today, which makes one wonder what the price of an automobile now would be without any government regulations on its production and quality.

Also, I did my Ph.D. dissertation on the Northwestern University mainframe, central IBM computer worth tens of millions of dollars in current money. It had a memory of 36k bytes and took up a huge air-conditioned room with its blinking lights, spinning tapes, massive central processor, very slow printer, batch punch-card input, and bustling attendants. The computer, lights, air conditioned room, and all created an almost spiritual mystery about it. To use this monster, I had to learn to write my own computer programs, and to change some of



The 1964 IBM/360 mainframe computer

its functions I had to rewire part of the computer. That was in 1962 and 1963. Today I sit before a 19-inch color monitor with a new Macintosh G4 that has 256 megabytes of memory (over 7,000 times what memory I had on the mainframe), a 19.1 gigabyte hard disk, a DVD-CD drive, and modem. I also have connected a color printer. The total cost of all this was about \$3,500. Incredible power at an unbelievable low cost compared to what I could have bought only one human generation ago. This is the fruit of freedom.



For the world as a whole, there is a very strong positive correlation between the democratic freedoms you have and the economic wealth and growth of your nation, as I

show in [Table 4.1](#), the [Appendix](#), and Figure 4.1. Much of this is due to the close association between civil liberties and political rights-freedom-and economic freedom, as shown in Figure 4.2. I am tempted to call this the Bill Gates effect. And this positive correlation goes far beyond economic matters to include as well your social and physical welfare. The more freedom people have, the more their nation's technological growth and scientific contributions; health services, hospitals, doctors, and life expectancy; availability of railroads, paved roads, and airports; literacy, high school and college graduates, universities, and books published; and so on. To adopt a current term for all this, the more your freedom, the more your *human security*.

But, why should freedom be so productive? One is that people like Bill Gates can follow their interest and fully realize their inherent capabilities and talents. But also, they have an incentive to work and produce what people want because they are rewarded--and handsomely so, if they can satisfy the desires of millions. There is something more here, however, than simply following personal interests and getting material rewards. You naturally take care of your own. It is like driving a rented automobile versus your own car--in subtle and perhaps even in some extreme ways, you are probably inclined to be rougher with the rented car. After all, you lose nothing when you rapidly start and stop a rented car, corner it at high speed, screech its tires, grind its gears, ignore potholes, and let it get filthy. The rental cost is the same either way.


This is like the

TABLE 4.1
Human and Economic Development
By Level of Freedom 1998

	Free	Partly Free	Unfree
Number of Nations	83	71	86
Average Freedom Rating [1]	13	8	3
Average HDI [2]	0.8	0.63	0.58
Average HPI [3]	14	26	34
Average GNP per person \$	11,082	2,420	2,384
Average PPP per person \$ [4]	11,918	4,285	3,733

Notes

1. Freedom = combined rating of Freedom House on civil liberties and political rights, which varies from a rating of 2 to 14. For this table, free = ratings of 11-14, Partly Free = 6-10, Unfree = 2-5. Data from the Appendix--see Table A.1.
2. PPP = purchasing power parity per person, or the average person's ability in \$ to purchasing goods comparable to what can be purchased by those living in other states. This is a good measure of comparable average wealth. Data from the Appendix--see Table A.7. Data for 1998.
3. HPI = Human Poverty Index. Source is the United Nations Development Program. See Table A.5 in the Appendix. Data for 1998.
4. HDI = Human Development Index. The index comprises life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment, GNP per capita in purchasing power parity. For source, footnote 3. Data for 1998.



commons, or common areas of a neighborhood. You take care of your house and yard. It is personal property and a reflection of your inner self, a matter of personal pride. But the commons, like a public park, is owned by the public and therefore by no one. Government bureaucrats are the stewards over such property, and by law must manage it. This is not their personal property, and therefore they do not have a primary motivation to take care of and improve it. Usually, their personal motivation is to do the least work at the best wage, and even if it is to do the best job possible, it is not to do more than needed. So I see trees and flowers that the Transportation Department planted along newly built public roads on Oahu, Hawaii, withering and dying for lack of water, and I walk along grassy areas in parks that are overgrown with weeds and littered with paper cups and plates, beer cans, and all the debris of people who use facilities that they do not own. I dare not think about using a public restroom.

The incentives of private ownership versus the commons gives us an understanding of

why plantation owners would often take good care of slaves they bought, though the owners might punish them severely for trying to escape or refusing to work. And by comparison, the biggest slave-like establishment of modern times, the Soviet gulag, or forced labor camp system, took little care of its forced laborers. Camp managers often worked them to death or allowed them to die of malnutrition and exposure. The life expectancy in some camps, especially the mining camps in Kolyma, was a matter of months. The reason is that the incentive for the camp managers was to get the most out of the workers for the least cost--then extra funds could be pocketed--not to take care of them. These people were not personal property, but public property. This was the very worst of the commons.

Besides the joys of freedom, the prosperity it creates, and the incentives of private ownership, there is the individualization of choice and behavior. While you share much with your neighbors, friends, and loved ones, each of you is different. you have values, perceptions, and experience that no economic and social planners can know, or usually even guess at; in no way can they become data in some planner's computer; your path through life is unique. This means that you alone can best judge what you value, desire, want, and can do. To borrow a useful cliché, you alone know where the shoe pinches.

This is more basic than it may first seem. In the free market, we are free to buy and sell, to create and build, as did Microsoft. This freedom enables us to best adjust to the world around us and apply our unique values and experience. Therefore, a farmer who has learned from his parents and his own direct experience how to till the unique soil of northeastern Ohio, to read the local weather patterns, and to plant and fertilize the seeds that will grow well in the rocky soil, will best know how to make his farm productive. No government official far away at the State capitol in Columbus, or the national capitol in Washington, D. C., can do as well. And really, were they to command him how to farm, this would destroy his incentive to produce and the farm's productivity. The loss of this freedom to farm is a loss of personal experience, knowledge, and values that commands by government cannot replace. You will see below the catastrophic results of this in communist nations.


Moreover, in a free market, buyers and sellers automatically balance the cost and amount of goods. This means it is often more profitable to sell many items at a small profit than few at a high profit. This encourages lower prices and cheaper goods to meet the mass demand of poorer people. Some producers will specialize in building yachts and make a profit at it, but many others will find it most profitable to market cheap clothes, fast food, games, and thousands of devices that make life easier. And in this way, businesses are encouraged to produce more items, more cheaply, and with better quality. We have seen this regarding computers. Note also, as our free market economists like Milton Friedman, Ludwig von Mises, and F. A. Hayek have stressed, that free market prices are an economy wide message system. They communicate

shortages, where things are cheap, where production might be profitable enough for a business to move into the market; they also communicate where demand is slack and businesses might cut back production. Prices in a free market tell business what to put on the supermarket shelves, where, when, and at how much. And therefore, the free market is equally a massive distribution system.

Think about this for the moment, about the miracle of the thousands of goods on the supermarket shelves, many from other countries and far away states. Who decides this? What great mind or computer figures out what is to be sold in what market for how much, when? And with no shortages, no long lines waiting for a supply truck to arrive as in command economies. How is this done without the economic planners that socialists believe necessary? Automatically and spontaneously, by the decisions of hundreds of thousands of free producers, suppliers, truckers, and market managers, all responding to different prices and demand.


This is why the command market and government intervention fail to improve prices and allocation over the free market, and creates economic dislocations, hardship, privation, and, as we will see, famine. No government officials, no social scientists, no central computer program, can possibly figure out what each person wants, when, and where, and how all this for tens of millions of people can be balanced. A government cannot improve the free market price mechanism, even at the minimum by anti-trust, anti-monopolistic laws; it can only distort or destroy it.

This idea of a free market was the cornerstone of classical liberalism, with the eighteenth century, British philosopher and economist Adam, Smith's *Wealth of Nations* its bible. He argued that wealth is best created when government keeps its hands off the economy and there is free trade. This free, or laissez-faire, market is, however, only one political-economic model.



Adam Smith
(1723–1790)

The major competing one in the Twentieth Century was that based on the economic and historical analysis of the nineteenth century German political philosopher Karl Marx as given in his *Das Kapital*, and who along with Friedrich Engels established scientific socialism, what we now call communism. The Russian revolutionary and philosopher Vladimir Ilich Lenin then showed in many works, such as his influential pamphlet *What Is To Be Done* how Marx-Engel's politico-



**Karl Marx
(1813-1883)**

economic theory could be put into effect--how a communist revolution could be brought about and a communist nirvana achieved through the dictatorship of the proletariat. Scholars now think his work is such a basic addition to Marxism, that they make Marxism-Leninism synonymous with communism.

Communism has been the most influential politico-economic theory of the Twentieth Century. With its supposed scientific theory of history, its assumed empirical proof, and its utopian plan to rid the world of poverty, exploitation, economic greed, and war, which it claims are all due in the modern world to capitalism, it captured the minds of many intellectuals and workers. And through revolution, invasion, and war, these believers took over one country after another: Russia, China, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Cuba, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Grenada, Nicaragua, and South Yemen. This is an impressive roster, indeed, and since the communist politico-economic model explicitly claims that while the free market will lead to the impoverishment of the worker and its own destruction, communism will create socio-economic equality and a society in which abundance will reign and "from each according to their ability, and to each according to their need."

This abstract model seems ideal and has misled many a compassionate intellectual. Now lets look at what this model really meant in practice. You already have seen how different the life of Gates would have been in such a communist, command economy. Now consider in detail what such a command economy in the former Soviet Union and communist China under Mao Tse-tung accomplished compared to a free market.

I will discuss in detail the 1917 Bolshevik--communist--coup against the Russian Kerensky government in the next chapter. Here, however, as a precursor to Stalin's collectivization of the peasant and his intentional famine in the Ukraine, I want to note the severe famine that Lenin created in the Soviet Union after the Russian Revolution as a result of his command policies. After the Red Army seized control of much of Russia by 1920, the Communist Party issued a Decree on Land that encouraged peasants to seize large estates, thus depriving cities and towns of food. This created much local disorder, as did the Party establishing committees of



Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

poor peasants to "assume the responsibility for repression..."; and the decree that in all small, grain-producing districts, officials should pick twenty-five to thirty "wealthy" hostages, all of whom they should kill if the peasants did not deliver their "excess" grain. But in practice, excess grain often turned out to be any grain; even the peasants' reserve and seed grain were expropriated by detachments of workers ignorant of farming, but nonetheless sent in the tens of thousands from the cities to uncover the "excess," which resulted in more disarray hardly conducive to good harvests. As Lenin himself confessed: "Practically, we took all the surplus grain--and sometimes even not only surplus grain but part of the grain the peasant required for food."

By 1920, 30 percent of what the peasant produced was requisitioned, a seizure of the peasant's product sometimes called "War Communism." But the White, anticommunist, armies had not dictated Lenin's requisitioning, since they had not yet posed a serious threat to the Red Army. Lenin's purpose was to move from a capitalist free market to a socialist one--to a command economy--as Lenin declared. This was Lenin's plan to nationalize the peasant, although not in the total way that Stalin would do a decade later through his collectivization of the peasant, as you will see below.

Nationalization and its attendant forced requisitions was a solution to the problem of getting the peasant's grain without paying for it; and of preventing the peasant from keeping his grain and other crops from the Party. And it made many new laws to assure that the peasant would play his proper role under communism. These set low prices for his produce, banned private trade, and established a system of rationing. Unlike a free market, they provided little motivation to produce; notwithstanding the likelihood of new detachments of workers coming through to expropriate or loot whatever was in a field or house. Understandably, the harvest of 1921 was only 40 percent that of 1913, before the revolution.

This disastrous harvest, along with the peasant having lost or in hunger having eaten the reserve food supplies needed to survive the periodic draughts, had human costs far beyond the hundreds of rebellions this all caused. In 1921 a drought that in some Russian provinces formerly would have at most created a minor famine, then triggered one of the worst ones in modern times: starvation faced over 30,000,000 people.



Collection wagon for Children wh starved to death in Lenin's famine



A victim of Lenin's famine

Faced with a calamity that could threaten the survival of communism, the Party began to provide some aid to the starving while requesting urgent international help. International relief, particularly from the United States through the American Relief Administration (ARA), was soon forthcoming. But even in the face of this historic disaster, Lenin wielded aid and food as a socialist weapon. Said Lenin, lacking any feeling for the victims:

it is necessary to supply with food out of the state funds only those employees who are actually needed under conditions of maximum productivity of labor, and to distribute the food provisions by making the whole matter an instrumentality of politics, used with the view of cutting down on the number of those who are not absolutely necessary and to spur on those who are really needed.¹

Also, Lenin at first ignored the counterpart famine in the Ukraine. The Party must have known as early as August, 1921, that the southern Ukraine was verging on famine, but Lenin refused to allow a transfer of food from the north to the south. This was to pacify Ukrainian nationalism and defeat the many rebellions there--to crush peasant resistance, a goal that Stalin would resume by famine in the early 1930s, as you will also see below.

Requests for foreign aid were for the Russian Republic; the Party mentioned nothing about famine in the Ukraine; and did nothing about it at first. Indeed, the Soviets tried to feed Russia with Ukrainian grain, justifying this by exaggerating its grain production. "Starving Ukrainians were forced to sacrifice their own lives to save hungry Russians...." The Party allowed no aid from the outside until American relief officers forced the issue, and even then the Party hindered the aid effort.



More famine victims

Then, in the summer of 1922, irrationally, unless one has firmly in mind their communist obsession with building socialism, the Party resumed large-scale grain exports. This, even though the Party had to starve a part of the population to get the



**American relief workers
feeding Russian Children**

grain. But it wanted capital for industrial heavy equipment. So it asked the ARA to continue aid so that some of these people could be fed. Thus, the picture that displayed the heartlessness of communism versus the apolitical compassion of democracies: in the port of Odessa Russians would see the SS Manitowac unloading American famine relief supplies while nearby the SS Vladimir was loading Ukrainian grain destined for Hamburg.

Although there were agricultural dislocations caused by civil war, Lenin and the Communist Party were mainly responsible for some 5,000,000 people starving to death or dying from associated diseases. The toll would have been much higher had not the ARA provided about \$45,000,000 in aid and kept alive about 10,000,000 people. (For the overall toll of mass murder during the civil war and deaths from this man-made famine amounting to murder, see the civil war period in [Table 1.1](#) of my [Lethal Politics](#))

After Lenin's death from a stroke in 1924, there was a struggle for Party rule between Leon Trotsky, commissar for war and Lenin's heir apparent, and Josef Stalin, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. By 1928 Stalin had won the battle and had full control over the Red Army, secret police, and communist cadre (see [map](#) of Western USSR at this time, and [world map](#)). He could now carry out his plans to fully socialize what was now known as the Soviet Union, especially to go much further than Lenin had dared go with the peasants, to nationalize--without compensation--independent farms, their livestock, and land, and consolidate them into huge farm factories run by the Party. Each farmer was to become an employee earning a daily wage for his work. It was to be total collectivization of the peasantry.



Josef Stalin 1879-1953

Theoretically, the idea has a certain appeal: turn "inefficient" small plots for which farmers could not afford, or use, modern farming equipment into large factory-like farms, each with its own tractors, each efficiently allocating farmers to specialized tasks. To be sure, this required persuading farmers to give up their land, animals, tools, and often their homes to the communes, and to become workers with regular wages, hours, and tasks.

The peasant resisted, of course. They killed their livestock rather than give them up,

**TABLE 1.1
OVERVIEW OF SOVIET DEMOCIDE
(MOST PROBABLE ESTIMATES) [1]**

PERIOD	FROM	-----DEMOICIDE (000)-----			-----COMPONENTS (000)-----				
		TOTAL [5]	CITIZENS	RATE% [2]	TERROR	DEPORT.	CAMPS [3]	FAMINE [4]	WARS [5]
Civil War	1917	3,284	3,284	0.43	750	?	34	2,500	1,410
NEP	1923	2,200	2,200	0.25	?	?	232	0	?
Collectivization	1929	11,440	11,440	1.04	1,733	1,400	3,306	5,000	0.20
Great Terror	1936	4,345	4,345	0.89	1,000	65	3,280	0	1.20
Pre-WWII	1939	5,104	4,438	1.02	1,932	283	2,889	0	256
World War II	1941	13,053	10,000	1.21	1,257	1,036	10,761	0	19,625
Post-War...	1946	15,613	12,448	0.88	1,376	1,557	12,348	333	90
Post-Stalin	1954	6,872	6,613	0.08	250	8	6,613	0	22
TOTAL [6]	1917	61,911	54,769	0.45	>8,298	>4,349	39,464	7,833	>21,403

NOTES:

1. Mid-estimates of dead: most probable central values in a low-high range.
2. Annualized rates for mid-period populations. The total is the weighted average.
For citizens only.
3. Camp totals include transit deaths.
4. Famine totals are only for those included as democide
5. Wars and rebellions; includes Nazi caused famine. Shown for comparison only.
6. Numbers may not add up to the total democide for each period due to rounding.

burned down their homes, fled to the cities, shot at the troops who came to enforce the Party's commands, and committed suicide. This Peasant War destroyed and depopulated whole villages. Even nomadic herdsman were not exempt, as Stalin decreed that the Party also must settle them into communes, and collectivize their wandering herds. By March 1, 1930, 14,264,300 peasant holdings had been collectivized throughout the Soviet Union.

As it turned out, once he "voluntarily" turned all he owned over to a collective farm, the peasant found it more like a penal colony. Usually thousands of miles away, Party functionaries in Moscow commanded commune work and activity, and regimented the lives and daily routine of each commune member, although they know nothing of local conditions and farming. Peasants, now commune "workers," had to obey orders without question, or communist agents, spies, or their supervisors, would report them. In words that a peasant living under Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in Cambodia could have uttered, as you will see in a later chapter, Myron Dolot pointed out:

We were always suspected of treason. Even sadness or happiness were causes for suspicion. Sadness was thought of as an indication of dissatisfaction with our life, while happiness, regardless of how sporadic, spontaneous, or fleeting, was considered to be a dangerous phenomenon that could destroy the devotion to the communist cause. You had to be cautious about the display of feelings at all times, and in every place. We were all made to understand that we would be allowed to live only as long as we followed the Party line, both in our private and social lives.²

This Peasant War was the largest and most deadly war fought between the World Wars I and II. The Party fought the war by trying to "persuade" peasants to "voluntarily" join the communes using lies, false promises, peer pressure, coercion, and finally naked force. Moreover, a massive, coordinated propaganda barrage extolled the manifold virtues of collectivization and condemned those "rich" peasants--or "kulaks"--who were systematically and selfishly sabotaging this humanitarian Party effort to spread the benefits of communism to the poor peasant.

Stalin also formally declared war on *kulaks*. Party activists and even everyday workers became convinced that these kulaks were wholly responsible for the resistance to collectivization and its associated violence. Party officials throughout the Soviet Union spewed forth hate propaganda, and consistently harangued activists on kulak evil-doing. Whipped into frenzy of hostility, and upon being sent out to the countryside in waves of collectivization, activists and cadre unleashed their pent up rage on any

assumed kulaks.

Kulaks were not only scapegoats, they were the focus of attack. Stalin pursued the collectivization campaign through a campaign to eliminate the kulaks as a class, and decreed the liquidation of all kulaks and their families, even extended relatives. This meant an execution for many, or the slow death of labor camps for lots more. Others were barely more fortunate to be deported by the Party to forced settlements in remote regions, like Siberia--in some ways worse than camps. Kulaks were not regarded as people, but as more like vermin.

This kind of scapegoating, deception, propaganda, and use of naked force are intrinsic to a command economy. To command an economy means just that, to use commands that subjects absolutely must obey--else prison, camp, or death--to get done what is planned. Since human beings have their own interests and are unwilling to be shoved around like so many chess pieces, they have to be persuaded or pushed, and as communist cadre everywhere have seemed to say, "If some die in the process, so be it--you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs."

In practice, those liquidated "kulaks" were mainly the peasants who had been more successful farmers--they owned fatter cows, they built better houses or barns, and they earned more than their neighbors. In short, these were not the rich (the average kulak earned less than the average factory worker, or the rural official persecuting him), the exploiting landlord. They were simply the best farmers. And they paid for their success. The Peasant War consumed their lives and the country. Speaking with Churchill during a World War II summit, Stalin admitted that this Peasant War was worse than that against the Nazis, it "was a terrible struggle....It was fearful." After saying that he had to deal with 10,000,000 kulaks, Stalin claimed that "the great bulk was very unpopular and was wiped out by their laborers."

Stalin's estimate was not far off. From 1929 to 1935, the Party deported to labor camps or resettlements, usually to a slow death, possibly 10,000,000, maybe even 15,000,000, "kulaks" and their families. Even infants and children, and the old and infirm. Even they apparently stood in the way of progress, of Stalin's collectivization. The cost in lives? The Soviets themselves admitted that their collectivization and dekulakization campaigns might have killed 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 peasants. This was mass murder, a hidden Holocaust that few in the world outside the former Soviet Union know about. All to apply an untested, theoretical economic model--Marxism-Leninism.

And did collectivization work? No, this greatest of experiments in scientific, social engineering, utterly failed. It denied the laws of economics and human nature, of the free market; and so, the communes never did produce enough food for even the Soviet

table. The Party had to turn to massive food imports and to giving the communes some freedom, but to no avail. Stalin helped agricultural productivity most when he permitted peasants, during their time off, to plant food on a little plot of land the Party gave them near their collective. As one might expect, these little plots became highly productive, and eventually accounted for most of the food produced in the Soviet Union, strongly vindicating the free market model.

Incredibly, the horror of collectivization was only the beginning. This Peasant War and the resulting communes totally disrupted the agricultural economy. By 1932, famine again threatened, but there was the Peasant War and the Party could not give aid to the enemy. In fact, Stalin saw the famine as positive: it would encourage peasants to join the collectives, particularly if that were their only source of food. But Stalin perceived another potential benefit from a famine. He could use it to squash Ukrainian nationalism. Ukrainians, even top communists, were becoming more assertive about strictly Ukrainian interest: music, language, Ukrainian history and literature were undergoing a renaissance. Stalin could not allow this to continue, since Ukrainian nationalism was inherently an opposing force to communism, at the heart of which was the peasant. Destroy them and Russian immigrants and collectivization would easily follow.

So Stalin opened in 1932 a new and differently fought front of the Peasant War by ordering an impossible grain delivery target of 7.7 million tons out of a Ukrainian harvest already reduced by a third from that of 1930. After much argument Ukrainian officials got this reduced to 6.6 million tons, but when the Party apportioned quotas among the villages, said one survivor, "Our village was given a quota that it couldn't have fulfilled in ten years!" In effect, the quotas were a sentence to death by starvation for Ukrainian peasant families. Stalin's war strategy on this front was simple yet imperial in scope: to force the unwilling peasants into communes, while also destroying the spiritual resources and cultural achievements that supported their nationalism.

As shown in Table 4.2, although collecting more grain than ever, although exporting millions of tons of grain, the Party showed the starving peasants no mercy. It took even warm baked bread off the peasant's tables. It marshaled detachments of workers and



Work of 100,000 prisoners on the White/Baltic Sea Canal 1931-33. Tens of thousands died.

activists to seize every last bit of produce or grain, including the seed grain needed for planting. They went through peasant homes with rods, pushing them into walls and ceilings, seeking hidden stores of food or grain;

they dug up or poked around yards with rods searching for hidden food, and brought in special animals to sniff out the food, like trained dogs now sniff for drugs in traveler's suitcases. To the Party officials and activists, peasants must have food hidden somewhere, since they were still alive.

TABLE 4.2.
Soviet Grain Collection 1928-1933

Period	Collected[1]	Exported
July, 1928-June 1929	10,790	-184
July, 1929-June 1930	16,081	1,343
July, 1930-June 1931	22,139	5,832
July, 1931-June 1932	22,839	4,786
July, 1932-June 1933	18,513	1,607

1. Thousand tons. Includes milling levy.

To survive, the peasants ate roots; they boiled bark and the soles of their boots for the broth. But at each grasp for food, the authorities stepped on their hands. When the peasants started eating their dogs and cats, the Party ordered village officials to bag a "certain quota of dog and cat skins," and they thus went through the village shooting these animals. When the peasants tried to eat birds and their eggs, communist activists organized systematic bird hunts, shooting birds out of the trees with shotguns. Finally, the peasants ate horse manure; they fought over it, sometimes finding whole grains in it. Emaciated, enfeebled, near the end, they sometimes ate--as have North Koreans during their communist-made famine--their own children and those of their neighbors they could kidnap.

The Party left the peasants with nothing. To isolate these starving victims, the Party ordered the military and police to seal Ukrainian borders to block the import of food. And the Party blacklisted some villages with especially stubborn peasants, totally isolating them from the outside; and forbid the sale of any food or other products--even soap.

And then they died by millions in the Winter of 1932-33. Stalin prevented any aid until he was sure that the Ukraine would no longer resist collectivization or be a threat to communism. About eighteen months of famine did it. With whole villages lifeless, highways and fields dotted with the dead, the survivors too weak to work, the Ukraine

prostrate and even workers in the cities now threatened, with victory in hand, Stalin ended quotas in March, 1933; in April some army grain reserves were released for distribution to the dying peasants.

The result? The Ukraine was like a huge Nazi death camp, with about a fourth of all peasants dead or dying, and the rest so weak and debilitated as to be unable to bury the dead. On Stalin's orders, about 5,000,000 Ukrainians had been murdered through starvation, 20 to 25 percent of the Ukrainian farm population. Another 2,000,000 probably starved to death elsewhere, such as 1,000,000 in the North Caucasus alone. While Stalin intended the Ukrainian deaths, those elsewhere were the unintended by-products of the war on the peasants--collectivization.



Stalin's Ukrainian famine victims

Still, the Party did learn little from this famine. It loosened its controls, and, as mentioned, allowed the peasants to operate small, free market, plots. But this was not enough to prevent famines. Aside from some local famines in the next decade, another major one occurred in the Ukraine and Byelorussia in 1946 to 1947. This time only 500,000 to 1,000,000 people starved to death. (For the overall toll of mass murder during collectivization and from the Ukrainian famine, see [Table 1.1](#) of my [Lethal Politics](#))

Regardless of these famines, no matter the costs of collectivization, some Western intellectuals claimed that the communist induced rapid industrialization had brought a better life to the average citizen. Hard to believe now, but there were Western books and articles extolling Soviet progress, and pointing to this as the wave of the future that all our politico-economic systems should emulate. One such the work by the English socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* (with the question mark dropped from the second edition) written during the worst of the collectivization and the Ukrainian famine. Even years later, when, details of the cost of Soviet communism and the famine, and the nature of the Party's dictatorship was much better known, they would write that the country was a "full-fledged democracy." And the very influential British playwright and socialist George Bernard Shaw would call

the Soviet Union "a really free country." In the eyes of these writers, the Soviet's now had national health care, guaranteed housing, social security, no unemployment, and a "democratic government" that marshaled all society's resources to create a better future, unlike the dictatorship of the rich in the West where greedy capitalists climbed over each other's bodies to impoverish the worker.

This stuff could only have been written by utterly ignoring the reality of Stalin's mass murder, enslavement of his people, and his famines. It is as though these Western supporters had visited a Nazi concentration camp and emerged claiming that the camp's government guaranteed that their subjects would have food, work, and a place to live, and the democratic right to elect the head of their barracks.



Sidney Webb 1859–1947

Even some thirty years after Stalin's death in 1953, even after some seventy years of Party command over the economy, even after life in the Soviet Union had markedly improved since the famine collectivization and famine years of the early 1930s, the Soviet citizen hardly lived better than in czarist times. As typical of communist countries, shopping in Soviet cities was often a long hassle, with lines after lines of people waiting to buy scarce goods; of days spent just to find toilet paper, sausages, or shoes; of a line for a ticket to buy an item, a line to pick up the item, and yet a third line to pay for it. The communist elite was too important to waste such time and deserved better, to be sure, and had their own restaurants, their own stores in which to buy the best of goods, their chauffeured cars, and their Party-owned villas or retreats. As one of the best indicators of public health, infant mortality was increasing, not decreasing as in all free market democracies.

Well, you might say, this really was Russia, and you know, the Russians; they were barbarians compared to Western Europeans. Then consider China (see contemporary [map and statistics](#), and [world map](#)), a far different country culturally, whose people have a reputation for intelligence and industriousness. In 1949, the Communist Party under Mao Tse-tung won the Civil War against the Nationalist government in 1949, and control over mainland China. Immediately Mao moved to consolidate and centralize power, destroy any source of opposition, and make communist authority supreme throughout the land. At least acceptance, if not outright loyalty, had to be assured to apply the communist economic model, especially among the mass of peasants. With actual or potential resistance liquidated, Mao then could command nationalization,

collectivization, and forced industrialization.

In hammering out this transitional, "dictatorship of the proletariat," the Mao and his henchmen in the Party murdered many millions of Chinese, sent them to forced labor camps to die, or caused them to commit suicide. It was often enough to be a better-off peasant, a simple businessman, a minor member of the former government, a humble priest, or a Westerner's friend. And any resistance to the Party or criticism of Mao or communism was enough for a bullet behind the head. This terrorism soon reached into the smallest village and furthest reaches of China.



**Mao Tse-tung
1893-1976**

This preparatory softening up and totalization of Chinese society took almost four years. It involved many movements or campaigns, each an effort by the new rulers to define specific goals and enemies, to name these and the suitable tactics and perhaps quotas to the lowest cadres, and to mobilize the masses through slogans, giant mass meetings, required political and orientation sessions, and often outright incitement to violence against the class enemy. Mao aimed some of these movements at economic growth or social welfare, such as the "Increase Production and Thrift," "Patriotic Cleanliness and Health," and "Elimination of Illiteracy" movements.

Perhaps the best known of these movements was that of "Land Reform." China was and still is a land of farming villages. Traditionally, much power in the village had rested with the gentry and relatively rich landowners. They were a largely independent power base, historically moderating between the peasants and the power of the local and central governments. This was not a feudal, peasant-landlord class system as had existed in Europe. The Chinese peasant was independent and often owned his own small piece of land.

Acting through the Party's organization, officials, and cadre, Mao's method used to destroy this free agricultural market was simple: create class hatred of what landlords there were and of the "rich" and then give him their land and wealth. Moreover, if the Party also could incite the peasant to kill or participate in killing the landlord, his fear of revenge or of losing his new land would cause him to support the Party. Therefore the Party's directive to cadres:

Adopt every possible measure to rouse the hatred of the people and excite them into frenzy and hysterical animosity against the landlords. The high-ranking cadres responsible for the Land Reform Movement must not hesitate to allow the Land Reform Squads a free hand in executing landlords³

The technique was for a group of activists to occupy a village, and then within a few days to select the victims, and arrange a "trial." The cadre would then haul the victims out of their beds at night, beat, humiliate, insult, and spit upon them, and eventually bring them before a "tribunal" seated at a table, and comprising Party activists, one or two local sympathizers, and if possible some person with some judicial experience to lend legal color to the proceedings. Then there would be the "jury," a crowd of local peasants who the activists had already aroused against the victims. Peasant faces would show manufactured hatred based on fear, for their cadres were watching them for compassion for the victims or lack of enthusiasm for the proceedings.

Amid cries of "enemy of the people," or "counter-revolutionary jackal," or "imperialist lackey," cadre would force the victim to face his "jury" with his hands tied, and with prompting from the "tribunal," to recite his crimes against the revolution. Then a member of the "tribunal" would say that the victim's punishment should be death, at which the coached "jury" would shout widely "Death!" Then the cadre would immediately shoot the victim, or wait until after they dug their own grave.

The Party officially ended "Land Reform" in 1953, and according to the Party affected around 480,000,000 of about 500,000,000 million peasants; almost 114,000,000 acres forcibly changed hands. Under this guise of redistributing land to the peasants, the party destroyed the power base of the gentry and rich peasant, and got the acquiescence, if not support, of the poorer peasants.

How many landowners and their relations the Part murdered or caused to commit suicide in this vast and bloody campaign we can never know. A reasonably conservative figure is that about 4,500,000 landlords, and relatively rich and better-off peasants were murdered. As fantastic as this human toll may be, the words of the highest party rulers give it credibility. In official 1948 study materials about "agrarian reform," for example, Mao instructed cadres that "one-tenth of the peasants [about 50,000,000] would have to be destroyed." Jen Pi-shih, a party Central Committee member, had also said in a 1948 speech to cadres that "30,000,000 landlords and rich peasants would have to be destroyed." (for a breakdown of mass murder-democide--by period, see [Table 8.1](#) of my [China's Bloody Century](#))

TABLE 8.1
PRC DEMOCIDE 1949-1987 [1]

PERIOD	YEARS	DEMOCIDE [000]	DEATH RATES %		WAR/REV. [000]
			PERIOD	ANNUAL	
Totalitarianization	1949-1953	8,427	1.48	0.35	2,785
Collectivization	1954-1958	7,474	1.21	0.24	25
Retrenchement	1959-1963	10,729	1.63	0.33	26
Cultural Revolution	1964-1975	7,731	0.96	0.08	563
Liberalization	1976-1987	874	0.09	0.01	42
TOTAL	1949-1987	35,236	4.49	0.12	3,440

1. Totals may be off due to rounding. Figures from Appendix II.A.

Power thus tightly centralized, society totally under control, and all possible countervailing forces destroyed or emasculated, with now a true command economy to work with, and having learned nothing from Stalin's horrible debacle, Mao put collectivization into effect. After some preliminary collectivization of the peasant into cooperatives, in April 1958 Mao began the forced collectivization of peasants into communes with the establishment of the "Sputnik " commune in Honan Province. The Beijing *China Youth News* described what it was like to live *in this commune*, with unintentional irony:

At dawn the bugles sound and whistles blow to gather the population of the commune.... A quarter of an hour later the peasants are drawn up in a line. At the orders of their brigade and company commanders they now move off in military step to the fields, carrying their banners. Here you no longer see the small groups of peasants, two or three at a time, smoking and making their way leisurely to the fields. Instead you hear the measured tramp of many feet and the sound of marching songs. The age-old habit of living haphazardly has now disappeared forever with the Chinese peasants. What an enormous change! In order to adapt itself better for modern life and collective labor the commune has launched a movement for the shifting and reunification of the villages. The peasants now move together in groups to spots nearer to their place of work. What an astonishing change! From the days of antiquity the peasants have regarded the home as their most precious possession, handed down to them by their ancestors. But now that the little patches of land, the small houses and the livestock have become the property of the commune, and now that the bonds which attached the peasants to their villages have been severed so that there is nothing left of their former home which they could still desire, they feel at peace. Now they say: "The place where we live doesn't matter to us; we are at home anywhere."

This "success" of this "model" commune, so the Party reported, led to a "spontaneous demand" by the peasants throughout China for communes of their own. Acceding to this, the Party ordered communes set up everywhere. Then the newly acquired land, and all else the peasant owned, such as sickles, bamboo or wooden carrying poles, baskets, farming tools of all sizes and types, and even houses, became the property of the communes. Virtually all that hundreds of millions of peasants owned was nationalized in one titanic gulp.

By the end of 1958, the Party had organized into 26,000 communes over 90 percent of the population--about 450,000,000 Chinese. The peasant was now the property of the commune, to labor like factory workers in teams and brigades at whatever the Party commanded, to eat in common mess halls, and often to sleep together in barracks. In an

instant, for about one-seventh of humanity, Mao had destroyed family lives, traditions, personal property, privacy, personal initiative, and individual freedom. Mao and Party functionaries now dictated every condition of peasant lives, now truly creating a *command* agricultural economy.



A commune in Henan

Mao still found time for even more Movements to remove any possible critics or opponents to its policies and ideology. One example was the "Anti-Rightist" Movement, which was notable for assigning quotas. Mao gave educational institutions, from primary and middle schools to technical schools, and up to the university, quotas of between 5 and 10 percent of their staffs to be delivered to the state as "rightists," who would then be imprisoned, tortured, and possibly executed. And because the quotas for rightists were often higher than institutions had legitimately qualified rightists to fill, rightists had to be invented. To understand this system is to know that some institutions would enthusiastically overfill their quotas.

But this was a diversion from the main line. Even as Mao was displaying the first model commune and planning to modernize agriculture, he also undertook to catch up with the West in industrialization, particularly Great Britain in steel production. Indeed, Mao considered collectivization and industrialization two legs of China's socialism, necessary for China's "[w]alking on two legs," as he put it.



Great Leap Forward poster

Beginning in May 1958, slogans, exhortations, drum-beating mass meetings, mobilized the whole country in a "Great Leap Forward." The Party hastily built workshops and factories, reportedly half-a-million in Hopei Province alone in less than two months. It erected Iron smelters throughout the country side; 1,000,000 by October, involving 100,000,000 Chinese. It ordered the communes, and "encouraged" millions of urban families, to contribute pots, pans, cutlery, and other iron and steel possessions for smelting. Peasants had to work day and night, fourteen or sixteen hours or more, on these projects.

And production statistics zoomed. But top Party officials soon realized that local



Guandong peasants labor
in Great Leap Forward

authorities had falsified the statistics. What factories and workshops produced was often worthless junk; much of the iron produced in backyard furnaces was impure and unusable slag.

All of this demolished Chinese living conditions. In a pre-1937 survey of 2,727 households spread around 136 different areas of China, the average food consumption of each adult male was 3,795 calories. In 1956, official sources reported the daily individual food consumption as less than 2,400 calories--an astounding 37 percent drop. In 1957, according to official statistics, rice production was 82,000,000 tons.

This reduced to 340 grams (12 ounces) per person per day; and considering the better rations of officials, soldiers, and agents, the ordinary person got less than 320 grams, as refugees reported, or under half the normal daily calories needed. Although there were nearly 150,000,000 fewer people in 1936, the rice production then was about the same as in 1957. Predictably, in 1956 and 1957 there was famine in certain districts.

Then there were the many the Party murdered during this collectivization period. As best we can estimate, the collectivization and the "Great Leap Forward," as well as the campaigns against "rightists," probable cost about an additional 5,550,000 Chinese lives.

This is not all this economic model, supposedly vastly superior to the free market, cost these poor people. The worst was yet to come. The effects of collectivization and the "Great Leap" were disastrous. Already in 1959, the negative effects on public welfare evident in previous years were multiplying. For example, *Honan Peasant's Daily*, a provincial newspaper, disclosed that many peasants died from overwork or malnutrition that summer. During two summer weeks, 367,000 collapsed and 29,000 died in the fields. Other papers revealed that over a similar period 7,000 so died in Kiangsi, 8,000 in Kiansu, and 13,000 in Chekiang.

The peasant was trapped by these conditions. With the Party forbidding the peasant from leaving his commune or work place, he could only rebel. From 1959 to 1960, the peasant rose up in arms in at least five of China's provinces, rebellions that the military could not subdue for over a year. It was reported that in Honan and Shantung "members of the militia stole weapons, set up roadblocks, seized stocks of grain, and engaged in widespread armed robbery." In 1959, rebellions took place over a large area in Chinghai, Kansu, and Schechwan; and during the same year Chinese, Hui, and Uighur forced laborers rebelled together and destroyed trucks, mines, bridges, and

tunnels.

But all this was part of the buildup to the worst famine in world history. According to the demographer John Aird in an U.S. Bureau of the Census study, during the late 1950s and early 1960s possibly as many as 40,000,000 people starved to death. However, the demographer Ansley Coale, using official Chinese data and adjusting for underreporting of vital statistics, concluded that 27,000,000 died, which is more in line with other estimates. This massive death toll is as though every person in Texas and Virginia in 1999 starved to death.

This famine was largely the result of failed communist policies and the grandest, most ambitious, most destructive social engineering project ever: the total communization and nationalization of an agriculture system involving over half-a-billion human beings and its reduction to military-like central planning and administration, and the vast and hurried "Great Leap Forward."

A wide-scale drought there was, affecting 41 percent of the farmland in 1959 and 56 percent from 1960 to 1961. This doubtlessly triggered the Great Famine and might have caused a million or so deaths had it happened in the 1930s under the corrupt Nationalist regime. But now the agricultural system was in such disarray and social policies were so counterproductive that the greatest of all famines was inevitable.

This, added to privation and famine, was enough for some people. More so than in 1959 and 1960, peasants resort to armed rebellion. During 1961 and the following year in southern China, there was continuous guerrilla warfare, and Fukien Province, across from Taiwan, also saw a serious armed uprising. A former army officer, a Colonel Chung, led some 8,000 peasants to attack the militia and loot granaries in Wuhua. During 1961 alone, official sources admit that resistance included 146,852 granary raids, 94,532 arsons, and 3,738 revolts. In addition, according to General Hsieh Fu-chih, the Minister of Security, there were 1,235 assassinations of party and administrative cadres.

As with the Soviet Union, many Western intellectuals were under the spell of Chinese communism, particularly of Mao, and argued that he had greatly improved the lot the average Chinese. Here also, if we do the ridiculous and ignore all the mass murder, total deprivation of freedom, and resulting Great Famine, we still must find these arguments naïve or ill informed. Life for the city dweller was better under the previous fascist Nationalist regime than under the communists. After more than twenty years of communism, the average Chinese standard of living had fallen below what it was before the Sino-Japanese War that began in 1937.

To further prove that to deny people freedom is to produce an economy of scarcity, famine, and death, note the wide-scale, famines that communist parties also have made elsewhere. In Chapter 1, I mentioned the famine in communist North Korea and the Party's bankrupting of the country. In an entirely different part of the world, communist Ethiopia put in place controls over agricultural production in the 1980s, and 1,000,000 Ethiopians starved to death or died from connected diseases--this is out of a population of 33,500,000 people, which made this famine nearly as large as China's proportionally.

These empirical economic experiments with an alternative theoretical model to the free market; this incredibly, bloody rebuilding of whole societies and cultures to match utopian plans; this force fitting of people into one job or another; and this effort to do better by dictator's command what free people can do better for themselves; has totally failed. All you need to do is think of the marketplace in any liberal democracy compared to the shortages, long lines, limited choices, massive famines, and bloody repression that prevailed in these command economies. Better yet, just think of the success of Gates and Microsoft. There is a joke about the command economy that Eastern Europeans made when they lived under communism: were a communist country to take over the great Sahara desert, we would hear nothing for ten years, after which there would be a shortage of sand.

Famines have also happened in authoritarian and fascist nations, although not even close in deaths to those under communism. By contrast, no democratically free people have ever had a famine. None. This is so important that I will put an even sharper point on it. *By the very nature of freedom, a free people are immune to one of humanity's' worst disasters, a famine.* This can be seen from in [Table 4.3a](#), summarized here in Table 4.3b.

TABLE 4.3b
20th Century Famine Totals

	Free	Partly Free	Unfree	Non-Sovereign	Totals
No. of Countries	0	15	30*	16	60
Fam. Dead (000)	0	14,374	>60,080	>12,115	>86,569

* Angola 1974-76 famine counted in both unfree and colony categories.

TABLE 4.3a
20th Century Famine

Country	Famine Years	Non-Sovereign	Famine Dead
Angola	1974-76	colony/unfree	?
Greece	1944?	Nazi occupied	250,000
India	1943/44	colony	3,000,000
Indochina	1945	Japanese occupied	1,500,000
Lebanon/Syria	1914-16	colony	325,000
Levant	1914-18	colony	56,000
Malawi	1949	colony	200
Mozambique	1906	colony	9,000
Netherlands	1944-45	Nazi occupied	15,000
Nigeria	1905	colony	5,000
Nigeria	1942-43	colony	?
Rwanda	1943-44	colony	300,000
Tanganyika	1907	colony	30,000
USSR (Eastern)	1941-45	Nazi occupied	6,500,000
West Africa	1913-14	colony	125,000
Zimbabwe	1922	colony	47
TOTAL DEAD			>12,115,247
Partly Free			
Armenia	1918-20	partly free	50,000
Austro-Hungary	1918-19	partly free	75,000
Bangladesh	1974	partly free	2,000,000
China	1927	partly free	4,000,000
China	1929	partly free	2,000,000
China	1942-44	partly free	4,500,000
China	1946-47	partly free	50,000
El Salvadore	1979-88	partly free	23,000
Ethiopia	1966	partly free	55,000
Ethiopia	1957-58	partly free	250,000
Ethiopia	1973-74	partly free	200,000
Germany	1918-19	partly free	203,000
Mexico	1900-20	partly free	900,000

Spain	1931-39	partly free	38,000
Uganda	1980-81	partly free	30,000

TOTAL DEAD

14,374,000

Unfree

Angola	1993-94	unfree	?
Cambodia	1970-75	unfree	30,000
Cambodia	1975-79	unfree	1,350,000
Cambodia	1979-81	unfree	250,000
Chad	1975-83?	unfree	100,000
China	1920-21	unfree	500,000
CHINA	1959-62	unfree	30,000,000
Ethiopia	1974-75	unfree	50,000
Ethiopia	1984-85	unfree	1,000,000
Korea, North	1995-	unfree	3,000,000
Liberia	1992-93	unfree	?
Liberia	1995-98	unfree	?
Mozambique	1982-85	unfree	250,000
Nigeria	1968-70	unfree	1,000,000
Sierra Leone	1995-98	unfree	?
Somalia	1974-75	unfree	20,000
Somalia	1991-93	unfree	500,000
Sudan	1988	unfree	250,000
Sudan	1984-85	unfree	250,000
Sudan	1998-	unfree	1,500,000
Tanganyika	1929	unfree	500
Tanganyika	1917-19	unfree	30,000
Turkey	1914-18	unfree	2,000,000
USSR	1921-23	unfree	9,000,000
USSR	1931-33	unfree	7,000,000
USSR	1946-47	unfree	2,000,000
Zaire	1997	unfree	?
Zaire	1977-78	unfree	?

TOTAL DEAD

60,080,500

This is not because nature is kinder to democracies. Note, for example that in 1931 the worst drought ever to hit the United States began in the Midwestern and southern plains states and centered on Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma. By 1934 the drought had spread to 27 states and covered over 75 percent of the country. Without rain, farmlands that were over-plowed and over-grazed became powder dry, resulting in huge dust storms called "black blizzards." Drought took out of cultivation about 35,000,000 acres of farmland, and dust storms removed or were removing topsoil from 225,000,000 acres more.



Dust bowl dust clouds

Just in 1935, 850,000,000 tons of topsoil probably blew off the Southern Plains. As the drought and dust storms continued year after year, whole farm families fled in caravans, wagons and carts piled high with belongings; leaving behind vacant homes and farm machinery partly buried in dusty soil.

Through a variety of relief, cultivation, and conservation projects and programs, Congress and the Roosevelt Administration acted to save what land, crops, and livestock they could, and help the farmer survive the drought. Finally, in 1939 the rains came and the drought was over.

While even lesser droughts had caused the starvation to death of many tens of millions where governments forbid a free market, I could not find a reference to even one American starving to death during the dust bowl. Some Americans did die of suffocation from the dust storms, however, and some died of related diseases.



Buried in dust

The worst famine to hit a European country in the last two centuries was the Irish famine of 1845 to 1849, which is sometimes blamed on a free market. A fungus attacked and destroyed the potato, the major crop of Ireland's peasants, causing massive famine throughout the country and the death of perhaps 1,000,000 people, almost 13 percent of the population. Now, Great Britain had united Ireland with her by the 1801 Act of Union, and before that had ruled Ireland as, in effect, a colony. Over the previous centuries the British had tightly controlled the development of the Irish economy through many repressive laws, such as those inhibiting world and British trade with



Searching for potatoes

Ireland. In particular, various British governments were intent on suppressing Roman Catholicism, the religion of virtually all Irish peasants. Dating from 1695 and not fully repealed until 1829, laws to this end had a disastrous effect on Ireland's agriculture.

For



Food riot in Dungarvan

example, the British forbid the Irish Catholic to receive an education, engage in trade or commerce, vote, buy land, lease land, rent land above a certain worth, reap any profit from land greater than a third of his rent, and own a horse worth more than a certain value. This code so distorted Ireland's agricultural system, so impoverished the

peasant, and so made them dependent on their landlords that any natural disaster wiping out their crops could only mean a major famine. Moreover, because of limits on the franchise, the secret ballot, and the manner of representation and legislative voting, Great Britain was not even an electoral democracy at the time of the famine. It did not become a democracy until it democratized its electoral system later in the century.

But there is even more to freedom than just avoiding disaster. It is no accident that democratically free people are the most economically advanced, technological developed, and wealthiest in the world, as shown in the [Appendix](#) and Figure 4.1, above. Nor is it by chance that the poorest nations are those in which their dictators allow no or little open economic competition, prevent people from buying and selling goods freely, and encourage bribes of government bureaucrats or their relatives.

Then look at the economic miracles in Germany and Japan. The Allied bombing of these countries in World War II thoroughly destroyed their economies and infrastructures. Germany and Japan also had to absorb millions of returning soldiers and civilians, which for West Germany alone was about 8,000,000 Germans, most

homeless and hungry. How did these countries recover as fast as they did, going from being among the most devastated of nations in 1945 to being in the early 1990s among the most economically powerful states? In each case, it was the effects of freedom, particularly a free market.

Of course, when the Allies occupied these countries after the war, they provided aid to relieve starvation, but this would have only been a short run solution had not they also broken up monopolistic government-big business cartels, encouraged private enterprise, freed the market place of many government controls, assured the rule of law, and democratized their political systems. It is to the credit of the Japanese and West German postwar leaders that when given their nation's independence, they maintained and enhanced their people's democratic freedom. Both Japan and German are now liberal democracies.

For further proof, note the rapid economic growth and modernization of now-democratic South Korea. A good measure of this growth is in its annual total of goods and services, or gross domestic product. This averaged a growth rate of 5.3 percent annually, 1950 to 1985, despite the devastating Korean War during the first three years. For the world as a whole, the average was less than half that, or 2.3 percent. In 1998, South Korea's growth rate was even higher at 6.8 percent, and it is now becoming a close competitor to Japan. Compare this to North Korea, with the same ethnicity, culture, and traditions, and with a more developed industrial base before the communist takeover. While the southern half of Korea is prospering, as noted, under a command economy the north is bankrupt, economically ravaged, with its people suffering severe famine and dying in the millions.

There is also the example of now-democratic Taiwan, whose economy from 1950 to 1985 grew at a rate of 7 percent, leveling off in 1998 to 4.8 percent. Taiwan now is among the industrially developed nations. Then there is the "Asian tiger" that is Singapore, which despite an authoritarian government has allowed the market to be free, and thereby has become an economic jewel of Southeast Asia. Over the years 1950 to 1985 it grew at an average annual rate of 7.9 percent, making it then the economically fastest growing country in the world.

The former British colony of Hong Kong is another free market, economic jewel. Located on a series of small islands and a small strip of mainland China, it comprises only 397 square miles. In 1945 it had a population of fewer than 600,000, but through natural population growth and by absorbing millions of refugees fleeing communist China, its population swelled to over 6,000,000. Though there were so many people on this small bit of land, there was little unemployment, a bustling, productive, and continually growing economy, and an annual growth rate of 6.9 percent, which was only slightly behind Singapore and Taiwan at the time.

Now compare the results of the freedom in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, to what happened in mainland China when Mao deprived its people of any freedom: total economic disaster, rebellions, economic retrogression, and people starving to death by the tens of millions. With the death of Mao in 1976, the new Party dictators began to liberalize its economy and introduced a semi-controlled free market in many areas of the country, as described in Chapter 1. Total party control had so devastated the economy that once it lifted many of its controls, China's economy leaped forward at or near a double-digit rate. In 1998, it was growing at 7.8 percent. The Chinese people are rebuilding their cities, a new class of Chinese investors and businesspeople is competing with businesses from abroad, and for the first time in decades the Chinese now have plenty of food. The signs of economic vigor and growth now astound a visitor returning to China after thirty years' absence.

Of course, I have only given examples here and not a systematic analysis of the consequences of freedom for all nations. That has been done in the [Appendix](#) and proves in general what the above examples show: no reasonable person can now deny that the evidence overwhelmingly supports freedom as a means to the economic betterment of society and the fulfillment of human needs. Quite simply,

freedom produces wealth and prosperity.

These are moral goods of your freedom, a moral reason for you to be free.

Previous chapters have established that you have an inherently moral right to be free, regardless of the consequences of freedom--its utility. Now we can say that, anyway, freedom does also have very desirable, moral consequences for humanity: wealth and prosperity. We have known for near two centuries this result of freedom, and its teaching by classical liberals of previous centuries did much to free Western economies from the heavy hand of government regulation and control. But this is not the only or maybe the most important moral good of freedom. Freedom has yet other moral goods that I will discuss in the next chapters. And of these not many people are aware.

NOTES

* Written for this web site. I am indebted to Judson Knight for his careful editing and helpful comments on a draft of this chapter. For the statistics on the Soviet Union and China and the details of their historical periods covered here, see my [Lethal Politics](#) and [China's Bloody Century](#).

1. Quoted in G. P. Maximoff, *The Guillotine at Work: Twenty Years of Terror in Russia (Data and Documents)*. Chicago: The Chicago Section of the Alexander Berkman Fund, 1940, p. 149.

2. Miron Dolot, *Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1985, p. 92.

3. Quoted in Ching-wen Chow, *Ten Years of Storm: The True Story of the Communist Regime in China*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, p. 101.

Chapter 5

Freedom Minimizes Political Violence

The more freedom a people have, the less their internal political violence; the less their freedom, the more such violence.

----This web site

The daily news always seems to be about internal (or domestic) political violence somewhere in the world. Constantly someone is trying to replace their ruler by violence, revolt against their government, rebellion against some government policy, or civil war to achieve independence. In July 2000 there were about forty nations in which these violent, political confrontations were occurring. I briefly discussed civil wars in Sudan and Burma in [Chapter 1](#); Somalia's clan wars in [Chapter 2](#); and the Civil War in Russia after the Bolshevik coup of 1917 and the numerous rebellions against Mao's collectivization and "Great Leap Forward" in the [last chapter](#). The question naturally follows: why do human beings constantly kill each other in this way?

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Before answering this, I want to give you more of a feel for how violent this internal political conflict can be. You may not realize that such violence has been more destructive of human lives than has been international war. The probability of a person being killed in an international war is less than that of dying in internal political violence, such as revolution, guerrilla warfare, rebellion, civil war, and riots. This is not even taking into consideration government genocide and mass murder like that of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao, which itself has totaled more dead than all internal and international wars together, and is so important that I will devote the [next chapter](#) to it.

China has lost tens of millions of people in her own civil wars, and her Taiping Rebellion in the mid-Nineteenth Century alone might have killed as many as 40,000,000 Chinese; and the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalist government and the communists cost almost 2,000,000 battle dead (see [Table 1.1](#) of my [China's Bloody Century](#)). Of the ten wars the United States has fought, including World War II, none killed more Americans than died in its Civil War. You have already seen the mass killing going on in Sudan and Burma. And, the Mexican Revolution was equally bloody, killing over many times the number that died in the American Civil War; and the Russian Civil War was one of the bloodiest of the Twentieth Century, killing about

1,400,000 people, not counting the famine deaths and mass murder on all sides. A close look at the Mexican and Russian revolutions should show why people who share citizenship can kill each other on such a massive scale.



Looking at Mexico first (see contemporary [map and statistics](#), and [world map](#)), the roots of its revolution lie in the rule of Porfirio Díaz, a former general who in 1876 rebelled against President Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada and seized power. Mexicans later elected him to the Presidency and, except for one term, consistently reelected him, sometimes without opposition, until revolutionaries forced his exile in May 1911. While Mexico therefore had elections, they usually were a façade. Competition for office was not free and open, political opponents were assassinated, and the fear of government officials and their supporters limited political speech.

Díaz tried to conciliate various groups, such as the Catholic Church, landed interests, and big business, and he was particularly committed to the economic growth of Mexico. He promoted foreign investments and ownership, eased the transfer of public lands to private hands, and helped concentrate the ownership of land for more efficient usage. He caused some one million families to lose their land, including the ancestral lands of some 5,000 Indian communities. By 1910, when the revolution broke out, fewer than 3,000 families owned almost all of Mexico's inhabitable land,



Mexico

Area	1,972,550 sq km--slightly less than three times the size of Texas
Population	100,349,766 (July 2000 est.)
Ethnic groups	mestizo (Amerindian-Spanish) 60%, Amerindian or predominantly Amerindian 30%, white 9%, other 1%
Religions	nominally Roman Catholic 89%, Protestant 6%, other 5%
Languages	nominally Roman Catholic 89%, Protestant 6%, other 5%
Life expectation	71.49 years
Literacy	89.90%
Purchasing power parity	\$8,500 (1999 est.); U.S. is \$33,900 (1999 est.)
Government	federal republic dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI
Freedom rating	partly free (closer to free than unfree) for 1998

with over 95 percent of the rural population owning no land at all. Nearly half of these landless lived on large privately owned farming or ranching estates or plantations, called haciendas. These sprawled across much of Mexico, containing about 80 percent of the rural communities. Some were huge; one being so large that a train took a day to cross its six million acres.



General Díaz in 1911

Deprived of their land, impoverished and unemployed, the mass of Indians and peons (the unskilled laborers or farm workers of Latin America), were a huge pool for authorities and landowners to exploit. And so they did.

Under Díaz, profiteering police and government officials protected greedy landowners and pitiless labor contractors. This enabled the venal, corrupt, and ruthless to ensnare Indians and peons in a nationwide system of chattel slavery and indebted labor.

One of the main methods used for enslaving peons on haciendas were to advance them money. While it was usually small amount, the peon found it almost impossible to repay. His wages were abysmal because of the ready availability of impoverished peons in the countryside, and living costs were, by hacienda contrivance, high. For example, usually he only could buy his necessities at the company store, since bosses paid him in coupons or metal disks that only the company store would accept. Running away from this forced labor was not an option. If he did, the police would search for him, usually catch him, and return him to the hacienda. Then, as a lesson to others, he would be whipped publicly, sometimes even to death. Moreover, debt was by law inherited, passed down to a peon's sons on his death, so his sons also could become indebted slaves through no fault of their own.

But the peon could become indebted in ways other than through the hacienda. He was enmeshed in a system of Mexican customs and laws that encouraged, if not required, that he spend more money than he had. For example, baptism demanded a fiesta, a priest, and liquor, the cost of which the peon could only cover by pledging his future wages. This was also true for the cost of tools, a wedding, and a baby's birth. Whether on the hacienda or not, usually to the poor and landless a debt was forever; and once in debt, the peon had no rights. The debt holder by law had all the power, which on the hacienda was over life and death, as surely as though these peons were slaves in ancient Rome.

Besides indebted peons, haciendas had another source of such slaves. Hacienda bosses would entice impoverished and landless Indians and other peons into signing

contracts to work on plantations about which the workers knew nothing; upon arrival, they would discover that there was no escape. Another source was the police, who would arrest and jail the poor and those dispossessed of land for trivial or trumped-up charges, and then sell them to hacienda owners. Yet another source was a police-round up of such people, as though they were cattle, followed by their deportation to a hacienda to work until they died. In some areas, these round-ups were the routine--even a matter of government policy. Local officials would contract with a hacienda to supply so many peons per year, and district political boss, or *jefe politico*, often fulfilled his contract by kidnapping and selling young schoolboys for fifty pesos each.

There were some comparatively good haciendas, to be sure. Their owners still forced the peons to work, and would whip to maintain discipline and order, but treated them with the paternalistic civility accorded to personal slaves. These haciendas were the exception, however. Normally, they were hellish for the peon, whose life on them was usually short and miserable. The owners had them whipped for the slightest infraction, and when their work slowed for whatever reason. They were sometimes whipped to death. After all, they were cheap to replace, and the police showed no concern over their murder.

On many haciendas, the peon's misery went far beyond whipping. Hacienda bosses would often rape the peon's wives and daughters, and would force the prettier ones to be their concubines. Nor did all the haciendas provide enough nutritional food, for their peons in the field, changes of clothing, bath facilities, or toilets. Because of this ill treatment, many of these peons soon died from disease, exposure, and exhaustion, deaths that can only be classed as murder. In some places, such as Valle Nacional, the forced labor system became at least as deadly as that which afflicted the forced laborers in the Soviet gulag and Nazi labor camps at their worst, but within guarded haciendas instead of work camps surrounded by guns and barbed wire.

The bosses especially mistreated those Indians enslaved on the haciendas, and they often were among the first to die. We can see this with the Yaqui Indians, for example, of whom about two-thirds died in the first year on a hacienda, on some hacienda few would survive for two years. For the Mayas, another Indian nation, the haciendas were killing them at a greater rate than they were being born.

But bosses also badly mistreated non-Indian peons, and in three months on one large hacienda near Santa Lucrecia, they killed more than half of 300 new workers. In another hacienda, the Valle Nacional, out of some 15,000 new workers taken on in one year, bosses killed about 14,000 within seven or eight months. I would doubt this incredible death rate were it not for the words of Antonio Pla, general manager of a

large portion of the tobacco lands in Valle Nacional: "The cheapest thing to do is to let them die; there are plenty more where they came from." Said one of the police officers of the town of Valle Nacional, "They die; they all die. The bosses never let them go until they're dying."

Even the process of deportation to the haciendas was lethal, particularly for Indians. Soldiers seized and deported Yaqui Indians to work on haciendas as slaves at the rate of 500 a month. This was even before Díaz decreed that the War Department must capture and deport every Yaqui Indian to Yucatán, wherever found and no matter the age. As many as 10 to 20 percent died during deportation, especially if the trip were a long one, and involved the military herding the deportees over mountains by foot. Sometimes whole families would commit suicide rather than endure the deportation and slave labor that lay at the end.

Out of a rural population of nearly 12,000,000 in 1910, possibly 750,000 had unknowingly contracted themselves into slavery on haciendas in southern Mexico; possibly over 100,000 on the Yucatán peninsula. The far more prevalent debt bondage possibly enslaved an additional 5,000,000 peons, or about an unbelievable near 41 percent of the total population of Mexico. This by far exceeds the amount of outright slavery you have seen in Sudan and the forced labor in Burma. Compare this to American slavery in 1860 just before the Civil War, where there were 3,951,000 slaves, or 12 percent of the population. What in effect was slavery in Mexico is most comparable to the slavery of ancient times, and, yet, it happened in our time, during the youth of some people alive today.

Were this lethal slavery all, it would be enough to condemn this reprehensible government and provide justification for the coming revolution. But there is more. This slave system necessarily depended on a certain amount of terror and resulting fear. Each of the states of Mexico had attached to it an *acordada*, a picked gang of assassins. They quietly murdered personal enemies of the governor or *jefe políticos*, including political opponents, critics, or alleged criminals, no matter how slight the evidence against them. For example, officials gave the son of a friend of Díaz, and a member of the *acordada*, two assistants and the instructions to "kill quietly along the border" any person he thought connected to the opposing Liberal Party. But much killing also was public and directly carried out by officials. In 1909, for example, they summarily executed sixteen people at Tehuitzingo, and on a street at Velardena, officials shot several people for holding a parade in defiance of the *jefe politico*. They forced twelve to thirty-two others to dig their own graves with their bare hands before shooting them. In the state of Hidalgo, officials buried up to their necks a group of Indians who had resisted the government taking their lands, then rode horses over them. And so on and on. From 1900 to 1910, this government probably

murdered more than 30,000 political opponents, suspects, critics, alleged criminals, and other undesirables.

Díaz's policies obviously provided opportunity for the venal and corrupt, and security and help for the rich and well placed. As long as they went along with the system, bureaucrats, officials controlling government largess, and the upper middle-class and wealthy profited from Díaz's rule. Even the industrial worker was only slightly better off. Moreover, Díaz seemed to encourage foreign exploitation of the country, which angered many well-off Mexicans. Now, also, intellectuals were promoting among the lower class a sense of exploitation. And the government's muscle, its army, was small, corrupt, and inefficient.

Given all this, rebellion was inevitable, and it did happen, several times. The first successful one was led by Francisco Madero in 1910 and launched the Mexican Revolution. A member of the upper middle class, as most revolutionary leaders are, he believed in a liberal constitutional government. Indians and peons understandably supported him, and his leading general was the former bandit chief, Pancho Villa. Madero won major victories against government forces and encouraged other rebellions throughout the country. In May 1911, the government collapsed, Díaz fled into exile, and Maderos took over the presidency.



President Francisco Madero



Pancho Villa

Leading a revolution is one thing. But rebuilding a government is quite another. In office, Maderos turned out to be ineffective, especially in promoting changes to the system. He did, however, give peons and workers free reign to air their grievances and seek change. This did not sit well with the Mexican elites, who saw this freedom, added to the disorders still plaguing the country, as endangering their property. In early 1913, the general commanding the Mexican army

in Mexico City, Victoriano Huerto, rebelled against Maderos and, joining hands with other rebel groups, forced him to resign. General Huerto then made himself president, and in a few days, someone assassinated Maderos.

Huerto's presidency was even worse. He was disorganized, repressive, and dictatorial, and instigated the most violent phase of the revolution. Separate rebel forces, Villa's among them, took violent action to restore constitutional government in three northern states. In the south, Emiliano Zapata organized and generated a peon rebellion demanding land reform. President Wilson of the United States tried to help these rebellions by embargoing arms to General Huerto, resulting in the American Navy's temporarily taking over Veracruz to stop a shipment of German arms, while allowing the rebel constitutionalists to buy them. Eventually, constitutionalist forces closed in on Huerto, and he escaped into exile in July 1914.



Emiliano Zapata



Military train, 1914

Still, even the constitutionalists could not establish a stable government, nor could they agree among themselves on what was to be done and by whom. Therefore, civil war again broke out in December 1914. Finally, by the end of 1915, one of the rebel leaders, Venustiano Carranza, captured control over most of Mexico and, despite the refusal of some other rebel leaders, including Zapata (assassinated in 1918) and Villa, to accept terms, took over the government and kept control until 1920. Carranza never brought about the reforms

he had promised, and in 1920, Alvaro Obregón, one of Carranza's most effective generals during the civil war, threw him out of power and eventually had himself elected president. Though dictatorial, Obregón brought relative stability, order, and change to Mexico.

What I left out of this sketch of the Mexican Revolution is the amazing violence, ruthlessness, and cruelty on all sides. In the opening years of this rebellion, for example, in the north government forces simply shot all captured rebels, showing no mercy. When in later years of the war President Carranza ordered General González to destroy the Zapatista "rabble" in Morelos, his troops burned down whole villages, destroyed their crops, marched women and children into detention camps, looted factories, devastated the local sugar industry, and hanged every male they could find.

They left a wasteland behind them.

Rebels were equally vicious and often extended their butchery to top government officials and supporters. A case in point was their seizure of the town of Guerrero. They murdered all captured federal officers, along with the town's top Díaz supporters and officials, including the judge, *jefe politico*, and postal inspector. The rebels raped at will. In Durango, for example, the U.S. ambassador reported that fifty women "of good family" killed themselves after rebels raped them. Villa himself forced "his attentions on a Frenchwoman," creating an international incident.



Rebel women soldiers

When rebels captured and held Mexico City in 1914, they pillaged homes and businesses, and shot police officers and political opponents, and hung those they suspected of crimes. In one case, they hung three people outside a police station, with signs announcing their crime--one was a "thief," a second a "counterfeiter," but the sign on the third said, "This man was killed by mistake."

From the beginning of the revolution, the forces of the Villistas and Zapatas had shown disregard for human life. When in 1910 Pancho Villa captured the town of Torreón he killed 200 Chinese members of a race he and his followers much despised. Nor did he have high any regard for the lives of his own troops. Once, when as an American journalist was interviewing him, a drunken soldier yelling nearby disturbed Villa. So while continuing his conversation, he pulled out his gun, looked out the window, and shot the man.

Their officers were no better, but among them stands out Rodolfo Fierro, who, it is said, once personally executed 300 prisoners, pausing only when he had to massage his bruised trigger finger. Often, these rebels were simply bandits and murderers legitimized by a cause. In one especially heinous case, a rebel leader captured a coal train in a tunnel, burned it, and then waited for a passenger train to run into the wreckage so that he could loot the train of gold and rob passengers of their valuables.

With the collapse of the Díaz regime, many state governors and federal generals no longer obeyed the central government. During the Carranza presidency they in effect became warlords, some levying their own taxes, some refusing to turn over federal revenues, some ignoring federal laws and orders they did not like. Some became

bandits, looting territory or states under their control; some bandits became generals controlling little states of their own. High military officers would loot and kill as they wished, even in Mexico City. Over all of Mexico for as long as a decade, all these warlords and rebel armies may have slaughtered in cold blood at least some 400,000 people; perhaps even over 500,000--more than have died in combat in all American foreign wars.



Rebel train

Before and during the revolution, the government used a detestable conscription system. With the choice of who would be drafted left to the local *jefe politico*, graft and bribery were endemic. If a man had the money, he could buy himself out of the draft or bribe officials. Even worse, those who criticized the regime, those who tried to strike, or those who otherwise annoyed officials found themselves drafted. The army served the function of a forced labor camp for poor and undesirables, and so became known as "The National Chain-Gang."

During the revolution, the government used press-gang methods extensively. In one case, for example, seven hundred spectators at a bullfight were grabbed for the army; in another case one thousand spectators from a big crowd watching a fire were abducted, including women that they forced to work in ammunition factories. In Mexico City people were afraid to go out after dark, even to post a letter, since it literally could result in "going to the cannon's mouth."

Soldiers so conscripted received little training, and officers threw them into combat as so much expendable equipment--there were always replacements, including even criminals, vagabonds, beggars, and, of course, Indians and peons. Rebels and Indians easily killed all. Because of the graft among their officers, these soldiers often got little medical care and little food. Some would die of starvation, many of disease. One example of this was in the territory of Quintana Roo, where before the revolution an army of 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers was in the field, continuously fighting the Maya Indians. These soldiers were almost all political suspects and therefore really only armed political prisoners. According to a government physician who served as the chief of sanitary service for the army in this territory, over a two-year period all the soldiers, over 4,000, died of starvation while General Bravo, their commanding officer, stole their unit's commissary money. This is murder. And from 1900 through the first year of the revolution, aside from combat deaths, by the army's treatment of its conscripts it so murdered nearly 145,000 of them.

In total, during the revolution because of battle, massacre, execution, and starvation, probably 800,000 Mexicans died. Nearly 1,200,000 more probably died from influenza, typhus, and other diseases. In fact, the overall toll from all causes might even be closer to 3,000,000, given the population decrease for these years. For my breakdown of the toll, see [Table 16.1](#) of my [Death By Government](#).



Some of the 2 million dead

The Russian Revolution that began while that in Mexico was still going on was no less bloody, and like that in Mexico, to understand it we will have to begin several years before it took place.

In 1894, with the death of his father, Alexander III, the last Russian czar, Nicholas II, came to power. He was a dedicated autocrat opposed to any liberal tendencies in Russia, a view strongly shared by his wife, Princess Alexandra. He was also an absolute Russian nationalist who imposed a policy of Russification throughout the empire, which in the west included Poland and Finland. He was also, as were many of his officials and Russians in general, anti-Semitic, and he overtly supported anti-Semitic activity.



Czar Nicholas II
1868-1918

Russians economically and culturally discriminated against their 5 to 7 million Jews, and government anti-Semitism encouraged and helped legitimize the periodic pogroms that swept Russian cities and towns. Officials allowed incendiary anti-Jewish propaganda to be published on government printing presses; and just stood by while gangs attacked Jews and their property. From 1900 to the abdication of the czar and the end of the Romanov dynasty in 1917, at least 3,200 Jews were murdered throughout Russia.

In line with its general suppression of freedom, officials killed and massacred others as well, such as shooting two-hundred demonstrating workers in the Lena gold field.

TABLE 16.1
Mexican Democide
1900-1920

KIND OF KILLING	DEMOCIDÉ (000) [1]
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT	1,417
pre-civil war massacres and executions	30 [2]
civil war democide	388
deportation	30
chattel slavery/peonage	825
conscription	144
REBELS/BANDITS/WARLORDS	420
TOTAL DEMOCIDÉ	1,837
CIVIL WAR/REBELLION	335

1. All estimates from table 16A.1. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates are mid-values in a low-high range.
2. Estimated low.
3. Includes pre-Revolutionary rebellions.

The most important massacre of these years occurred in January of 1905 when in St. Petersburg soldiers shot down 1,000 peaceful demonstrators. This "Bloody Sunday," as it became known, catalyzed what was a revolutionary situation into outright revolution.

In the years leading up to Bloody Sunday, Russia had been in turmoil. Strikes, student demonstrations, and peasant disturbances were frequent. Several revolutionary movements were violently seeking reform, such as the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats, who organized protests and tried to incite the masses. Because of Bloody Sunday, student demonstrations became almost continuous, revolutionary groups organized huge strikes, and in many region peasants rebelled. Bombings and assassinations were widespread.

This culminated in a massive general strike that finally persuaded Nicholas II and his officials to compromise. They issued the so-called October Manifesto that promised civil liberties, a new дума--legislature--with actual power to pass and reject all laws, and other reforms. The manifesto went far toward turning the government into a constitutional monarchy. It split the opposition into moderates willing to accept it and radicals believing it hardly went far enough. The radicals fought on--in the next year alone terrorism by the Battle Organization of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Socialist Revolutionaries Maximalists caused 1,400 deaths and still another 3,000 in the year following that. But the Manifesto ended the 1905 revolution.

Throughout the years leading up to and following this revolution, the monarchy fought the revolutionaries in one district or another with harsh regulations, newspaper closings, arrests of editors, and, for six months, even summary court martials with almost immediate execution. The records of overall executions tell the story of these tumultuous years and the monarchy's response. From 1866 to 1900 officials executed no more than 94 people, perhaps as few as 48; from 1901 to 1904 it executed nearly 400 people; from 1905 through 1908 the number rose to 2,200; and from 1908 through the remaining years of the monarchy, executions might have reached 11,000.

Nonetheless, considering the revolutionary activity and the bombings, assassinations, and disturbances involved, the violent deaths would have been surprisingly low for an empire this huge and diverse and with its bloody history had it not been for World War I, its treatment of ethnic Germans and POWs, and the massacre or extermination of rebellious nations and groups in the empire's southern periphery. In 1915, the Duma expropriated all the property of the 150,000 to 200,000 Germans living in Zhiton-tir Gubernia and deported as many as 200,000 to the east under such conditions that 25,000 to almost 140,000 died.

The worst killing took place in the Kirghiz Kazak Confederacy. Following Russian orders local authorities murdered Turkish-speaking Central Asian nomads outright, or after robbing them of their animals and equipment, drove them into the winter mountains or desert to die. Except for some who escaped across the border into China, authorities may have murdered as many as 500,000 nomads.

There also was the killing by Armenian volunteers wearing Russian uniforms, but serving as irregulars with the Russian army. When Russia invaded the eastern provinces of Turkey during the war, these Armenian irregulars sought revenge against the Kurds for their murder of Armenians in Turkey, and possibly murdered hundreds of thousand Kurds between 1915 and 1916. The responsibility of the Russian army for this is unclear, but at least it bears some onus for these deaths.

Worst of all, and for which the Russian Monarchy bears full responsibility, was its treatment of 2,300,000 German, Austro-Hungarian, Czech, and Turkish prisoners of war. Surely the Russian people suffered greatly during the war. There were wide-scale shortages of necessities, and resulting localized famines; medical services had always been poor and deteriorated during the war, resulting in the spread of disease. Moreover, Russian soldiers themselves suffered from hunger, poor medical care, and unsanitary conditions, perhaps 1,300,000 alone dying of disease. Russia was in no shape, therefore, to treat POWs with the care Britain, for example, could give them.

Nonetheless, even taking this into account, Russian-held POWs were abysmally mistreated and died in transit to camps and in the camps themselves by the tens of thousands. Just consider that during the transportation of POWs to camps they might be locked in railroad cars or wagons for weeks. In one case, for example, officials kept two hundred Turkish POWs suffering from cholera in sealed wagons for three weeks until they reached their destination--140 died, sixty were scarcely alive in the filth.

Weakened by hunger and sickness during the long trip, prisoners then might have to plod 10 to 30 miles to their final camp, with some dying on the way. Reaching camp provided no security, since the conditions in many were lethal. During the winter of 1914-15, just on one camp 1,300 men died, over half of the camp's POWs. When the doctors complained about the number of deaths to a general who came on a tour of inspection, his answer was that still more men died in the trenches.

During this same winter in the Novo Nikolayevsk camp, the prisoners were lucky even to be able to sleep on rotten straw and especially to get a blanket. Camp doctors had no medicines or surgical appliances; they did not even have soap. Sick and healthy lay together indiscriminately, and often water was not to be had for days, or

would drip from icicles onto their straw beds. No wonder that when typhus broke out it spread rapidly and prisoners died in huge numbers. Only when these epidemics threatened the Russians themselves did they finally allow captive officers to help their men.

In total, the Russian monarchy probably was responsible for the deaths of 400,000 POWs. Since officials knew about the conditions in the camps and could have done much to alleviate them, this was as much murder as the death of 3,000,000 Soviet POWs in Nazi concentration camps during World War II.

By 1917, the war was going so badly for the Russians that many troops refused to fight and whole units were deserting, while on the home front there was continuous turmoil, including general strikes, and massive demonstrations against the war and the monarchy--just on March 8 alone 30,000 people were on the streets demonstrating. Nicholas II's cabinet tried to dismiss the Duma it had called into session to deal with the crisis and thought responsible for much of the unrest, but instead of dissolving some members set up a provisional cabinet, in effect a rebel provisional government. Nicholas II and his Cabinet had lost all power to effect events--the Russian Revolution had begun.



Some killed in pro and anti-Bolshevik street violence

Events moved fast as one military unit after another joined the rebels, including the czar's own guards that under orders from the provisional government took the Empress and her children into custody. And on March 14, France and England, Russia's allies in the war, recognized the provisional government as the legal government of all Russia. Thus under tremendous pressure, having lost crucial support of the aristocracy, his troops, and foreign powers; no longer able to control the streets, Nicholas II abdicated.

The day before the abdication, the provisional government formed a new one to be headed by Prince Georgy Lvov. This government and the subsequent one of Aleksandr Kerensky, a democratic socialist who took over as Prime Minister in July, inherited a country in economic and political chaos, with a near total breakdown in



**Pro-Tsarist militia in Odessa.
Would battle the Red Army**

government authority and military morale, frequent strikes, plots, and the opposition of diverse, radical revolutionary groups. Not the least of these were the Bolsheviks founded and led by Vladimir Ilich Lenin, who already in July had organized an unsuccessful uprising in Petrograd. Kerensky's government itself was disorganized, feared a coup from the right, and was quite unable to move against those openly plotting to seize power from the left.

Originally the left wing of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, Lenin's Bolsheviks were a small, uncompromising,

and militant group of dedicated Marxist communists. Their incredibly small number, considering subsequent events, was clear when the first all-Russian Congress of Soviets had been held, and in which only 105 out of 1,090 delegates declared themselves as Bolsheviks.



Lenin revolutionizing

In November 1917, with the powerful Petrograd garrison remaining neutral, Lenin seized the Winter Palace in Petrograd. Since this was the seat of Kerensky's shaky government, and he had only 1,500 to 2,000 defenders to match the 6,000 to 7,000 soldiers, sailors, and Red Guards Lenin's Bolsheviks had thrown together, they easily overthrew the government. Widely unpopular, however, and faced with strong political opposition, Lenin at first made common cause with the Left Social Revolutionaries, a militant, socialist group, in order to survive, centralize power, and consolidate this communist revolution; and in 1919 Lenin adopted the name *Communist Party* for the Bolsheviks and their political allies.

To fight this forceful takeover of the government, generals throughout the Russian empire created whole armies; some led by anti-Russians and nationalists, some by anti-communists, some by pro-monarchists or pro-authoritarians, some by advocates of democracy. These so-called White armies were a direct threat to the new Communist Party and its so-called Red Army. Moreover, in the areas the communists controlled the clergy, bourgeoisie, and professionals opposed them. The urban

workers, who had been communist allies at first, also soon turned against them when they saw that the communists had taken over the Soviets (elected governing councils) and would not yield power to worker unions or representatives; and peasants, who also were especially supportive when the communists began to divide among them land taken from the aristocrats' estates and rich landowners, turned to outright rebellion when the communists forcibly began to requisition their grain and produce.

In the first year-and-a-half of Lenin's rule, in 20 provinces alone, there were 344 peasant rebellions. Up to early 1921, there were about 50 anti-communist rebel armies. For example, in August 1920, the starving peasants of the Kirsanov District, Tambov Province, rebelled against the further extortion of grain by the communists. The rebellion soon spread to adjoining districts and destroyed Party authority in five of them. Under the command of Aleksandr Stepanovich Antonov, the rebellion became a full-scale, armed insurrection. He created two armies of Red Army deserters and revolting peasants, and by February 1921, he had as many as 50,000 fighting men, including even internal guard units. Until defeated in August 1921, he controlled Tambov Province and parts of the provinces of Penza and Saratov.



Communist Civil War poster



Lenin's Red Army

Many such rebellions broke out throughout the now named Soviet Union, although few were as dangerous to Communist Party control. Even in 1921, the Cheka (secret police) admitted 118 risings. This *Peasant War*, which just as well could be called a *Bread War*, continued even after the White armies were defeated. It was so serious that even in 1921 one Soviet historian noted that the "center of the [Russian Republic] is almost totally encircled by peasant insurrection, from Makno on the Dnieper to

Antonov on the Volga."

White armies and peasant rebellions aside, even in the urban industrial areas communist control was precarious, at best. What saved Lenin and the Party was their *Red Terror*. By 1918, Lenin already ordered the wide use of terror, including inciting workers to murder their "class enemies." According to Pravda, the Party organ,

workers and poor should take up arms and act against those "who agitate against the Soviet Power, ten bullets for every man who raises a hand against it.... The rule of Capital will never be extinguished until the last capitalist, nobleman, Christian, and officer draws his last breath." Understandably, there was a wave of arbitrary murders of civil servants, engineers, factory managers, and priests wherever the communists controlled the country. Mass shootings, arrests, and torture were an integral part of covert communists policy, and not simply a reaction to the formation of the White armies. Indeed, the Red Terror preceded the start of the Civil War.

After an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Lenin in August 1918, he legalized the terror, and directed it against "enemies of the people" and "counter-revolutionaries," defined primarily by social group and class membership: bourgeoisie, aristocrats, "rich" landowners (kulaks), and clergy. The Party's organ *Pravda* helped launch this expanded Red Terror with this cry for blood: "Workers, the time has come when either you must destroy the bourgeoisie, or it will destroy you. Prepare for a mass merciless onslaught upon the enemies of the revolution. The towns must be cleansed of this bourgeois putrefaction. All the bourgeois gentlemen must be registered, as has happened with the officer gentlemen, and all who are dangerous to the cause of revolution must be exterminated.... Henceforth the hymn of the working class will be a hymn of hatred and revenge."

Lenin's Red Terror operated through a variety of official organs, including the People's Courts for "crimes" against the individual, the Revolutionary Courts, and the various local Chekas for "crimes" against the state. Lenin also gave the right of execution to the Military Revolutionary Tribunals, Transport Cheka, Punitive columns, and the like. Communists jailed actual or ideologically defined opponents, tortured many barbarously to force them to sign false confessions, and executed large numbers.

For example, communists executed a butcher in Moscow for "insulting" the images of Marx and Lenin by calling them scarecrows (a clear "enemy of the people"); or threatened to shoot anyone in Ivanovo-Vornesensk who did not register their sewing machines (obvious "counter-revolutionaries"). A communist functionary issued an order in Baku that local officials should shoot any telephone girl who was tardy in response to a call (doubtless "sabotage"). With information that an Aaron Chonsir in Odessa was engaging in "counter-revolutionary activities," the Cheka looked through the street directories to find his address. Finding eleven people with the same name, they arrested all, interrogated and tortured each several times, narrowed it down to the two most likely "counter-revolutionaries," and since they could not make up their mind between them, had both shot to ensure getting the right one. Obviously,

the Revolution was still immature--in the late 1930s Stalin would have had all eleven shot.

And so communists shot vast numbers of men and women out of hand: 200 in this jail, 450 in that prison yard, 320 in the woods outside of town; even in small outlying areas, such as in the small Siberian town of Ossa Ochansk in 1919, they massacred 3,000 men. And this went on and on. As late as 1922, the communists executed 8,100 priests, monks, and nuns. This alone is equivalent to one modern, jumbo passenger jet crashing, with no survivors, each day for 32 days.



The Czar and his family, all shot and stabbed to death by the communists in July 1918

Moreover, the communists showed no merci to prisoners taken in clashes with the White armies and often executed them. They even shot the relatives of defecting officers, as when the 86th Infantry Regiment went over to the Whites in March 1919, and the communists killed all the relatives of each defecting officer. Places reoccupied after the defeat of one White army or another suffered systematic blood baths as the Cheka screened through the population for aristocrats, bourgeoisie, and supporters of the Whites. When The Red Army captured Riga in January 1919, for example, communists executed over 1,500 in the city and more than 2,000 in the country districts. When defeated White General Wrangel finally fled with his remaining officers and men from the Crimea, the Red Army and Cheka may have slaughtered from 50,000 to 150,000 people during reoccupation. Undeniably, the Whites themselves carried out massacres, killed prisoners, and were guilty of numerous atrocities. But these were either the acts of undisciplined soldiers or ordered against individuals by sadistic or fanatical generals. Lenin, however, directed the Red Terror, against entire social groups and classes.

Then there was the *Peasant War*, which although it tends to be ignored in the history books, was no less vicious than the Civil War. In village after village, in the guise of requisitioning food, communists tried to plunder the peasants, which understandably resulted in pitched battles, massacres, and frequent atrocities. Just in July 1918, twenty-six major uprisings began; in August forty-seven; and in September thirty-five. The communists fiercely fought the Peasant War over the full length and breadth of the new Soviet Union from 1918 through 1922, and at any time there were apparently over one hundred rebellions, involving thousands of peasant fighters. If, of course, any "enemies of the people" were captured or surrendered, the communists

were likely to kill them out of hand; they also massacred those who had helped the rebels, provided food and shelter, or simply showed sympathy; they leveled some villages "infected with rebellion," slaughtered inhabitants; and deported remaining villagers north, many to die in the process. About 500,000 people were killed in this Peasant War, half from combat and the other half murdered by the communists. The effect on food production was catastrophic and, as described in [Chapter 4](#), was the main cause of a severe famine in which 5,000,000 people starved to death or died of associated diseases.

The number of combat deaths in the Civil and Peasant Wars, and not a result of mass murder, was likely about 1,350,000 people. Although a fantastic toll by normal standards, this was a fraction of the total killed during this period, as I will show.

With the growing strength and generalship of the Red Army, and the lack of unity and a common strategy and program among the opposing White armies and peasant rebels, by 1920 Lenin and Communist Party had surely won the Civil War. And through the Red Terror they also had secured the home front. The terror eliminated or cowed the opposition and enabled Lenin to stabilize the Party's control, assure its continuity and authority, and above all, save communism. (Here is a map of the resulting [western Soviet Union](#) for 1921-1929, and the present [world map](#))




Typhus emaciated Ukrainian family in front of destroyed home.

Lenin bought the success of the Red Terror at an added huge cost in lives. Not only did the communists shoot political opponents, class "enemies," "enemies of the people," former rebels, and criminals, but they shot even those poor citizens guilty of nothing, fitting under no label but hostage. For example, in 1919 the Defense Council commanded the arrest of members of the Soviet executive committees and Committees of the Poor in areas where snow clearance of railway lines was unsatisfactory. Officials were to shoot these hostages if the snow were not soon cleared away.

The number murdered throughout Soviet territory by the Red Terror, the execution of prisoners, and revenge against former Whites or their supporters, as a conservative estimate, was about 500,000 people, including at least 200,000 officially executed. All

SOVIET UNION
1921-09-01-1929-1-204



LITHUANIA
1921-09-01-1929-1-204
1921-09-01-1929-1-204
1921-09-01-1929-1-204
1921-09-01-1929-1-204

UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPS.
1929-01-01-1929-1-204
1929-01-01-1929-1-204
1929-01-01-1929-1-204
1929-01-01-1929-1-204

Notes:
1. S.S.R. Soviet Socialist Rep.
2. A.S.S.R. Autonomous Soviet Socialist Rep.
3. A.S.S.R. Autonomous Region
4. A.S.S.R. Autonomous Krai
5. A.S.S.R. Autonomous Oblast
6. A.S.S.R. Autonomous Okrug
7. A.S.S.R. Autonomous Oblast
8. A.S.S.R. Autonomous Oblast
9. A.S.S.R. Autonomous Oblast
10. A.S.S.R. Autonomous Oblast

Legend:
K.B. KAVKASO-BALKAR
K.A. KARACHAY-CHERKESIA
D.H. CHECHEN
N.O. NORTH OSSETIA
I.N. INGUISH
D.H.K. DZARKH
K.A. KARACHAY-CHERKESIA
D.H. CHECHEN
N.O. NORTH OSSETIA
I.N. INGUISH
D.H.K. DZARKH

these are added to the probable 250,000 murdered in the Peasant War. Lest you dismiss all those communist executions during these years as the traditional Russian way of handling opposition, Czarist Russia executed an average of 17 people per year in the 80 years preceding the Revolution--17! From 1860 to 1900, Soviet sources give only 94 executions, although during these years there were dozens of assassinations. And in 1912, after years of revolts, assassinations of high officials, bombings and anti-government terrorism, there was a maximum of 183,949 imprisoned, including criminals; less than half the number executed, not imprisoned, by the communists during the Civil War period. Lenin and his henchmen did not shrink from their carnage. They not only accepted this incredible blood toll; they proclaimed the need for one many times higher. Consider the September 1918, speech by Grigory Zinoviev, Lenin's lieutenant in Petrograd: "To overcome our enemies we must have our own socialist militarism. We must carry along with us 90 million out of the 100 million of Soviet Russia's population. As for the rest, we have nothing to say to them. They must be annihilated."

To those killed in the Red Terror and Peasant War we must add those that died from the brutal regime in the new concentration and labor camps or in transit to them. Lenin created these camps in July 1918, with a Party decree that officials must compel inmates capable of labor to do physical work. This was the beginning of the deadly, communist forced labor system--gulag--which we could as well call a slave labor system, and which became as deadly as some of the most lethal haciendas for forced laborers in pre-revolutionary Mexico. Within a year, Party decrees established forced labor camps in each provincial capitol and a lower limit of 300 prisoners in each camp. The communists established the first large camps on the far north Solovetsky Islands. In August 1919 telegram, Lenin made the criteria for imprisonment in such camps clear: "Lock up all the doubtful ones in a concentration camp outside the city." Note the word "doubtful," rather than "guilty."

From the beginning, the communists intentionally made the conditions in some of these camps so atrocious that prisoners could not expect to survive for more than several years. If prisoners were not executed, they often were caused to die from beatings, disease, exposure, and fatigue. The communists occasionally emptied camps by loading inmates on barges and then sinking them. With all this misery, you would think that at least a court had tried and sentenced prisoners, but no. Reread Lenin's telegram, above. A simple bureaucratic decision sent people to these camps. By the end of 1920, official figures admitted to 84 such camps in 43 provinces of the Russian Republic alone, with almost 50,000 inmates. By October 1922, there were 132 camps with about 60,000 inmates. During this revolution period, 1917-1922, the communists probably murdered 34,000 inmates in total.

Overall, in the Red Terror, the Peasant War, the new concentration and labor camps, and the famine reported in [Chapter 4](#) of which, conservatively estimated, the communists are responsible for half the deaths; Lenin and Party probably murdered 3,284,000 people, apart from battle deaths. When these are included, this revolution cost about 4,700,000 deaths, or about 3 percent of the population. This is almost twice that from all causes in the American Civil War--1.6 percent I give a full accounting of the this Civil War toll in [Table 2.1](#) from my [Lethal Politics](#).

**TABLE 2.1
CIVIL WAR PERIOD
DEMOICIDE AND OTHER KILLED***

FACTORS	DEAD ESTIMATES (000)		
	LOW	MID EST.	HIGH
DEMOICIDE	1	3	8
PERIOD RATE	0.54%	2.13%	5.26%
ANNUAL RATE	0.11%	0.43%	1.05%
FOREIGNERS	?		
DEMOICIDE COMPONENTS			
TERROR	320	750	4,300
DEPORTATIONS		?	
CAMP/TRANSIT	12	34	72
FAMINE	500	2,500	3,750
OTHER KILLED	3,430	6,210	9,460
WAR/REBELLION	930	1,410	2,710
FAMINE/DISEASE	2,500	4,800	6,750

* From Appendix 2.1.

Although few have been as violent, twentieth century revolutions, civil wars, violent coups, and rebellions number in the hundreds.¹ What sense can we make out of all these? Does the fact that the Mexican and Russian people were not free have anything to do with this revolution? To answer these questions, I have listed in [Table A.19](#) (from the [Appendix](#)) those nations with violence in 1998-1999. Table 5.1 here (also from the [Appendix](#)) provides a contingency count of the level of a nation's freedom versus its violence, almost all internal.

To determine the tables, I divided 190 nations into four groups in terms of their level of freedom; and similarly, but independently, in terms of their level of violence. The table then answers the question as to how the level of a nation's freedom matches up with its level of violence. We can then answer this by looking at Table 5.1. From it we then can see that out of the 47 nations that had extreme violence, 31 of them, or 66 percent, were unfree ([Table A.19](#) lists these nations). This, while no free nations had any high violence.

TABLE 5.1
Observed Frequencies for Freedom and Violence Ratings

Freedom Ratings	Violence Ratings				Totals
	Low	Low Medium	High Medium	High	
Free	35	10	2	0	47
Partly Free	11	27	7	3	48
Partly Unfree	1	7	27	13	48
Unfree	0	4	12	31	47
Totals	47	48	48	47	190

Percents of Overall Total for Freedom and Violence Ratings

	Low	Low Medium	High Medium	High	Totals
Free	18.42	5.26	1.05	0	24.7
Partly Free	5.79	14.21	3.68	1.58	25.3
Partly Unfree	0.53	3.68	14.21	6.84	25.3
Unfree	0	2.11	6.32	16.32	24.7
Totals	24.7	25.3	25.3	24.7	100

Chi Square = 173.8

Chi Square significance = $p < .0001$

Then consider who had none or low violence. It was mainly the free nations: of the 47 nations with none or low violence, 74 percent were free. All unfree nations had some sort of violence, none at the low level. To see especially the relationship between freedom and violence, look at the count of nations in the diagonal cells from the low for free nations to the high for unfree. By far, they always have the highest count, as they should if there is the close relationship between freedom and violence pointed out in this chapter. Of course, all this may be by chance. But this is tested by the chi square statistic at the bottom of the table, which shows that the odds of getting these results by chance is greater than 10,000 to 1.

By now, it seems obvious. The one ingredient that bloody internal violence has in common is that the people that usually suffer from it also must endure being enslaved. Liberal democracies had little internal political violence.

But, you may object, these results were only for one year and that could have been an odd year. To answer this objection, I have collected internal conflict statistics for 214

governments (regimes), 1900 to 1987, selected to best represent the variation among nations in their development, power, culture, region, and politics; calculated the average number killed for democracies, authoritarian regimes (people are partly free), and totalitarian ones (no freedom), and listed the results in [Table 5.2](#) from my [Power Kills](#); and plotted the results in Figure 4.1 shown here. As you can see, the stark difference in average internal violence between democracies and those nations whose people have no freedom holds up even over these eighty-eight years. For internal violence, therefore, there is this very important correlation.

The more democratic freedom a people have, the less severe their internal political violence.

This is a statistical fact. To assert that freedom minimizes such violence does not mean that freedom necessarily ends it. Some rioting, terrorism, and even civil war, might still happen. Freedom is no guarantee against this. But in the world at large, with all the issues people and governments may fight over, we have no proven and useful means of ending every kind of internal political violence forever, everywhere. But, we now know that we can sharply reduce such violence to the mildest and smallest amount possible, and that is through freedom.

How do we understand this power of democratic freedom? Many believe that the answer to this is psychological and personal. They think that free societies educate people against the mass killing of their neighbors; that free people are not as belligerent as those elsewhere; that they have deep inhibitions to killing others, as went on in Mexico and Russia, for example, or as you saw in Burma and Sudan; and that free people are more tolerant of their differences. There is much truth in all this, but commentators often neglect the social preconditions of this psychological resistance to political violence. The answer is that *the social structure of a free, democratic society, creates the psychological conditions for its greater internal peace.*


You will recall from earlier chapters that where freedom flourishes, there are relatively free markets, and freedom of religion, association, ideas, and speech. Corporations, partnerships, associations, societies, leagues, churches, schools, and clubs proliferate. Through your interests, work, and play, you become a member of these multiple groups, each a separate pyramid of power, each competing with the others and with government for your membership, time, and resources.

You can liken these pyramids to what you would see from a low flying plane looking across the downtown of a city and out to the suburbs. Some buildings are very tall, some short, and others away from the downtown area, are close to the ground. If you

imagine each building standing for some group's power in a free society, you have a good analogy to how a free people disperse power. Surely, in contemporary societies the government will be the tallest and largest building of all, with some other buildings close in size. One might be a church, as in Israel or a Catholic democracy; another big building might be some

corporation, like Microsoft in the United States. Other buildings might be some powerful political party, wealthy and influential family, or some group like a labor union.

While each group is distinct and legally separate, their memberships overlap and crosscut society. As stockholder, political party member, contributor to an environmental group, worker, tennis player, churchgoer, you belong to many of these groups. Your friends and coworkers probably belong to some of the same groups, but also to some different ones.



Similarly, in a free society the critical social distinctions of wealth, power, and prestige are subdivided in many ways. Few people are high on all three. More are low on all three, but these people are not close to a majority. Most people have different amounts of wealth, power, and prestige. Even Bill Gates, while the highest on wealth, does not have the prestige of a top movie actor or popular musician, or the power of the judge that has now decided to break up his Microsoft because of its "monopolistic practices." Even the President of the United States, despite his great power and prestige, is only moderately high on wealth. And the adored movie actor will be high in prestige and moderately high in wealth, but low in power.

All this pluralism in your group memberships and in wealth, power, and prestige cross pressures your interests and motivations. That is, your membership in separate groups cuts up into different pieces what you want, your desires, and your goals, each satisfied by a different group, such as your church on Sunday, bowling or tennis league on Tuesday night, factory or office for 40 week-day hours, parent teacher association meeting on Wednesday, and, family at home. These interests differ, but overlap, and all take time and energy. Moreover, you share some of these interests with others, and which others will differ depending on the group. For all free people across a society, there is a constantly changing criss-cross of interests and differences. For you, therefore, to satisfy one interest requires balancing it against other interests that you have. Do you take the family on a picnic this weekend, play golf with your friends, do that extra work that needs to be done around the house, or help your political party win its campaign?

This cross pressuring of interests is true of a democratic government as well. After all, a democratic government is not some monolith, a uniform pyramid of power. Many departments, agencies, and bureaus, make up the government, each staffed with bureaucrats and political appointees, each with their own official and personal interests. Between all are many official and personal connections and linkages that serve to satisfy their mutual interests. The military services coordinate their strategies and may even share equipment with other departments and agencies. Intelligence services will share some secrets and even sometimes agents. Health services will coordinate their studies, undertake common projects with the military, and provide health supplies when needed. So multiple shared and cross-pressured interests sew together a democratic government itself. And these interests are shared with nongovernmental interest and pressure groups, and will be cross-pressured by them as well.

Because of all these diverse connections and linkages in a democratic society, politicians, leaders, and groups have a paramount interest in keeping the peace. And

where a conflict might escalate into violence, as over some religious or environmental issue, people's interests are so cross pressured by different groups and ties, that they simply cannot develop the needed depth of feeling and single-minded devotion to any interest at stake, except perhaps to their families and children. Keep in mind that for a person to choose in concert with others in a group to kill people or destroy their property demands that they have an almost fanatic dedication to the interest--the stakes--involved, almost to the exclusion of all else.

Yet there is also something about democratically free societies that is even more important than these violence reducing links and cross pressures. This is their culture. Where people are free, as in a free market, exchange dominates and resolves conflicts. "You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours." "You give me that, and I'll give you this." Money is often the currency of such exchange, but also so are people's privileges of one sort or another, benefits, positions, and so on. But except where such exchange is so standardized that there is little room for bargaining, as in buying a hamburger at the local fast food restaurant, in a democracy people soak up certain norms governing their conflicts. These are that they tolerate their differences, negotiate some compromise, and in the process, make concessions. From the highest government officials to the lowest worker, from the consideration of bills in a legislature to who does the dishes after dinner, there is bargaining of one sort or another going on to resolve an actual or potential conflict. Some of this becomes regularized, as in the bargaining of unions and management in the United States structured by the Labor Relations Board, or that given by tradition that dictates in some families that the wife will always wash the dishes. But so much more involves bargaining.

Therefore, in a free society a culture of bargaining, what you might call an exchange or democratic culture, evolves. This is part of the settling in that takes place when a nation first becomes democratic. Authoritarian practices, doing things by orders, decrees, and commands sent down a hierarchy, gradually gets replaced by many hierarchies of power and the use of bargaining and its techniques of negotiation and compromise to settle conflicts. Free people soon come to expect that when they have a conflict, they will negotiate the issues and through concessions and the splitting of differences, they will resolve it. The more years a democracy exists, the more its people's expectations become hardened into social customs and perception. No matter the conflict, people who have been long democratically free do not expect revolution and civil war. For most important, *they see each other as democratic, part of one's in-group, one's moral, democratic universe.* They each share not only socially, in overlapping groups, functions, and linkages, but also in culture.

The result of this structure of freedom, this *spontaneous society*, as F.A. Hayek called

it in his *Law, Legislation, and Liberty*, is then to inhibit violence as you have seen, and to culturally dispose people to cooperation, negotiation, compromise, and tolerance of others. Just consider the acceptance and application of the Constitution of the United States and Congressional rules in settling in 1999 that most serious of political conflicts, whether President Clinton would be fired from office. This supremely contentious dispute that I sketched in [Chapter 3](#), this most potentially violent issue, was decided with no loss of life, no injuries, no destruction of property, no disorder, no political instability. Similarly for the even more potentially violent, month long dispute over the outcome of the 2000 American presidential election. Above all examples I might give, these two more than any other, show the sheer power of a democratic institutions and culture to cause you to peacefully resolve your social and political conflicts.

But this is, so to speak, one end of the stick. This spontaneous society explains why a free people are most peaceful in their national affairs, but why should those societies in which people are commanded by absolute dictators, where people are most unfree, be most violent? The worst of these dictators rule their people and organize their society according to ideological or theological imperatives. Be it Marxism-Leninism and the drive for true communism as in the Russian Revolution, socialist equalitarianism as in Burma, racial purity as in Nazi Germany, or the realization of God's will as in Sudan, the dictators operate through a rigid and society-wide command structure. And this polarizes society.

First, the competing pyramids of power--church, schools, businesses, and so on-- that discipline, check, and balance each other and government in a free society do not exist. There is one solid pyramid of power, with the dictator or ruling elite at the top, with various levels of government in the middle and near the bottom, and with the mass of powerless subjects at the bottom.

Second, where in a free society separate cross-cutting groups service diverse interests, there is now, in effect, only one division in society: that between those in power who command and those who must obey. In the worst of these nations, such as Pol Pot's Cambodia, to be exemplified in the [next chapter](#), Kim Il-sung's North Korea, Mao's China, and Stalin's Soviet Union, as seen in the [last chapter](#), you could only work for the Communist Party, buy food from its stores, read newspapers it publishes, see its movies and television programs, go to its schools, study its textbooks, and prey at a church it controlled. This sharply divides society into those in power and those out of power, into "them" versus "us." This aligns the vital interests of us versus them along one conflict fault line traversing society, as a magnet aligns metal filings along its magnetic forces. Any minor gripe about the society or politics is against the same "them," and when one says "they" are responsible for a problem or conflict, friends

and loved ones know exactly whom is meant--the whole apparatus of the dictator's rule: his henchmen, police, officials, spies, and bureaucrats.

Since this regime owns and runs near everything, any minor issue therefore becomes a matter of the dictator's power, legitimacy, or credibility. A strike in one small town against a government owned factory is a serious matter to the dictator. If he shows weakness in defense of his policies, no matter how localized, the strike can spread along the us versus them fault line and crystallize a nation wide rebellion. So the dictator must use major force to put it down. For the people, such a strike may be symbolic, and a display of resistance they should support, and therefore, the strike still may spread along the fault line between the dictator and people. Anyhow, the regime cannot afford to let any resistance, any display of independence, anywhere in the country by anybody, go unchallenged. Even a peaceful demonstration, as in Burma and China, must be violently squashed, with leaders arrested, tortured for information, and often killed.

So rule is by the gun; violence a natural concomitant. But, there is more to this. As a culture of accommodation is a corollary of freedom, a culture of force and violence is a theorem of dictatorial rule. Where such rule is absolute, this is also a culture of fear--not knowing when someone might perceive you as doing something wrong and report you to the police, doubt whether authorities will use your ancestors or race or religion as a black mark against you; and insecurity about the lives of your loved ones, who authorities may drag off to serve in the military, cause to disappear because of something they said, or make some sexual plaything. The fear exists up and down the dictator's command structure as well. The secret police may shoot a general because of his joke about the "Great Leader," or they may jail and torture top government functionaries because of a rumored plot. The dictator himself must always fear that his security forces will turn their guns on him.

Where power becomes absolute, massive killing follows, and rebellion is a concomitant. There also are partly free regimes like a monarch ruling according to tradition and custom, as in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia; or an authoritarian one, as in Mexico before its revolution in which arranged elections and compliant military, police, and rich landowners kept the dictator in power. Power in this case is more dispersed, and some freedoms do exist. And therefore, the average violence is less than in those nations in which the people have no freedom. If, however, the authoritarian rule is especially unjust and despicable, as it was in Mexico, the resulting violence can be quite bloody. Regardless, as you have seen, the correlation holds. The less free a society and the more coercive commands dominate it, then the greater the polarization and culture of fear and violence, and the more likely extreme violence will occur.

In the last chapter, I showed that by promoting wealth and prosperity, your freedom is a moral good. Here, you see that freedom also promotes nonviolence and peace within a nation. This is also a moral good of freedom. *It is another moral reason why you should be democratically free.*

Political violence within nations is only one form of violence, however. There is another form, far more deadly than any other form of violence, and that is genocide and mass murder. I need a separate chapter to deal with this.

NOTES

* Written for this web site. I am indebted to Judson Knight for his careful editing and helpful comments on a portion this chapter. For the statistics and details on the Mexican and Russian Revolution covered here, see Chapters 16 and 17 of my [Death By Government](#); for those on the post-revolutionary period in Russia, soon to be the USSR, see my [Lethal Politics](#). For the tests of the general relationship between internal political violence and democracy, see [Chapter 35](#) of [The Conflict Helix](#); ["Libertarianism, Violence Within States, and the Polarity Principle"](#); ["Libertarianism, Violence Within States, and the Polarity Principle"](#); [Power Kills](#); and this book's [Appendix](#).

1. See a [list](#) of present conflicts, those concluded since WWII, and a conflict map. On my [links](#) page I provide links to data sources on conflict and war.

Chapter 6

Freedom Virtually Ends Genocide and Mass Murder

The more freedom a people have, the less likely their government will murder them; the less their freedom, the more likely such democide.
----This web site

By shooting, drowning, burying alive, stabbing, torture, beating, suffocation, starvation, exposure, poison, crushing, and other countless ways that lives can be wiped out, governments have killed unarmed and helpless people. Intentionally. With forethought. This is murder. It is *democide*.

The more popularly understood term for government murder is *genocide*, but there is a difference between democide and genocide as described in my "[Democide versus Genocide: Which is What?](#)", and which must be understood: in short, *democide* is a government's murder of people for whatever reason; *genocide* is the murder of people because of their race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, or language. The most infamous example of genocide was Nazi Germany's cold-blooded murder of near 6,000,000 Jews during World War II (see [Table 1.1](#) from my [Democide](#)). Men, women, and children died simply because they were ethnic Jews. In

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["Power predicts democide"](#)

[Chapter 1](#), you also have read about the Burmese military genocide of the Karen minority; the Sudanese government's genocide of the Black Southern minority; the Chinese Communist Party's genocide of the Falun Gong; and in [Chapter 5](#) you also read about the Mexican government's genocide of Indians. An example of nongenocidal democide is the Chinese Party and Burma's military murders of pro-democracy demonstrators; the Mexican and, in [Chapter 1](#), the Saudi Arabian government's murders of political opponents; and, in [Chapter 3](#), Stalin's deadly famine he imposed on the Ukraine.



Starving them to death.
The Turkish Armenian genocide

If you have been living in a democracy all your life, you may find it difficult to accept the truth that governments murder people by the thousands and millions. I know that even some of my political science colleagues have

resisted the thought. I could see them wince when at a conference or meeting, for example, I would say outright that Kim Il-sung, the deceased dictator of North Korea, is responsible for the murder of something like 1,700,000 people (see [Table 15.1](#) from my [Death By Government](#)). You can easily call some person a murderer if they kill people in cold blood, as did London's famous "Jack the Ripper," who killed six or seven people in 1888; or the "Boston Strangler," Albert DeSalvo, who in 1962-1964 killed thirteen people. You may resist, however, calling a dictator a mass murderer, even when speaking of Uganda's Idi Amin, who physically took part in some murders carried out by his government, and was responsible for the violent deaths of some 300,000 of his subjects.

Part of this reluctance to call a government or its ruler a murderer comes from the fact that to do so is a new and strange thought. Democide is a black hole in our textbooks, college teaching, and social science research. Few people know the extent to which governments murder people. In the twentieth century, the age of great advances in technology, medicine, wealth, and education, governments nonetheless probably murdered over 170,000,000 people, the worst of these murderous governments are listed in [Table 6.1](#) here.¹ This is more than four times those killed in combat in all international and national wars, including world wars I and II, Vietnam, Korea, the Mexican Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the Chinese Civil War. The toll could even be more than 300,000,000. This is as though we had a nuclear war, but with its deaths and destruction spread over a

TABLE 6.1
Democide 1900-1987

REGIMES	YEARS	DEMOCIDE (000)[1]	
		TOTAL	DOMESTIC
MEGAMURDERERS	1900-87	151,491	116,380
DEKA-MEGA...	1900-87	128,168	100,842
U.S.S.R.	1917-87	61,911	54,769
China (PRC)	1949-87	35,236	35,236
Germany	1933-45	20,946	762
China (KMT)	1928-49	10,075	10,075
LESSER MEGA...	1900-87	19,178	12,237
Japan	1936-45	5,964	Nil
China (Mao Soviets) [2]	1923-49	3,466	3,466
Cambodia	1975-79	2,035	2,000
Turkey	1909-18	1,883	1,752
Vietnam	1945-87	1,670	944
Poland	1945-48	1,585	1,585
Pakistan	1958-87	1,503	1,503
Yugoslavia (Tito)	1944-87	1,072	987
SUSPECTED MEGA...	1900-87	4,145	3,301
North Korea	1948-87	1,663	1,293
Mexico	1900-20	1,417	1,417
Russia	1900-17	1,066	591
CENTI-KILO...	1900-87	14,918	10,812
TOP 5	1900-87	4,074	2,192
China (Warlords)	1917-49	910	910
Turkey (Atatürk)	1919-23	878	703
United Kingdom	1900-87	816	Nil
Portugal (Dictatorship)	1926-82	741	Nil
Indonesia	1965-87	729	579
LESSER MURDERERS	1900-87	2,792	2,355
WORLD TOTAL	1900-87	169,202	129,547

1. Includes genocide, and mass murder; excludes war-dead. These are most probable mid-estimates in low to high ranges. Figures may not sum due to round off.
2. Guemilla period.

TABLE 15.1
North Korean Democide
1948-1987

TYPE OF KILLING	DEMOCIDÉ (000) [1]
DOMESTIC DEMOCIDE	1,293
purges	10 [2]
"Open Struggle" campaign	10 [2]
"Collective Guidance campaign	25 [2]
labor concentration camps	265
corvée/hard labor	983
FOREIGN DEMOCIDE	370
of South Koreans	363
others	7
TOTAL DEMOCIDE	1,663
NORTH KOREAN WAR-DEAD	1,401 [3]

1. Mid-estimates from table 15A.1

2. This is a low.

3. Includes military action since the Korean War.

century. Yet few know about this obscene slaughter.



There is a good reason why.

The authoritarian and totalitarian governments that do most of this killing

usually control who writes their histories, and what appears in them. Also, democratically free people project onto the rest of the world their own democratic cultural biases. They see governments as doing largely good things for people. Some policies may be wrong, some stupid, but the idea of murdering people because of their politics, religion, or ethnicity, or by quota, is alien. And our political science textbooks tell us that governments have positive functions, such as national defense, welfare, and security--that they provide a legal framework within which people can achieve their own interests. With this conception, it is difficult to conceive of nondemocratic governments as many are: a gang of thugs holding a whole nation captive with their guns, enslaving the people to their whims, and looting, raping, and killing at will.

Moreover, democratic culture predisposes liberal democracies to avoid conflict and seek cooperation with other nations, even those ruled by despots. Democratic governments do not seek to arouse public opinion against other countries that will destabilize diplomatic arrangements and create pressure for hostile action. Seldom do democratic governments point their fingers at those guilty of democide, therefore, unless already in conflict with them and therefore in need of public support. Even then, they often will avoid doing so until the proof is overpowering (as in Rwanda, as discussed below), and even then, democracies will avoid the term murder, or even genocide.



All to be killed in one hour--victims of the Turkish genocide of the Armenians 1915-1918


Such, for example, is the case with the many decades long refusal on the part of the U.S. State Department to admit, despite the evidence from its own ambassador

and other diplomats at the time, that during World War I the Turkish government planned and launched a genocidal campaign against its Armenian citizens, murdering as many as 1,500,000 of them. Turkey is a member of NATO, refuses to admit the genocide, and has taken

strong diplomatic action against those who make this claim. Yet Turkey perpetuated the first large-scale act of genocide in the twentieth century, not Russia or Germany.


A few examples of democide will suffice too show the nature and extent of this abominable and utterly inhumane practice. One is the Rwanda's Great Genocide of 1994, which involved the plotted murder in four months of over 600,000, perhaps 800,000, even possibly as many as 1,000,000, Tutsi and Hutu, at least 14 percent of the population. In people killed within such a short amount of time, it is one of the twentieth century's worst acts of democide. The second example will be that of the largely non-genocidal democide committed by the Khmer Rouge government in Cambodia, 1975-1979. This killer regime murdered about 2,000,000 Cambodians in four years, or a little less than one-third of the population. Many more were killed than in Rwanda, but over a much longer time. I also will give briefer examples from Stalin and Mao's vast democides.

Before describing the Great Genocide, it should be noted that with regard to various totals I will present, such as of 100,000 or 200,000 murdered, the meaning in terms of human beings killed is hard to grasp. To feel what 100,000 dead means, think of lying down 100,000 corpses, head to toe, in a line alongside a straight road. Assume, since many were babies, young children, and short adults, that each corpse averages a little more than 5 feet long. Now, if you were to drive a car down this road along these 100,000 bodies, how far would you have to drive to reach the last one? Almost 100 miles. This gives you a simple multiplier. Two hundred thousand murdered would stretch head to toe nearly 200 miles, and a million murdered would be almost 1,000 miles. Maybe then you can feel how incredible, how horrible, it is that 100,000 human beings, or even 1,000 (end to end, a little less than a mile), each a separate soul like you, would have their precious lives wiped out. Each death also leaves countless loved ones to die of heartbreak, thus multiplying the toll. This human misery is not in the numbers, but numbers are necessary for recounting the sad tale of crime on a gargantuan scale.



The Rwandan Great Genocide of 1994, though by far the largest in the country's history, was only one of many acts of genocides carried out by different Rwandan governments in decades before 1994 and that have continued to be done by her governments since. Located in the south-central region of Africa, and bordered by Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania, Rwanda is smaller than the State of Maryland (see [map and statistics](#), and [world map](#)). In 1999, its population was about 7,200,000, one of the most densely populated countries, and one of the poorest. One important ethnic group was the small minority of Tutsi, who made up 15 percent of Rwandans, and who tended to be tall and thin. The overwhelming majority of

RINGS OF TEARS
The 174,000,000 murdered by government
1900-1999 would head to toe circle the
earth about four times



Source: <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~rummel/>

CENTRAL AFRICA



Rwanda

Area	26,338 sq km --slightly smaller than Maryland
Population	7,229,129
Ethnic groups	Hutu 84%, Tutsi 15%, Twa (Pygmoid) 1%
Religions	Roman Catholic 65%, Protestant 9%, Muslim 1%, indigenous beliefs and other 25%
Languages	Kinyarwanda (official) universal Bantu vernacular, French (official), English (official), Kiswahili (Swahili) used in commercial centers
Life expectation	39.34 years
Literacy	60.50%
Purchasing power parity	\$720 (1999 est.)
Government	republic; presidential, multiparty system
Freedom rating	unfree for 1998

Rwandans, over 80 percent, are ethnic Hutu, more likely to be short and stocky.

The Western media have greatly misunderstood the 1994 genocide as a tribal meltdown, as ethnic hatred and intolerance run amok. The mental picture is of a Hutu running widely down a street swinging a machete at any Tutsi he can catch. This is a myth. Rather, the genocide was a well-calculated mass murder planned by Hutu government leaders. Surely, individual Hutu who hated Tutsi, or had grievances against certain Tutsi, joined in the blood fest, and undoubtedly, sadistic Hutu just saw this genocide as an excuse to kill. We also should not overlook the many Hutu who refused to kill, and protected Tutsi even at the risk of their lives. But this genocide was, pure and simple, part of a political struggle to maintain power, as was the "ethnic cleansing" that happened later in Bosnia and Kosovo. It exemplified the iron law of human behavior: power kills.

Centuries ago, the Tutsi migrated from the north to Rwanda and proceeded to dominate the Hutu with a feudal system, but without the strict tribal or ethnic divisions one sees in Rwanda today. At the time "Hutu" and "Tutsi" distinguished social and political groups, instead of ethnic. Generally, Tutsi were cattle owners and members of the court, while Hutu were farmers. Nor were these differences indelible: Hutu could become Tutsi, and vice versa. Nor was Tutsi political domination absolute. Hutu chiefs became part of the hierarchy, and custom required Tutsi governors to recognize certain obligations to the Hutu. In many ways there was a sharing of power, and eventually, both Tutsi and Hutu spoke the same language, generally were Catholic in religion, and shared the same culture. Even after the end of colonization, they went to the same schools, worked together, and drank at the same bars.

Then came colonization. Germany first took Rwanda in the 19th Century, and then after the defeat of Germany in World War I the victors turned Rwanda over to Belgium as a protectorate. As did Germany, Belgium tried to rule at a distance by indirectly governing through existing Rwandan political institutions, which largely meant working through the Tutsi. Certainly colonial authorities thought the Tutsi to be more intelligent and vigorous, more like Caucasians, and therefore favored them in government, education, and business. In effect, Belgium promoted a more rigid and pervasive Tutsi rule over the Hutu. Since the difference between Tutsi and Hutu was not always readily evident, the colonial authorities defined a Tutsi one who owned ten or more cows, and a Hutu as anyone with less. Moreover, Christian missionaries, particularly of the Roman Catholic Church, taught that the Tutsi were Hametic rather than Negroid in origin, possibly from Ethiopia, and with Christian roots. Where the difference between Tutsi and Hutu had been unclear before colonization, hardly stressed in social affairs and interaction, it now became a precise government and social matter. In 1926, Belgium introduced identity cards indicating whether the holder was Tutsi or Hutu.

After the end of World War II, there was much talk about equality and freedom. Western intellectuals began to spread the word about the benefits and justice of democracy, Christian missionaries joined in this new ideological wave promoting democracy and equality among the Hutu. Yet for all the teaching about social justice, the Hutu were still required to carry ethnic identity cards; and behind the scenes, the colonial authorities continued to support Tutsi

control over all governmental functions. All this did much to aggravate Hutu and Tutsi differences, therefore, while encouraging the wish for self-government among the great majority of Hutu.

Independence and self-determination were the irresistible cry during the 1950s, and Belgians came to see Rwandan independence as inevitable. This raised the question of what kind of government an independent Rwanda would have. Being members of a democracy themselves, colonial authorities wanted to give more power to the Hutu majority and prepare free elections and a democratic government. They therefore changed colonial policy and began to prepare the Hutu for a large role in government by encouraging their education, and phasing them in more and important official positions. This further encouraged the belief among Hutus that by right, the government belonged to them.

In 1959 this rising sentiment culminated in a Hutu rebellion against both Belgium and the Tutsi government and elite. The Hutu massacred about 10,000 Tutsi and the next year forced 100,000 to 200,000 to flee the country with their king. The Hutu then declared a republic, and in 1962 Belgium granted Rwanda full independence.

Over the next decades, Tutsi would continually invade one border area of Rwanda or another to overthrow the Hutu government. In the years between 1961 and 1967 alone, they tried this ten times. The resulting fighting and genocide over the years forced Tutsi from their homes, and increased the number of refugees to about 600,000, among whom the men became ready fighters in new Tutsi incursions. In 1963 they launched the most serious of these invasions, this one from Uganda, and for the first time threatened to bring down the government. But they were soon defeated, and only succeeded in provoking another Hutu massacre of Tutsi who had remained in the country. Also, during this and other invasions of this period, Tutsi carried out their own genocide, murdering some 20,000 Hutu.

Regardless of their lack of success in defeating the Hutu government, the Tutsi refugees would not give up. Under German and then Belgian colonial rule, they had come to believe that they were superior to Hutu in all-important ways, and that it was only right that they, and not the Hutu, rule the country.

Among themselves, the Hutu were split between the north and south, as shown in 1973, when Defense Minister General Juvenal Habyarimana overthrew the president, accusing him of favoritism for southern Hutu, and made himself president. His new power was not secure either, but he did defeat a coup against him in 1980, and remained in power until the beginning of the Great Genocide. Added to the political difficulties of his rule was the collapse in the international market for coffee, the principal crop of Rwanda, which led to famine in some areas. Moreover, President Habyarimana drove the government deeply into debt, forcing him to turn to the World Bank for aid. This he got in return for the promise to liberalize the economy from government controls, but he spent the money on building up the army, and ignored the World Bank's stipulations.

President Habyarimana's government allowed Rwandans virtually no freedom. He created a

strict one-party state with the intention of being able to control and quickly mobilize the population. The government divided people into communes, and if a citizen wanted to move in or out of his assigned commune, he had to report to the police. All citizens had to register, and, as in Burma, the government forced everyone to do a certain amount of forced labor: building roads, clearing brush, digging ditches, and so on. Also, they had to take part in weekly propaganda meetings to glorify the party. Rwandans have been among the least free in civil and political rights. On a scale of 2 (free) to 14 (unfree), [Freedom House](#), a non-profit, nonpartisan organization promoting democracy and human rights and based in Washington, D.C., rated the Rwandan people as 13 in lack of freedom for 1993, and a bottom 14 for the following year during which the Great Genocide occurred.

In the midst of Rwanda's economic troubles, Tutsi refugees again invaded the country in 1990. With the help of the Ugandans, they had formed a political and military force they named the Front Patriotique Rawndais (FPR, sometimes called the RPF), but were again defeated, this time with the help of Belgium, and French troops. The FPR tried to hold on to parts of the country and would periodically resume its offensive until the government launched the Great Genocide in 1994.

And while this civil war was devastating part of the country, economic troubles increased. Inflation, along with personal and government debt, rose sharply. Coffee prices dropped so low that the government destroyed coffee trees and replaced them with other crops. Upon being asked again, the World Bank tried to help, and provided more funds toward overcoming Rwanda's huge national debt.

By this time, Hutu extremists had resurrected the old non-Black, Ethiopian theory about Tutsi origins that Belgium had once used to justify Tutsi rule, only now, the Hutu used this myth to their advantage. Extremists claimed that the Tutsi did not belong in Rwanda, that they were outsiders who had invaded the country and subjugated the Hutu. They argued for the total expulsion of all Tutsi. Government anti-Tutsi propaganda also made much of the genocide of Hutu by the Tutsi in neighboring Burundi. There, the ethnic division was about the same as in Rwanda, but the Tutsi were in control. In 1972, the Burundi government responded to a Hutu uprising by massacring about 150,000 Hutu, and after another Hutu uprising in 1988, the Tutsi massacred as many as 200,000 Hutu. The Hutu Rwandan government regularly cited this genocidal slaughter by the Burundi Tutsi as a reason why they could not allow the Tutsi within their own borders to take or share power.

However, the United Nations, United States, Belgium, and other African nations were applying considerable pressure to President Habyarimana to come to terms with the FPR and end the civil war. Badly in need of more foreign aid, in 1992 he agreed to form a coalition government with all political parties, and to share power with Tutsi leaders until he could hold an election. This hardly sat well with the Hutu political and military elite and extremists, but in any case, President Habyarimana found one reason or another to delay fulfilling this agreement--perhaps in order to prepare for the Great Genocide. Also, the United Nation's mandate for overseeing this accord was to expire in April 1994; then UN troops would have to withdraw. Meanwhile, Tutsi FPR forces, helped by Ugandan military, continued the civil war, broken by

occasional cease-fires.

By April of 1994, events had prepared the way for the Great Genocide. The economy was a mess, and tensions between Hutu and Tutsi were at a boiling point due to the continuing FPR assaults. The country was so beleaguered that it began to look as though Habyarimana would finally surrender to foreign pressure and allow the Tutsi to share power. Radical Hutu elite and top governmental leaders, however, had other plans.

In April 1994, a plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundian President Ndadaye crashed under mysterious circumstances. The prevailing theory was that Habyarimana's own Presidential Guard shot it down. Whether radical Hutu planned this assassination or not, it triggered the Great Genocide.

As the Great Genocide was unleashed, there was bloodlust in the air, and some Hutu and Tutsi alike now felt free to settle scores and kill those they resented. Overall, however, the government--that is President Habyarimana's wife, a few close advisors, and three brothers-in-laws--had prepared for the Great Genocide before Habyarimana's death. Their middle-level organizers numbered about 300 to 500 officials and bureaucrats. The police and a special Hutu militia (*interhamwe*) of 7,000 to 14,000 Tutsi-haters at their command did the dirty work. Officials in on the plan had specifically organized the militia to murder Tutsi, and they succeeded very well: some may well have killed as many as 200-300 people. Militia killers also encouraged--and sometimes at gunpoint ordered--Hutu civilians to kill their Tutsi friends and neighbors. Hutu who refused, or who showed reluctance, were themselves murdered. Insiders had also trained a Palace Guard of about 6,000 Hutu to help the militia and exterminate Hutu and Tutsi political opponents and their supporters. Even Hutu moderates did not escape death. Meanwhile, every day a radio station from the capital exhorted Hutu, as their patriotic duty, to grab whatever weapon they had and kill Tutsi without mercy.



Genocide victims



A machete, the weapon used to slaughter hundreds of thousands of Rwandans

Note that at the workers' level, this was not an act of massacre by the uneducated, undisciplined masses, ordinary folk easily misled and aroused. As with the Holocaust, when Nazi killing squads were often led and composed of Ph.Ds and other professionals, the claims of the powerful and authoritative easily swayed the well educated to murder. In the Great Genocide, Hutu lawyers, teachers, professors, medical doctors, journalists, and other professionals, made their contribution to the methodical annihilation of the

Tutsi or defiant Hutu.

Since most Rwandans were Christians, the country had many churches in which the Tutsi sought refuge. Not to be deterred, the Hutu killers simply surrounded the churches and set them on fire, or forced their way in and systematically butchered all inside. Hospitals were also a favorite target, since they not only hired many Tutsi but also were places where the Hutu killers could easily find and kill wounded Tutsi. For example, on April 23 militia and soldiers from the Rwandan army killed 170 patients and medical personnel at the Butare Hospital. Dr. Claude-Emile Rowagoneza, a Tutsi, gave testimony on what he saw happen in and outside the hospital:



More genocide victims

The massacres were delayed until April 20th. That day everyone was asked to stay at home except those working in the hospital. Medical staff was transported to the hospital. Nurses had to walk and many were stopped at the checkpoint, asked to show their identity cards, and killed if they were Tutsi. There were 35 doctors at the hospital of which four were Tutsi. Because of the danger all four Tutsi stayed at the hospital, as did some nurses. Drs. Jean-Bosco Rugira and Jean-Claude Kanangire are known to have been killed, and the fate of Dr. Isidore Kanangire who was hiding in the hospital and may have been evacuated by the French, is unknown. In mid-May injured soldiers from the Kanombe barracks started being brought to Butare Hospital and no more civilians were being admitted. They also started deciding who were Tutsi on the basis of their features, looking at the nose, height, and fingers because the identity cards were no longer accurate. Some of the doctors at the hospital risked their lives by helping threatened staff by hiding and feeding them.... When the patients' wounds had healed some of the doctors--the "bad" doctors--expelled the Tutsi although everyone knew they would be killed outside. At night, the interhamwe and the soldiers came in but these doctors were colluding willingly. If people refused to go, they were taken out at night. They could be seen being killed by the interhamwe waiting at the gates. Later the Prime Minister came down to Butare...and while here he had a meeting with medical staff. They all said peace had returned and told the patients that it was safe to return home.... Those who did were then killed.... My wife was taken twice by interhamwe but neighbors insisted that she was Hutu....My sister, mother, and father fled to Burundi but all my aunts, uncles, and in-laws were killed except for my mother-in-law. In other words, more than 40 of my relatives were killed.

By June 6, eight weeks later, this deliberate Great Genocide had already taken some 500,000 Rwandan lives, mostly Tutsi. Whole families were massacred, including babies. As the Great Genocide progressed, the United Nations, Belgium, and particularly the United States, showed extreme caution in calling this genocide a genocide. Not could they decide whether to remain engaged in the country. In the first few days, Belgium withdrew completely when Hutu killed ten of its soldiers. Not understanding what was going on, the UN reduced its peacekeeping soldiers from 4,500 men to 270, and fully restricted the action of even this small contingent. As

UN troops retreated from one base after another, waiting Hutu militia set upon and massacred the Tutsi families that had huddled under the UN flag for protection.

It took the Clinton Administration three weeks--by which time hundreds of thousands had already been massacred--to declare a state of disaster in Rwanda. Even then, they characterized the situation as one of tribal killings, with crazed Hutu civilians roaming the streets with machetes hacking away at any Tutsi within reach. In actuality, this genocide was no less planned than the Holocaust or Turkey's World War I genocidal slaughter of their Armenians.



More genocide victims

The American declaration provided unintended cover for the Hutu government to continue its Great Genocide. Even when the deliberate nature of the government's action became too blatant to ignore, the Clinton Administration refused to call it genocide. To do so would have required foreign signatories of the Genocide Convention, including the United States, to immediately get involved. The Clinton Administration also continued to delay agreeing to the details of a UN dispatch of troops, and prevented any foreign action until June 8, nearly three months into the Great Genocide. Then, the Security Council finally received U.S. agreement, and authorized troops to enter Rwanda and prevent further genocide. These troops backed the Tutsi FPR, helped defeat the Hutu conspirators, and caused their government to collapse. An FPR-backed government then took power, and installed a dictatorship as severe as the one it replaced.

At this point I should stress that the Tutsi were not blameless in the Great Genocide. Tutsi civilians and the FPR retaliated against the government's actions against them by killing Hutu, sometimes at random. For innocents on both sides this was a historically unprecedented catastrophe. As mentioned, over 1,000,000 might have died, and around 2,000,000 Hutu were forced to flee their homes, with possibly some 1,200,000 ending up in Zaire alone. All would live miserable lives in refugee camps, often in danger. They suffered from hunger, disease, and attacks by armed gangs of Tutsi. Localized cholera epidemics were frequent; just one of these killed 20,000 refugees. Still, Hutu were unwilling to leave the camps, fearing Tutsi reprisals. When the new Tutsi government tried to close one camp in southwestern Rwanda, for example, troops opened fire on unarmed crowd of Hutu protesters, an act which the United Nations claimed killed 2,000.

Overall, perhaps one-third of a 1993 population around 7,300,000 died or fled the country during the Great Genocide and the subsequent fighting. Though foreign troops and the FPR had ended the Great Genocide, itself, the killing was not over. Several thousand Hutu rebelled against the new government, and with the support of the local Hutu population, they continued to attack and murder Tutsi. To deny these rebels cover, soldiers cleared rebel areas of banana plantations, particularly in the northwest, all but destroying the local economy. From May 1997 to March 1998, these hostilities killed about 10,000 Tutsi and Hutu in this

region alone.

These are just numbers, of course. At the personal level, one can more easily feel what these facts mean for one Tutsi small businessman, Immanuel Sebomana. He was on a bus in northwestern Rwanda when Hutu rebels stopped it. Sebomana jumped from a window immediately and ran for his life into the bush. The rebels then surrounded the bus, set it on fire, and killed any of the remaining passengers who tried to escape. Meanwhile, Hutu civilians joined the soldiers gathered around the bus, cheering, and singing while 35 passengers died.



Rwandan refugees in Zaire 1994

Rwanda represents a clear case of genocide by a government trying to maintain power. The incredible killing that took place in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 is different. First, it is an example of large-scale, nongenocidal mass murder, and only secondarily of genocide. Second, this democide was part of an attempt by communists to impose a revolution on the country. They tried to abolish its religion; eradicate its culture; totally remodel its economy; communize all social interaction; control all speech, writing, laughing, and loving; exterminate anyone with any ties to Western nations, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand; and eliminate all who had any connections to the previous government or military. Because of all this, it is necessary to focus on the intended revolution itself to explain how and why this one government, in four years, could and would murder more than one-quarter of its population.

A little smaller than Oklahoma, Cambodia is located in Southeast Asia, bordered by Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and the Gulf of Thailand. Cambodia's population in 1970 was about 7,100,000, slightly smaller than Rwanda's, and almost wholly Buddhist (see the contemporary [map and statistics](#), and [world map](#)).

The devastating history of Cambodia during the 1960s and 1970s is intimately bound up with the Vietnam War. Communist North Vietnamese provided military aid and soldiers to Cambodia's own communist guerrillas, the Khmer Rouge or Red Cambodians. Cambodia was an avenue for war supplies from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong guerrillas fighting under their command in South Vietnam against South Vietnamese and American troops. As a result, the United States systematically bombed Khmer Rouge guerrillas and Viet Cong supply routes, and in a final attempt to destroy these routes, invaded Cambodia from South Vietnam. But, American Congressional and public opinion hostile to the invasion soon forced American forces to retreat back to South Vietnam.

In proportion to its population, Cambodia underwent a human catastrophe unequaled by any

SOUTHEAST ASIA



Cambodia

Area	181,040 sq km--slightly smaller than Oklahoma
Population	12,212,306
Ethnic groups	Khmer 90%, Vietnamese 5%, Chinese 1%, other 4%
Religions	Theravada Buddhist 95%, other 5%
Languages	Khmer (official) 95%, French, English
Life expectation	71.49 years
Literacy	89.90%
Purchasing power parity	\$710 (1999 est.)
Government	multiparty coalition government under a constitutional monarchy
Freedom rating	unfree for 1998

other country in the twentieth century (see [Figure 1.2](#) of my *Death By Government*). It probably lost slightly less than 4,000,000 people to war, rebellion, manufactured famine, and democide-- genocide, nonjudicial executions, and massacres-- or close to 56 percent of its 1970 population. Between 1970 and 1980, from democide alone, successive governments and guerrilla groups murdered almost 3,300,000 men, women, and children, including 35,000 foreigners. Most of these, probably as many as 2,400,000, were murdered by the communist Khmer Rouge, both before and (to a much greater extent) when they took over Cambodia after April 1975. These statistics are shown in Table 6.2 here.²

The United States had supported and supplied the Cambodian military government of General Lon Nol. But the American Congress ended all aid to him with the


withdrawal of the United States from the Vietnam War in 1973. After successive retreats, Lon Nol could no longer even defend the capital, Phnom Penh, against the Khmer Rouge guerrillas. The Cambodian army then declared a cease-fire and laid down its arms. On April 17, 1975, a rag-tag bunch of solemn, black-pajama-clad teenagers with red scarves and Mao caps, carrying arms of all descriptions, walked or were trucked from different directions into Phnom Penh. They were part of an army of 68,000 Khmer Rouge guerrillas that had achieved victory for a Communist Party of only 14,000 members against an army of about 200,000 men.

TABLE 6.2
Cambodian Dead 1967-1987

SOURCE OF DEATHS	FROM	TO	DEAD
WAR/REBELLION [2]	Mar-70	1987	514
FAMINE/DISEASE [3]	Mar-70	1987	280
DEMOICIDE [4]	Mar-70	1987	3,186
By Regimes	Mar-70	1987	2,292
Sihanouk [5]	1967	Mar-70	12 [8]
Lon Nol	Mar-70	Apr-75	15
Khmer Rouge	Apr-70	Jan-79	2,035
domestic	Apr-70	Jan-79	2,000
foreign [5]	Apr-70	Jan-79	35 [8]
Samrin	Jan-79	1987	230
By Guerrillas	Mar-70	1987	372
Khmer Rouge [5]	1967	Mar-70	1 [8]
	Apr-70	Apr-75	211
	[5] Jan-79	1987	150 [8]
Other groups [5]	Jan-79	1987	10 [8]
By Foreigners [6]			522
South Vietnam [5]	Mar-70	1973	1 [8]
North Vietnam [7]	Mar-70	1987	461
United States	Mar-70	Aug-73	60
Khmer Rouge Total	Mar-70	1987	2,397 [9]
Overall Dead	Mar-70	1987	3,979 [9]

1. All figures from Statistics of Democide on this site.
2. Figure for war-dead, excluding democide.
3. Non-democidal only; includes death from malnutrition.
4. Includes democidal famine/disease and military action (e.g., bombing).
5. Estimated democide low.
6. In Cambodia.
7. Vietnam after 1975.
8. This is a low estimate.
9. Includes 35,000 foreign dead.

FIGURE 1.2
Democide Lethality



At first, the people hardly knew what to make of these victorious guerrillas. After all, the war was over, the killing had stopped, and people who had chafed under the Lon Nol government were relieved and happy. Many intellectuals and middle-class Cambodians were disgusted with the everyday corruption of the government, and were willing to try anything that brought change, even Communism. The Khmer Rouge was cheered, and there were public and private celebrations.

But before the people could settle down and enjoy a few days of peace, the Khmer Rouge began doing the unimaginable: they turned their weapons on the 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 inhabitants of the capital and with angry yelling, shouting, hand-waving, threats of immediate death, and actual shooting, demanded that everyone get out of the city. In this and all other newly occupied cities and towns, their order to evacuate was implacable. Including those in other cities and towns elsewhere, the Khmer Rouge kicked into a largely unprepared countryside near 4,240,000 urban Cambodians and refugees, even the sick, infirm and aged. Even for those on the operating table or in labor with child, the order was absolute: "Go! Go! You must leave!"



From top to bottom: victorious Khmer Rouge enter Phnom Penh; forced evacuation of 2-3 million; on the road, where hundreds of thousands die; ghost town.

Families evacuated any way possible, carrying what few possessions they could grab. The wealthy or middle-class rode out in cars, soon to be abandoned, or stolen from them by the Khmer Rouge. Some left on heavily loaded motor scooters or bicycles, which would also soon be confiscated. The vast multitude of pathetic urbanites and refugees only had their feet, and formed barely moving lines extending for miles. Some ill or infirm hobbled along; some thrown from hospitals crawled along on hands and knees. According to a British journalist who, from the safety of the French embassy, watched the slowly moving mass of evacuees, the Khmer Rouge was "tipping out patients [from the hospitals] like garbage into the streets.... Bandaged men and women hobbled by the embassy. Wives pushed wounded soldier husbands on hospital beds on wheels, some with serum drips still attached. In five years of war, this is the greatest caravan of human misery I have seen."

Failure to evacuate meant death. Failure to begin evacuation promptly enough meant death. Failure of anyone in the mass of humanity that clogged the roads out of a city and in the neighboring countryside to obey Khmer Rouge orders meant

death. Failure to give the Khmer Rouge what they wanted--whether car, motor scooter, bicycle, watch, or whatever--meant death.

The direction the people exited the city depended on the side they were on when they received the evacuation order. The Khmer Rouge told refugees to return to their home village; but for the mass and particularly the urbanites, where they went after evacuation and what village the Khmer Rouge eventually settled them in depended on the whim of the soldiers and cadre along the way. People were jumbled together, trudging along for days or weeks, usually with whatever clothes, covering, and provisions they could snatch at the last moment. Many had minimal supplies, since they had believed the Khmer Rouge who, to minimize disorder, told them that the evacuation would only be for a few days. The very young and old, and those already sick, injured, or infirm soon died on the roads or trails. One of these trudging millions, a medical doctor named Vann Hay, said that every 200 meters he saw a dead child.

Including those killed outright, the toll from this outrageous and bloody evacuation is in dispute. Whether 40,000 to 80,000 evacuees were murdered or died, as one scholar sympathetic to the Khmer Rouge claimed, or 280,000 to 400,000 as the CIA estimated, the sheer horror of this urban expulsion is undeniable.

Primarily, this was done as a matter of ideology. The Khmer Rouge saw the city as the home of foreign ideas, capitalists, and their supportive bourgeoisie intellectuals; and as thoroughly corrupt and requiring a thorough cleansing. And those the Khmer Rouge believed the city had corrupted, its professionals, business people, public officials, teachers, writers, and workers, must either be eliminated or reeducated and purified. And to the Khmer Rouge, the best way of remaking those "corrupted minds" that they allowed to survive was to make them work in the fields along side pure peasants. Consider the slogans broadcast over Radio Phnom Penh and given at meetings at the time: "what is infected must be cut out.... What is rotten must be removed.... What is too long must be shortened and made the right length.... It isn't enough to cut down a bad plant, it must be uprooted." This inhuman



Pol Pot



expulsion was an opening salvo in the Khmer Rouge campaign to utterly remake Cambodian culture and society, and to construct pure Communism forthwith. Pol Pot and a few henchmen, who organized and loosely commanded the Khmer Rouge, planned all this. (Pol Pot was a Cambodian communist revolutionary who had received his higher education and radical ideas in France, and helped found the Khmer Workers party--Khmer Rouge--in 1960, which he then headed. He subsequently organized and led the guerrilla attacks on Prince Sihanouk's Western oriented government in the 1960s, and against the American supported General Lon Nol government that overthrew it in 1970.)

As the pitiful evacuees reached their homes or assigned villages, there was usually no relief from the horrors already suffered. The situation was just different in kind. However, it should be noted that under Khmer Rouge rule, Cambodia was not one totalitarian society dictated by one set of doctrines or rules, except at the most abstract and general level. How the Khmer Rouge applied such abstractions, under what rules, and with what punishment for violations, varied from one district or region to another. This is why I write that Pol Pot "loosely" commanded.

Nonetheless, Pol Pot and his henchmen managed to hold the initiative, establish control throughout the country, and create the surprising uniformity in most regions shown here in Table 6.3.3
They collectivized peasants everywhere--95 to 97 percent of the population eventually forced into collective farms--and expected evacuees and peasants to work solely for the communist revolution. They forbid all political, civil, or human rights. They prohibited travel without a pass from village to village. They forced Cambodians to eat and sleep in communes, and ordered even young children to work in the fields. In some regions, they made peasants work from about 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 or 10:00 p.m., with time off only for "political education." They



closed permanently all primary, secondary, and technical schools, as well as colleges and universities. They shut down all hospitals and automatically murdered Western-trained medical doctors. They prohibited sex between the unmarried, and in some places, they threatened boys and girls with death for as little as holding hands. Also at risk of death, unauthorized contact was forbidden even between those married. The Khmer Rouge allowed no appeals, no courts, no judges, no trials, and no law. They eliminated all money, businesses, books, and newspapers. They banned practicing lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers, scientists, and all other professionals, because whatever truths these professions contained, the peasant could pick up through experience.



Haing Ngor

This is all incredible and some details on this may help its digestion. Just consider how the Khmer Rouge controlled personal relations. They made showing love to a relative or laughing with them dangerous, since they might perceive this as showing less dedication to, or poking fun at, the Great Revolution. It

TABLE 6.3
Conditions of Life
Under the Khmer Rouge

Civil/Political

- no freedom to travel abroad or from village to village
- no freedom to choose employment
- no freedom of speech
- no freedom of organization
- no freedom of religion—no religion allowed
- no courts, judges, or appeals
- no codified law or rules

Social/Cultural

- no public or private worker rights
- no independent work or living (all in collectives).
- no skilled private or public medical care
- no foreign medicines
- no mail or telegrams
- no radio, television, or movies
- no international telephones or cables
- no newspapers, journals, or magazines
- no books or libraries
- no general schooling
- no holidays or religious festivals

Economic

- no money (all money eliminated)
- no banks
- no wages or salaries
- no markets
- no businesses
- no restaurants or stores

Personal

- no independent eating (all cooked and ate collectively)
- no personal food
- no regional gastronomic specialties (all ate the same)
- no private plots to grow food
- no personal names (one had to give up his old name)
- no independent family life
- no sexual freedom
- no music
- no freedom from work after the age of five
- no personally owned buses, cars, scooters, or bicycles
- no personal clothes, pots, pans, watches, or anything
- no freedom to cry or laugh
- no private conversation

was even dangerous to use some term of endearment, such as "honey," "sweetheart," or "dearest," for a loved one. The doctor Haing Ngor tried to so refer to his wife, for example, and a spy overheard and reported him for this, as well as the fact that he had eaten food he picked in the forest, instead of bringing it into the village for communal eating. The local head cadre interrogated him about these sins, and told him, "The *chhlop* [informers] say that you call your wife 'sweet.' We have no 'sweethearts' here. That is forbidden." Soldiers then took him to a prison where cadre severally tortured him, cut off his finger, and sliced his ankle with a hatchet. He barely survived.

This deadly communist revolution created pitiful human dilemmas. Think about what this same doctor Haing Ngor went through when his wife suffered life-threatening complications during childbirth. To help her deliver her baby would mean death, since the Khmer Rouge forbid husbands from delivering their wife's babies. In any case, to use his medical skills to save her would in effect tell the cadre that he was a doctor, and would result in his death, and possibly that of his wife and newborn child. To do nothing might mean their death anyway; still, if he did nothing, the wife might pull through. He chose to do nothing, and perhaps he could do nothing anyway since he had no proper medical instruments. Mother and baby soon both died, then, leaving a gaping wound in his heart that never healed. (He subsequently came to the United States after the defeat of Vietnam to be noted below, became an actor, and received an Academy Award for his performance in "The Killing Fields," the movie about the murderous Khmer Rouge regime. In 1996 he was murdered for money as he arrived home in Los Angeles, for which three members of the Oriental LazyBoyz street gang were subsequently tried and convicted).

But even if Ngor's child had been born, he could not have kept it for long. The Khmer Rouge took children away from their parents and made them live and work in labor brigades. If the children died of fatigue or disease, the cadre were good enough to inform their parents; then, what emotion the parents showed could mean their life or death. If they wept or displayed extreme unhappiness, this showed a

bourgeois sentimentality--after all, their children had sacrificed themselves for the Great Revolution and the parents should be proud, not unhappy. Similarly, a wife expressing grief over an executed husband--an enemy of the Great Revolution--was explicitly criticizing the Khmer Rouge. This unforgivable act of bourgeois sentimentality could mean her death.



Throughout Cambodia, fear was a normal condition of life. The Khmer Rouge systematically massacred people because of past positions, associations, or relatives. When the cadre

discovered someone who had been a top military man under a previous government, a former government official or bureaucrat, a business executive or high monk, they and their whole families, including babies, were murdered, sometimes after extended torture. This root-and-branch extermination of the tainted even reached down to cousins of cousins of former soldiers. For instance, Khmer Rouge cadre came to believe that the villagers of Kauk Lon really were former Lon Nol officers, customs officials and police agents. Troops then forced every villager--about 360 men, women, and children--to march into a nearby forest. As they walked among the trees, waiting soldiers ambushed and machine-gunned them all down. Similar slaughter often awaited those who had had any relations with the West or Vietnam, even sometimes the Soviet Union, or who had ever opposed the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge even might execute those found with Western property, such as books, or those who spoke French or English--even those who had been schooled beyond the seventh grade. Even in some areas wearing glasses was a capital offense.

Then there was the killing of people for laziness, complaining, wrong attitudes, or unsatisfactory work. I will give only one example of this, but as a teacher, it is for me the most hideous of all the accounts I have read. This is the Buddhist monk Hem Samluat's description of an execution he witnessed in the village of Do Nauy:

It was . . . of Tan Samay, a high schoolteacher from Battambang. The Khmer Rouge accused him of incompetence. The only thing taught the children at the village was how to cultivate the soil. Maybe Tan Samay was trying to teach them other things, too, and that was his downfall. His pupils hanged him. A noose was passed around his neck; then the rope was passed over the branch of a tree. Half a dozen children between eight and ten years old held the loose end of the rope, pulling it sharply three or four times, dropping it in between. All the while they were shouting, "Unfit teacher! Unfit teacher!" until Tan Samay was dead. The worst was that the children took obvious pleasure in killing.⁴

The scale of these murders can be gauged from the admission of Chong Bol, who claimed that as a political commissar at the end of 1975 he had participated in the killing of 5,000 people. Think about this for a moment. If this murderer had been a citizen of a democracy and had admitted killing even one-tenth this many people in cold blood, historians would record him as history's most monstrous murderer. As an officer of a government, as with the Nazi SS, soldiers, Soviet death camp managers, and Chinese commissars, who also exterminated thousands, these will be noted as acts of their respective regimes, and history will forget the individual murderer. Such heinous crimes are depersonalized, their horror lost among general abstractions. They are just statistics.

Not only did the Khmer Rouge run amok massacring their people, but also everywhere the Khmer Rouge tried to destroy the very heart of peasant life. Hinayana Buddhism had been a state religion, and the priesthood of monks with their saffron robes was a central part of Cambodian culture. Some 90 percent of Cambodians believed in some form of Buddhism.

Many received a rudimentary schooling from the monks, and many young people became monks for part of their lives. The Khmer Rouge could not allow so powerful an institution to stand and therefore set out with vigor to destroy it. They exterminated all leading monks and either murdered or defrocked the lesser ones. One estimate is that out of 40,000 to 60,000 monks only 800 to 1,000 survived to carry on their religion. We do know that of 2,680 monks in eight monasteries, merely seventy were alive in 1979. As for the Buddhist temples that populated the landscape of Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge destroyed 95 percent of them, and turned the few remaining into warehouses or allocated them for some other degrading use. Amazingly, in the very short span of a year or so, the small gang of Khmer Rouge wiped out the center of Cambodian culture, its spiritual incarnation, its institutions.

This was an act of genocide within the larger Cambodian democide, and it was not the only one. In most if not all the country, simply being of Chinese, Vietnamese, Thai, or Lao ancestry meant death. As part of a planned genocide campaign, the Khmer Rouge sought out and killed other minorities, such as the Moslem Cham. In the district of Kompong Xiem, for example, they demolished five Cham hamlets and reportedly massacred 20,000 that lived there; in the district of Koong Neas only four Cham apparently survived out of some 20,000. The cadre threw the Cham Grand Mufti, their spiritual leader, into boiling water and then hit him on the head with an iron bar. They beat another leader, the First Mufti, to death, tortured and disemboweled the Second Mufti, and murdered by starvation in prison the Chairman of the Islamic Association of Kampuchea (Cambodia). Overall, the Khmer Rouge annihilated nearly half--about 125,000--of all the Cambodian Cham.

As to the other minorities, the Khmer Rouge also slaughtered about 200,000 ethnic Chinese, almost half of those in Cambodia--a calamity for ethnic Chinese in this part of the world unequalled in modern times--additionally, they murdered 3,000 Protestants and 5,000 Catholics; around 150,000 ethnic Vietnamese (over half); and 12,000 ethnic Thai out of 20,000. One Cambodian peasant, Heng Chan, whose wife was of Vietnamese descent, lost not only his wife, but also five sons, three daughters, three grandchildren, and sixteen of his wife's relatives. In this genocide, the Khmer Rouge probably murdered 541,000 Chinese, Chams, Vietnamese, and other minorities, or about 7 percent of the Cambodian population.

As though this was not enough, by threat of death the Khmer Rouge forced ordinary Cambodians to labor to the point of life-endangering exhaustion, and fed them barely enough to keep them alive while further weakening their bodies through extreme malnutrition. The Khmer Rouge fed their hard laborers an average of 800 to 1,200 calories per day, where as for even light labor a worker requires an average of 1,800 calories at a minimum. Nor did the Khmer Rouge provide them with protection against the dangers of exposure and disease. Even Pol Pot admitted in 1976 that 80 percent of the peasants had malaria. In many places people died like fish in a heavily polluted stream. The horror is that people are not fish, but thinking, feeling, loving human beings.

As one would expect, in this hell the Khmer Rouge did not spare each other the fear of death either, but often executed their soldiers and cadre for infractions of minor rules. More

important, as the Pol Pot gang maneuvered to consolidate its rule over Cambodia, the struggle for power at the top, and the paranoia of top leaders increased. Not only was there the usual despot's fear of an assassin's knife in the night, but an intensifying fear that dissident Khmer Rouge might destroy the communist revolution. Increasingly, the Pol Pot gang saw sabotage, and CIA, KGB, or Vietnamese operatives, behind all production failures and project delays.

Purge after purge of high and low Khmer Rouge followed. They increasingly filled the cells of the major security facility in Phnom Penh, Tuol Sleng, with communist officials and cadre. Pol Pot's gang had these people tortured until they fingered collaborators among higher-ups, who were then executed. Confessions were the aim of most torture, and the gang would even arrest, with all the lethal consequences, interrogators who were so crude as to kill their victims before getting a confession. On the suffering of the tortured, one such interrogator reported.

I questioned this bitch who came back from France; my activity was that I set fire to her ass until it became a burned-out mess, then beat her to the point that she was so turned around I couldn't get any answer out of her; the enemy then croaked, ending her answers....[5](#)

The sheer pile of confessions forced from tortured lips must have further stimulated paranoia at the top. The recorded number of prisoners admitted to Tuol Sleng was about 20,000, suggesting how many were tortured and made such confessions. Only fourteen of them survived this imprisonment--fourteen. And this was only one such torture/execution chamber, albeit the main one in the country.

In sum, the Cambodia of the Khmer Rouge was a giant forced labor and death camp, in which all suffered the torments of hell.

Turning to foreign relations, Pol Pot and his people hated their neighboring communist Vietnamese and felt no fraternal loyalty to them. They saw the Vietnamese as racially inferior, and as the foremost danger to the Khmer Rouge revolution. Even before their victory over Lon Nol, the Khmer Rouge had tried to purge their ranks of those trained in Hanoi, and had carried out the pogrom against ethnic Vietnamese described above. It was not long after their victory that they began to attack Vietnamese territory across the border. In many of these incursions they fought pitched battles with Vietnamese units, attacked and burned Vietnamese



Two of 20,000 tortured and executed in Tuol Sleng prison

villages, and murdered their populations.

These attacks grew in intensity and became, in effect, a war against Vietnam. The Vietnamese first responded vigorously to these attacks; then, apparently to buy time for war preparations, they tried to negotiate Khmer Rouge border complaints, and to find a basis for cooperative relations. This phase lasted until December 1979, when Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia. Her heavily armed troops, with gunships and tanks, easily rolled over the fewer and lightly armed Khmer Rouge defenders. In the next month, the invading forces occupied Phnom Penh. As Vietnamese troops approached one village after another, most peasants rebelled against the local Khmer Rouge cadre and troops, killing them with their own weapons, with farm tools, and sometimes with their own hands. Surviving Khmer Rouge, along with possibly 100,000 people they forced to move with them (vengefully killing many on the way), retreated to a mountainous region along the Thai border. From there and from refugee camps they soon controlled in Thailand, they carried out a guerrilla war against the Vietnamese and their puppet Samrin regime, and then against the government Vietnam established when it completely withdrew from the country. Only in the last decade would they finally be defeated.



Some remains of Khmer Rouge rule

The human, social, and cultural cost to Cambodian of the Khmer Rouge years is incalculable. In democide alone, the Khmer Rouge probably murdered 600,000 to 3,000,000 Cambodians by execution, torture or other mistreatment, malnutrition, famine, exposure, and disease, as listed in Table 6.2. ">. A most prudent estimate is 2,000,000 dead, or about one-third of the 1975 population. In addition, some 352,000 refugees also escaped the country.

As wholesale murderers, the Khmer Rouge is in a class with the Rwandan Hutu government. For rapidly killing a high proportion of their population, they have no competitors. Not even Stalin or Mao could come close. Even Hitler might be shamed by the poor performance of his killers compared to Pol Pot's gang or the Hutu government.

And, yes, the Khmer Rouge were racists: they believed in the racial superiority of the dark-skinned Khmer over the Vietnamese, Chinese, Moslem Cham, and others. This racism underlay the genocide they committed against these minorities, but also played a role in their vicious incursions into Vietnam and massacre of its citizen. This being noted, the basic reason for most of their democide was ideological. The Khmer Rouge were fanatical adherents to a new variant of communism, one which combined the Maoism of the destructive Great Leap Forward and communes, the Stalinism of the Soviet collectivization period in the early 1930s and later Great Terror, and an obsessive and deadly nationalism. To create their revolution, the Khmer Rouge were willing to kill millions of Cambodians--even, they said, until no more than a million remained--as long as they were able to do three things in a few short years. One to totally reconstruct Cambodia; to fully collectivize it; and to exterminate all class enemies, capitalists, monks, former power holders, and anything foreign. All others would work and eat

communally, and the Khmer Rouge would satisfy their every need. All would be equal; all would be happy.

Second, the Khmer Rouge wanted to immediately create a thoroughly independent and self-sufficient Cambodia. For the Khmer Rouge, the key idea was "independence-sovereignty." They wanted to end any dependence on other nations for anything, whether food or newsprint or machinery. As crazy as it was--all nations depend on trade--this was a basic, constantly repeated fixation.

Finally, they wanted to recover the ancient glory of the Khmer Kingdom. Part of this glory, they felt, lay in the pure soul of the Khmer that existed then, a soul that modern life and Western influence had corrupted. The Khmer Rouge believed that by emptying the cities, and ordering the millions of urbanites to work like oxen in the fields to absorb the simple peasant life, they were purifying the people and the nation. During the evacuation of Phnom Penh, a political official explained to the French priest François Ponchaud: "The city is bad, for there is money in the city. People can be reformed, but not cities. By sweating to clear the land, sowing and harvesting crops, men will learn the real value of things. Man has to know that he is born from a grain of rice!" Ideas do have consequences, as the Cambodian death toll under these ideologues well attests.

Other governments have murdered many more of their citizens than did the Rwandan Hutu government and the Khmer Rouge, but over a longer period and with a much larger population. The most murderous of these have also, like the Khmer Rouge, been communist governments, as shown in Table 6.4 below. While discussing in [Chapter 4](#) Lenin's famine, Stalin's collectivization campaign and forced starvation of the Ukrainian in the early 1930s, and Mao's land reform and collectivization in the 1950s, I also described their democide of millions. I also described the similar democide of Lenin's Peasant War in the [last chapter](#). Here I want to



Stalin in 1935

further illustrate the shocking consequences of their absolute power for human life through three examples of specific democides in Stalin's Soviet Union and Mao's China.

During the 1930s, Stalin ordered a number of purges against presumed enemies of the people. These were carried out by the NKVD (predecessor to the KGB), which on the flimsiest of presumptions, and in many cases without any evidence of any wrongdoing at all, would arrest and torture citizens until they would admit to whatever the interrogator demanded. Then the NKVD would shoot them to death. Sometimes, the NKVD would murder people on no pretext at all--simply to meet a quota.



Stalin's signature (upper right) on a NKVD proposal to kill captured Polish officers and other POWs --over 14,000 then shot

Top communists believed that there was a certain percentage of the population that opposed the Communist Party, and therefore had to be eliminated. But in typical communist fashion, this was not something that could be left to the discretion of low-level cadre. After all, to ensure that lower level cadre were correctly guided in their work, the Party had to put a production quota on iron, steel, pigs, wheat, and virtually everything else of an economic nature. Thus it is logical that officials would also be given

quotas of people to murder. Furthermore, it was consistent with the communist idea of central planning and control. From Moscow NKVD headquarters the order would go out to a village or town to kill so many "enemies of the people," and soon enough the local henchmen would report back that the task was completed.

That such orders would be given is incredible enough, and that the local official would obey them is also unbelievable. Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, in their book appropriately titled *Empire of Fear*, asked as to why "quite ordinary decent human beings, with a normal hatred of injustice and cruelty" would carry out these merciless purges and executions? The answer: simple: sweating, trembling, fear. They wrote about what a friend, they called M--, said of his experience, as an NKVD official in a country town in the Novosibirsk region:

The number of victims demanded by Moscow from this town was five hundred. M--went through all the local dossiers, and found nothing but trivial offenses recorded. But Moscow's requirements were implacable; he was driven to desperate measures. He listed priests and their relatives; he put down anyone who was reported to have spoken critically about conditions in the Soviet Union; he included all former members of Admiral Kolchak's White Army [an anti-Communist force in the Civil War of 1918 to 1922]. Even though the Soviet Government had decreed that it was not an offense to have served in Kolchak's Army, since its personnel had been forcibly conscripted, it was more than M--'s life was worth not to fulfill his quota. He made up his list of five hundred enemies of the people, had them quickly charged and executed and reported to Moscow: "Task accomplished in accordance with your instructions."

M--...detested what he had to do. He was by nature a decent, honest, kindly man. He told me the story with savage resentment. Years afterwards its horror and injustice lay heavy on his conscience.



One of >1 mil. Soviet-Germans deported east by Stalin in WWII--1/5 to 1/4th died as a result.

But M-- did what he was ordered. Apart from a man's ordinary desire to remain alive, M-- had a mother, a father, a wife, and two children.⁷

During this period, as I described in [Chapter 4](#), Stalin also forced upon the Ukrainian peasant mass starvation as a means to defeat their nationalism and opposition to collectivization, thus murdering within a couple of years around 5,000,000 of them. It is as though the American Federal Government purposely starved to death or killed by associated diseases, everyone in Maryland, Minnesota, or Wisconsin. Yet he was not satisfied with this and also struck at Ukrainian nationalism in other ways, as by directly murdering those who communicated the Ukrainian culture--he ordered shot Ukrainian writers, historians, composers; and even itinerant, blind folk singers. The following from the memoirs of composer Dmitri Shostakovich, has its own chilling horror.



Victims of Stalin's mass murder

Since time immemorial, folk singers have wandered along the roads of the Ukraine....they were always blind and defenseless people, but no one ever touched or hurt them. Hurting a blind man--what could be lower?

And then in the mid thirties the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Lirniki and Banduristy [folk singers] was announced, and all the folk singers had to gather and discuss what to do in the future. "Life is better, life is merrier." Stalin had said. The blind men believed it. They came to the congress from all over the Ukraine, from tiny, forgotten villages. There were several hundred of them at the congress, they say. It was a living museum, the country's living history. All its songs, all its music and poetry. And they were almost all shot, almost all those pathetic blind men killed.

Why was this done? ...Here were these blind men, walking around singing songs of dubious content. The songs weren't passed by the censors. And what kind of censorship can you have with blind men? You can't hand a blind man a corrected and approved text and you can't write him an order either. You have to tell everything to a blind man. That takes too long. And you can't file away a piece of paper, and there's no time anyway. Collectivization. Mechanization. It was easier to shoot them. And so they did.⁸



Pro-Mao Cultural Rev. Poster

As to communist China, its so-called "Cultural Revolution" during the 1960s was a tumultuous period. The Great Famine that the Chinese Communist Party caused in the late 1950s to early 1960s that I mentioned in [Chapter 4](#) helped split the Party.



Red Guards

Many communists militantly and fervently supported Chairman Mao's desire to continue his Glorious Revolution. Opposed to him were powerful pragmatists, the "capitalist roaders," who wished to liberalize the economy. This Party rupture became a

violent and very bloody conflict for power between these two groups, and broke into outright civil war in 1966. Military units fought each other, even with cannon and tanks; students waged pitched battles with machine guns and grenades given them by military sympathizers. The victors in one battle or another would then often systematically purge the opposition, subjecting them to torture and mass execution. The estimates of how many were murdered in this democidal civil war vary widely. A prudent estimate is 1,600,000 Chinese, though the toll may have reached even 10,000,000 or more. Another 500,000 may have died in battle. In the ebb and flow of power and the utter lack of compassion for human life and suffering, this civil war of the 1960s was like the Mexican Revolution played out in a much larger population over a vastly larger land area.

In this struggle, Mao and his supporters could trust no intellectual or scientist of any sort, especially in the governing of any organization. Therefore, the Party put fanatical communist radicals, regardless of their inexperience or ignorance, in charge of universities, schools, scientific institutions, hospitals, and intellectual associations. Consider the following experience, related by a Chinese scientist regarding the Party's appointment of Shan Guizhang, a fanatic and ignorant communist, to head the prestigious Changchun Institute of Optics and Precision Instruments.



Wang Guangmai—beaten by Red Guards for once having gone abroad

Shan had read *Tales of the Plum Flower Society*, a fictional



Shouting revolutionary slogans

thriller about the Party's effort to uncover a spy network in the Academy of Sciences. The book, unfortunately, gave the imaginary chief spy the name Peng Jiamu, which also was the name of a real scientist at the institute. Incredibly, Shan thought that the real scientist Peng was the make believe spy in the book. So, Shan had 166 scientists at the institute arrested as spies, along with local accountants, police, workers, and even nursery attendants. Enough proof of spying was a radio or camera at home, or ability to speak a foreign language. Security forces beat some of the "spies" to death; some others committed suicide. After Shan

successfully rid the institute of these "spies," the Party promoted him to a provincial Party committee.

Few would deny any longer what these examples attest, that communism--Marxism-Leninism and its variants--meant in practice bloody terrorism, deadly purges, lethal prison camps and forced labor, fatal deportations, man-made famines, extrajudicial executions and show trials, outright mass murder, and genocide. In total as I have calculated in Table 6.4 here,⁶ communist regimes may have murdered near 110,000,000 people from 1917 to 1987. This greatest of human social experiments was not only a complete failure, but the most costly in human lives and misery.

The Khmer Rouge example gives you insight into why communists believed it necessary and moral to massacre so many of their fellow humans. Their absolutist ideology was married to absolute power. They believed that they knew the truth, without a shred of doubt;



that they would bring about the greatest human welfare and happiness; and that to realize this Utopia, they must mercilessly tear down the old feudal or capitalist order and culture and then totally rebuild a communist society. Nothing could be allowed to stand in the way of this achievement. Government--the Communist Party--was above any law. All other institutions, cultural norms, traditions, and sentiments were expendable.

The communists saw the construction of this Utopia as a war on poverty, exploitation, imperialism, and inequality--and as in a real war, noncombatants would unfortunately get caught in the battle, and their were necessary enemy casualties: the clergy, bourgeoisie, capitalists, "wreckers," intellectuals, counterrevolutionaries, rightists, tyrants, the rich, and landlords. In a war, millions may die, but these means may well be justified by the end, as in the defeat of Hitler in World War II. To many communists, the goal of a communist Utopia was such as to justify all the deaths.

TABLE 6.4
Communist Democide 1900-87


REGIME	YEARS	DEMOCIDIE (OOO)
Afghanistan	1978-87	228
Albania	1944-87	100
Angola	1975-87	125
Bulgaria	1944-87	222
Cambodia (K. Rouge)	1975-79	2,035
Cambodia (Samrin)	1979-87	230
China	1949-87	35,236
Cuba	1959-87	73
Czechoslovakia	1948-68	65
Ethiopia	1974-87	725
Germany (East)	1948-87	70
Grenada (Coup)	1983	0.106
Hungary	1948-87	27
Korea, North	1948-87	1,663
Laos (PDR)	1975-87	56
Mongolia	1926-87	100
Mozambique	1975-87	198
Nicaragua (Sand.)	1979-87	5
Poland	1948-87	22
Rumania	1948-87	435
USSR	1917-87	61,911
Vietnam (Hanoi)	1945-87	1,670
Yemen, South	1967-87	1
Yugoslavia	1944-87	1,072
SUBTOTAL 1900-87		106,267
COM. GUERRILLAS 1900-87		4,019
COMMUNIST TOTAL 1900-87		110,286
WORLD TOTAL 1900-87		169,199

The irony of this is that communism in practice, even after decades of total control, did not improve the lot of the average person, but usually made their living conditions worse than before the revolution. As I have noted, it is not by chance that the greatest famines have happened within the Soviet Union (about 5,000,000 dead during 1921-23 and 7,000,000 from 1932-3, including 2,000,000 outside Ukraine) and communist China (about 27,000,000 dead from 1959-61). Almost 55,000,000 people died in various communist famines and associated epidemics; a little over 10,000,000 of them were intentionally starved to death, the rest died as an unintended result of communist agricultural policies. This is as though the whole population of the American New England and Middle Atlantic States, or California and Texas, had been wiped out. And that something like 35,000,000 people escaped communist countries as refugees, was an unequalled vote against communist, utopian pretensions. It was as though everyone had fled California, emptying it of all human beings.

There is a supremely important lesson for human life and welfare to be learned from this horrendous sacrifice to one ideology:

No one can be trusted with unlimited power. The more power a government has to impose the beliefs of an ideological or religious elite or decree the whims of a dictator, the more likely human lives and welfare will be sacrificed.

Certainly, as listed in Table 6.1, above, communism does not stand alone in such mass murder. We have the example of totalitarian [Nazi Germany](#), which exterminated some 21,000,000 Jews, Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, Yugoslavs, Frenchmen, Germans, and other nationalities. Then there is the fascist [Nationalist government](#) of China under Chiang Kai-shek, which murdered near 10,000,000 Chinese from 1928 to 1949, and the fascist [Japanese militarists](#) who murdered almost 6,000,000 Chinese, Indonesians, Indochina's, Koreans, Filipinos, and others during World War II. There also are the 1,000,000 or more Bengalis and Hindus murdered in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971 by the fascistic [Pakistan military](#). Nor should we forget the mass expulsion of ethnic Germans and German citizens from Eastern Europe at the end of World War II, particularly by the authoritarian, pre-communist [Polish government](#) as it seized the German Eastern Territories, murdering perhaps over 1,000,000 of them. In [Chapter 5](#), you already have seen the mass murder before and during the Mexican Revolution, and in [Chapter 1](#) that by the governments of Burma and Sudan. And I could go on and on to detail various kinds of non-communist democide, as I did in my [Death By Government](#).



Chinese to be buried alive by Japanese soldiers



Waiting Nazi execution

What connects all these cases of democide is this: as a government's power is more unrestrained, as its power reaches into all the corners of culture and society, the more likely it is to kill its own citizens. As a governing elite has the power to do whatever it wants, whether to satisfy its most personal wishes, or to pursue what it believes is right and true, it may do so whatever the cost in lives. Here, power is the necessary condition for mass murder. Once an elite has full authority, other causes and conditions can operate to bring about the immediate genocide, terrorism, massacres, or whatever killing the members of an elite feel is warranted.

All this provides a solid, life oriented argument for freedom:

Freedom preserves and secures life.

That which preserves and protects human life is a moral good. And, as I have showed, freedom is already a moral good for promoting human welfare and minimizing internal political violence. I now will add to this list the moral good of saving human lives.

I have saved a discussion of another moral good until the next chapter. It even may be more surprising to you than the life-preserving aspect I have described here.

NOTES

* Written for this web site. I am indebted to Judson Knight for his careful editing and helpful comments on this chapter.

For the statistics on and details on the Khmer Rouge and Cambodia covered here, see Chapters 9 of my [Death By Government](#) and Chapter 4 of my [Statistics of Democide](#); for those on the Soviet Union, see my [Lethal Politics](#); and for China, see my [China's Bloody Century](#).

For the statistical analysis using a variety of techniques to test the relationship of freedom to democide, see on this site Part II of [Statistics of Democide](#) and the [Appendix](#) to this book.

1. For the genocidal component and the democide as a percent of the population, see [Table 1.2](#) from my [Death By Government](#).

2. This is from [Table 9.1](#) of my [Death By Government](#).

3. From Table 9.2 of my [Death By Government](#).

4. John Barron and Anthony Paul, *Peace With Horror: The Untold Story of Communist Genocide in Cambodia*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, pp. 148-149. American Edition titled *Murder of a Gentle Land*. New York: Reader's Digest Press--Thomas Y. Crowell.

5. Arch Puddington, "The Khmer Rouge File," *The American Spectator* (July): pp. 18-20.

6. From my ["How many did communist regimes murder?"](#)

7. Vladimir and Evodkia Petrov, *Empire of Fear*. New York: Praeger, 1956, pp. 75-76.

8. Quoted in Oksana Procyk, Leonid Heretz, and James E. Mace, *Famine in the Soviet Ukraine 1932-1933: A Memorial Exhibition*. Widener Library, Harvard University Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 53-54.

Chapter 7

Freedom is A Solution To War

There has never been a clear case of democracies making war on each other. Given the number of democracies, the odds of this occurring by chance is well beyond millions to one. Besides, there are very good theoretical reasons for this absence of war, and why democratic freedom is the path to perpetual peace.
----This web site

July 1 had finally come. Now, at 7:25 AM, an incredible all-out bombardment was ending the weeklong shelling of German trenches in a deafening roar of continuous explosions. Fountains of rocks and soil, and sometimes whole tree trunks, blasted into the air. No bushes survived, and what few trees remained were little more than shredded, and whittled trunks.

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Some 50,000 British and French artillery gunners had shot 1,500,000 shells--comprising 21,000 tons of explosive material of all descriptions--onto the Germans. They even fired some gas shells at them, such that a cloud of gas could seep downward into the German trenches and reach the lowest bunkers. The British and French commanding generals were confident that this shelling would leave few of the enemy capable of fighting in their front trenches, and that the shelling would destroy much of the difficult barbed wire protecting them.

The noise had been deafening, but reassuring to the young British volunteers waiting in their trenches to attack the Germans. Fresh from home and hardly trained, they were apprehensive, nervous, some sweating, most feeling the suspense after waiting over a week for the battle. They had prayed, made out their wills, written home, and shaken hands with their friends. Some were slightly intoxicated; some drunk from the rum the army gave them.

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["Democracies ARE less warlike than other regimes"](#)



Once a tree lined road

Above all, they were optimistic. They knew they were going to win a great victory. After all, they were the volunteer regiments; the British "Pals" who had enthusiastically enlisted with their friends, fellow workers, and

neighbors, all formed into the same regiments. Clerks and workers from a single commercial company composed whole platoons. And their officers had told them how easy it would be. In any case, they had been hearing the thunderous shelling from their own artillery for seven days, and watching the stupendous explosions just a thousand or more yards in front of them

Finally, it was 7:30 a.m. and the shelling stopped. Utter silence engulfed the front. Suddenly the British officers blew their whistles, waved their polished sticks--many thought it beneath them to carry guns or to personally kill--and yelled for their troops to follow them. Along a front 20 miles long, nearly 100,000 young men, in the first wave of this mighty offensive, crowded up the trench ladders and across the parapet. Shoulder to shoulder they walked in clear light toward what remained of the German trenches, redoubts, and fortified villages. They could not run if they wanted to, since each carried 66 to 90 pounds of ammunition and equipment. Besides, several days of heavy rain had turned the deep clay into slippery mud; in some areas, it was marshland.



Zero Hour--the attack

In many places along the line, these soldiers were preceded by a walking barrage of friendly shells timed to keep German troops hunkered down in their trenches. Since the gunners had a strict rate of advance for their shells, however, the barrages were often too far ahead of the men.

These soldiers did not know they were in a deadly race across 1,000 to 2,000 yards to reach the parapet of the German trenches. The Germans had been surviving deep within their trenches, sometimes thirty of forty feet down, within well-fortified dugouts, some actually concrete bunkers. Moreover, few of the shells that exploded above or around them was the type of heavy artillery that could reach or bury their fortifications.

Once the shelling stopped and the Germans heard the British whistles, they scrambled for what remained of the parapet of their trenches. True, the Germans were physically in sad shape. They had been under the rain of shells



Up and over

German soldiers opened fire with their rifles. Machine gunners triggered the lethal chatter of their guns, not aiming but simply moving their barrels left to right, right to left, spraying bullets back and forth into the line of on coming men. Then the German artillery opened up. They knew weeks before that an attack was coming, though they had thought because the preparations were so clearly visible from the high ground they held, it could only be a British or French diversion and not a full scale attack. So German headquarters had not reinforced them. Nonetheless, they had sighted their artillery beforehand, and now their shells fell among the advancing British soldiers. The explosions flattened many, threw them violently aside, or heaved them up in the air in a fountain of mud--full bodies here, parts of bodies there.

The air was a maelstrom of whizzing bullets, buzzing shrapnel, exploding shells. British officers could not make their commands heard above the noise, nor could their men even hear the yells or cries of pain of a friend three feet away. Some miraculously reached the wire in front of German trenches, but shelling had done little to destroy it. Those that tried to go over it were caught in the barbs, easy targets for the Germans only feet away. Soon, bodies of British soldiers hanging at all angles along miles of wire formed a grotesque line.

Other British soldiers found the few openings the shelling had cut in the wire, but as they funneled through it the Germans found a concentrated target, and slaughtered them. Some of the attackers who did reach the German trenches were burned to death with flame-throwers

Within minutes no-man's land was a dead man's land of human bodies, body parts, pieces of uniforms, helmets, destroyed equipment, metal fragments, shrapnel, shredded wood, and shell holes. Before the morning was over, the bodies of British soldiers had mounted to nearly 20,000 dead and 38,000 wounded or missing. Nor was this the end of it for the wounded. Since the German soldiers could not risk someone crawling up to throw a grenade in their trench, they shot any wounded that moved. Enemy shelling had partly buried some British wounded in the mud, and some had fallen or been blown into slippery-sided shell holes, soon to die of their wounds or to drown in the muddy sludge at the bottom. Many bodies were so deeply buried in the mud, or so badly disintegrated as to never be found.

continuously. Day after day, they faced the prospect of being blown up or entombed in their trenches. They had little sleep, were mentally exhausted by the bombardment and a week's wait, and scared. They knew they were going to be attacked and possibly shot or bayoneted. Still, many were first to the top, with time to set up their machine guns and arrange themselves along the parapet. What they saw then was unbelievable. Walking toward them shoulder to shoulder were thousands of British men, often with their unarmed officers in front.



The walking advance across no man's land



Crossing the wire

At 10:00 a.m., despite the carnage, the general order came down from British Army Headquarters to continue the attack. This only threw many more lives away. By noon, the trenches from which the British soldiers had launched the offensive were in chaos. They were full of dead, wounded, and the terrified and exhausted men of the first waves who had miraculously made it back to the trenches. Mixed in were the fresh but horror-stricken soldiers from the rear, ordered forward by their officers. But there was a blessing to this confusion: further efforts to breach the German trenches died away as local officers became increasingly reluctant to send more men to their deaths.

Meanwhile, the British soldier's initial exuberance and confidence had sunk to a dull expectation of death. At best they hoped for a wound that would take them to the rear: a shot through a hand, a shredded leg, even a lost arm would do, if they could then escape the almost certain death of no man's land. Some even wounded themselves to avoid battle. Some--but not as many as one would think--tried to run away. The British army had positioned soldiers behind front trenches for just this possibility, and these "battle police" either turned these men around to return to battle and probable death, or shot them then and there.



Wounded in the trench

Reported British Lieutenant Alfred Bundy on his part in leading this first day's attack:

Went over top at 7.30 a.m. after what seemed an interminable period of terrible apprehension. Our artillery seemed to increase in intensity and the German guns opened up on No Man's Land. The din was deafening, the fumes choking and visibility limited owing to the dust and clouds caused by exploding shells. It was a veritable inferno. I was momentarily expecting to be blown to pieces. My platoon continued to advance in good order without many casualties and until we had reached nearly half way to the [German] front line. I saw no sign of life there. Suddenly however an appalling rifle and machine-gun fire opened against us and my men commenced to fall. I shouted "down" but most of those that were still not hit had already taken what cover they could find. I dropped in a shell hole and occasionally attempted to move to my right and left but bullets were forming an impenetrable barrier and exposure of the head meant certain death. None of our men was visible but in all directions came pitiful groans and cries of pain....I finally decided to wait till dusk and about 9.30 I started to crawl flat on my stomach. At times I made short wild dashes and finally came to our wire. The [Germans] were still traversing our front line trenches and as I lay waiting for strength to rush the final few yards sparks flew from the wire continuously as it was struck by bullets. At last the firing ceased and after tearing my clothes and flesh on the wire I reached the parapet and fell over in our trench now full of dead and wounded. I found a few of my men but the majority were still out and most were dead. Came across my Company Commander Hunt who was almost insane. Took charge of 'C' company of about 30 men.¹

Throughout the night, the cries and groans of the British wounded never stopped. Sometimes someone would cry for his mother. The wounded, along with those such as Lt. Bundy who were not, managed to walk or crawl back to their trenches, and stretcher-bearers brought in what casualties they could find. In the rear medical stations, nurses made the wounded that were sure to die as comfortable as possible, while those standing a chance of survival and in need of immediate treatment were rushed to hospitals in the rear.


Clare Tisdall, who worked as a British nurse at a Casualty Clearing Station during the battle, described her experience.

[W]e practically never stopped. I was up for seventeen nights before I had a night in bed. A lot of the boys had legs blown off, or hastily amputated at the front-line. These boys were the ones who were in the greatest pain, and I very often used to have to hold the stump up in the ambulance for the whole journey, so that it wouldn't bump on the stretcher.

The worse case I saw--and it still haunts me--was of a man being carried past us. It was at night, and in the dim light I thought that his face was covered with a black cloth. But as he came nearer, I was horrified to realize that the whole lower half of his face had been completely blown off and what had appeared to be a black cloth was a huge gaping hole. It was the only time I nearly fainted. [2](#)

This was war, and luck, and the natural variations in geography, leadership, weapons, and experience assured different outcomes from one part of the front to another. In a few places, German trenches were overrun, in other places the British bombardment destroyed German trenches--yet attacking the second line of trenches, however, was often no less deadly than attacking the first line been in other places.

Why did the British commanding generals order these men to walk across no man's land toward the higher German trenches, in full daylight, for five to six minutes in easy range of machine gunners, snipers and riflemen, and artillery? Simple: since British Pal battalions of "citizen soldiers" were little-trained and lacked combat experience, the battle plan gave them the easiest and strictest of commands: go up the ladder, stand up, hold your rifle across your breast pointed at the sky (so that no one would be accidentally shot), walk in a line abreast to the German's trenches, shoot or bayonet any Germans in the trench, and occupy it. They gave no room for initiative: the battle plan was rigid and finely detailed in pages of orders given to the front line officers.



Haydn Reynolds Mackey (Official War Artist) "British Red Cross Society and Order of St. John workers attending wounded on their arrival at Boulogne"

Above all, the British commanding generals believed in the ability of massed artillery to conquer infantry. They thought the artillery would more than compensate for the lack of surprise and the apparent vulnerability of their men. They had planned on a massive six-day bombardment, extended to seven days because of rain, which would be so devastating it would destroy the German trenches and fortifications and cut his frontal barbed wire. Then the British soldiers need only stroll to the German's wrecked trenches and occupy them. In other words, these generals

did not understand the limits of their artillery and the resources of the Germans to strengthen their trenches against the rain of shells. Not only did they spread the shelling evenly across the whole front, despite the variation in fortifications their soldiers faced, they did not understand the killing power of the machine gun; and did they have any contingency plans for failure.

Nor did the first day's military and human catastrophe deter the British generals. They saw it as only a setback, not a defeat. After all, their reasoning went, the offensive had weakened the Germans. So they turned the battle into one of attrition, intending to make the Germans lose so many lives and so much material they must finally retreat. No matter the dead, the British launched offensive after offensive and chewed up more human lives. Four months later, the British finally ended the battle after an unbelievable 1,120,000 casualties: 620,000 on their side, and 500,000 of them Germans. And the winnings? The offensives had gained at most 16 miles of moonscape littered with the debris of battle, all of which in later battles the German soon recovered anyway.

Casualties in Major Battles 1914-1918		
Tannenberg	Aug-14	58,000
Gallipoli	April-Dec. 1915	500,000
Verdun	Feb.-Dec. 1916	510,000
Somme	July-Nov. 1916	1,200,000
Passchendael	July-Nov. 1917	558,000
German Spring Offensive	Mar.-Apr. 1918	504,000


As to those British soldiers who day after day would climb the trench ladder and, as though moving against a hard wind or rain, walk toward the Germans and into a hail of bullets and shells, one might wonder how they could do this. The usual characterizations come to mind. Patriotism, duty, hatred of the enemy, all surely played a role. Mostly, however, it was loyalty to fellow soldiers, mutual friendship, the desire not to let anyone down--even the inspiring heroism of their British officers. The latter were often the first up and over the parapet, standing up fearlessly and unarmed, knowing they would likely die, and still leading their men onward.

Then why did the British officers do what they did? Unlike their men, who had just joined the service and were from the working classes, the officers had attended the finest schools, and had usually been acculturated into a military role that they accepted without question. They were "gentlemen." They looked after their men, helped them with their problems, and showed them compassion--but also tough discipline. Their job was to lead men into battle and to win the objective, and to do so calmly and fearlessly. As a result, their life expectancy was no more than a few weeks, compared to a few months for their men.

This battle was the Battle of the Somme in World War I (see [map](#), and [world map](#)), an engagement named after a French river that flowed to the south. The British Expeditionary Force in France launched this battle in 1916 against the German front lines. The French, far more experienced and much better trained for this type of warfare, manned the southern part of the front. By making better use of their artillery, the French largely achieved their first day's objectives against weaker German fortifications.

The French Commander-in-Chief, Joseph Jacques C  saire Joffre, conceived of the offensive, which Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, newly appointed commander of the British Expeditionary Force, then put into action. Joffre hoped the offensive would break through German defenses, create chaos in the rear, and enable the encircling of the Germans in northern France. At the very least, Joffre wanted to take German pressure off French troops holding fast against the German offensive at Verdun 150 miles away; but by the time the Battle of the Somme was launched, the German's had already been defeated at Verdun. The latter was another bloody meat grinder, creating some 1,200,000 casualties for the two sides before it ended.

Not only was the Battle of the Somme a military failure and human disaster, but also not launching it could have saved Russia from defeat. Had the British and French transferred the guns and ammunition used in the Somme to help the Russians, they might have defeated the Germans and thereby forestalled or prevented the Russian



The Battle of the Somme, 1916

Revolution that turned Russia into a communist state in 1917, which then withdrew from the war.

Ever since the Battle of the Somme, British home front support for war has not been as robust and enthusiastic as before the toll and nature of this battle became public. Those killed in just the first day of this battle exceeded that of any other day of war in British history, before or since. Even during the first day of the D-Day invasion of Normandy 28 years later, the English and Canadians suffered only 4,000 casualties, compared to the 58,000 for the first day of the Somme offensive. Since the British army kept those enlisting from a neighborhood or town together, whole communities were devastated by the death of most of their young men. In the first hours of the offensive, for example, the Ulster division from Northern Ireland lost 5,600 men, all from a relatively small community. For the British, this battle became symbolic of the horrors and uselessness of war, and decades later, when the threat of Hitler was clear, the British people and especially British intellectuals recoiled from the thought of rearmament and another war. No one could forget the useless death of Britain's best and brightest in the Battle of the Somme.



Yet, as bloody and stupid as this battle was, it was only one in the war. From its beginning in 1914 to its end in 1918, World War I combat ate up about 5,500 lives per day; to total by its end at least 9,000,000 men and women combat dead.

Of all the soldier's correspondence I have read, one exchange touched me most deeply, and shows the misery and horror of war not only for the soldiers in combat, but for their loved ones as well. This letter is from Private William Martin to his fiancée Emily Chitticks, written while he was fighting in France with the Devonshire Regiment. It is dated March 24, 1917.

My dearest Emily

Just a few lines dear to tell you I am still in the land of the living and keeping well, trusting you are the same dear. I have just received your letter dear and was very pleased to get it. It came rather more punctual this time for it only took five days. We are not in the same place dear, in fact we don't stay in the same place very long....we are having very nice weather at present dear and I hope it continues.... Fondest love and kisses from your loving Sweetheart

Will

Martin was killed in action three days after writing it. Unaware of this, Emily continued to write, even when receiving no reply. Finally, the Army returned five of her letters with "killed in action" marked on them. This is one of those returned.

March 29, 1917

My Dearest Will

I was so delighted to get your letter this morning and know you are quite alright. I am pleased to say I am alright myself and hope dear this will find you the same. I was so pleased to hear darling that you had such a nice enjoyable evening, It was quite a treat I am sure. I don't suppose you do get much amusement.

I am glad you are getting my letters dear, I am not waiting until I get your letters dear now before I write because it would make it so long for you to wait for a letter, and I guess you are pleased to get as many as possible.

I can understand darling your not being able to write as frequently. I shall get used to waiting for your letters soon I guess, but at first it seems so strange after being used to having them so regularly.

Well darling I don't know any more to say now and I am feeling sleepy. Oh I wish you were here darling, but its no good wishing. Fondest love and lots of kisses from your ever-loving little girl Emily.³

William Martin's grave was never found. Emily was so heartbroken by his death that she never married. When she died in 1974 Martin's letters were buried with her, as she requested.

What can we do about war?
Most wars, like World War I, should never have been fought. It was a result of flagrant political and diplomatic errors. The lesson so many learned from this war, however, was not to avoid such errors in future conflicts, but that we must never fight another war, and that armaments and arms races cause wars. This was the wrong lesson, and it led to World War II. When Great Britain and France could have been stopped Hitler cheaply--when a strong military showing by them would have avoided World War II--the awful



Nazis shooting those still alive.

memory of the bloody cost of the battles of the Somme and Verdun proved too strong. Finally, Great Britain and France drew the line against Hitler in Poland in 1939, but it was too late to avoid a war. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Hitler's declaration of war on the United States made this war global.

As hellish and bloody as war is, I believe that we had to fight this war. Just think of what it would mean in lives and misery if the Nazis had controlled all of Europe, including Great Britain and Russia. Add to this the control by the Japanese military of all of Asia and the Western Pacific. The butchery that these murderers therefore would

unleash on both sides of the world would doubtlessly far exceed the human cost of World War II. Even before their defeat in 1945, the Nazis already had murdered about 21,000,000 people (see [Table 1.1](#) from [Democide: Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder](#))--many more than the 16,000,000 killed in battle in all World War II for all countries involved. The Japanese militarists murdered an additional some 6,000,000 people (see [Table 8.1](#) and [Statistics of Democide](#)). Remember from the [last chapter](#) that dictators of all kinds have killed several times more people than has combat in all the wars, foreign and domestic. As horrible as it was, as described in the last chapter, *the Hutu rulers of Rwanda killed more people in four months than did the Battle of the Somme during the same length of time.* And this was only one murderous government in a fairly small country.

All proposals to prevent war have suffered from this defect: they ignore how dictators differ from democratic leaders. There have always been those who when they inherit or seize power, forcefully fill their army with unwilling soldiers, and then grind them to death in a war to grab more power and control over others. The rogues' gallery of these murderers and aggressors is long, and as listed in [Table 1.4](#) of my [Death By Government](#), surely at the top would include for the twentieth century alone Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Vladimir Illich Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, Chiang Kai-shek, Tojo Hideki, and Pol Pot. When you have such people controlling large armies, the solutions to war, such as pacifism, unilateral disarmament, or disarmament treaties, do not work. They make the world safe only for such tyrants.



Japanese soldiers bayonetting Chinese prisoners

Now, finally, we have the proven knowledge to avoid both wars and the aggression of dictators. This solution was proposed in the latter part of the eighteenth century and recent social science research has shown it so. In his *Perpetual Peace*, written in 1795, the great German Philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that the way to universal peace lay in creating republics, or what today we would call representative democracies. Kant wrote that:

The republican constitution, besides the purity of its origin (having sprung from the pure source of the concept of law), also gives a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace. The reason is this: if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.⁴



Note two things about this solution. First is that where people have equal rights and freely participate in their governance, they will be unlikely to promote war in which they or their loved ones might die and their property destroyed. And second, where leaders are responsible to their people as voters, they will be unwilling to fight. Then when both leaders of two nations are so restrained, war between them should not occur.

The idea that democracies are therefore inherently peaceful was not lost to others. It became part of a more general philosophy of governance that Kant shared with liberals of the time, a system of belief we now call *classical liberalism*, which I dealt with in [Chapter 3](#) with regard to the free market. Adam Smith, John Stewart Mill, and John Locke, among



Immanuel Kant 1724-1804

other influential thinkers of the time, argued for the maximum freedom of the individual. They believed in minimal government. They also supported free trade between nations and, as I noted, a free market within. Such freedom, they argued, would create a harmony among nations, and promote peace. As Thomas Paine--who like most of America's Founding Fathers was a classical liberal--wrote in his influential *Rights of Man* in 1791-1792,

Government on the old system is an assumption of power, for the aggrandizement of itself; on the new [republican form of government as just established in the United States], a delegation of power for the common benefit of society. The former supports itself by keeping up a system of war; the latter promises a system of peace, as the true means of enriching a nation.⁵

Full proof of this point had to wait, however, until scientists like Bruce Russett, Zeev Maoz, James Lee Ray, and myself, could develop research methods to document it (under "democracy and war," see the [links](#) to such work on the internet--for my work, see the "[democratic peace](#)" page on this site). We did related research throughout the 1970s, thanks in part to the growth of new statistical models made possible by the advent of the computer, and in the 1980s we, and scholars who followed our lead, proved Kant correct. By then we had collected data on all wars that had occurred over the last several centuries, and by applying various statistical analyses to these data, we established that there never has been a war between well-established democracies. Moreover, through these techniques we also proved that there was not a hidden factor accounting for this, such as a lack of common borders, or geographic distance between democracies. Nor was this democratic peace attributable to the wealth of democracies; or their international power, education levels, technology, resources, religion, or population density. Our findings are straightforward:

Well-established democracies do not make war on each other.

Table 7.1 provides some evidence on this.⁶ It gives a simple count of wars between democracies, democracies and nondemocracies, and between nondemocracies from 1816 to 1991. As the table shows, among all the wars during this period, 353 nations fought each other. The numbers refer to pairs of nations (dyads) violently engaged in war against each other. For example, in the brief 1979 war between Cambodia and Vietnam there was only one pair of nations at war. In the Six Day War of 1967, Israel fought Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, thus making it three pairs at war (Israel vs. Egypt, Israel vs. Jordan, and Israel vs. Syria). The table presents the result of adding all pairs at war for all wars 1816 to 1991. In no case did a democracy fight another democracy, which is also true since 1991. There never has been a Battle of the Somme between free people. No battle even close. In fact there had been no lethal military action between *liberal*

TABLE 7.1
Democratic Versus
Nondemocratic Wars 1816-1991

DYADS [1]	WARS [2]
democracies vs. democracies	0
democracies vs. nondemocracies	155
nondemocracies vs. nondemocracies	198
TOTAL	353

1. Stable democracies. This only excludes the war between an ephemeral republican France and republican Rome in 1849.
 2. Defined as any military action in which at least 1,000 are killed.
- From Small and Singer 1976, updated to 1980 based on Small and Singer (1982); more recent estimates from the author.

democracies, as defined in [Chapter 3](#), ever.

But, you might still ask whether this is owed to chance. Since in the 20th Century democracies were a minority among nations, and in previous centuries there were only a handful of democracies at any given time, is not it likely that this lack of war is by chance--luck? Statistical analysis enables us to calculate the probability of such events taking place. True, statistics can be misused and have been, but this is true of any scientific method. Virtually all the medical drugs one takes today are based on statistical tests, not unlike those used to test whether democracies do not make war on each other is a chance occurrence. If one is going to be cynical about statistics, then one should also be very wary of taking any modern drugs for an illness or disease. This issue is really not statistics but how well they have been applied and whether the data meet the assumptions of the statistical model used.

For example of how statistics can be applied, aside from creating the power of Table 7.1, I will calculate the statistical significance of democracies not making war on each other through the binomial theorem. For this, one requires several statistics: the number of nondemocratic pairs and democratic pairs of states in the world for the period during which the wars between these types of pairs occurred, and the number of wars between each type. The problem has not been in determining the number of democratic pairs, but how many nondemocratic pairs there are for some period of time. This has been confronted in the literature, and for those periods in which this number could be defined the zero wars between democracies has been very significant (usually much less than a probability of .01 that this zero was by chance).

To do this now for the years 1946-1986, there then were 45 states that had a democratic regime; 109 that did not. There were thus 6,876 possible pairs (dyads) these nations could form (such as Bolivia-Chile), of which 990 were democratic-democratic pairs, and none of which fought each other. Thirty-two nondemocratic pairs engaged in war. Thus the probability of any dyad engaging in war 1946-1986 was $32/6876 = .0047$; of not engaging in war was .9953. Now, what was the probability of the 990 dyads not engaging in war during this period? Using the binomial theorem, it is .9953 to the 990th power = .0099, or rounded off, .01. This is highly significant. The odds of this lack of war between democracies being by chance are virtually 100 to 1.

One should not take this result in isolation, since the lack of war has been tested in different ways for other periods, definitions of democracy, and ways of defining war, and in each case has been significant. Thus, the overall significance is really a multiple (or function, if some of these studies are not independent) of these different significant probabilities, which would make the overall probability (subjectively estimated) of the results being by chance alone surely at least a million to one.

You may have many other questions about this lack of relationship between democracy and war, often called the *democratic peace*. I have tried to answer a number of them in an [Appendix](#) to my book [Power Kills](#), and for the papers, articles, tables, etc., on this site relevant to the democratic peace, see the aforementioned ["The Wonder That is Freedom"](#) page, and the page of [links](#). Elsewhere on this site I also have tried to clarify the meaning of the term ["democratic peace"](#).

Why is it that free and democratic peoples not make war on each other? Remember Immanuel Kant's hypothesis that since you would not want to bear the cost of wars, you would, if you could, restrain your leaders. On the surface, this seems a good explanation, and it does help to explain why democracies do not make war on each other. Yet democratic people have also been jingoistic. They have favored war and encouraged their leaders to fight. For instance, the public outcry over the explosion aboard the American battleship *Maine* in a Cuban harbor and its sinking with a loss of 260 men in 1898 pressured Congress and President McKinley into intervening militarily in Cuba. Spain then reluctantly declared war on the United States. American public opinion also strongly favored President Truman's commitment of American troops to the defense of South Korea against the North Korean invasion in 1950; and similarly favored President Johnson's request to Congress for a blank check--the Tonkin Gulf resolution of 1964--to come to the defense of South Vietnam, then near collapse under the weight of North Vietnam's aggression.

Clearly, then, there is something much deeper than simply your fear of death and destruction at work in preventing wars among democracies. This peacekeeping factor is analogous to what inhibits democratic nations from internal political violence, as I described it in [Chapter 5](#). Where democratic freedom flourishes in two countries, where there are free markets, and freedom of religion, association, ideas, and speech, then societies of mutual interest like corporations, partnerships, associations, societies, churches, schools, and clubs proliferate in and between the countries. Examples of these are the Catholic and Protestant Churches, Coca Cola, Disney, the Red Cross, the Boy Scouts, and the Association of Tennis Professionals. These cross-national groups become separate pyramids of power, competing with each other and with governments. As a result, both democratic nations then really comprise one society, one crosscut by these multifold groups, with multiple bonds between them.

Moreover, between democratic governments there are many official and unofficial connections and linkages made to achieve similar functions and satisfy mutual interests. Their militaries freely coordinate strategies, and may even share equipment in line with their mutual defense arrangements and perceived common dangers. An example is nuclear weapons and military equipment shared by Great Britain and the United States. Intelligence services will share some secrets and even sometimes agents. Health services will coordinate their studies, undertake common projects, and provide health supplies when needed. Multiple shared and cross-pressured interests sew democratic societies together.

Politicians, leaders, and groups, therefore, have a common interest in keeping the peace. And where conflict might escalate into violence, as over some trade issue or fishing rights, interests are so cross-pressured by different groups and ties that the depth of feeling and single-minded devotion to the interest at stake is simply not there. Keep in mind that for democratic leaders to choose to make the huge jump to war against another country, there must be almost fanatical dedication to the interests--the stakes--involved, almost to the exclusion of all else.

There is also something about democracies that is even more important than these links, bonds, and cross pressures. This is their democratic culture. Democratic peoples see one another as willing to compromise and negotiate issues rather than to fight violently over them. More important, they see one another as the same kind--part of one's in-group, one's moral universe. They each share not only socially, in overlapping groups, functions, and linkages, but also in political culture. Americans and Canadians, for example, have no expectation of fighting each other over trade restrictions and disputes. Both see each other as similarly free, democratic, and willing to bargain. And therefore, they have a totally unarmed 5,525-mile border between them. Similarly, with the development of a solid liberal democracy in Japan since the end of World War II, there is now no expectation of war between Japan and any other democracy, including the United States and democratic South Korea.

Finally, credit should be given to the ideology of democratic liberalism itself. Democratic liberals believe in the right of people to make their voices heard, to have a role in government, and to be free. Such liberals, who in domestic policy may be conservative, progressive, social democrat, Democrat, or Republican, greatly oppose any violence against other democracies. Even if those in power would consider such actions, democratic liberals--who compose the vast majority of intellectuals, journalists, and politicians--would arouse a storm of protest against them.

To summarize, there is no war between democracies because their people are free. This freedom creates a multitude of groups that produce diverse linkages across borders, cross-pressured interests, and make for an exchange culture of negotiation and compromise. Free people see each other as of the same kind, as morally similar, as negotiators instead of aggressors, and therefore have no expectation of war; and there is a prevalent ideology of democratic liberalism that believes in democratic freedom and opposes violence between democracies.

Then why do nondemocracies--or rather, the dictators who control them, since by definition the people have little to say--make war on each other? Do not they see each other as of the same kind, sharing the same coercive culture? Yes, and that is exactly the problem for them. They live by coercion and force. Their guns keep them in power. They depend on a controlled populace manipulated through propaganda, deceit, and terror. Commands and decrees are the working routine of dictators; negotiations are a battleground in which one wins through lies, subterfuge, misinformation, stalling, and manipulation. A dictator's international relations are no different. They see them as war fought by other means. They will only truly negotiate in the face of bigger and better guns, and they will only keep to their promises as long as these guns remain pointed at them. This is also how one dictator sees another--and,

incidentally, how they see democracies.

This is not to say that war necessarily *will* happen between two countries if one or both is not democratic. They may be too far away from each other, too weak, or too inhibited by the greater power of a third country. It is only to say that the governments of such countries lack the social and cultural inhibitions that would prevent armed conflict between them, and that their dictatorial governments inherently encourage war. War may not happen, but it can, and the more undemocratic the governments, the more likely it will.

There are two beliefs about democracy as a possible solution to war that I should address. One is the belief that what we have always done throughout our history is an inevitable force of our nature. Since we always have had war, we always will. Note, however, that down through the ages almost all the world lived under absolute monarchs, be they kings, queens, emperors, czars, or whatever. Monarchs inherited their rule and commanded without question. There were exceptions for historically brief periods, such as in the classical Greek city-states, ancient Rome, and Switzerland during the Middle Ages. So dominant was monarchism that just three centuries ago in most of the world it would have seemed natural to our species, unchangeable. Now, absolute hereditary rule only exists in a few small countries such as [Saudi Arabia](#), and should be gone entirely within in a generation or so.

Another example of an institution that once seemed inevitable was the ownership of slaves. This slavery was even more universally accepted and practiced than absolute monarchies. Yet now it is virtually ended except in some small backwater countries like Sudan, and there only as an adjunct to its civil war. As a species we may kill and murder each other, but also as a species we have the mental freedom, will, and creativity to eliminate that which we collectively despise or which endangers us. We need only the knowledge to do so, and we now have this about war.

The second belief that inhibits accepting freedom as a solution to war is its simplicity. My social science colleagues often rave about this. "The social world is too complex," they say, unaware that this statement itself is not a proven truth, but only a hypothesis. They go on, "You can't reduce human behavior to one variable like this. War must be the result of many factors interacting in complex ways, diplomatic, political, military, social, cultural, and so on. I cannot believe you would simply reduce all this to freedom. How can you ignore the balance of power, historical grievances, religious conflict, territorial conflicts, and the like?" I do not. In relations between democratic and nondemocratic nations, or among nondemocratic nations themselves, all these complex factors beloved of the historian and political scientist may indeed cause war. It is just that the less freedom the people of these countries have, the more likely war will result. Only between democracies does freedom create the conditions to override these factors.




Pre-Civil War American slaves

It is not just a free, democratic populace that inhibits war, but also the *degree* to which people are free. To understand this, you now have to stop thinking about war as a single event that happens or does not happen. Rather, think of war as embodying different amounts of killing, just as a yardstick embodies different degrees of length. A war may be as vast in scope as World War I or World War II, in which the fighting between Germany the Soviet Union alone took more than 7,500,000 lives. But the severity of a war may only be in hundreds killed, not millions--as was the war between India and China in 1962, in which each lost around 500 dead, or the Gulf War, when the United States lost 148 people from battle and 35 from friendly fire. All are wars, but the relevant distinction among them here is one of magnitude.

Then imagine a yardstick of freedom, where at one end you place democracies like Canada, New Zealand, and

Sweden; and at the other end you put the least free countries, like North Korea, Sudan, Burma, Cuba, and Laos. Toward the middle would be such authoritarian countries as Egypt, Bangladesh, and Malaysia. Then for any two countries, the closer the government of each is to the democratic end of the yardstick, the more likely fewer will be killed in any war between them. Thus we can establish a correlation between the degree of freedom and the degree of intensity in war.

Figure 7.1 graphs this correlation for governments divided into democratic, authoritarian (people are partly free), and totalitarian (no freedom) subgroups.⁷ Then when measuring the international war dead between two governments, we find a near perfect correlation between freedom and war dead over the years 1900-1980. At one end of this correlation we have two nations that are both democratically (labeled "demo" in the figure) free and fought no wars and have, if any violence at all, very minor violence between the most marginal (electoral) democracies of them. At the other end, we have nations in which there are no civil rights and political liberties, and a dictator commands all politically relevant activity and groups. Such totalitarian governments (labeled "tot" or "total"), as the figure illustrates, are most likely to have the bloodiest wars. That part of World War II involving totalitarian Germany and the Soviet Union is a case in point. In fighting against each other, the Soviet Union lost 7,500,000 in battle, and Nazi Germany lost most of its 3,500,000 battle dead. No two nations have ever before or since inflicted such massive bloodshed on each other.



Authoritarian nations (labeled "aut" or "author") are between democratic and totalitarian ones in their degree of freedom; and, as should be true empirically, their violence is more or less, depending on whether it is with democracies or totalitarian nations.

To the iron law that democracies do not make war on each other, we can now add:

The less democratically free any two nations are, the more likely is severe violence between them.

There are many other kinds of international violence than war. There is violence short of war, such as American jets shooting down Iraqi fighter planes that violate the United Nations defined no-fly zone over southern Iraq; the blowing up of a South Korean passenger jet by North Korean agents; military action by Cuban forces against Somalia during the Ethiopia-Somalia War over the Ogaden (1976-1983). And despite this absence of violence *between* democracies, democracies overall could be as violent in international affairs as nondemocracies. *Democracies would just direct great violence at nondemocracies*

However, when you consider the explanation for why democracies are peaceful--that democratic peoples are acculturated into negotiation and compromise over violence--you should expect that democracies overall would


have the least severe foreign violence and war--the least dead in all their violence fighting other countries. Another way of putting this is that the more freedom a nation has, the less its leaders squander the lives of their people in foreign violence and war. And this is true, as I show in Figure 7.2. ⁸ The facts are clear:

the less democratic a country is, the more intense its foreign violence.

This is not to say that democracies are generally pacifist. They have engaged in bloody wars, usually to fight aggression and defend themselves and other democracies. And certainly democracies have also been the aggressors, as was the United States in the Spanish-American War, the Philippine-American War of 1899-1902, and the Grenada and Panama interventions. On the average, however, democratic leaders are more careful about the lives of their citizens and, therefore, they fight less severe wars.

There also are exceptions to this, as in the Battle of the Somme during which the British commanding generals continued to throw troops into battle even after its bloody losses and lack of success. However, it should be pointed out again that the repercussions of this on British public opinion were so great as to make British foreign policy naively pacifist for a full generation. Totalitarian regimes have no such negative feedback. Their dictators can time after time, in war after war, use their people as mass instruments of war, like bullets and shells, throwing them at the enemy in human waves, for whatever purpose.

As a species, we have been killing ourselves by the millions in war after war throughout history. Now, finally, we have the power of knowledge to end forever, or at the very least drastically reduce, all this human slaughter. Freedom gives us the answer. Foster democratic freedom for all humanity to end this bloody scourge. And until we achieve this, foster at least some freedom where none exist to lessen the mass killing by war. War is an evil, and the fact that it has had to be fought by free people to preserve their freedom makes it no less so. What would eliminate this evil must be a moral good. And this is therefore another moral good of freedom.



NOTES

* Written for this web site. I am indebted to Judson Knight for his careful editing and helpful comments on this chapter.

1. Malcolm Brown, *The Imperial War Museum Book Of The Somme*. Trans-Atlantic Publications, 1997.

2. From the "History on Line" [web site](#).

3. From an October 1998 British Broadcasting Corporation Special Report on World War I.

4. Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*. Translated by Lewis White Beck. New York: The Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill,

1957, pp. 12-13.

5. Howard, Michael. *War And The Liberal Conscious*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1978, p. 29.

6. This is Table 1.1 in my *Death By Government*.

7. This is from Figure 3.1 in my [Power Kills](#).

8. This is from Figure 4.2 in my [Power Kills](#).

Chapter 8

Freedom is a Right and Creates Human Security

We have identified power with greatness, thugs with statesmen, and propaganda with results; we have let moral and cultural relativism silence our outrage, while conceding the moral high ground to the utopian dreamers; we have refused to recognize evil as evil; and we have ignored the catastrophic human cost of such confusions
----This web site

The best way to sum up this book is by reference to [Table 8.1](#). In the top Table 8.1a one can clearly see the difference that freedom makes in the wealth and prosperity of a people. The greater their freedom, the more their purchasing power compared to other nations, the less their poverty, and the greater their human development. In short, freedom is the way to economic and social human security.

There is more to human security than wealth and prosperity. There is also the security of knowing that one's life and that of one's loved ones are safe from lethal repression, genocide and mass murder, and deadly famines. Here Table 8.1b of [Table 8.1](#) could not be more

TABLE 8.1a
Wealth and Prosperity For 198 Nations
By Level of Freedom 1997-1998

Characteristic	Free	Partly Free	Unfree
Average Freedom Level [1]	13	8	3
Average PPP per person \$ [2]	11,918	4,285	3,733
Average Hum. Pov. Index [3]	14	26	34
Average Hum. Dev. Index [4]	0.8	0.63	0.58

TABLE 8.1b
Deaths By Cause and Freedom Rating 1980-1987

Cause	Deaths (000)			
	Free	Partly Free	Unfree	Total
Famine	0	14,374	>60,080	>74454
Democide [5]	157	26,092	103,194	129,443
Internat'l War [6]	2,306	19,171	34,000	55,477
Civil War [7]	481	4,673	5,981	11,135
Total	2,944	64,310	>203,356	>270,509

Notes

1. Combined rating of Freedom House on civil liberties and political rights, which varies from a rating of 2 to 14. For this table, free = ratings of 11-14, Partly Free = 6-10, Unfree = 2-5. Data from the Appendix--see Table A.1.
2. PPP = purchasing power parity per person, or the average person's ability in \$ to purchasing goods comparable to what can be purchased by those living in other states. This is a good measure of comparable average wealth. Data from the Appendix--see Table A.7. Data for 1998.
3. Hum. Pov. Index = Human Poverty Index (HPI). Source is the United Nations Development Program. See Table A.5 in the Appendix. Data for 1998.
4. Hum. Dev. Index = Human Development Index (HDI). The index comprises life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment, GNP per capita in purchasing power parity. For source, footnote 3. Data for 1998.
5. Domestic genocide and mass murder From Table 16A.1 of *Statistics of Democide* on this site. Includes nation-state and quasi-state regimes
6. Includes combat dead and other civilian war dead. Excludes war time democide. From diverse sources, including that for democide.

7. For 141 state level regimes. Excludes democide. Source same as for democide.

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consistent-the more freedom of a people, the less their deaths due to famine, genocide and mass murder, and international and civil war. The [Appendix](#) to this book tests these and related statistics in various wars to make sure that freedom is, indeed, the factor responsible for greater human security. Given the scientific analyses there I can assert with considerable confidence that freedom is in fact what it appears to be in [Table 8.1](#), and what I have claimed for it in the previous chapters, which is that *the freedom of a people is the cause of their greater wealth and prosperity, of human development, and of security from violence.*

But as important as the statistics of these tables and those in the [Appendix](#) are, they are still only statistics and miss the sheer misery, pain, and horror of the unfree. They reflect a wretched and bloody Hell: billions of human beings are subject to absolute privation, exposure, famine, disease, torture, beatings, forced labor, genocide, mass murder, executions, deportations, political violence, and war. These billions live in fear for their lives, and for that of their lived ones. They have no human rights, no liberties. These pitiful people are only pieces on a playing board for the armed thugs and gangs that oppress their nations, raping them, looting them, exploiting them, and murdering them. We hide the identity of the gangs--we sanctify them--with the benign

concept of "government," as in the "government" of Khmer Rouge Cambodia, Stalin's Soviet Union, or Hitler's Germany.

The gangs that control these so-called governments oppress whole nations under cover of international law. They are like a gang that captures a group of hikers and then does with them what it wills, robbing all, torturing and murdering some because gang members don't like them or they are "disobedient," and raping others. Nonetheless, they "govern" by the right of sovereignty: the community of nations explicitly grants them the right by international law to govern a nation when they show that they effectively control the national government, and this right carries with it the promise that other nations will not intervene in their internal affairs. International law now recognizes that if these gangs go to extremes, such as massive ethnic cleansing or genocide, than the international community has a countervailing right to stop them. However, this area of international law is still developing, and as we saw in the current examples of Sudan, Burma, North Korea, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, and China, and one could include Cuba, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, among others, the thugs still largely have their way with their victims.

This is unconscionable. As I showed in [Chapter 2](#), citizens of all countries--a Chinese peasant, a Sudanese Black, a Saudi Arabian woman, or a Burmese Karen, and all six billion



Francisco Goya etching: "Great prowess! With dead men!"

other people--
have the right
to freedom of
speech,
religion,
organization, a
fair trial,
among other
rights, and all
these civil and
political rights
are subsumed
by one
overarching
right to be free.
This right
overrides
sovereignty,
which is
granted
according to
tradition based
on a system of
international

treaties, not natural law. Freedom, by contrast, is not something others grant you. It is a right due every human being. It can only be taken from a people and denied them by force of arms, by power.

For too many intellectuals, however, it is not enough to point out that a people have a right to be free. They will counter by arguing that freedom is desirable, but first people must be made equal, given food to eat, work, and health care. Freedom must be limited as a means to good ends, such as the public welfare, prosperity, peace, ethnic unity, or national honor. There is a cottage industry among intellectuals who go about creating such justifications for denying people their freedom. Sometimes they are so persuasive that even reasonable people will accept their convoluted arguments. Need I mention the works of Marx and Lenin, for example, who provided "scientific" excuses for the tyranny of such thugs as Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot? There even were many now-forgotten, or now-excused, intellectuals and other influential figures that praised the economic efficiency and progressiveness of Hitler and Mussolini before World War II. And one should not ignore the large number of Western intellectual, academics, and students who fell in love with Mao Tse-tung, some even carrying around his *Red Book* of Mao quotations, while this absolute, tyrannical dictator of communist China murdered millions of people, created the world's greatest famine through his policies, and caused a civil war--the Cultural Revolution--that killed millions more.



One of 21,000,000 Nazi
murdered

For many compassionate people, such intellectuals arguing that freedom must be sacrificed for a better life have had the best of the argument and the moral high ground. These intellectuals have tried to show that freedom empowers greed, barbaric competition, inefficiency, inequality, the debasement of morals, the weakening of ethnic or racial identity, and so on. In spite of the international certification of freedom as a human right by the United Nations, and treaties and agreements among nations, those defending freedom often feel guilty, as though they somehow lack sympathy for the poor and oppressed. For example, you might have heard it said of communist Castro's barbaric rule over the Cuban people: "After all, the Cubans have free medical care, a good educational system, and a right to work." Never mind that Castro is responsible for the murder of tens of thousands of Cubans, the torture, and beating of many more, and the imprisonment of vast numbers of those who have only protested their lack of rights.

To be defensive about freedom in the face of such justifications is morally wrong headed. No moral code or civil law allows that a gang leader and his followers can murder, torture, and repress others at will as long as it enables them to provide their families with a good life. But even were it accepted that under the cover of government authority, a ruler can murder and repress his people so as it promotes human betterment, the burden of proof is on those who argue that therefore a people will be better off.

And there is no such proof. Quite the opposite: in the twentieth century we have had the most costly and extensive tests of such arguments, involving billions of people. The Nazis, Italian fascists under Mussolini, Japanese militarists, and Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, have tested fascist promises of a better life. Likewise, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot have tested the Utopian promises of communism, to mention the most prominent communist experiments; and Burma, Iraq, and Syria, among others, have as well tested state socialism. All these vast social experiments have failed, utterly and miserably, and they have done so at the vast human cost that has included global social upheaval, the displacement of millions, the impoverishment of billions, the death of tens of millions from famine, extreme internal violence, and the most destructive wars--not to mention the many tens of millions more murdered outright. *These social experiments carried out by force against billions of people have produced a vast nation of the dead, which if it were a sovereign country would be among the world's top ten in population.*

In sharp contrast, there are the



Francisco Goya etching: "And there is no remedy"

arguments for freedom, which is, as I have shown in previous chapters, not only a right, *but a supreme moral good in itself*. The very fact of a people's freedom creates a better life for all, as shown in [Table 8.1](#) and the [Appendix](#). As shown, free people create a *wealthy and prosperous society*. When people are free to go about their own business, they put their ingenuity and creativity in the service of all. They search for ways to satisfy the needs, desires, wants of others. The true Utopia lies not in some state-sponsored tyranny, but the free market in goods, ideas, and services, whose operating principle is that success depends on satisfying others. As described in [Chapter 4](#), Bill Gates of Microsoft did not become a billionaire by stealing people's money, looting their possessions, taxing them and secreting money away in Switzerland, or using public funds to build himself mansions. No one *had* to buy Gates' products or invest in his company. He became the world's richest man by providing people with computer software that they wanted, and that made easier their life or work. People rarely do things for others because they are completely selfless--we set aside and admire those rare Mother Therasas that are. Rather, almost all act out of self-interest, and it is therefore better to create a society in which self-interest leads to mutual

betterment, rather than one in which a small coterie of fanatics exert their own self-interest at the expense of the lives and welfare of others.

What underlines this moral good of freedom even more is the independence and incentives the farmer or peasant has to best use his land to produce crops and food that people need to live. The result is that in a democratically free country like the United States, farmers produce so much food as to create a surplus that the government then buys, stores, and grants in aid to poor countries. At the same time, in many of those countries where the rulers have denied their farmers any freedom in order to achieve some Utopian future, where they order farmers what to grow, where, and how, and at what prices to sell the resulting crops, famines have killed tens of millions of people. The roll call of these famines is long, but must include the Soviet Union, China, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Cambodia, and North Korea. It is not by chance, as shown in [Table 8.1](#) that *no democratically free people have suffered from mass famine.*

It is extraordinary how little known this is. There are plenty of hunger projects and plans to increase food aid for the starving millions, all of which is good enough in the short run. A starving person will die before the people can kick out their rulers or make them reform their policies. Yet simply feeding the starving today is not enough. They also have to be fed tomorrow and every day thereafter. However, free these people from their rulers' commands over their farming, and soon they will be able to feed themselves and others as well. There is a cliché about this: give a starving person a fish to eat and you feed him only for one day; teach him how to fish, and he feeds himself forever. Yet teaching is no good alone if a person is not free to apply their new knowledge: yes, teach them how to fish, but also promote the freedom they need to do so.

Yet, the incredible economic productivity and wealth produced by a free people and their freedom from famines are not the only or perhaps even the most important moral good of freedom. When people are free, they comprise a spontaneous society the characteristics of which *strongly inhibit society-wide political violence*, as shown in [Table 8.1](#). Freedom greatly reduces the possibility of revolutions, civil war, rebellions, guerrilla warfare, coups, violent riots, and the like. Most of the violence within nations occurs where thugs rule with absolute power. There is a continuum here. *The more power that the rulers have, and the less their*



N. Korean famine: A Pyongyang woman shows her one-day food ration. UN/DPI photo by James Bu

people are free, then the more internal violence these people will suffer.

Keep in mind that throughout the world people are essentially the same. It is not that the people of any culture, civilization, or nation are by nature any more bloodthirsty, barbaric, power-hungry, or violent than those of another. What makes for peace within a nation is not national character, but social conditions that reduce tension and hostility between people, lessen the stakes of conflict, cross-pressure interests, and promote negotiation, tolerance, and compromise. Such are the conditions created by democratic freedom. The more a people are free, the greater such conditions inhibit internal violence. *Surely that which protects people against internal violence, that which so saves human lives, is a moral good. And this is freedom.*

Then there is mass democide, the most destructive of human lives than any other form of violence. Except in the case of the Nazi Holocaust of European Jews, few people know



Nazi mass murder

how murderous the dictators of this world have been and could be. Virtually unknown is the fact that the number of non-Jewish Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, Yugoslavs, Frenchmen, Germans, and on, murdered by Hitler surpasses by two or three times the Jews he killed. Then there are the shocking tens of millions murdered by Stalin and Mao, and the other millions wiped out by Pol Pot, Ho Chi Minh, Kim Il-sung, and their kind. Just omitting foreigners, who are most often murdered during a war, such thugs have murdered about 123,000,000 of their own people from 1900 to 1987. Adding foreigners they have killed raises the toll to an incredible near 170,000,000. Adding to this unbelievable toll since 1987 is the million people the Hutu rulers of Rwanda may have slaughtered in four months (Chapter 6. Even now, these mass murders still go on in Burma, Sudan, Afghanistan, North

TABLE 1.2
20th Century Democide

REGIMES	YEARS	DEMOCID (OOO)[1]			ANNUAL	
		TOTAL	DOMESTIC	GENOCIDE	RATE % [2]	
MEGAMURDERERS	1900-87	151,491	116,380	33,476		[4]
DEKA-MEGAMURDERERS	1900-87	128,168	100,842	26,690	0.18	[4]
U.S.S.R.	1917-87	61,911	54,769	10,000	0.42	
China (PRC)	1949-87	35,236	35,236	375	0.12	
Germany	1933-45	20,946	762	16,315	0.09	
China (KMT)	1928-49	10,075	10,075	Nil	0.07	[5]
LESSER MEGAMURDERS	1900-87	19,178	12,237	6,184	1.63	[4]
Japan	1936-45	5,964	Nil	Nil	Nil	
China (Mao Soviets) [3]	1923-49	3,466	3,466	Nil	0.05	[5]
Cambodia	1975-79	2,035	2,000	541	8.16	
Turkey	1909-18	1,883	1,752	1,883	0.96	
Vietnam	1945-87	1,670	944	Nil	0.10	
Poland	1945-48	1,585	1,585	1,585	1.99	
Pakistan	1958-87	1,503	1,503	1,500	0.06	
Yugoslavia (Tito)	1944-87	1,072	987	675	0.12	
SUSPECTED MEGAMURDERERS	1900-87	4,145	3,301	602	0.24	[4]
North Korea	1948-87	1,663	1,293	Nil	0.25	
Mexico	1900-20	1,417	1,417	100	0.45	
Russia	1900-17	1,066	591	502	0.02	
CENTI-KILOMURDERERS	1900-87	14,918	10,812	4,071	0.26	[4]
TOP 5	1900-87	4,074	2,192	1,078	0.89	[4]
China (Warlords)	1917-49	910	910	Nil	0.02	
Turkey (Atatürk)	1919-23	878	703	878	2.64	
United Kingdom	1900-87	816	Nil	Nil	Nil	
Portugal (Dictatorship)	1926-82	741	Nil	Nil	Nil	
Indonesia	1965-87	729	579	200	0.02	
LESSER MURDERERS	1900-87	2,792	2,355	1,019	.1	[4]
WORLD TOTAL	1900-87	169,202	129,547	38,566	.1	[6]

1. Includes genocide, politicide, and mass murder; excludes war-dead.

These are most probable mid-estimates in low to high ranges.

Figures may not sum due to round off.

2. The percent of a population killed in democide per year of the regime

3. Guerrilla period. 4. Average.

5. The rate is the average of that for three successive periods.

6. The world annual rate is calculated for the 1944 global population

Korea, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Congo, just to mention the most glaring examples.



Serb irregular militiamen kick the corpse of a Croatian civilian—Vukovar, Croatia, Nov. 1991.
Photo by Ron Haviv

It should be clear, then, why I refer to the rulers of these murderous regimes as *thugs*. I am not a diplomat nor government official and do not have to worry about the delicate sensitivities of these rulers. I can speak truth to power, and call thugs the thugs they are. As should be clear from this book and web site, they often murder people by carefully thought out plans, they set up a bureaucracy to do so, they train people for this purpose, and then they order the killing. Sometimes they murder people because of their race, ethnicity, or religion; their parents or other relative's

political activities, or beliefs, or speech; or their lack of proper enthusiasm for their glorious rulers. Sometimes they established a murder quota to fill, or kill people randomly to set an example. While we can approximate how many these thugs have killed, we cannot even guess at the heartbreak and misery these deaths have caused their loved ones, and how many of these grieving survivors have died of a broken heart or committed suicide.

Moreover, the term murder hardly carries the full weight of the pain and misery of the victims. Some lucky ones died quickly with a shot to the back of the head, or had their head decapitated. Most died quite wretchedly, in pain from torture or beatings; by drowning, being buried or burned alive; or in agony from wounds. Many died from intentionally administered starvation, thirst, exposure, or disease. Some died horribly as the result of repeated human medical experiments. We have no pain/misery index to measure all this except for the incredible pile of corpses these thugs have created in nearly one century. We must assume that a penumbra of pain and misery, of love and hope squashed, and a future stolen surrounds each of these millions of corpses.

What is true about freedom and internal violence is also so for this mass democide. As clear from [Table 8.1](#), *the more freedom a people have, the less likely their rulers are to murder them. The more power the thugs have, the more likely they will murder their people. Could there be a greater moral good than to end or minimize such mass murder? This is what freedom does and for this it is, emphatically, a moral good.*

This is still more to say about freedom's value. While we now know that the world's ruling thugs generally kill several times more of their subjects than do wars, it is war on which

moralists and pacifists generally focus their hatred, and their resources to end or moderate it. This singular concentration is understandable given the horror and human costs, and vital political significance of war. Yet, it should be clear by now that war is a symptom of freedom's denial; and that freedom is the cure. Three points bear repeating from [Chapter 7](#).



Francisco Goya etching: "What more can be done?"

First, *democratically free people do not make war on each other*. This is so important that some scientists have made this historical fact the subject of whole books, such as Bruce Russett's *Grasping The Democratic Peace*, James Lee Ray's *Democracy and International Conflict*, and Spencer R. Weart's *Never At War*. There is a very good explanation for why democracies do not make war on each other, and it is the same as that for why there is by far the least internal violence and democide within democracies. The diverse groups, cross-national bonds, social links, and shared values of democratic peoples sew them together; and shared liberal values dispose them toward peaceful negotiation and compromise with each other. It is as though the people of democratic nations were one society. *The truth about democracies not making war on each other gives us a way of eliminating war from the world: globalize democratic freedom.*

This solution is far in the future, however. It may only kick in when most nations are democratized. Therefore the second point: *the less free the people within any two nations, the bloodier and more destructive the wars between them; the greater their freedom, the less such wars.*

And third, as seen in [Table 8.1](#): *the more freedom the people of a nation have, the less bloody and destructive their wars.*

What this means is that we do not have to wait for all, or almost all, nations to become liberal democracies to reduce the severity of war. As we promote freedom, as the people of more and more nations gain greater human rights and political liberties, as those people without any freedom become partly free, we will decrease the bloodiness of the world's wars. In short, *increasing freedom in the world decreases the death toll of its wars. Surely, whatever reduces, and then finally ends, the scourge of war from our history, without causing a greater evil, must be a moral good. And this is freedom.*

The implications of this for foreign policy and international activism are profound. Since peace, national security, and national welfare are the paramount concerns of a democratic nation's foreign policy, clearly the overriding goal should be to peacefully promote human rights and democratic freedom. This should be the bottom line of international negotiations, treaties, foreign aid, and military action (if necessary for defense or humanitarian reasons, as in Kosovo or Bosnia). As to defense policy, military planning is based on assessments of intentions and capability. What is clear is that the less the people of a nation are free, the more we should beware of the intentions of their rulers. In other words, it is not the democracies of the world that we need to defend against.

Moreover, think about what the peace-creating power of freedom means for nuclear weapons. Many people are justly worried about the ultimate danger to humanity--nuclear war. They protest and demonstrate against nuclear weapons. Some cross the line into illegal activities, such as destroying military property, and risk prison to draw public attention to the danger of such weapons. Were these dedicated people to spend even half this



Injured Hiroshima atomic bomb victim waits for medical help. Without even strength to suckle, the infant died in about ten days.

effort on promoting freedom and human rights for the people of the most powerful dictatorships that have or may soon have such weapons--for instance, China, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran--they would be striking at the *root cause* for the risk of nuclear attack.

The power of freedom to end war, minimize violence within nations, and eradicate genocide and mass murder, almost seems magical. It is as though we have a single-drug cure for cancer. Had I not actually done much of the research myself over more than forty years, of which the most recent is shown on this web site, I would have doubted all this. Yet, my work and that of other social scientists and scholars have proven it true.

Our knowledge of the peace-creating and peace-making effects of freedom now gives us a nonviolent way to promote a nonviolent world. As should now be clear, *democratic freedom is a method of nonviolence*. Enhancing, spreading, and promoting human rights and democracy are the way to enhance, spread, and promote nonviolence. Proponents of nonviolence have worked out many peaceful tactics for opposing dictators, such as sit-down strikes, general strikes, mass demonstrations, refusal to pay taxes, underground newspapers, sabotage by excessive obedience to the rules, and the like. Much thought has gone into how a people can nonviolently promote human rights. Overall, however, nonviolence works best among a free people, and *freedom itself promotes a nonviolent solution to social problems and conflicts*.

In conclusion, then, we have then a wondrous human freedom as a moral force for the good. *It produces social justice, creates wealth and prosperity, minimizes violence, saves human lives, and is a solution to war*. In two words, it creates *human security*. Moreover, and most important, *you should not only be free because of how good it is for you. You should be free because it is your right as a human being*

In opposition to freedom is power, its antonym. While freedom is a right, the power to govern is a privilege granted by a people to those they elect, and can hold responsible for its use. Too often, however, thugs seize control of a people with their guns and use them to make their power total and absolute. Where freedom produces wealth and prosperity, such absolute power causes impoverishment and famine. Where freedom minimizes internal violence, eliminates genocide and mass murder, and solves the problem of war, such absolute power unleashes internal violence, murders millions, and produces the bloodiest wars. In short, *power kills, absolute power kills absolutely*.

Now, to summarize this whole book, why freedom?

Because it is your right. And it is a moral good-- it promotes wealth and prosperity, social justice, and nonviolence, and preserves human life.

NOTES

* Written for this web site. I am indebted to Judson Knight for his careful editing and helpful comments on a draft of this chapter.

Appendix

Testing Whether Freedom Predicts Human Security and Violence

Statistics display what is hidden, make visible what is invisible, uncover what is latent, and thus speak truth to power.

----This web site

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[A note to readers: There are many hyperlinked tables and figures here that you may want to consult as you read. The easiest way to do this is to open one or more separate browser windows that contain the tables or figures. You can do this on the Mac, for example, by pressing the command key when you click the link to the table or figure. You may thus have a number of such tables or figures open at the same time as you are reading the text.]

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Related Statistical Analyses on this Site

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INTRODUCTION

It is easy to say that *human security* is a general concept including the human and economic development of a people--their wealth and prosperity--and the threat to their lives by genocide and mass murder, war, and political turmoil and instability. But then how does one measure human security such that we can say the people of Argentina, for example, have greater human security than those of Peru or Malaysia? we can, of course, select national indicators like years of schooling, life expectancy, or GNP per capita, number of people killed in internal violence, and compare nations on them. But even then if nations are consistently high or low on these indicators, they may differ considerable on others, like income inequality, gender equality, or amount of

violence. What we want is some overall measure of human security that takes into account the different aspects of human security, the different ways of measuring each

aspect, and the differences and similarities of nations on these measures.

To resolve this problem of measurement, researchers often select a bundle of representative indicators, standardize them in some way to make them comparable, as by standard scores, and then add them together to get one overall measure. The problem of applying this technique to human security is that it assumes each indicator in the bundle is equal to every other in measuring human security--that is, if there are p number of indicators, then each of them should have a $1/p$ weight in the final overall measure. This is like giving equal weight to GNP per capita, gender equality in years of schooling, death rate, and income equality. To equally weight such measures without theory or empirical rationale is an arbitrary simplification that may confound an analysis of human security and lead to misinterpretation.

We could, of course, simply pick one indicator to represent human security. But what indicator? Why? Another solution is to simply do an analysis on each of say a dozen indicators of different aspects of human security. This raises the arbitrariness to the level of statistical results. They will certainly differ, which then raises the question as to which to accept. If we average them, say, then we are back to the arbitrariness of equal weighting.

There is a best solution to this problem of measuring human security, however, and that is to let the variation and covariation of nations on the measures show how these measures should be combined and with what weights. In essence, this is a question of the dimensionality of the data. Ideally, *if human security is an empirical meaningful concept, if it refers to something in reality that is a consistent factor in human life, then we should find one empirical dimension in the data that reflects it.*

Consider for example the idea of economic development, which has played a large role in the research and practice of international relations. Is there such an empirical dimension, or is economic development really an uncorrelated bunch of national attributes, such as GNP per capita, energy production per capita, schooling, roads per acre, books published per capita, number of hospitals, death rate, and so on, the selection of any of which would give a different picture of a nation's level of development? To be sure, one can look at all the correlations among such variables and if they are high conclude that there is a common dimension among them. But the fault with simply calculating correlations is that many of the correlations may be due to other variables, and when the effect of these other variables is partialled¹ out of the correlations, many of the high ones may disappear. One needs a method that not only takes account of the intercorrelations among such measures, but also their partial correlations.

Such a method is factor analysis, which determines the statistically independent dimensions among many variables, such that the first dimension is the largest accounting for the intercorrelations in the data, a second dimension accounts for the next greatest amount of intercorrelation after partialling out the effects of the first dimension; any third dimension is independent of the first two after partialling out their effects, and so on for the dimensions found.²

Consider one simple and classic illustration of factor analysis, which is to determine how people differ in their physical attributes, such as weight, height, girth, arm length, foot size, etc. If one were to collect measurements on a reasonable sample of people and subject them to a factor analysis, one would find two major dimensions: fat versus thin, and tall versus short. These are actually the major concepts we use to describe people and show that we have already carried out a mental factor analysis of human variation. Similarly, if we were to do a factor analysis of many measurements of boxes, we would find three dimensions: height, length, and width.

Regarding economic development, when researchers apply factor analysis to cross-national economic, political, social, and cultural data, they invariably find that economic development versus underdevelopment is not only a dimension in such data, but it encompasses more variation among nations than does any other dimension.³ This is to say that across nations and years, economic development consists of many highly intercorrelated national attributes, and scholars and practitioners alike are well justified in using the concept to describe nations. Moreover, different measures of economic development are so highly intercorrelated that one can simply measure the concept by taking one of the central measures, like GNP per capita or, to do away with the exchange rate problem of GNP, energy consumption per capita.

Does the same thing hold true for human security--is there a closely intercorrelated cluster of measures of human security, a dimension? If so, then we can either take a measure most highly correlated with the dimension as its indicator, or calculate factor scores on it by weighting the different measures involved in the analysis by their independent variance contribution to the dimension and summing the result.

There are three kinds of dimensions that a factor analysis delineates. One is the *unrotated* dimensions, which are a best fit to all the data, with each dimension being statistically independent of the others. Then there are the *orthogonally rotated* dimensions that, while maintaining their independence, have been rotated together around the origin of the data space to best fit the distinct clusters of intercorrelation among the variables. The technique to be used here for doing this is Varimax rotation.

One also may do an alternative *oblique rotation* by relaxing the independence between dimensions--they can be correlated--and fitting each dimension to a separate cluster of intercorrelated variables.

Here I will do a number of factor analyses to measure human security and freedom. And on each of my factor analysis that defines more than one dimension in the data I will do both orthogonal and oblique rotations, the latter using the *orthotron* technique. However, I will only report the orthogonal rotations unless those for the oblique are different in important and relevant ways.

Relevantly, there are two kinds of factor analysis. One is called *component analysis*, which analyzes all the variance and covariance among variables, whether unique, random, or error variance. This is the desirable method for simply determining out of a set of variables representing a unitary concept, such as freedom, the factor (component, in this case) scores to measure the dimensions found in the data, and thus the concept. The second kind is common factor analysis, a method for getting at an underlying causal nexus that explains a tightly intercorrelated cluster of variables.

In the first part of my analyses, then, I will pick measures for all nations on freedom and human security, the latter divided into violence, human development, and economic development. And then each of these domains will be component analyzed to identify its separate dimensions. If such exists, I will calculate component scores on the relevant dimensions.

The second part of the analysis involves the role of freedom in human security. Since freedom--that is, liberal democracy--is discussed here and in the literature as though it is a unitary idea, a single empirical dimension, among nations, I must determine through component analysis whether this is so. Then I need to ascertain whether this dimension, if one exists, is not only part of human security, but that human security depends on it. Given the arguments in this book this requires two assessments: whether there is a combined dimension involving freedom and other aspects of human security; and whether freedom is so important to the other aspects of human security that it predicts to, or explains in a statistical sense, the other aspects of human security.

To answer this question about dependency I will first apply a simple contingency analysis to judge how well a people's human security corresponds to their amount of freedom or its lack and to uncover nonlinearities in the relationship, and then use a chi-square test to assess the statistical significance of the result. Since this is the first

time I mention such a test, I should note that I am dealing with the total population of nations, and so I am not making any probabilistic assumptions about a population from a sample. But there is another way of looking at the significance test: as determining the probability of getting the existing relationship among the data given all the possible ways the data may combine. Given the null hypothesis of a random combination, what is the probability that rejecting the particular combination of data--contingency--as random would be in error.

Because of its straightforwardness and ease of interpretation, the contingency test is useful. However, more important is the subsequent test of my ability to predict human security from freedom through bivariate, multiple, polynomial, and nonlinear regression analysis. These will involve a range of assessments, including an analysis of the errors in prediction to determine whether the data should be transformed and helper variables included.

These analyses will be on all 190 nations for 1997-98. One problem is that there are 41 nations with a population below a million, such as (with population in parentheses) Nauru (11,000), Tuvalu (11,000), Palau (19,000), San Marino (26,000), Liechtenstein (32,000), Monaco (33,000), and St. Kitts and Nevis (39,000). Together, the 49 micro-nations total 17.5 million people, or a mere 0.3 percent of the world's population. Yet they make up a quarter of the 190 nations I will analyze, a heavy weight on the results, indeed. Most of these micro-nations are islands, many in the Pacific or Caribbean. It is a question, then, whether these micro-nations bias the analysis, since a good many of them are democratic.

These micro-nations are also those with the most missing data. Although I will estimate missing data through regression analysis, the best procedure for this purpose, there is an unavoidable amount of error introduced into the analysis. For this reason and the very smallness of these nations, I will do all analyses for the 190 nations and then repeat them for 149 nations, with the 41 micro-nations removed. I need not show or mention these latter results unless they differ in relevant and important ways from those for all nations.

A further note on missing data: counting all variables and their transformations, I will be analyzing near seventy variables, many with missing data.⁴ I could, of course, omit nations with missing data. But since many variables have data for all 190 nations, this would lose information if I excluded nations from the analysis that had missing data on even one variable (as required by the technique of pair-wise deletion of missing data in the computer program I will use). I can calculate correlations between every pair of variables with the data present on them, but the resulting correlation matrix cannot be factor analyzed by existing programs.⁵ The best

approach, as noted above regarding micro-nations, is to estimate missing data from those variables which have data present. This has to be done carefully, however. Since I want to uncover the dependency of human security on freedom, I should not estimate any missing data on variables that will measure freedom from those that I will use to measure human security. Otherwise, I would add artifactual (tautological) variance to my dependency analysis. To avoid this, I will only estimate a nation's missing data on political variables from other political variables, or those non-political variables that I will not use to measure the nation's human security, such as its population or area. Similarly, I will not employ any political variables to estimate a nation's missing data on human security.⁶

Finally, I will do all my analyses through the *StatView* statistical application for the Macintosh computer.⁷

MEASURES OF FREEDOM, HUMAN SECURITY, AND VIOLENCE

Measures of Freedom

The theory to be tested is that civil and political human rights--a people's freedoms--are closely entwined with human security and, most important, predict to it. The more such rights a people have, the greater their human security. The dependent variable is therefore some indicator of human security, the independent some indicator of freedom.

The aim now is to find through component (factor) analysis an indicator of freedom. I have listed in [Table A.1](#) the sixteen political variables I will analyze for this purpose. They span a variety of ways of measuring freedom, and in addition include several relevant political variables, such as whether a nation is now or was once under French law, British law, or had or is now a state socialist or communist government. There are also variables indexing the change in a nation's freedom.

[Table A.2](#) presents the results of the component analysis for 190 nations. I have ordered from high to low the loadings for the variables on each dimension in the table, and have omitted those loadings below an absolute .40. This makes the pattern in the data much clearer. Moreover, for ease in going back to [Table A.1](#) to assess the meaning, measurement, or source of a variable, I have attached to the variable its

TABLE A.1
Political Variables

#	Code	N	Year	Variable	Footnote
1	Ci-Lib	190	1998	Civil liberties	1
2	Ci-Chg	155	1977-98	Civil liberties increase or decrease	2
3	Po-Rgt	190	1998	Political rights	3
4	Po-Chg	155	1977-98	Political rights increase or decrease	4
5	Freedo	190	1998	Freedom	5
6	Fr-Chg	155	1977-98	Freedom increase or decrease	6
7	E-Free	122	1997	Economic Freedom.	7
8	EF-Chg	120	1985-97	Economic freedom increase or decrease	8
9	Solist	190	1997-98	Socialist past or present	9
10	BriLaw	175	1997-98	British legal origin.	10
11	FreLaw	175	1997-98	French legal origin.	11
12	Accout	170	1997-98	Government accountability.	12
13	Effect	153	1997-98	Government effectiveness.	13
14	Regula	163	1997-98	Government regulations.	14
15	Ru-Law	163	1997-98	Rule of law.	15
16	Honest	152	1997-98	Government honesty	16

Footnotes

- [1] Civil liberties rated on a seven-point scale from 7=yes to 0=none, as to the degree of freedom of expression, association, rule of law, personal autonomy, and economic rights. This coding is a reversal of the ratings in the source: Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org/).
- [2] Civil liberties 1997-98 minus that for 1977-78. Source same as for footnote 1.
- [3] Political rights rated on a seven-point scale from 1=yes to 7=none as to whether the head of state or government and legislators are elected through free and fair elections, competitiveness and fairness of elections, rights of minorities to participate, and the people's freedom from domination by powerful groups, like the military. This coding is a reversal of the ratings in the source: Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org/).
- [4] Political rights 1997-98 minus that for 1977-78. Source: see footnote 1.
- [5] Freedom on a scale from 2=free to 14=unfree; a sum of the ratings on civil liberties and political rights.
- [6] Freedom 1997-98 minus that for 1977-78. Source: see footnote 1.
- [7] Economic Freedom. From James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, *Economic Freedom of the World: 2000 Annual Report* (www.fraserinstitute.ca/publications/books/econ_free_2000/)
- [8] Economic freedom 1997 minus that for 1985. Source: see footnote 7.
- [9] The legal system is presently socialist (communist or state) or once was = 1; no = 0. Diverse sources, including Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators; file: Social Indicators and Fixed Factors (www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm#4)
- [10] Under present British legal system or once had been = 1; no = 0. Source: Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators; file: Social Indicators and Fixed Factors (www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm#4).
- [11] Under present French legal system or once had been = 1, no = 0. Source: see footnote 10.
- [12] Accountability measures the independence of the media from government, and the extent to which citizens can participate in selecting their governments. This coding is a statistical compilation of perceptions of the quality of governance of a large number of survey respondents in industrial and developing countries,

as well as non-governmental organizations, commercial risk rating agencies, and think-tanks during 1997 and 1998. Source: Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton (1999a). "Aggregating Governance Indicators". World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper No. 2195; and (1999b) "Governance Matters". World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper No. 2196 (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/gov_data.htm).

- [13] Government effectiveness combines the perceptions of quality of public service, competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service, and the credibility of government policies. For the nature of the coding and source, see footnote 12.
- [14] Government regulations includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies, such as price controls, as well as the perceptions of the burden on business imposed by regulations. For the nature of the coding and source, see footnote 12.
- [15] Rule of law includes the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rule of law, the perception of the incidence of violent and non-violent crime, and the effectiveness of the judiciary, and enforceability of contracts. For the nature of the coding and source, see footnote 12.
- [16] Government honesty combines perceptions of the use of government power for private gain, such as payments to get something done and the effects of corruption on business. For the nature of the coding and source, see footnote 12.

TABLE A.2
Component Analysis of Political Variables

Orthogonal Rotation

	Dim. 1	Dim. 2	Dim. 3	Dim. 4	h²	SMC
Effect 13.	.92				.79	.91
Accout 12.	.90				.86	.99
Ru-Law 15.	.89				.85	.99
Honest 16.	.89				.90	.99
Regula 14.	.87				.89	.99
E-Free 7.	.85				.96	1.00
Freedo 5.	.83	.41			.73	.74
Po-Rgt 3.	.79	.44			.61	.46
Ci-Lib 1.	.77				.79	.68
Fr-Chg 6.		.97			.84	.71
PR-Chg 4.		.94			.91	.73
CI-Chg 2.		.92			.90	.91
BriLaw 10.			.85		.86	.92
FreLaw 11			-.89		.76	.81
Solist 9.				.78	.83	.86
EF-Chg 8.				.75	.81	.90
% variance	43	21	10	9	83	

Notes

Principle components of 190 nations. Dim. = Dimension

Number of components = eigenvalues over 1.0.

Rotation by varimax

h² = communality

Only loadings at or over an absolute .4 are shown

SMC = squared multiple correlation squared of the variable on all the others.

Component scores on dimension 1 = FreedomCS

Component scores on dimension 2 = FreeChgCS

order number in [Table A.1](#), e.g., Effect 13.

Since these are orthogonal dimensions, one can read each of the loadings, such as .92 on dimension 1 for the Effect variable, as the correlation of the variable with the dimension. Since the square of a correlation between two variables times 100 give the percent of variance they have in common, Effect has 85 percent (.92 squared) of its variation in common with the dimension, a high amount. Note that the absolute .40 cutoff for the loadings shown in [Table A.2](#) omits loadings for those variables that have less than 16 percent of their variance in common with the dimension, a very small amount in this kind of cross-national analysis. Actually, I usually limit my interpretation to variables with at least 25 percent of their variance in common with a dimension, but by including the smaller loadings, I avoid missing some of the real minor but perhaps still important relationships.

The percent variance totals at the bottom of [Table A.2](#) measure the strength or size of a dimension. The first dimension therefore accounts for 43 percent of the total variation in the sixteen variables over 190 nations, an unusually large dimension for this kind of data. Note that the next dimension is half its size, and the last two are relatively small.

I give two other kinds of useful information in [Table A.2](#). One is h^2 (read as communality squared), which is the proportion of variance in a variable across the 190 nations that is accounted for by the dimensions. The lowest in [Table A.2](#) is .61 for Po-Rgt (political rights), which is still a large amount and means that all these variables have very high intercorrelations among themselves.

The SMC in [Table A.2](#) stands for the squared multiple correlation of a variable regressed on all the others, and is worth study in its own right. It is another way of measuring how well variation in a variable depends on all the others. In one case the SMC is 1.00, and in some other cases it is .99, which means these variables are perfectly, or virtually perfectly, predicted from the fifteen others.

Now, what do the dimensions in [Table A.2](#) mean? First, there is one very strong dimension that includes government effectiveness, accountability, honesty (lack of corruption), a freer regulatory environment, economic freedom, the overall freedom ratings, and its two elements: civil rights and political liberties. This means that there is a very strong dimension of freedom vs. nonfreedom delineating a tight cluster of intercorrelated political variables.

When the intercorrelations among these variables are partialled out of the data, there

is a second independent dimension that reflects a cluster of the change variables: change from 1977 to 1998 on the freedom ratings and its two elements, civil rights and political liberties. Note that the freedom and political liberties ratings themselves have a small positive correlation with this dimension, indicating that it is measuring a positive change to greater freedom.

There is a problem in these change measures, which may explain why they form a dimension unto themselves. The low to high range in these change measures is bracketed by the highest and lowest ratings of freedom, which were 1 and 7 for both political rights and civil liberties, and 2 and 14 for the combined freedom variable. Those nations measured as least free can only change for the better, and those most free can only change for the worst. Moreover, for those nations that are most stable at any level, there is no change at all. Even more problematical, the largest changes can only occur for those nations at or near one end of the freedom scale or another, and the direction of change depends on how close to the free or unfree end of the scale they are. The upshot is that unlike the economic and human development change measures, the freedom one is restricted in a way to make it unique. Nonetheless, despite their limitations I included them in case they showed an unsuspecting relationship to the other variables.

Note that the change in economic freedom (EF-Chg 8) has no significant correlation with this dimension, but instead forms an independent dimension with a nation being socialist or having a socialist background. This correlation results from the fall of communism in many countries and their introduction of a free market. Moreover, since this dimension is independent of the others, it shows that past or present socialist influences and a change in economic freedom have little correlation among 190 nations with their overall freedom, rule of law, government effectiveness, and so on, in 1997-1998.

Finally, there is a small dimension reflecting whether a nation is presently or was once under British versus French law. Since this dimension is statistically independent of the others, it shows that British or French legal and political influence have had little effect on a nation's freedom or its change in freedom over the years.

I did this analysis to determine the component scores (CS) to be used in an analysis of human security. I therefore calculated (regression technique) scores for the two largest dimensions, which together account for 64 percent of the variation in the data for the 190 nations. I labeled these:

Dimension 1 scores = FreedomCS

Dimension 2 scores = FreeChgCS

Measures of Stability/Violence

I component analyzed three conflict and violence variables of a nation's foreign and domestic affairs. See [Table A.3](#) for the variables, and I give the results of their component analysis in [Table A.4](#).

These variables comprise one dimension of violence and instability, as shown by their loadings. Deaths have the least, although still important correlation with this dimension. This is understandable, given that deaths are a general statistical category that includes not only deaths from violence but also from disease, poor health services, and disasters. I calculated the component scores for this dimension and named them:

Dimension 1 scores = ViolenceCS.

Note that because of its low loading on the dimensions, and resulting low weight in the calculation of the component scores, deaths will have an appropriately minor effect on these scores.

Measures of Human Development

By *human development* I mean that people can develop their capabilities and realize their potential, achieve well-being, and live a long life; and we can measure this by such variables as the schooling available to them, their health services, the equality between the sexes, relative income equality, and their life expectancy. [Table A.5](#) lists these and other measures of human development that I will component analyze.

It is true that many of these eighteen variables are highly correlated with each other and some are involved in the calculation of the human development and gender development indices (variables number 20 to 22, and 36 to 37). However, these indices comprise an arbitrary summing together of the separate variables by the source, and thus the variables may have some unique variance to contribute to measuring human development. If this is so, the component analysis will pick up the variance.

The component analysis of these variables uncovered three dimensions with

TABLE A.3
Instability and Violence Variables

#	Code	N	Year	Variable	Footnote
17	Violen 17	190	1998-99	Violence and democide	[1]
18	Unstab 18	152	1997-98	The degree of instability and violence	[2]
19	Deaths 19	190	1998	Deaths	[3]

Footnotes

- [1] Violence and democide is coded on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 = no internal or foreign violence or democide; 5 = the greatest internal or foreign violence or democide. Examples of a 5 are Rwanda, Burma, and Yugoslavia; examples of a 3 are China, Georgia, and India; and examples of a 0 coding are Hungary, Iceland, and Canada.
- [2] Instability and violence measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violence means. This coding is a statistical compilation of perceptions of the quality of governance of a large number of survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as well as non-governmental organizations, commercial risk rating agencies, and think-tanks during 1997 and 1998. Source: Kaufmann, Daniel, A. Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton (1999a). "Aggregating Governance Indicators". World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper No. 2195; and (1999b) "Governance Matters". World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper No. 2196 (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/gov_data.htm).
- [3] Deaths per 1,000 people. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base. <http://www.census.gov/ftp/pub/ipc/www/idbnew.html>

TABLE A.4
Component Analysis of Instability and Violence

One Dimensional Solution

	Dim. 1 h² SMC		
Unstab 18	.86	.74	.38
Violen 17	.84	.71	.39
Deaths 19	.62	.38	.12
% variance	61	36	

Notes

Principle components. Dim. = Dimension
 Number of components = eigenvalues over 1.0.
 h² = communality
 SMC = squared multiple correlation squared of the variable on all the others.
 Only loadings at or over an absolute .4 are shown
 Component scores on dimension 1
 = ViolenceCS

TABLE A.5
Human Development Variables

#	Code	N	Year	Variable	Footnote
20	HDI 20	172	1998	Human development index.	[1]
21	HDIrise 21	135	1985-98	Rise in human development index.	[2]
22	HPI 22	103	1998	HPI=Human poverty index.	[3]
23	LifExp 23	190	1998	Life expectancy.	[4]
24	LifExpRise 24	181	1990-98	Rise in life expectancy ratio: 1990 to 1998	[5]
25	InfMor 25	190	1998	Infant mortality rate.	[6]
26	ChiMor 26	190	1998	Child mortality rate	[7]
27	SecSch 27	146	1996	Secondary school enrollment	[8]
28	Educat 28	123	2000	Average years of school.	[9]
29	Ed-Ind 29	172	1998	Education index.	[10]
30	Litera 30	175	1998	Literacy rate	[11]
31	BirthR 31	190	1998	Births per 1,000 pop.	[12]
32	Unequal 32	112	1998	Richest 20% of income or consumption to poorest 20%.	[13]
33	SexInfM 33	190	1998	Male vs. Female infant mortality rate	[14]
34	SexLifExp 34	190	1998	Male vs. female life expectancy.	[15]
35	Sex-Lite 35	157	1998	Male vs. female adult literacy rate	[16]
36	GDI-Ra 36	141	1998	Gender-related development index rank.	[17]
37	GDI-Val 37	141	1998	Gender development index value.	[18]

Footnotes

- 1 HDI=Human development index. "Human Development Report 2000," United Nations Development Program" (<http://www.undp.org/hdr2000/english/HDR2000.html>). The index comprises life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment, GNP per capita in purchasing power parity.
- 2 $1998 \text{ HDI} - 1985 \text{ HDI} / (1998 \text{ HDI} + 1985 \text{ HDI})$.
- 3 HPI=Human poverty index. Source: see footnote 1. The index is measured differently for developing and industrialized countries (indicated in parentheses), and comprises probability at birth of not surviving until age 40 (60); adult illiteracy rate (functional illiteracy rate); percentage of people (living below the income poverty line) without access to safe water, health services, and children under five who are underweight; (long-terms unemployment for 12 months or more).
- 4 Life expectancy. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base. (<http://www.census.gov/ftp/pub/ipc/www/idbnew.html>)
- 5 $(\text{Life expectancy } 1998 - \text{Life expectancy } 1990) / (\text{Life expectancy } 1998 + \text{Life expectancy } 1990)$.
- 6 Source: see footnote 4.
- 7 Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births); nearest year. Source: Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators; file: Social Indicators and Fixed Factors (www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm#4).
- 8 Percent enrolled to the number in age group; nearest year. Source: See footnote 7.
- 9 Source: Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee, "International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications," manuscript, Harvard University, February 2000 (<http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/>)
- 10 Source: See footnote 1.
- 11 Adult literacy rate at age 15 years and above. Source: see footnote 1.
- 12 Births per 1,000 pop. Source: see footnote 4.
- 13 Richest 20% of income or consumption to poorest 20%. Source: see footnote 1.
- 14 Difference in infant mortality rate--female from male. Calculated from source given in footnote 4.
- 15 Difference in life expectancy--female from male. Calculated from source given in footnote 4.
- 16 Male minus female adult literacy rate at age 15 and above. Source: see footnote 1.
- 17 Gender-related development index rank. GDI is composed of the same measures as HI, except gender differences taken into account, e.g., female and male life expectancy rates. Source: see footnote 1.
- 18 Gender-related development index values, instead of ranks. See footnote 17.

eigenvalues over 1.0, the usual criterion in factor analysis, but since the third was close to the cut off at 1.06, and its few moderate loadings were irrelevant, I dropped it. [Table A.6](#) lists the resulting two-dimensional, orthogonally rotated solution.

As should be clear from [Table A.6](#), there is one very dominant dimension that accounts for 67 percent of the variation of 190 nations on the eighteen variables. The variables most highly correlated with this dimension are the gender development index (#37), human development index (#20), child mortality, education index, birth rate, literacy, and the human poverty index (#22). Noting also the plus and minus correlations, this dimension defines a tight cluster of highly intercorrelated variables having human development in common, with high human development at one end and low development at the other.

The second dimension delineates increasing versus decreasing human development. Increasing life expectancy has a moderate relationship with the dimension, and inequality in income slightly less so in a negative direction. Given the independence of this dimension from the first, it means that there is virtually no relationship between human development levels and the increase or decrease in human development that occurred. Moreover, the human development of a nation has almost no meaningful relationship to its income inequality, although the change in this development has a moderate positive correlation with income equality--the greater the positive change in human development, the less income or consumption inequality.

I calculated component scores for both dimensions and labeled them:

Component scores for dimension 1 = HumDevCS

Component scores for dimension 2 = HumDevRiseCS

Measures of Economic Development

All cross-national factor analysis with such per capita variables as GNP, energy consumption, income, telephones, automobiles, and mail have defined a major economic development, or wealth, dimension. Factor analyses have so consistently delineated it that I include only enough variables to index this dimension, which I list in [Table A.7](#). I also include economic growth, foreign aid, and foreign indebtedness, since they measure an aspect of a nation's economy that bears on national, and therefore, human security.

TABLE A.6
Component Analysis of
Human Development Variables

Orthogonal Rotation

	Dim. 1	Dim. 2	h²	SMC
GDI-Val 37	.98		.96	0.99
HDI 20	.97		.94	0.99
GDI-Ra 36	-.96		.92	0.98
Ed-Ind 29	.93		.90	0.98
ChiMor 26	-.93		.89	0.94
InfMor 25	-.92		.89	0.95
BirthR 31	-.92		.85	0.87
Litera 30	.91		.86	0.97
HPI 22	-.91		.83	0.92
SecSch 27	.90		.81	0.91
LifExp 23	.89		.87	0.93
Educat 28	.88		.80	0.83
SexLiter 35	-.78		.66	0.68
SexInfM 33.	.68		.62	0.67
SexLifeExp 34	.66		.47	0.6
HDirise 21		.87	.85	0.7
LifExpRise 24		.61	.38	0.47
Unequal 32		-.57	.45	0.69
% variance	67	11	78	

Notes

Principle components of 190 nations. Dim. = Dimension

Number of components = eigenvalues over 1.06.

Rotation by varimax

Only loadings at or over an absolute .4 are shown

h² = communality

SMC = squared multiple correlation squared of the variable on all the others.

Component scores on dimension 1 = HumDevCS

Component scores on dimension 2 = HumDevRiseCS

TABLE A.7
Economic Development Variables

#	Code	N	Year	Variable	Footnote
38	Income 38	190	1998	Income	[1]
39	Develo 39	190	1998	Developing country or not	[2]
40	GNPpc 40	190	1998	GNP per capita	[3]
41	PPPpc 41	173	1998	PPP per capita	[4]
42	E-Grth% 42	113	1997-98	GNP growth rate %	[5]
43	E-Impro 43	163	1985-95	GDP per capita growth index	[6]
44	ForAid 44	190	1993-95	Official Development Assistance	[7]
45	FAidpc 45	190	1993-95	Official Development Assistance per capita.	[8]
46	ForDeb 46	190	1993-95	Total foreign debt	[9]

Footnotes

- 1 Income: 1=low income, 2=low middle, 3=upper middle, 4=high. Source: Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators; file: Social Indicators and Fixed Factors (www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm#4).
- 2 1= developing country; 0=not. Source: see footnote 1.
- 3 In U.S. \$. Source: "2000 World Development Indicators," The World Bank Group (<http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/databytopic.html>)
- 4 Purchasing power parity per capita in U.S.\$; missing values replaced by GDP per cap. Source: see footnote 3.
- 5 1997-98 average annual growth % in GNP \$. Source: see footnote 3
- 6 GDP per capita in 1995 US\$: (1995 minus 1985)/(1995 + 1985). Calculated from source: see footnote 3
- 7 Average annual Official Development Assistance US\$ million. "World Resources 1998-99," The World Bank. (<http://www.wri.org/wri/wr-98-99/>)
- 8 Average annual Official Development Assistance US\$ per capita. Source: see footnote 7.
- 9 Total external debt US\$ million. Source: see footnote 7.

[Table A.8](#) presents my component analysis of these variables. The strong economic development dimension is clear in the results, with such variables as income, GNP per capita, and whether a developing country or not, closely correlated with it. A second dimension exclusively loading the foreign aid and indebtedness variables is also clear, as is the third dimension correlated with the economic growth variables.

These results are interesting in themselves. They indicate that the economic growth of a country is uncorrelated with the foreign aid it receives or gives and its indebtedness, and unrelated to its economic development. More specifically, giving or receiving aid has not increased or lessened the rate of economic growth of these 190 nations.

However, a repeat of this analysis on the 149 nations remaining after I remove the micro-nations has slightly different results. An economic development dimension still emerges as most powerful in accounting for the variance, but now the amount and per capita foreign aid have a negative relationship to the economic growth rate, while foreign indebtedness has a positive correlation with economic growth. These are small dimensions, and the correlations involved are moderate to small, but nonetheless they show that for foreign aid and economic growth, including the very small nations in the analysis can alter the dimensions.

Nonetheless, consistent with the component scores from the analyses of the political, violence, and human development variables, I calculated those for economic development on the 190 nation components. I named them:

Component scores for dim. 1 = EconDevCS

Component scores for dim. 2 = AidDebtCS

Component scores for dim. 3 = EcoGrothCS

Other Variables

I have now reduced all the variables that manifest freedom and human security to their independent dimensions. Before carrying out an overall analysis of them, however, there are important national attributes that I also should include because of their general importance. These are measures of total GNP, population, population growth, area, density, and migrants, among others, and I list them all in [Table A.9](#). These variables may well affect the intercorrelations among the human security dimensions, and their relationship to freedom.

TABLE A.8
Component Analysis of
Economic Development Variables

Orthogonal Rotation

	Dim. 1	Dim. 2	Dim. 3	h²	SMC
PPPpc 41	.96			.92	.94
GNPpc 40	.94			.88	.93
Develo 39	-.91			.83	.8
Income 38	.91			.83	.78
ForAid 44		.78		.61	.26
ForDeb 46		.66		.44	.11
FAidpc 45		.52		.27	.3
E-Grth% 42			.73	.53	.06
E-Impro 43			.7	.49	.17
% variance	43	16	13	72	

Notes

Principle components of 190 nations. Dim. = Dimension

Number of components = eigenvalues over 1.0.

Rotation by varimax

Only loadings at or over an absolute .4 are shown

h² = communality

SMC = squared multiple correlation squared of the variable
on all the others.

Component scores on dimension 1 = EconDevCS

Component scores on dimension 3 = AidDebtCS

Component scores on dimension 2 = EcoGrothCS

TABLE A.9
Other Variables

#	Code	N	Year	Variable	Footnote
47	GNP 47	190	1998	Gross national product	[1]
48	Popula 48	190	1998	Population	[2]
49	Po-Gro 49	190	1998	Population growth rate	[3]
50	Area 50	190	1998	Area	[4]
51	Po-Den 51	190	1998	Population density	[5]
52	Ethnic 52	105	1998	Ethnic fractionalization.	[6]
53	Mig-pc 53	190	1998	Migrants per 1,000 population	[7]
54	Longit 54	190	1998	Longitude.	[8]
55	Latitu 55	190	1998	Latitude.	[9]
56	Locati 56	190	1998	Geographic location	[10]

Footnotes

- 1 GNP \$ billions; missing values filled in with 1995. Source: "2000 World Development Indicators," The World Bank Group. (<http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/databytopic.html>)
- 2 Source: see footnote 1.
- 3 Percent.. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base. (<http://www.census.gov/ftp/pub/ipc/www/idbnew.html>)
- 4 Surface area in thousand sq. km. Source: see footnote 1.
- 5 People per sq. km. Source: see footnote 1.
- 6 Source: Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators; file: Social Indicators and Fixed Factors. (www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm#4).
- 7 Source: see footnote 3.
- 8 Location on north-south geographic axis. Source: see footnote 6
- 9 Location on east-west geographic axis. Source: see footnote 6
- 10 Global position: latitude plus longitude.

[Table A.10](#) shows the four dimensions I found among these variables. None of them are especially strong. The first is an East-West dimension (China, Russia, and India are not too far apart in longitude), with a very small correlation with population density. The second is a population growth dimension, also including migrants as a proportion of the population. The third is a sheer size dimension, including population and area, with a moderate correlation with ethnic fractionalization. The final dimension is a North-South one, with a good correlation with GNP and a small negative correlation with ethnic fractionalization. This means that nations above the equator tend to have higher GNPs and fewer ethnic divisions.

I calculated four component scores and labeled them:

Component scores on dimension 1 = LocationCS

Component scores on dimension 2 = PopGrothCS

Component scores on dimension 3 = SizeCS

Component scores on dimension 4 = NorthSouthCS

All Human Security Variables

I had applied the previous component analysis to violence, human development, and economic development separately, and they clearly showed that one very strong dimension embodying the domains' conceptual meaning well represented each of these domains, such as that of human development. It may be, however, that the variables representing each domain may interact in complex ways to produce quite different dimensions than found for the separate domains. After all, my interest is in human security itself, and not the separate domains.

Accordingly, I did a component analysis of all thirty variables used to encompass the three domains, with the results shown in [Table A.11](#). As one can see, there is one dominant dimension accounting for over half of the variation of 190 nations on these data. This is truly an impressive dimension: it defines a cluster of such variables as those measuring gender equality (GDI-Ra), overall human development (HDI), infant mortality, schooling, income, purchasing power parity per capita, deaths, and instability.

Scores on the first dimension in [Table A.11](#) will provide one overall measure of human security, and I named it:

TABLE A.10
Component Analysis
Of Other Variables

Orthogonal Rotation

	Dim. 1	Dim. 2	Dim. 3	Dim. 4	h²	SMC
Locati 56.	.96				.56	.06
longit 54	.95				.63	.25
Po-Den 51	.4				.88	.63
Po-Gro 49		.92			.67	.28
Migrant 53		.87			.26	.09
area 50			.81		.54	.15
Popula 48			.78		.79	.58
Ethnic 52			.54	-.46	.92	1.
Latitu 55				.7	.58	1.
GNP 47				.68	.97	1.
% variance	21	18	17	13	68	

Notes

Principle components of 190 nations. Dim. = Dimension

Number of components = eigenvalues over 1.0.

Rotation by varimax

Only loadings at or over an absolute .4 are shown

h² = communality

SMC = squared multiple correlation squared of the variable
on all the others.

Component scores on dimension 1 = LocationCS

Component scores on dimension 2 = PopGrothCS

Component scores on dimension 3 = SizeCS

Component scores on dimension 4 = NorthSouthCS

TABLE A.11
Component Analysis of ALL
Human Security Variables

Orthogonal Rotation*

	Dim. 1	Dim. 2	Dim. 3	h2	SMC
GDI-Ra 36	-.98			.31	.54
GDI-Val 37	.98			.63	.73
HDI 20	.97			.66	.91
InfMor 25	-.92			.95	.99
SecSch 27	.91			.85	.83
ChiMor 26	-.90			.84	.93
LifExp 23	.90			.88	.97
HPI 22	-.89			.31	.50
Ed-Ind 29	.89			.91	.96
BirthR 31	-.89			.90	.95
Educat 28	.87			.85	.92
Litera 30	.86			.82	.86
Income 38	.83			.89	.98
PPPpc 41	.82		-.46	.88	.97
SexLiter 35	-.75			.84	.91
GNPpc 40	.74		-.53	.37	.73
Unstab 18	-.74			.58	.71
SexInfM 33.	.69			.55	.68
Develo 39	-.64		.60	.63	.71
Deaths 19	-.60		-.48	.97	.99
SexLifeExp 34	.60			.97	.99
Violen 17	-.49			.80	.86
HDirise 21		.85		.82	.86
E-Impro 43		.71		.88	.94
LifExpRise 24		.52		.91	.97
Unequal 32		-.42		.09	.34
ForAid 44				.60	.69
ForDeb 46				.23	.30
FAidpc 45				.27	.39
E-Grth% 42				.13	.25
	51	9	7	68	

Notes

Principle components of 190 nations. Dim. = Dimension

Number of components = eigenvalues over 1.28.

Rotation by varimax

Only loadings at or over an absolute .4 are shown

h2 = communality

SMC = squared multiple correlation squared of the variable on all the others.

Component scores on dimension 1 = AllHumanSecVarCS

Component scores on dimension 1 = AllHumanSecVarCS

An alternative, and in my view, more desirable way of measuring overall human security is to integrate into one indicator the component scores from the violence, human development, and economic development domains. Each of these domains is important in itself, and the three-component analyses of [Tables A.4, A.6, and A.8](#) brought out a very strong dimension defining each domain. However, these dimensions lost their distinction in the overall component analysis of [Table A.11](#).

Then the question is how to put these dimensions together to create one measure of human security. Now, the component scores on each of these dimensions represent an indicator of its domain. They create the *space* of human security. I can analyze these indicators themselves to determine the dimensions of this space, and whether there is one very strong dimension spanning this space. In this I would be seeking a common factor, and not as above, a component that encompasses all the variance in the data, including that of a variable's correlation with itself. Here, I want just that variance among the three domains that is common to them. By assumption, human security should be such an empirically unitary concept. Therefore, I will apply a common factor analysis, and my estimate of the initial communality of each variable (component scores) before iteration to a common factor solution will be its squared multiple correlation with the others.

[Table A.12](#) presents the results and [Table A.13](#) summarizes all the component scores I have so far calculated, including those from the analysis of [Table A.12](#).

From [Table A.12](#) one can see that there is very close and exclusive intercorrelation among the human security component scores, as should be the case if the concept "human security" is not only theoretical, but empirical as well. The only other scores correlated with human security are those defining a geographical north-south dimension. With a correlation of .53 with the dimension it indicates that human security tends to be higher among nations in northern latitudes.

This completes the task of defining measures of freedom, human security, and violence. I can now use these measures to assess how well freedom predicts to human security.

TABLE A.12
Common Factor Analysis of
Human Security Component Scores

Human Security Component Scores Only Comp. Scores	Factor 1			Including Other		
	Factor 1	h²	SMC	Factor 1	h²	SMC
ViolenceCS	-.85	.72	.61	-.81	.66	.64
HumDevCS	.83	.69	.66	.88	.77	.71
EconDevCS	.81	.66	.55	.82	.67	.6
HumDevRiseCS		.04	.30		.02	.36
EcoGrothCS		.01	.20		.00	.27
AidDebtCS		.00	.02		.00	.07
LocationCS					.00	.03
PopGrothCS					.04	.17
SizeCS					.01	.12
NorthSouthCS				.53	.28	.37
	35	35		25	25	

Notes

Common factor analysis of 190 nations.

Number of factors = eigenvalues over 1.00.

h² = communality

Only loadings at or over an absolute .4 are shown

SMC = squared multiple correlation squared of the variable on all the others.

Factor scores on factor 1 of human security component scores only =HumanSecFS

TABLE A.13
Component And Factor Scores

Domain	Scores	% total Variance	Source
Freedom	FreedomCS	49	Table A.2
	FreeChgCS	21	Table A.2
Violence	ViolenceCS	61	Table A.4
Human Development	HumDevCS	67	Table A.6
	HumDevRiseCS	11	Table A.6
Economic Development	EconDevCS	49	Table A.8
	AidDebtCS	16	Table A.8
	EcoGrothCS	13	Table A.8
Other	LocationCS	21	Table A.10
	PopGrothCS	18	Table A.10
	SizeCS	17	Table A.10
	NorthSouthCS	13	Table A.10
Human Security	AllHumanSecVarCS	51	Table A.11
	HumanSecFS	35	Table A.12

Notes

% total variance is the percent of variance accounted for by the dimension upon which the scores were calculated. This indicates the strength of the dimension, and thus scores, in accounting for the variation in all the variables in the analysis.

DOES FREEDOM PREDICT HUMAN SECURITY?

Freedom is a Common Factor of Human Security

I now want to test the argument of this book that the freedom of people to pursue their own desires and hold the government responsible for its actions creates a spontaneous social field within which humans are most secure--violence is minimal, and human and economic development are best achieved. That is, freedom predicts human security. There are three ways of testing this. One is to include the freedom scores with those measuring human security and do a common factor analysis on them. This will then show whether there is a common factor underlying human security that centrally includes freedom. A second way is to do a contingency analysis of different levels of freedom versus levels of human security. And finally, one can do a regression analysis of the human security scores onto those measuring freedom. I will apply all three approaches, and by theory they should show a consistent relationship of freedom to human security.

In [Table A.14](#) I present a common factor analysis of the two freedom scores along with the forty other variables on which I did the above component analyses. I did this analysis for those who wonder if I lost some important variance by doing the component analysis of the separate domains and then intercorrelating the resulting scores with freedom. [Table A.14](#) does show that I capture over 50 percent of the variance in freedom scores (FreedomCS) by the first factor, which also includes almost all the human development variables and the major ones defining economic development, such as GNP per capita and high income. There is also a very minor residual economic development factor 3, but it involves no freedom or violence variables. Were this all the analyses I were to do, I would have to conclude that the relationship between freedom and human security was close--involving just one major factor, *a factor of freedom*.

But a problem with the results in [Table A.14](#) is that the larger number of variables for Human Development and the inclusion of the "Other" variables added variance that could have skewed the results. However, one reason I did the separate component analyses on each domain reported in [Tables A.4, A.6, A.8, and A.10](#), was to avoid this problem, and to partial out of the results the major sources of variance in these data and to reduce them to their independent dimensions.

Now, [Table A.15](#) shows the result of a common factor analysis of these factor scores, and illustrates the virtue of reducing the variance in the separate domains to component scores prior to the common factor analysis. It shows that human development, economic development, violence, and freedom, tightly cluster into a common factor. All have correlations over .83 with it, and freedom shares with

TABLE A.14
Common Factor Analysis of
Freedom Scores and All Other Variables

Domain	Scores/ Variables	Orthogonal Solution Factors			h ²	SMC
		1	2	3		
Freedom	FreedomCS	.78			.70	.87
	FreeChgCS				.06	.34
Violence	Violen 17	-.48			.28	.65
	Unstab 18	-.74			.61	.80
	Deaths 19	-.57			.41	.99
Human Development	HDI 20	.97			.95	.99
	HDIrise 21		.88		.88	.86
	HPI 22	-.88			.79	.96
	LifExp 23	.90			.83	.98
	LifExpRise 24				.14	.56
	InfMor 25	-.92			.89	.96
	ChiMor 26	-.90			.87	.96
	SecSch 27	.91			.83	.93
	Educat 28	.86			.80	.88
	Ed-Ind 29	.88			.88	.98
	Litera 30	.85			.86	.97
	BirthR 31	-.89			.87	1.00
	Unequal 32		-.48	.41	.54	.84
	SexInfM 33.	.68			.53	.76
	SexLifeExp 34	.59			.52	.72
SexLiter 35	-.73			.61	.76	
GDI-Ra 36	-.98			.98	.99	
GDI-Val 37	.97			.95	.99	
Economic Development	Income 38	.83			.78	.87
	Develo 39	-.64		-.54	.73	.88
	GNPpc 40	.75		.50	.85	.96
	PPPpc 41	.83		.49	.94	.98
	E-Grth% 42				.04	.40
	E-Impro 43		.65		.51	.76
	ForAid 44				.09	.37
	FAidpc 45				.18	.44
ForDeb 46				.03	.41	
Other	GNP 47				.08	.45
	Popula 48				.02	.46
	Po-Gro 49	-.50		.50	.50	1.00
	area 50				.01	.55
	Po-Den 51				.14	.65

Ethnic 52	-.42		.21	.44
Migrant 53		.59	.40	1.00
Longit 54			.04	1.00
Latitu 55	.42		.18	1.00
Locati 56.			.04	1.00
% variance	39	7	6	51

Notes

After inspecting the eigenvalues and loadings,
only three relevant factors rotated.

h^2 = communality.

Only loadings at or over an absolute .4 are shown

TABLE A.15
Common Factor Analysis of Freedom,
Human Security and Other Scores

Scores	All Component Scores				Freedom and Human Security Component Scores		
	Orthogonal Rotation				One Factor Result		
	Fac. 1	Fac. 2	h^2	SMC	Fac. 1	h^2	SMC
FreedomCS	.86		.80	.79	.92	.85	.77
EconDevCS	.86		.75	.76	.82	.67	.71
HumDevCS	.85		.73	.72	.80	.64	.66
ViolenceCS	-.83		.73	.71	-.84	.71	.68
NorthSouthCS	.52		.39	.42	X	X	X
EcoGrothCS		.67	.45	.31		.02	.27
HumDevRiseCS		.59	.38	.36		.05	.31
PopGrothCS			.07	.18	X	X	X
Size			.02	.13	X	X	X
FreeChgCS			.02	.11		.01	.10
AidDebtCS			.01	.08		.03	.03
LocationCS			.00	.08	X	X	X
% variance	27	9	36		37	37	

Notes

Number of components = eigenvalues over 1.0.

Rotation by varimax

h^2 = communality

SMC = squared multiple correlation squared of
the variable on all the others.

Only loadings at or over an absolute .4 are shown

economic development the highest correlation of .86. Among all the "Other" variables, only the geographic north-south dimension has a correlation with this factor, showing that the relationship of freedom to human security tends to dominate among northern nations. If only I include the freedom and human security related scores, as done in the right half of [Table A.15](#), then as should be the case if freedom is as important as stated here, there is only one common factor among these scores and freedom is the central score on it, sharing 85 percent of its variance (see the communality h^2). Violence is next in variance shared, followed by the two development scores. This alone is enough to show *freedom is the critical factor in explaining and improving human security*.

To understand why this should be so, consider the nature of common factor analysis. If there is a common cause underlying the variation of nations on several variables, then these variables will form a common factor and that variable that best reflects the underlying cause will have the highest loading on this factor. As I have argued in this book, freedom is the underlying cause for human security, and indeed, I find those indicators of human security clustering with freedom at their center.

Over all, then, it should be clear from the common factor analyses that *the freedom or nonfreedom of a people is the common factor in their human security or insecurity*.

Human Security and Violence are Contingent on Freedom

Are different levels in a people's human security contingent on the level--degree--of their freedom? I partly answered this in the previous section, but contingency analysis adds to the previous analysis in two ways. It shows whether there may be a nonlinear relationship in the scores, and it gives a simpler, and therefore for some, more interpretable representation of the results.

Now the component scores for freedom, and the factor scores for human security (see [Table A.13](#)) provide us with interval scale data such that I can simply use the product moment correlation and its significance test to judge contingency. Then I would find that the correlation between the scores for FreedomCS and HumSecFS is .84, and that with violence is -.77, both significant at $p < .0001$.

I also can show the bivariate plot of these correlations, list the residuals of their bivariate regressions, and do nonlinear regressions as well, which I will report in the next section. More interesting and revealing here, however, would be a simple contingency table. It clearly would show how the nations at different levels in human

security are dispersed for different levels of freedom.

Accordingly, I divided the component scores for FreedomCS and HumSecFS into four levels of near equal numbers of nations, and calculated the four-by-four contingency table shown in [Table A.16](#). The scores are untransformed, so the distribution of nations in the [Table A.16](#) is of interest for showing the basic, raw count. Even then, the distribution is as one would expect from this book: as I go from freedom to unfree, the number of nations with high human security scores decreases from the most at 39 to 0.

The best way to view the contingencies is along the diagonal going, which changes from 31 nations that are Unfree and have low HumSecFS to 39 nations that are Free and have high HumSecFS. All the counts on this diagonal are the highest, and show a stepwise decrease as I move cell by cell away from the diagonal; and the contingency table of percents in the bottom half of [Table A.16](#) makes this contingency more evident. Clearly, human security is contingent on freedom, with a very significant chi-square $p < .0001$.

[Table A.17](#) lists the contingent distribution of nations by name. As one can see, except for the African developing nation of Botswana, there is no other that is free and below high medium in human security--most by far are high in human security. At the other end, there are no nations that are both unfree and high in human security, but three socialist and one former socialist nation are high medium. The large majority of unfree nations are low in human security.

Along with human and economic development components, human security also includes violence. Therefore, the relationship between freedom and violence is imbedded in the contingency results shown. Nonetheless, the relationship of freedom to violence is of special interest, given the chapters devoted to it in this book, and is therefore given in [Tables A.18](#) and [A.19](#). The results are not much different from those for human security as far as the count is concerned, although the nations that make up each count are changed. Note, for example, that, while there are no unfree nations with low violence, three former Russian republics and Vietnam are low medium. The data were coded for 1997-98, and regarding the former republics, subsequently had considerable instability and violence.

[Tables A.18](#) and [A.19](#) show a much greater contingency for violence than I would have expected given the theoretical relationship of violence to freedom. The less freedom a people have, the greater the likelihood of government instability, internal and foreign war, and democide. If great violence is to occur, it will be among the least

TABLE A.16
Observed Frequencies for Freedom and Human Security Ratings

Freedom Ratings	Human Security Ratings				Totals
	Low	Low Medium	High Medium	High	
Free	0	1	7	39	47
Partly Free	0	13	28	7	48
Partly Unfree	16	22	9	1	48
Unfree	31	12	4	0	47
Totals	47	48	48	47	190

Percents of Overall Total for Freedom and Human Security Ratings

	Low	Low Medium	High Medium	High	Totals
Free	0	0.53	3.68	20.53	24.7
Partly Free	0	6.84	14.74	3.68	25.3
Partly Unfree	8.42	11.58	4.74	0.53	25.3
Unfree	16.32	6.32	2.11	0	24.7
Totals	24.7	25.3	25.3	24.7	100

Chi Square = 192.2

Chi Square significance = $p < .0001$

TABLE A.17
Distribution of Nations on Freedom Versus Human Security

		Human Security							
		Low	Low Medium	High Medium	High				
Free			Botswana	Estonia Hungary Nauru Palau St. Kitts/Nevis Trinidad/Tob. Uruguay	Andorra Australia Austria Bahamas Barbados Belgium Canada Chile	Costa Rica Cyprus Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Iceland	Ireland Israel Italy Japan Liechtenstein Luxembourg Malta Mauritius	Monaco Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal San Marino Seychelles Singapore	Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan United Kingdom United States
Partly Free									
Partly Unfree									
Unfree									

Notes

Contingency table of FreedomCS versus HumSecFS. See Table A.13 for variable codes
See Table A.16 for the cell count.

free nations. However, the precipitating events for such violence might not have occurred, as with the unfree, low medium violence, nations mentioned above. Therefore, the theoretical space of violence and freedom and one often found empirically, is triangular as shown in [Figure A.2.8](#) This means that, probabilistically, freedom is a necessary but not sufficient cause for violence. But, what I have done here is to measure violence by a variety of measures, as listed in [Table A.3](#), some of which involve ratings of each country as to its instability and likelihood of violence. Violence need not have actually happened for a nation to be high on this measure. Consequently, I no longer have the triangular space of violence, but one more like an ellipse angled upward toward less freedom and more violence, as will be evidence in the regressions below. And thus I get the concentration of nations along the freedom-violence diagonal in [Tables A.18](#) and [A.19](#).

Now regarding human security as a whole, [Tables A.16](#) and [A.17](#) well show that *the human security or violence of a nation is contingent on the freedom of its people*.

Freedom Predicts Human Security

By prediction here I mean that one can find an equation for freedom and human security or violence such that if one plugs into the equation how a nation scores on freedom, one will be able to closely estimate level of human security.

To begin the search for such an equation, [Table A.20](#) shows the bivariate regression of common factor scores of human security onto Freedom's component scores. The regression is very significant and accounts for 71 percent of the variance. By social science standards, this is a very good fit. But the two plots, especially the residuals versus the fitted (regression estimates), are not satisfactory. It is cone shaped, with a much tighter fit (prediction) of human security at the high end. These plots suggest that I should transform the scores on either or both freedom and human security before the regression, or that I apply some form of nonlinear equation.

Now, the contingency tables in [Table A.16](#) and the plot of the residuals against the human security in [Table A.20](#) do not show much nonlinearity in the data. I further confirm this by calculating a polynomial regression of degree 2, and then degree 3, and growth, logarithmic, power, and exponential regressions, and found no meaningful improvement in the prediction.

That suggests I transform the scores. Given the plots, and the theoretical power of freedom, two transformation seem best. One is to expand both freedom and human

TABLE A.20
Bivariate Regression Analysis of Human Security on Freedom

Summary
HumSecFS vs. FreedomCS



Nations	190
R	.84
R Squared	.71
Adjusted R Sq.	.71

Intercept
FreedomCS

Coefficients

HumSecFS vs. FreedomCS

Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
.00	.04	.00	.00	>.9999
.79	.04	.84	21.47	<.0001



security by some multiplicative transformations of each. I did this and after some experimentation, found that regressing the cubic transformation of human security onto a polynomial of degree 2 gave a regression correlation of .89, an increase in 8 percent of the variance predicted. Still, the residuals showed that more variance could be predicted.

Accordingly, I listed the residuals and found four nations to be major outliers: Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These are oil producing nations whose commercial oil profits provide resources for their economic and human development far exceeding that normally available to other nations. Removing these four nations from the analysis raised the multiple correlation to .92, or 84 percent of the variance.

It is tempting to stop here, for it is already clear that I can well predict human security from freedom, even including the four oil producing states in the regression. However, the analysis of residuals shows that even more improvement is possible. The highest positive versus the lowest negative residuals suggest that there is a cultural factor involved--that countries in Asia tend to have higher human security per level of freedom than expected, while those in black Africa tend to be lower. Therefore, I also included two dummy variables in the regressions. One is whether a nation is Asian (including East and South East Asian nations, and Burma and Thailand) = 1; or not = 0. The other is whether the nation is African (excluding North Africa): if so =1; if not = 0.

[Table A.21](#) shows the result of these transformations and including the two dummy variables. With a multiple R of .94 the equation accounts for 89 percent of the variance in human security. This is as good as social science results get on such diverse variables as included here. One expects very high predictability when, for example, regressing different measures of economic development on each other, such as GNP per capita, energy consumption, and telephones per capita. However, freedom and human security are different animals, and that freedom gives us such a high prediction of human security is solid evidence for the power of freedom. Also, the four independent variables are all significant according to the t-test, with all except the Asian dummy variable having $p < .0001$

The [Table A.21](#) plot of human security onto the fitted scores from the equation are very good, showing virtually no curve and almost equal dispersion. But, the number of residuals below zero is 87 versus 99 above, which shows a slight imbalance. This can be seen better by the plot of the residuals against the estimates (fitted) in [Table A.21](#). Ideally, the dispersion of values should show a rough circle, which is a little off

TABLE A.21
Multiple Regression Analysis of Freedom vs Human Security

Regression Summary
CubeHumSecFS Dependent


Count	186
Num. Missing	4
R	0.94
R Squared	0.89
Adjusted R Sq.	0.88

Intercept
 FreedomCS
 SqFreedomCS
 Asia
 Africa


Regression Coefficients
CubeHumSecFS vs. 4 Independents

Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
4.70	.75	4.70	6.24	<.0001
-1.13	.18	-1.16	-6.20	<.0001
1.94	.18	1.98	10.66	<.0001
.25	.09	.07	2.71	.0075
-.48	.07	-.20	-7.11	<.0001

Dependent vs. Fitted



Residuals vs. Fitted



Note: the Z on the CUBEHumSecFS means that the dependent variable was standardized before regression.

along the fitted axis. Also, one can see better in this plot the asymmetry in residuals. Although there is still a little room for an improvement, I am happy with an already incredible multiple R of .94

All this again proves that *freedom is basic to human security--the more freedom people have the more their human security.*

Freedom Predicts Violence

Although violence is an aspect of human security, because of the special importance of violence per se in this book, it is of interest to determine how well freedom predicts violence alone. I followed for violence the same steps involved in the previous human security regressions.

First, [Table A.22](#) looks at the bivariate regression and its plots. Even this simple regression gives us a very significant prediction of 59 percent of the variance in violence for 190 nations. However, as the residuals show I can improve this, since they fall within a cone even more evident than for human security in [Table A.20](#). Clearly, I should do a transformation of some sort on one or both scores and perhaps I should add some helper variables to the regression.

First, consider the logic of this relationship. In my [Statistics of Democide](#) on this site, I showed that the power of government over a nation had a multiplicative effect on democide, the deadliest form of violence. The square of power accounted for more variance in democide than did power alone. Such power is the opposite of freedom and implies that by logging the violence scores I should improve the regression fit. I did this and raised the variance predicted from 59 percent to 62 percent. This hardly improved the residual plots, however.

An analysis of the high positive and negative residuals suggested two things. One is that the degree of human development in a nation tends to inhibit violence--not as much as does freedom, but in addition to it. The partial correlation of logged violence with freedom holding human development constant is $-.57$; for human development holding freedom constant it is $-.39$, a difference between 32 and 15 percent of the variance in violence.

Second, religion seems to play a role in violence. Specifically, Christian nations seem to have much less violence than expected given the freedom of their people; and Moslem countries seem to have more. Therefore, two dummy variables were coded,

TABLE A.22
Bivariate Regression Analysis of Violence on Freedom



Summary
FreedomCS vs. ViolenceFS

Nations	190
R	0.77
R Squared	0.59
Adjusted R Sq.	0.59

Intercept
FreedomCS

Coefficients
ViolenceCS vs. FreedomCS

Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
.00	.05	.00	.00	>.9999
-.77	.05	-.77	-16.47	<.0001



where a nation with most its people being Christian = 1, not = 0; most Moslem = 1, not = 0.

[Table A.23](#) gives the results. The addition of the three variables to freedom gives a multiple R of .86, which means that I can predict 74 percent of the variance in logged violence. This is very good, better than one should expect given that freedom is necessary but not sufficient for the actual occurrence of domestic and foreign violence, even with the measurement of violence by component scores (see [Table A.4](#)).

The regression coefficients in [Table A.23](#) are all very significant, freedom being the most significant by far. Moreover, my plot of the residuals against the fitted shows a near circular distribution of nations, which suggest that there is not much more I can do to improve the prediction. Nor are there any excessive outliers that I might remove, as shown in the plot of residuals versus the dependent variable.

In all, these analyses of freedom's relationship to violence well prove that *the amount of war, revolution, turmoil, and domestic unrest and instability experienced by a people depend fundamentally on the degree to which they are free. Free people have the least violence; the least free the most.*

CONCLUSION

For all nations 1997 to 1998, the human security of their people, their human and economic development, the violence in their lives and the political instability of their institutions, is theoretically and empirically dependent on their freedom--their civil rights and political liberties, rule of law, and the accountability of their government. One can well predict a people's human security by knowing how free they are.

Moreover, just considering the violence, instability, and total deaths a people can suffer, the more freedom they have the less of this they will endure.

These results are fully consistent with work done on war, revolution, and democide in other studies for different years and samples.⁹ The work on democide in Part 3 of my [Statistics of Democide](#), for example, was for the years 1900 to 1987 and showed that the more freedom of a people, the less likely their government's genocide and mass murder.



TABLE A.23
Multiple Regression Analysis of Diolence

Summary
LogViolenceCS vs. 4 Independents

Nations	190	
R	.86	Intercept
R Squared	.74	FreedomCS
Adjusted R Squared	.73	HumDevCS
		Moslem
		Christian

Coefficients
LogViolenceCS vs. 4 Independents

Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
.84	.03	.84	30.04	<.0001
-.08	.01	-.65	-11.86	<.0001
-.04	.01	-.38	-7.05	<.0001
-.04	.01	-.16	-3.35	0.001
.03	.01	.15	2.97	0.0034



As clear from the statistics, I am not dealing simply with the presence or absence of freedom, but with a continuum. That is why I point out that "the *more* freedom...", or "the *less* freedom..." As noted in [Chapter 8](#), the implication of this is profound for the foreign policies of the democracies and democratic activists. It is that *even if we just improve the human rights of a people, even if we promote some democratization of their political institutions, it will improve their human security, and reduce the violence that inflicts them.*

NOTES

1. For a conceptual and technical introduction to the correlation, see on this site "[Understanding Correlation.](#)"
 2. For a conceptual introduction and the technical terms and concepts used here, such as dimension, rotation, orthogonal, factor score, common factor analysis, etc, see on this site "[Understanding Factor Analysis](#)".
 3. For a relevant analysis on this site, see "[The Socio-Economic And Geographic Context Of Democide](#)".
 4. Interestingly, sometimes the reason for missing data is political. Out of deference to mainland China, for example, the United Nations generally refuses to give statistics for Taiwan.
 5. The correlation matrix would be nongramian. One can write a factor analysis program that can handle this matrix, but it would produce negative eigenvalues, which means that many of the factor loadings would be inflated.
 6. I made all estimates using the TREND function in Mac Excel 98.
 7. For the program, see the [Statview](#) web site. What the program terms "iterated principal axis" is really a common factor analysis, with a choice of the initial communality of a variable being the squared multiple correlation coefficient (SMC), the highest off-diagonal correlation for a variable, or simply 1.
 8. See, for example, the empirical results in [Figure 2](#) and [Figure 4](#) of my "[Libertarianism and International Violence](#)". The theoretical space is also shown in [Figure 2](#) of my "[Libertarianism, Violence Within States, and the Polarity Principle](#)".
 9. For a comparison of these studies, see on this site [Chapter 35](#) of [The Conflict Helix](#); Part V of [War, Power, Peace](#); "[Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations](#)"; and Part 1 of [Power Kills](#).
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