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Freedom's Principles

R.J. Rummel

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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PREFACE

In Terms of Freedom

This is a book for those who want to foster freedom at home and abroad. If you believe in individual freedom as a right of all people, and if you believe that free people in free nations have an obligation to help those who suffer repression and enslavement under the world's thug regimes, then Freedom's Principles is for you. The pages that follow offer nothing less than a fundamental understanding of the psychological, socio-economic, and political roots of a worldview that I call *freedomism*.

So what is this freedomism? Why do I use this new term, instead of adopting a conventional political party label? I might explain by considering the political labels of my own country, the United States. Looking at American politics alone, it can be readily understood that the general positions of the Democrats, Republicans, Reform Party, Libertarian Party, Green Party, Socialist Party, and Communist Party, not to mention the plethora of even smaller groups, do not emphasize freedom at home *and* abroad as a core theme, although some of their political leaders may come close to doing so at times. Republicans, for example, if I may take President Bush as most representative, are freedomists in their foreign policy, to a much lesser extent in their economic policies, and not at all in their traditional social conservatism.

Then there are the Democrats who are keen to spread democratic freedom abroad, if we are to believe the public statements of such leading figures as Bill and Hillary Clinton. In practice, this means an emphasis on working through the United Nations, and the maintenance of stability in international relations. National defense is also important for Democrats, but, as an issue, it ranks second to international aid, to sensitivity to the "international community", and to "building bridges." Moreover, Democrats are soft socialists at home, believing in high taxes, government economic regulation and controls, in pursuit of a "social welfare" agenda. That said, American Democrats do also emphasize freedom, and not only rhetorically, but also in their policies, for the American citizen, at least.

What, then, of the libertarians? For sure, the beliefs of libertarians move us closer to what I mean by freedomism. As a young man, I was a self-professed democratic socialist, but in the early 1970s, under the hammer blows of Ludwig von Mises, F.A. Hayek, and Milton Friedman, I gave up my belief in socialism in favor of democratic libertarianism. And libertarian is what I called myself until recently. Indeed, I remain libertarian in domestic policy. I contend that the more domestic freedom there is from regulation, government control, taxation, and oppressive laws, the better. But only up to a point. I am not an anarchist. I believe that social justice means minimal government consistent with the guaranteed protection of equal civil and political rights for all. Yet this is a view that is commonly held by libertarian thinkers. Why, then, do I no longer describe my own view as libertarian? The reason lies beyond domestic politics.

On foreign policy, the libertarian is typically an isolationist, fundamentally opposed to foreign involvements and interventions, a perspective that has led some libertarians into an odd coalition with the democratic socialist and the communist (Marxist) left. Put simply, the libertarian argument is, "As domestic politics should be free, let international relations also be free. Let there be free trade and commerce, and freedom for other countries to do whatever they want with their people. What goes on in such countries is not our business."

In my view, the libertarian making such an argument is simply blinded by his faith in freedom, seemingly unaware that everything demands contextual qualification. Should those with a dangerous infectious disease remain free, when they could spread it everywhere, killing maybe hundreds with it? Unfortunately, by their isolationism, libertarians make life easier for the gangs of thugs (blandly called dictatorships) that murder, torture, and oppress their people as a routine matter of policy.

Not our business, our libertarian says, even though his fundamental belief in freedom is being violated in the most horrible ways, and even though he knows this to be the case. In his isolationism, the libertarian implies that since it's somebody else that's suffering, not him, or his loved ones, or his friends, it's okay. This is a position I have found myself unable to hold, and not because I care any less about my own personal security. Indeed, it is my contention that the isolationist ultimately plays fast and loose with his own welfare and that of his loved ones. For in an age of nuclear weapons and readily transportable biological, free nations can no longer sit back and ignore what goes on elsewhere in the production and deliverability of such weapons. Opposition to the rapacious affairs of thug regimes, including military intervention, is, in my view, absolutely necessary to secure and defend existing democracies, leaving aside the issue of advancing democracy further throughout our world.

In short, I believe that thug regimes cannot be trusted with either the possession or the capability for production of weapons of mass destruction. Yet the isolationists, whatever their party, seem willing to let the thugs rule not only their enslaved peoples, but, in due course, the world, too. As a freedomist, I say this is wrong. I believe that it is the responsibility of those within free nations to promote the freedom of all the world's peoples, and if tyrant leaders anywhere become a threat to the free world, as did those who ruled Iraq and Afghanistan until recently, and as those of Iran are threatening to do now, then that free world must take action, including military action if all else fails, for the sake of all the world.

This, then, is my position. I am a freedomist, and I believe many others are as well. I intend this book to give substance to this belief, to provide not only the intellectual understanding of why the political world is as it is today, but also a path to a future world that is free, bountiful, and at peace. This is an ambitious undertaking, to be sure. Only you, the reader, can judge whether I succeed.

Chapter 1

On Freedom

*All religions, arts, and sciences are branches of the same
tree. All these aspirations are directed toward ennobling
man's life, lifting it from the sphere of mere physical
existence and leading the individual towards freedom.*

—Albert Einstein

By freedom, I mean a political condition in which an individual can:

- speak his mind freely,
- join and profess any religion,
- create or join any association,
- buy or sell goods in an open market,
- own property as an exclusive right,
- determine who governs him.

In addition, such freedom must:

- be consistent with a like freedom of others,
- be guaranteed by a fundamental body of laws he had a part in creating.

Whatever freedoms people have cannot exist in a political vacuum. There must be some way of assuring and protecting their rights—their freedom—and government is the answer. Even those libertarians, who are the most ardent proponents of the maximum freedom, and believe that government is essentially evil, still accept that some degree of government is still necessary or inevitable. But not just any government will do. It must be one that not only commands obedience to its laws, but in its very organization embodies the meaning of freedom. This is democracy.

As a concept, democracy has developed many meanings since its first use by the ancient Greeks, and even its well-established meanings have changed. Although limited to free males, this idea of direct participation of the people in government was the essence of democracy up to modern times; now it is usually known as pure or direct democracy.

The writers of the American Constitution disliked direct democracy, although otherwise they favored freedom. For one thing, it was impractical for nations of millions of people, or even for cities of hundreds of thousands. Clearly, a representative system was necessary. For another, they felt that direct democracy, as it was understood, was mob

rule—government by the ill-informed, who would simply use government to their own advantage. Therefore, they established a republic, not a democracy—as political philosophers then defined those terms.

A republic is based on the consent and will of the people. It is implemented through a buffer of elected representatives and indirect election, as by the president and vice president of the United States. An electoral college elects them, with the electors chosen by the voters of each state and their number dependent upon the number of senators and representatives each state sends to Congress.

But, in the twentieth century, the understanding of democracy as the direct participation of citizens has been transformed to mean any government in which the people elect their representatives, that is, any republican or representative government.

Freedom, however, may still not fully exist within a democracy. It depends on the kind of democracy. All democracies have an electoral system through which people choose their representatives and leaders, and thus give their consent to be governed and to have those representatives communicate their interests. The manner in which democracies conduct their elections varies from one to another, but all share the following:

- Regular elections for high office
- A secret ballot
- A franchise that includes nearly the whole adult population
- Open, competitive elections

Having a near-universal franchise is an entirely modern addition to the idea of democracy. Not long ago, governments that were called democratic excluded from the franchise all slaves and women, as did the United States through much of its history (male, black American former slaves got the right to vote after the Civil War; women did not get this right until 1920, when Congress passed the Nineteenth Amendment), as well as all non-slave males who did not meet certain property or literacy requirements. We now consider it perverse to call democratic any country that so restricts the vote, as did the apartheid regime in South Africa that limited voting to the minority population of whites.

Real competition in the elections is another key requirement. Many communist nations exhibited all the electoral characteristics mentioned in their periodic election of legislators handpicked by the Communist Party, who then simply rubber-stamped what the Party wanted. "Competitive" means that those running for office reflect different political beliefs and positions on the issues. If they do not, as in the communist nations and present-day Iran, then the government is not democratic.

Besides its electoral characteristics, one kind of democracy has characteristics crucial to freedom, such as the freedom of religion and speech, and the freedom to organize political groups or parties, even if they represent a small radical minority, that then

nominate their members to run for high office. In addition, these democracies provide an open, transparent government such that one knows how their representatives voted and debated.

One of the most important of the individual rights helping to guarantee freedom is the right to a fair trial under law. Above the state there must be a law that structures the government, elaborates the reciprocal rights and duties of the government and the people, and which government members must observe when implementing policy. This is a constitution, which may be a single document, as in the United States, or a set of documents, statutes, and traditions, as in Great Britain.

If a democracy recognizes these rights and the individual freedoms listed, we call it a liberal democracy. But if it has only the electoral characteristics but suppresses freedom of speech, possesses leaders that put themselves above the law and representatives that make and vote on policies in secret, then we can call it a procedural, or better, an electoral democracy.

For American readers particularly, there is conceptual confusion over the term "liberal" that requires clarification. In the mid-seventeenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, political philosophers emphasized the root meaning of liberal, which is from the Latin *liberalis* for "free man" and the French *liber* for "free." It stood for an emphasis on individual liberty—on the freedom of a people versus their government. A liberal slogan of the time was "that government is best which governs least."

In modern times, though, the term "liberal" has evolved to mean a belief that government is a tool to improve society and deal with the problems of poverty, discrimination, and monopolies, among others, and to improve public health, education, social security, the environment, and working conditions. There is no less an emphasis on human rights, a dedication that is shared by Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and modern liberals, but today's liberals no longer accept minimum government, nor do they see in the government the danger that classical liberals attributed to it.

My understanding of "liberal democracy" however, draws on the root definition of "liberal" and not its modern usage. A liberal democracy means that a people rule themselves through periodic elections in which nearly all adults can participate; they elect their highest leaders to the offices for which they are eligible, and they are governed under the rule of law that guarantees them their human rights.

I can now state the first of Freedom's Principles – the Freedom Principle:

To be free is to be governed by a liberal democracy.

At this point, I should mention some possible misunderstandings of freedom.

Misunderstanding 1. *"In most liberal democracies, such as Germany and Sweden, the government is very intrusive into people's lives, and highly regulates business. Therefore, these people really are not free."*

There is no absolute freedom, not even in an anarchy. Even those cultural norms and mores, which are not seen as political, are nonetheless a framework of regulation. What we can say is that if a people are able to change the laws and their governors, are free to criticize the government, organize a political party, and attend a church of their choice, and these rights are guaranteed, then they are reasonably free compared to electoral democracies and nondemocracies. Keep in mind that what regulations there are, what intrusions exist, are due to the political choices of a free people. One then cannot argue that they are unfree, if they continue to be empowered to change these choices.

Misunderstanding 2. *"Your idea of freedom is culturally and racially loaded, since liberal democracies are virtually all in Europe or their former white colonies."*

No, liberal democracies are spread throughout the world. There are now 31 electoral democracies and 89 liberal ones. The latter include the European and North American democracies, as well as such diverse nations as Andorra, Bahamas, Belize, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominica, Grenada, Iceland, Japan, Kiribati, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Nauru, Palau, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, South Africa, South Korea, Suriname, and Taiwan. This variety of cultures, races, ethnicities, and geography should dispel the notion that liberal democracy is a peculiarly Western type of government that the West is trying to push on the rest of the world.

Misunderstanding 3. *"How can one be free when big business controls where we work, what we can buy, and for how much?"*

There is a close correlation between liberal democracy and the free market. Even those liberal democracies seen as socialistic, such as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, have relatively free markets. Such economies are dynamic, with big businesses coming and going, and with no single business dominating any sector of the economy for long. Ford Motor Company, U.S. Steel, and IBM were once considered virtually permanent monopolies, but they are not monopolies today. Now, even Microsoft is losing its software dominance.

PART I. PSYCHOLOGY OF FREEDOM

> *There are two sentences inscribed upon the Delphic oracle, "Know thyself," and "Nothing too much"; upon these all other precepts depend.*

—*Plutarch, Consolation to Apollonius*

CHAPTER 2

Freedom Is A State Of Mind

The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n.

—John Milton, Paradise Lost

In a recent argument with a friend or loved one, we may have shown irritation, perhaps anger. Our voice may have been unusually loud; perhaps we shouted and even slammed something around. Now we may regret what we said.

Meanwhile, CNN reports that, "President Bush, stunned when John R. Bolton's nomination for United Nations ambassador hit a Republican road bump, is working hard to avoid a political setback at the outset of his second term when senators hold a showdown vote next week."

The *Christian Science Monitor* reports that, "From driver's licenses, to passports, to plane tickets, the paperwork necessary to enter and move about America may soon be subject to more restrictive rules - all in the name of homeland security."

The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press reports that, "Truthful publication of information about an arrested juvenile is protected by the [freedom of speech] First Amendment even when police unlawfully disclosed the information, a federal appellate court ruled last week."

AP reports that, "A car bomb exploded during Friday prayers at a Shiite mosque in Baghdad, killing eight people and wounding twenty, police said."

Reuters reports that, "Thousands of villagers rioted in eastern China injuring dozens of police after two of about 200 elderly women protesting against factory pollution died during efforts to disperse them, residents and officials said. . . ."

BBC reports that, "Thousands of people have taken part in demonstrations in Nepal . . . [calling] for the speedy restoration of democracy and the release of all political detainees."

Agence France-Presse (AFP) reports that, "More than 300,000 people have died as a result of the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region, British lawmakers said in a report, a figure more than four times greater than an official UN estimate."

And so forth.

What do all these disparate reports have in common? What thread of understanding ties them together, in spite of their diversity? The answer is that they are all manifestations of the essentially mental nature of freedom, or its lack. Of course, material phenomena are described (cheers, smiles, loud voices, combat, wounds and death, perhaps physical destruction) and in some reports, the use of physical weapons. But decisions about freedom (as in American travel and the court case), political confrontations (as in the Senate committee consideration of the Bolton nomination), or conflicts over freedom or its denial are fundamentally all engagements of *minds*. They all involve perceptions, needs, interests, wills, expectations, esteem, and moralities.

This is a fundamental statement of my position. Freedom, and its opposite, subjugation, is *in our minds*. It is in the minds of men that freedom is fostered or lost. The hand-waving, the smiling, the shouting, the destruction, the weapons, and the deaths are merely the manifestations of mental phenomena. Too often, we focus on these manifestations, rather than on the underlying mental state or relationship between minds that they manifest. To understand freedom, then, is to understand how our minds work. It begins, then, with understanding ourselves and what we share with each other as human beings.

I have organized the ingredients of this self-knowledge into the five Principles that comprise Part I of this book:

- The Subjectivity Principle
- The Intentionality Principle
- The Self-Esteem Principle
- The Expectations Principle
- The Responsibility Principle

In short, these Principles point out that our knowledge and perception are subjective and personal; our behavior is intentional, and goal-directed; our intentions are organized around achieving and enhancing our self-esteem; our behavior is guided by our expectations of its outcomes; and we are free to choose our goals and means and therefore are responsible for our future. A comprehension of these principles and their elements will provide an essential psychological foundation for the social and political material that follows, and so I will discuss each principle in turn.

CHAPTER 3

The Subjectivity Principle

All the mighty world
Of eye, and ear, both what they half create,
And what perceive.

—Wordsworth, Tintern Abbey

We must begin with the most basic of all principles, that governing what we see and do, and this is in the very act of perceiving reality, which I liken to the act of painting. We are the artists of our lives. We mix the colors, draw the lines, fix the focus, and achieve the artistic balance. Reality disciplines our painting, of course; it is our starting point. As the artist, we add here, leave out there; substitute color, simplify; and provide this reality with a point, a theme, and a center of interest. We produce a thousand such paintings every moment. With unconscious artistry, each is a personal statement; each is individualistic.

The Subjectivity Principle is:

Perception is subjective.

Three elements define this subjectivity:

- Perception
- Mental field
- Balance

Perception is what we hear, see, taste, smell, and feel (touch). Now, most people realize that their perception of things can be wrong, that they may be mistaken. We all have had disagreements with others on what we saw or heard. And we have heard of witnesses to a crime or accident who disagree wildly over the facts. Some teachers who wish to dramatically illustrate such disagreement have staged mock fights or holdups in a classroom. In one form of the exercise, a masked man rushes in, points a weapon at the teacher, demands his wallet, and then flees with it, leaving the class stunned. Afterwards, each member of the class is asked to write down what he saw and heard. Their accounts usually differ noticeably.

But, of course, this is an example of a rapidly unfolding situation in which careful observation is difficult. Surely, one might believe that if there were enough time to study a given situation or event, then witnesses would all perceive it the same way. This is an easy enough hypothesis to test. Ask any two people to describe in writing a particular furnished room, or a car. Then compare. We would find many similarities, but we would

also find some important and interesting differences. Sometimes such differences result from error, or from inattentiveness. However, there is something more fundamental at work in such an exercise. Even attentive observers often see things differently. And, most interesting of all, each observer can be correct.

First, consider that each observer has a *different vantage point* from all the others, and their visual perspectives will differ accordingly. A cylinder viewed from above appears round and flat, but from the side it appears as a rectangle slightly rounded at the top and bottom, while if viewed from an angle it appears as the cylinder that it is. In ordinary, everyday life with our fellows, these differing vantage points are of little account, but their potential significance can be readily understood by any fan of active, contact sports such as football or basketball.

Suppose that, during play, two players come together, and one of them falls to the ground. From the referee's line of sight, no foul is committed, while the spectators (especially the television audiences who see multiple angles and instant replays) see an obvious violation. Referee and audience both call the incident as they see it, and they may see different things from their different vantage points.

But there is more to the subjectivity of perception than this. After all, people can change or, at least, compare their respective vantage points. There is a second, more fundamental reason for differing perceptions, and that is that, as human beings, we all endow what we sense with *meaning*. Thus, what we perceive becomes good or bad, repulsive or attractive, dangerous or safe. We may see a man running toward us with a knife as dangerous; a calm lake as peaceful; a child-murderer as bad; a contribution to charity as good.

Cultures are systems of meanings laid onto reality; to become acculturated is to learn the language through which a culture gives the world unique shape and evaluation. A clear example of this is a cross, which to a Christian signifies the death of Jesus for mankind as well as the whole complex of values and beliefs bound up in the Christian religion. Yet, to non-Christian cultures a cross may be meaningless, simply two pieces of wood connected at right angles.

As another example, consider this quotation:

> *The filet mignon was seared on both sides by a charcoal fire and then with the warm juices trapped inside cooked medium rare. A small slice along the top with a knife revealed the pink interior, with red juice oozing around the knife. The first piece melted in my mouth.*

Physically, these words are just a series of lines on paper, with little intrinsic power to be perceived. Only lines, unless you can read English. To test this, just turn this book upside down. The words simply become lines, without meaning. Now, turn the book right side up again. The lines disappear, and meanings and images fill your mind.

We have learned to unconsciously associate words with meaning. English readers, reading the above words, would inwardly perceived cooking a delicious steak. Our reading words and perceiving steak, what was done to it, and perhaps salivating, is similar to our reading other aspects of the outside world and perceiving money, another's status, irritation, inviting eyes, a slippery road, a running dog.

Besides varying perspectives and meanings-values, a third reason for differing perceptions is that people have unique experiences and learning capacities, even when they share the same culture. People have their own background. No two people learn alike. Moreover, people have different occupations, and each occupation emphasizes and ignores different aspects of reality. Simply by virtue of their separate occupational interests, a philosopher, priest, engineer, union worker, or lawyer will perceive the world dissimilarly.

Two people may physically see the same thing from the same perspective, therefore, but each through their different languages, evaluations, experience, and occupations, may perceive it differently and endow it with their own personal meaning. Dissimilar perspective, meaning, and experience are enough to explain why our perception will often differ radically from others.

There is yet an even more basic reason for differing perceptions, however. What we sense is unconsciously transformed within our mental field in order to maintain our psychological balance. This mental process is familiar. People often perceive what they want to perceive, what they ardently hope to see. Their minds go to great pains to extract from the world that which they project onto it. People tend to see things consistent with their beliefs. If we believe businessmen, politicians, or bureaucrats are bad, we will tend to see their failings. If we like a person, we tend to see the good; hate him and we tend to see the worst. Some people are natural optimists, always seeing sunshine; others are pessimists, forever seeing storm clouds instead.

Our perception is thus the result of a complex transformation of amorphous sensory stimuli. I can describe this process of perception to show its importance to interpersonal conflict and cooperation, and ultimately to people being free. Consider that things outside our mental field have different powers to make us perceive them. I like to use the examples of a thunderclap, a screaming baby, and a dripping faucet late at night. Each has a different degree of strength, but for most of us, each has the power to force itself on our perception. Even when we are busily occupied with something of great interest, a thunderclap (or an earthquake, or smell of fire, or a scream) will break through, making us perceive it. However, the rustlings of leaves, a humming in the background, or a low, monotonous voice, are weak forces bearing upon us. We may have to "reach out" to hear them. Concentrate on something else and we no longer perceive them.

Independent of the outside world's powers to force our perception, we have power to impose a perception on reality. We can hallucinate. We can magnify some things such that we perceive them in spite of what else is happening. Think of the whisper of one's

name in a crowded room, a famous person joining a noisy party, or one's child crying when there is a thunderous storm outside.

What we perceive in reality is a balance between these two sets of powers, one the outside world's power to force us to perceive specific things, and the second our power to impose a certain perception on the world. This is the most basic opposition, the most basic conflict. Its outcome is what we perceive reality to be.

The elements of the Subjectivity Principle, then, are perception, mental field, and balance. To illustrate them, assume that your mental field is surrounded by a flexible perceptual envelope separating your inner psychic processes and forces, the conscious doing-perceiving you, from external things, as shown in Figure 3.1. The powers of the

Figure 3.1

Outside World at 8:43 p.m.,
Wednesday, June 21, 2006

outside world are forces bearing on your field, and are met by your own powers to ignore, magnify, or alter them. The balance between reality's inner directed and your outer directed powers are the perceptual envelope surrounding your mental field.

Figure 3.1 illustrates what some of these outer powers might be on an hypothetical moment, say 8:43 p.m., June 21, 2006, while you are watching television. The size of the arrows corresponds to the relative powers of things to be perceived and your tendency to see them in a certain way or to ignore them. If the television program is uninteresting, you may be distracted easily, especially by the muggy, summer heat, or your noisy children. However, were you completely absorbed in the program, then you would perceive nothing else, not even your child walking into the room, or the sound of a noisy motorcycle going by your house. Your mental field might look like that in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2

Engrossed in Television

Your Mental Field

Television

This balance of our mental field changes with our interest and concentration. Its shape and extension will depend on our personality and experience. And, of course, our

culture. No wonder, then, that we are likely to perceive things differently from each other. Our perception is subjective and personal. Reality does not draw its picture on a clean slate in our minds. Nor are our minds a passive movie screen on which sensory stimuli impact, to create a moving picture of the world. Rather, our minds are an active agent of perception, creating and transforming reality, while at the same time being disciplined and sometimes dominated by it.

What I have said so far can lead to several kinds of misunderstanding that I will attempt to resolve.

Misunderstanding 1: *"There is no real truth—reality is relative."*

To say, as I do, that perception is subjective is not to deny that we can have true perception. Through trial and error, we can converge on a reality sufficiently true for us to survive and prosper. Consider that we cannot long survive driving a car unless we have a reliable perception of the road, other cars, driving conditions, and the like.

Science is the best method humanity has developed for distilling truth from our subjectivity, and there is no doubt that this truth has been sufficiently precise to aid us in understanding and coping with our environment.

Misunderstanding 2: *"We only perceive what we want to perceive."*

While we do tend to perceive things consistent with our desires and beliefs, for the normal person this tendency is limited by what in fact exists. While we may tend to see a girl we do not like as hostile or negative, we will still perceive the specific girl, what she is wearing, doing, saying. Nor will we perceive her if she is not there, unless our senses have been distorted by drugs or alcohol. To understand perception as subjective is to comprehend that we color, select, and differentiate the world through our mental field, not that we generally create a wholly original world of our own.

Misunderstanding 3: *"There is one true perception."*

Two people may perceive reality differently and both may be right. They are simply viewing the same thing from different perspectives and each may be emphasizing a different aspect. Blind men feeling different parts of an elephant may each believe they are correct and the others wrong about their perception. Yet, all can be correct; all can have a different part of the truth.

Misunderstanding 4: *"If there is agreement on the physical facts of an event or object, perceptions will agree."*

Here is a source of much confusion about perception and its subjectivity. A developer and an environmentalist can agree on the physical facts of a bulldozer, but to each the machine will have also intense and opposing complexes of meaning making their perceptions of it different in quality. To the developer, it is a valuable and indispensable

tool for clearing land on which to build. To the environmentalist, it is a destroyer of trees, foliage, and the natural lay of the land--an evil instrument of capitalist greed.

Another example is that of two white policemen arresting a black person for robbing a white owned store in a black neighborhood. The police, bystanders, and storeowner may all agree on the facts: black enters store with a gun, demands money, and is distracted and clubbed by storeowner, and then restrained until the police arrive. But, although all may agree on these facts, white and black bystanders may perceive this event differently. Whites may perceive a robber being arrested. Blacks may perceive white domination again being exercised against blacks.

The problem here is that there are two aspects of a sensory fact: its physical nature, with which natural science has been most concerned and about which people can most easily establish agreement; and its endowed meaning. Now, meaning is a matter of culture, ideology, and personal experience. Among Americans in a committee meeting, a participant who pleasantly questions the chairman, disagrees with the others, and presents his own views may well be seen as independent minded and making a contribution. Among Japanese, such a participant might be perceived as rude and destructive of consensus. A Republican might see a new government regulation about what should be on food labels as another unnecessary intervention in business; a Democrat may see this as a compassionate attempt to help people make decisions about buying and eating food.

Misunderstanding 5: *"We are the victims of our perception."*

This is the belief that we cannot help what we perceive and therefore cannot be blamed if we act on it. That is, we cannot censure a Marxist (communist) for his view of the world, or a Catholic, or a Frenchman. I disagree. To point out the subjectivity of perception is not to excuse one for allowing a particular perspective to dominate. The best test of one's perception is checking the facts, comparing meanings, and keeping an open mind on the possibility of misperception. And the most important corrective to being a victim of perception is that we realize its subjectivity, our tendency to see things our way. This helps avoid a belief in one's infallibility, a disease of the mind intrinsic to many political movements and religions.

CHAPTER 4

The Intentionality Principle

Life is real! Life is earnest!
And the grave is not its goal;
Dust thou art, to dust returnest,
Was not spoken of the soul.

—*Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, A Psalm of Life*

Life is exciting: it is living, sensing, feeling, doing; being purposeful, moving forward in time, trying. We are not pushed by the past, lashed by the present. We are pulled, willfully, by the future. We are intentional creatures; we are goal-bound.

The Intentionality Principle is:

We behave to achieve.

This does not necessarily mean that before acting we define our goal, list our alternative courses of action, and then select the one most likely to achieve that goal. Rarely in our lives do we choose so rationally. Usually, our behavior, thoughts, and emotions are entwined in a dynamic, being-perceiving-doing-process. Nonetheless, when we get up in the morning and prepare breakfast, there is an implicit goal guiding our actions. We brew coffee, toast bread, pour juice, sit down at the table, and go through the diverse actions collected together in the term eating. All this toward the goal of satisfying our hunger, or simply getting past a necessity of the day.

Sometimes, of course, we do have to make our goals and means more explicit, as when we decide to go to college. Then we may first make clear what we want from college (a degree, a good job, a good time) before we make the actual choice of what college to attend, and what field in which to major. However, as long as we understand our goals as the often - but not necessarily - unarticulated ends toward which we direct behavior, then the following discussion should be consistent with our experience.

As intentional individuals, we are fundamentally future-directed. We usually behave in order to achieve a goal, not because of something that has happened in the past. This may all seem obvious, but the distinction between "in order to" and "because of" has implications for political thought, for it divides two contending perspectives on behavior, that of the freedomist, and that of the socialist.

One perspective is that our behavior is because of—the result of—causes acting on us and the conditions of our life, such as a bad family, poverty, capitalism, or lack of education. Or because of external stimuli to which we have become conditioned. Or

because of psychological complexes and mechanisms. This belief that our behavior can be explained by a knowledge of our background, environment, or psychological complexes tends to dominate the social sciences. Those who subscribe to it are called behaviorists (or behavioralists in psychology). They assume that if they knew the relevant past and present conditions of our life and the causes operating, then they could predict most, if not all, our behavior. It is no accident that the practitioners of such behavioral disciplines as sociology and anthropology tend to be among the most attracted to socialism.

An opposing view is that understanding and predicting our behavior requires knowing our goals. It is the belief that we behave in order to achieve a goal, sometimes regardless of the causes and conditions acting on us. This makes accounting for and predicting individual behavior far more difficult, since the goals of behavior are inside our heads, and not the easily defined, external causes and conditions that social scientists work with.

One can easily test whether the "in order to" or "because of" approaches give a better understanding of behavior. Pick any person and ask how best one can explain their behavior. Is it by asking why they are doing something? If so, they may answer, "Getting ready to go to a movie," "Preparing to eat," "Working for a college degree," or, "Going to work? Or do they instead explain their behavior by reference to a prior cause, like an upset stomach, depression over work, a hangover, their parents' influence, or hot weather?

Usually, we will find that the explanation in terms of goals is the simplest and most effective:

"Sweetheart," a man may ask his wife, "what are you doing?"

"Getting ready to go shopping," she may respond.

This goal of shopping explains and ties together all her activities over the next two hours in ways an explanation in terms of causes could not. Knowing his wife after many years of marriage, the husband could predict fairly accurately her behavior—what she will do before she leaves, how she will go shopping and where, what she is likely to buy, about how long she will be gone, how she will return, and what she will do for around fifteen minutes after she returns. In the same way, by knowing a person is seeking a Ph.D. degree in political science from college, one can in a broad way explain and predict a good proportion of their behavior over the next several years, without knowing anything else about them.

Of course, not all behavior is goal-directed. Indeed, reference to prior causes is sometimes the best way of understanding the actions of another. Some behavior is reflex action, as when we touch something hot, or unthinkingly react to someone's lack of consideration. Some behavior is aberrant or irrational, caused by deep psychological or personal problems. And sickness, fatigue, lack of sleep, moods, a sudden change in

the sleep-food cycles (the jet-lag of air travelers), and so on, influence the way we behave. Moreover, reference to causes can explain why some people pick certain goals over others, such as the influence of parents over their son's choice of a college major, of a wife's demands on her husbands attempt to stop smoking, or of a heart attack on a businessman's entering an aerobic exercise program. Nonetheless, generally the best initial explanation of individual behavior is their goals.

The Intentionality Principle has four elements:

- Needs
- Attitudes (goals and means)
- Interests
- Sentiments

The first element is that our intentions gratify certain fundamental human needs: sex, hunger, sleep, gregariousness, protectiveness, curiosity, security, and self-assertion. The first three and curiosity are self-explanatory.

Gregariousness is the human need to associate with others, to be part of a family or group. The power of this need is felt through loneliness, an emotion that can be as strong as sexual desire or hunger for food. Protectiveness is the need to help others, which some call the maternal instinct, but which both sexes have. It is the altruistic urge, the need to do good, to improve society. It is driven by the emotions of pity, compassion, and sympathy. Security is the need for protection, safety, and assurance. This need shows itself through the power of fear. And finally, self-assertion is the need for status and identity, for achievement, for excellence. Its related emotion is pride and self-satisfaction.

These are not needs I have pulled out of a hat, but those that have been identified in multivariate psychological research by Professor Raymond B. Cattell, and others (see the *Handbook of Multivariate Psychology*, which he edited, and his *Personality and Motivation*)

These needs are the source of psychic energy driving our intentions.

To understand this further, consider attitudes, the second element listed. An attitude is some latent (inactive) goal and means. It always takes the form of:

"In this situation I want to do x with (or by) y."

The "want" expresses the need, the x is the goal, and the y the means. Thus, "I want to go (means) to the movies (goal) tonight (situation)" is an attitude, as is: "I want to help the world's hungry by contributing to CARE," or "I want to end the threat of nuclear weapons by preventing their proliferation," or "I want to see my children through college," or, more starkly, "I want to eat."

An interest, the third element of the Intentionality Principle, is the same as an attitude in form and content, except that it is active, driven by our stimulated needs. To appreciate this, assume that our needs are simulated by an on-off light switch; and the unlighted light bulb is our attitudes, the lighted bulb our interests. When our need is turned on, it empowers our associated attitudes and turns them into interests—into energized goals. Thus, the attitude that we want to eat a hamburger and French fries may be latent, an unlighted bulb, so to say, until we pass a McDonald's and smell the hamburgers. The aroma may stimulate—turn on—our hunger need, which then transforms our latent attitude into a driving interest. (This way of thinking of needs and interests passed into common English as a sexual metaphor in the 1960s with the phrase, "Hey, you turn me on!")

Our attitudes are the total collection of "I wants" that potentially satisfy our needs; our interests are those particular attitudes stimulated by our needs, and which we now desire to achieve or gratify. The basic reason we seek to achieve goals, then, is that we believe they will gratify our needs. But those needs have to be stimulated first. And the appropriate attitudes have to exist in our mind before they can become interests—active goals.

These, then, are the elements of human motivation, and their importance for individual freedom and for social conflict can hardly be overestimated. They have certainly been well recognized by the leaders of many political movements. To arouse the people to revolution, revolutionaries must first develop in them the proper attitudes connected to their needs; these attitudes must then be stimulated, by appeal to needs to transform then into interests. Marxists have a slogan for this: "Raising class consciousness." Politically motivated teachers sometimes use a more respectable slogan: "Sensitizing the student."

Now, such attitudes as "I want to eliminate hunger in the world" or "I want to help impoverished nations" or "I want world peace" are already stimulated for many people and accordingly shared by them. Therefore, those who want to foster freedom in the world should show how freedom results in far more that the satisfaction of the simple desire to be free, and, indeed, can make manifest the wishes which such popular attitudes express. To do this, educators might explain that no democratically free people have ever had a famine, that democratically free nations are also the wealthiest and most developed, that such nations do not make war on each other and have the least domestic violence. I shall return to these facts in due course.

The fourth element of the Intentionality Principle is sentiments. These are clusters of attitudes sharing a similar goal. They are a goal complex.

There is a religious sentiment, comprising attitudes on church attendance, reading the holy works, prayers, and expectations of the afterlife, birth control, and etcetera. There is also a sentiment concerning sports and games, involving attitudes on participating in or watching them, such as, "I want to watch football," and "I want to play poker." There is a career or job sentiment, comprising attitudes like "I want a higher salary," "I want

more job status," "I want a better job." And there is also a material-mechanical sentiment, clustering attitudes about material or mechanical things, such as "I want to own a ranch house," "I want a new Buick," or "I want the best golf clubs." Then there are the ideological sentiments that are basic to protecting and fostering freedom, such as "I want all people to be free," "I want freedom of religion and speech in our country;" or its opposite, "I want a dictatorship of the workers," and "I want evil capitalism eliminated."

The two most important sentiments are the superego and self-sentiment. The superego is our morality, a cluster of our moral ethical attitudes. It is the angel with a halo, standing in our mental field, pointing at our selves with its finger, and commanding: "You should not do this." "You should do that." "It is your duty." "That is wrong."

Our self-sentiment, however, comprises our attitudes about ourselves; it is our ideal self-image, what we want to be. Perhaps we wish to exercise more self-control, be a better conversationalist, improve our reputation for honesty, upgrade our competence, increase our rationality, and so forth. Along with the superego, the self-sentiment functions fundamentally to orient our behavior, as I will describe in the next chapter.

To review, then, The Intentionality Principle says that our behavior is future oriented, that we direct behavior towards achieving or satisfying our interests. Moreover, these interests are attitudes that have been activated by our needs. We feel a need, which we try to gratify (goal) through some means. To turn this around, our interests satisfy our needs. Finally, attitudes (and thus interests) cluster into sentiments, of which the most important ones define our morality and self-ideal.

For example, assume that while you are asleep at 2:30 a.m. there is the sound of a breaking window in another room. This would be a powerful stimulus forcing itself on your awareness and awakening you, as shown in Figure 4.1. Your first reflex would be to check the time.

Note especially that perception does not directly stimulate needs. Rather, what we perceive, even something so dramatic as a breaking window at 2:30 a.m., must work through our mental field. It sets mental forces to work and these may, but not necessarily, stimulate the need. There is no one-to-one relationship between a perception and a stimulated need, however. Much depends on our mental states, beliefs, meanings, norms, and location.

There are some sources of misunderstanding here that I should clarify before moving on.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Since everyone has the same needs, they have the same interests."*

Needs are common to us all, but how these are satisfied is a matter of culture, experience, heredity, and personality. One person may satisfy their need for food by eating dead birds boiled in water (chicken soup), while another may prefer goat

intestines, pig brains, or raw fish. Intercourse with the other sex may satisfy one's sexual need, if one is heterosexual, that is. An individual may gratify his protectiveness need by loving and caring for his child, while another might lavish such care on a dog, or the poor, or the hungry.

Figure 4.1

Your Mental Field At 2:30 a.m. When The Sound Of A Window Breaking Awankens You

The point is that although different people have common needs, and indeed, may share many interests, no two people have the same overall interests. And the greater their differences in culture, education, occupation, power and status, the more divergent their interests are likely to be.

Misunderstanding 2: *"Interests are always selfish."*

This misunderstanding stems from equating "self-interests" with "selfish." All our interests are self-interests in that they will satisfy our needs. No interest is "selfless" in this sense. However, the protectiveness need may dominate our interests and drive us toward helping others and even sacrificing our life for an ideal, such as freedom, peace, or equality.

That people are prepared to give up their life for a human ideal, country, or loved one does not mean that they are acting without self-interests. Rather, they behave to satisfy a dominating altruistic interest—to gratify an overpowering need in line with their moral and self-sentiments.

Misunderstanding 3: *"Goals are concrete, specific, conscious."*

Certainly some goals are clear and specific, such as seeking a book at the library, Christmas shopping, preparing supper, or voting in an election. Much behavior, however, is a flow of intermixed perceiving-doing, without any explicit goals. Nonetheless, the behavior is intentional, the goals implicit.

As I write this, I may become thirsty. A need to drink water is aroused, an interest in water activated. But I do not think: "I am now thirsty. I want water. I can get some by walking to the refrigerator, opening the door, and pouring myself a glass of cold water from the container therein." No, I simply leave my computer and while thinking of what I am writing, I get the water. Much of our intentional behavior is such a routine response to our needs that we hardly think about it. But it is still goal-directed behavior. It is only when we must behave in a non-patterned, non-routine way that we will make our goal explicit, as in a decision over buying a house, changing schools or jobs, marriage, divorce, voting, and the like.

Misunderstanding 4: *"Intentions and interests are knowable."*

This is the belief that we really can know another's intentions and interests. But our intentions and interests are locked up in our hidden mental field. They are personal, a result of the sum total of our unique experience and personality, an aspect of our self. Others cannot really know our interests. Nor can we really know that of others. Thus, those who believe government planning should take precedence over individual decisions face this insurmountable roadblock, amongst others.

Misunderstanding 5: *"Since we are driven by our needs and guided towards goals by our interests, we act because of them."*

No, we may ignore our needs, such as that for sex or for food. We may even suffer awful pain, although our needs and most interests scream at us to do what is necessary to escape it, as in being tortured, or trying to help our team win a gymnastics

competition regardless of a serious muscle injury. We have free will, a will that can be so strong that it disregards our stimulated needs in order to achieve some goal. How else can we explain the soldier in combat, the secret agent who refuses to divulge information under torture, the monk in a monastery, and the suicide bomber?

Taking all this into account, a fundamental problem we face, then, is how to communicate our interests so that others can understand and trust our behavior; and how to sufficiently understand the interests of others in order to work or live with them. In this problem lies a key to our personal freedom, and the relationship of such freedom to conflict and violence.

CHAPTER 5

The Self-Esteem Principle

A man's true merit 'tis not hard to find;
But each man's secret standard in his mind,
That casting weight pride adds to emptiness,
This, who can gratify? for who can guess?

Alexander Pope, Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot

We do not act just for any purpose, any goal; intentions are not arbitrary. Rather, we strive for completion, for betterment, for our own self-ideal. That is, we seek self-esteem.

Our self-ideal is self-respect, admiration by others, virtuousness as each of us defines it. It is holding our head high. This, we all strive toward achieving or enhancing.

The Self-Esteem Principle is:

We strive for self-esteem.

What improves one individual's self-esteem will not necessarily better another's. The specific goals linked to self-esteem differ greatly among individuals. One's esteem may be tied to being a good mate. For others, it may be seeing their children through college, making a million dollars, getting a Ph.D, writing a best seller, or even murdering someone. This last possibility should drive home the point that esteem is personal, often group-oriented, and not defined by the morality of outsiders. A gang member's esteem, for example, is often linked to his reputation in his gang. And if murdering an old man without showing any emotion raises him in their esteem, then it will also help his own.

If we can infer how an individual assesses their self-esteem (whether by honesty, independence, duty, devotion, power, or wealth) and the particular means most related to their self-esteem (such as being a successful businessman, good parent, respected scientist, effective politician, good warrior) we can well explain their present behavior, and predict how they are likely to behave in certain situations.

To assert that self-esteem is the central goal means that other goals take a back seat while self-esteem drives our interests and integrates our mental field. Our needs are satisfied depending on how they relate to self-esteem; our interests are filtered through our self-esteem. A prisoner under torture may refuse to divulge secrets, enduring pain, ignoring some of his needs and interests, even endangering his survival. All this to maintain his self-esteem as he sees it: by protecting his country or cause.

Further examples abound. A student may stay up all night studying for an examination, denying the need for food and sleep, just to move one step closer to a medical degree. An official working in a corrupt government agency may expose the wrongdoing of his colleagues, even though ostracism and harassment will follow, because he could not live with himself if he remained silent. A revolutionary may give up security, career, and family to fight a repressive regime. An army officer, whose esteem is linked to faithfully carrying out orders and achieving high rank, may receive an order to machine gun a cluster of men and women huddled against a wall and execute the order without hesitation. One individual's esteem may be another's evil.

Four elements are involved in the Self-Esteem Principle:

- Superego
- Ego
- Self
- Will

The first is the superego sentiment, the collection of attitudes we call morality. It is the internalized parent that tells us what we should and should not do. The superego is closely connected to self-esteem, for self-enhancement and completion, our self-ideal, depends on our moral view of the world. And our self.

The second element is our ego, or the organizing, administering aspect of our relationships and our interaction with the outside world. Our ego relates our perception to behavior, means to goals, superego to self-esteem. It carries out such functions as thinking over or solving a problem, judging alternative means, assessing the truth. And it has a complementary role to the superego, like that of executive to a board of directors, or the American President to the Supreme Court. Our needs may stimulate a desire to go somewhere, our activated interests may define the somewhere and how to get there, and our superego may approve, guide, and evaluate the trip. But it is our ego that actually manages the trip.

Our ego's integration and organization of our perception, needs, interests, sentiments, superego, and self-esteem, enable us to function as normal human beings—to solve our problems in a reasonable, satisfactory way; to have a fair harmony with our environment; to meet challenges; and to satisfy our needs. It is people who have such a poor integration of these elements, whose perceptions, superego, needs, and self-sentiment, are so poorly organized that they cannot resolve problems and satisfy needs, that we call insane or mentally ill.

Two final elements in the Self-Esteem Principle are our self and will. Our self is the "I," the "me" we intuit. It is our total personality, our integrated needs, attitudes, and sentiments. It is our feeling of inward continuity and identity; our felt future-oriented movement toward self-actualization and the maintenance and enhancement of our self-esteem. It is the gestalt unifying our ego, superego, and self-sentiment, a whole forming a moving, mental equilibrium. This simply means that our consciousness forms a mental

unity, an integrated whole which is our continuous, flowing, feeling-thinking-acting self. The theme, which gives most meaning to this whole and movement, is the future to which our self is striving, which is actualizing and enhancing our self-esteem.

Figure 5.1

The Self and Superego and Self-Sentiment Filter Interests

Finally, there is the will, which is a facet of the self. Will defines our ability to make conscious choices and bring our selves to act on them. Needs stimulate interests. Interests define which behavior will achieve what goals in order to satisfy specific needs. Will is the power to bring our self to behave as interests dictate.

This does not mean that we will so behave, however, for we may be prevented from doing so. We may have the will to go to work in bitter cold weather and icy streets, but our car may not start. We may have gathered the will to ask our boss for a raise, but we may have been fired just before we could act. In any case, everyone has experienced

will power. It takes will to stop an undesirable habit, such as smoking; to leave a warm bed on a frigid morning; to tell another individual off; or to take physical risks

In summary, as shown in Figure 5.1, our organized self and the inner, combined superego and self-sentiment, filter our stimulated needs. They determine which will be satisfied, which absorbed, which opposed. Absorbed needs are those whose energy can be employed in our pursuit of major goals and partially satisfied by them. Our need for security may be absorbed in a drive for power; our need for self-assertion may help our performance in athletic competition or writing a blog; our need for others may be partially satisfied through an altruistic involvement in a charity drive or politics, among other things.

Self-esteem is, then, a central concept in understanding how and why human beings behave the way they do. But it is also a much-misunderstood concept, as the following observations will make clear.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Many people, such as the poor or uneducated, lack clear goals and an idea of self-esteem."*

Not so. The poor or uneducated are mentally no different from anyone else. They may differ only in what gives them self-esteem. This may be a reputation as a good family person, churchgoer, fisherman, farmer, ladies' man, mother, bowler; or having the best car, knowing all the football statistics, or being able to down the most beers. That higher-status people may not esteem these goals does not make them less central to the "underdogs" of society.

Misunderstanding 2: *"Criminals have no morality or self-respect."*

The problem here is that people tend to project onto others what they consider moral or good. They find it difficult to accept that another individual acting "immorally" can be moral in his own eyes. Yet each culture has its own morality; each subculture its own variation; each family its own values. Leaving the aged to die alone in the cold is immoral in the American culture, but moral in some traditional Eskimo cultures. Abortion is considered moral by many American Protestants, immoral by most Catholics. Sodomy is immoral in the dominant American culture, while moral within certain subcultures.

Moreover, criminals have a morality and sense of respect and self-esteem no less than non-criminals. Often, the morality and esteem is integrated within the criminal's gang or family. Such movies as "The Godfather" have dramatized the close ties within the Mafia families, the strong sense of what is right and wrong, and the importance of respect to its members. Criminals operate in their own society and culture, with its own rules and norms, and its own hierarchy of status. The bank robber has high prestige, the tough gang leader has power, the brave criminal has respect, the crook who refused to tell on his accomplices has honor, the cool killer has deference, and the loyal gang member

has repute. These are all dimensions of esteem through which criminals enhance their self-image.

Misunderstanding 3: *"The mass murderers and war makers of history must have been insane."*

Hitler or Stalin only seems understandable by denying their sanity. Yet, in their own frame of reference, given their own perception, considering their own morality, and their own sense of self-esteem, then their behavior—to themselves—may have been perfectly necessary and rational. And moral. Of course, they also may have been insane. The only point I am making here is that insanity is a possible, perhaps plausible, but not necessary, hypothesis about the monsters of history.

Misunderstanding 4: *"Our most basic drive is for power. That is what we get our esteem from, if anything."*

If we understand this to mean a drive to dominate others, then there is no such general drive or need. There is some linkage of power to temperament, needs, and sentiments, however.

Some people have dominating temperaments. But others are submissive. All people have a self-assertive need, but the desire to be looked up to, to achieve status, is not the same as a desire for power, although there is some relationship. Power is, after all, also a status. Moreover, since the self-sentiment involves the desire for identity, to be something, to be esteemed, it is also related to power. But a need to assert oneself, a desire for identity, and having a dominating personality, is not the same as a single-minded lust for power.

CHAPTER 6

The Expectation Principle

For now sits Expectation in the air.

—Shakespeare, Henry V

To strive, to strain toward goals, to seek esteem requires a guide to the future. We must have a mental map. Routes must be determined, detours assessed, distances considered. There are highways and slow, scenic routes. There are resting-places. There are risks. All are defined by our expectations.

The Principle is:

Expectations guide our behavior.

Were we never to consider the consequences of our behavior, we would behave as we liked, as our personality and perception, needs and interests, so disposed us. But we anticipate. We look ahead. We want to do that which best gratifies our interests; which best avoids the undesirable. As a future-directed creature, acting to achieve goals, we must have some idea of what will happen if we behave in one way or another. We must make predictions about the outcomes of our behavior. These predictions are our expectations.

If we need money badly, we could rob a bank. But we expect the police to catch us. Even if they don't, we would nervously fear every knock at the door, so we determine that the money would not be worth the worry and sleepless nights. If any acquaintance asks to borrow $25, we are disposed to lend it to him. But if from past experience we expect that they will not repay the money or will do so reluctantly only after we ask for it several times, we probably will tell them we're broke at the moment. If we help a neighbor clean his yard and he shows no appreciation or later desire to help us rake the leaves, then we are not likely to help them again. If we know from experience that a particular restaurant is reasonably priced, has outstanding food, and good service, then we are inclined to go there when we take out a special guest.

There are two elements to the Expectations Principle:

- Prediction
- Credibility

The first is prediction. As mentioned, our expectations are really our predictions about the consequences of our actions.

To the question, "Can one predict the future?" we must answer, "Certainly. Otherwise we could not act on our interest and satisfy our needs." We can predict our mate will be home when we return from a doctor's appointment, and will have dinner prepared. In the evening, we can predict that the lights will go on when we flip the light switch and that we will enjoy the regular evening entertainment schedule when we turn on the TV at 7:00 p.m. Moreover, we can anticipate that we will have a tennis match the next day with an individual who always shows up on the court about fifteen minutes late.

All this is mundane, to be sure, but of vital importance nonetheless. Our routine behavior takes place in a matrix of predictions we make unconsciously about the environment and others. What makes our behavior routine is that our expectations are automatic, unconscious. We need not surface them because they are continuously successful. However, let a new and uncertain situation arise, let our loved one be unexpectedly away when we get home, let the lights remain off when we flip the switch, our car not start when we key the ignition, then we become aware of these predictions by virtue of their failure.

As I will discuss in the next part of this book, a harmonious peace is actually a settled structure of expectations, an order in which people can make correct predictions about the consequences of their behavior. And I will show that conflict is a process by which this structure of correct expectations is established.

Prediction is the first element of the Expectation Principle, then, and credibility the second. This is the degree to which others can expect us to do what we promise or threaten.

We all are concerned for the reputation of our word. For some people a written contract is completely unnecessary. When they say they will do something, we may be certain that they will. In bringing up children, the role of credibility is most directly observed in everyday life. Children develop an acute sense for the subtle nuances of their parents' behavior. And no wonder, since their parents are their universe at first, and the major source of their pleasure or pain. They soon learn how credible is their parent's threat: "If you don't stop, I'll spank you." Or their promise: "Eat your salad and you can have desert, but not otherwise."

What others expect from our threats and promises is one side of credibility. The other side is simply our will to carry out our threats or promises. If our will is weak, so that we cannot bring ourselves to act on our threat to fire the yardman, or secretary, or flunk a student, or punish our child; or honor our promise to pay the loan that is now due, or do the chore, or take the time out for our child; then, we will have more difficulty persuading them next time that we mean our threat or promise.

To summarize, the Expectation Principle is that we guide our behavior by our expectation of its consequences. This is pictured in Figure 6.1 by the feedback arrow from the future.

There are a few misunderstandings about expectations I should clarify before moving on.

Figure 6.1

Your Expectations Guide
Your Future Directed Behavior

PRESENT   FUTURE

THE EXPECTATIONS
OF THE
OUTCOME OF YOUR
BEHAVIOR

YOUR FUTURE
ORIENTED
INTENTIONS

YOUR MENTAL
FIELD

Misunderstanding 1: *"Perception and expectations are similar."*

No, they are different. Perception is of present sensory stimuli, immediately responsive to the outside world. Expectations are what we predict may happen in the future. Of course, expectations may be future sensory perceptions we anticipate now, as of the tastes we will enjoy at a good restaurant. However, expectations may involve no future perceptions, as when we anticipate an increase in self-esteem from an action, expect heaven if our behavior is moral, or foresee an improvement in our tennis with practice. Yet, such expectations can be powerful influences on behavior.

Misunderstanding 2: *"The future is unpredictable."*

Nonsense. We can guide our behavior only by making predictions sufficiently well to enable us to gratify our needs. One can easily test this. Just list several dozen predictions about your behavior and that of your loved ones in the next two hours. Few

will be wrong. For example, when our children were in the teens, I could predict that at about 5:30 p.m. my older daughter, Dawn, would come home; that she would greet her mother, then add "I'm hungry. What's for dinner?" I also could predict that about thirty minutes later, I would hear "Dawn, set the table," and moments later, "Let's eat." I could predict that if I then left my study, and went upstairs to the dining area, I would find food on the table and Dawn and my wife waiting for me. If my younger daughter Lei had soccer after school, I could predict that she would not be joining us.

All trivial in the greater scheme of things, but it is such a matrix of everyday expectations that enables us to order our lives. But we also do this at a "higher" level. We can predict that our social security check will arrive once a month and that we will have to pay taxes on it. Moreover, we may predict that with a little care, our old car will last another five years. And yet a higher level: one can predict war with North Korea were American bombers or missiles to destroy their growing nuclear capability; that China will invade Taiwan if it declares its sovereign independence from China; that Japan will retaliate with its own tariffs if France raised theirs on imported Japanese television sets; that if Britain expels an Iranian diplomat for spying, they will expel one of Britain's. Statesmen guide their diplomacy within a matrix of such predictions about the consequences of each nation's behavior.

At all levels, we make predictions. Predictions are our way of life, continuously; and, most often, unconsciously.

Misunderstanding 3: *"We all act to maximize pleasure and minimize pain."*

Of course, we do seek pleasure and to avoid pain. But, if by this is meant sensual pleasure and pain, then we each have other interests as well. Not always will we be dominated by a simple pleasure-pain formula. We are too concerned about our self-esteem for that. Were seeking sensate pleasure to lower our self-esteem, were pain, adversity, and sacrifice to enhance it, we would select the pain. Pleasure and pain are ephemeral while we must live with ourselves for the whole of our lives.

Moreover, we have a superego and such needs as self-assertiveness and protectiveness. And sacrifice for others, even if giving up pleasure, is common behavior. Most parents do this for their children, day-in, day-out.

CHAPTER 7

The Responsibility Principle

*To deny the freedom of the will
is to make morality impossible.*

—J. A. Froude, Calvinism

Perceiving, expecting, satisfying interests; intentional, ever striving, we are no random driftwood on fortune's waves. Nor are we some instinct-dominated animal.

The Responsibility Principle is:

We are responsible for our behavior.

Its elements are:

- Free will
- Morality
- Choice

Of course, physical nature, our body chemistry, and our social environment affect us all; and we are all influenced by our upbringing, our education (or lack of it), and by our social system. Indeed, we can be genetically handicapped, or unconsciously misguided by mental complexes and mechanisms. But we are also, without doubt, a thinking, self-aware, moral creature. We can *overcome.*

We can change our environment, we can educate ourselves, we can compensate for our handicaps, and we can understand our mental problems. We need not be merely an effect; we can be a cause. We have a free will. We have the final responsibility for our actions.

If this were not the case – were our lives fully determined by causes beyond our control then morality would be meaningless. To say a person is immoral, to condemn his actions, to criticize his behavior is to assume he had a choice. But choice is possible only if the will is potentially free. Were we a helpless victim of causes outside ourselves, we would have no free choice. And we could not be blamed for what we do.

The second element of the Responsibility Principle is morality. The third is choice. Our morality, our superego, is what we believe we should, or should not, do. It is our ethics, our norms about what is right and wrong. Choice means that we can choose among a number of alternative behaviors that are not completely determined to select a particular one. Figure 7.1 pictures these elements in our mental field. Our superego (morality),

self-sentiment, and expectations primarily influence our choice among alternative behaviors and our resulting, willful action toward enhancing our self-esteem.

Figure 7.1

Elements Of The Mental Field

EXPECTATIONS

SUPEREGO

SELF-SENTIMENT → CHOICE → WILL → SELF-ESTEEM

BEHAVIORAL ALTERNATIVES

YOUR MENTAL FIELD

The more important misunderstandings of the Responsibility Principle are as follows.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Interest and morality oppose each other."*

No, our morality is also bound up in our interests. Consider these moral interests: "I want to see war eliminated," "I want to see murderers punished," or "I want poor people to be helped."

The correct division is not between morality and interests, but between moral and immoral interests. And we sometimes have considerable personal conflict between these two kinds. The devil and angel in our head, squabbling over a choice that must be made, are all too real at times.

Misunderstanding 2: *"The existence of uniformities in our behavior shows we are determined."*

There is no doubt that human behavior is patterned. I am certain that 7:30 a.m. on a weekday is the worst time for me to drive into town. Traffic will be bumper-to-bumper, stop, and go. And I know that at 9:30 a.m. I can breeze into town with hardly a stop. With less certainty, but with fair success, one can predict much about an individual's behavior from a knowledge of his education, residence, occupation, and family background.

Uniformities in behavior, however, are often patterns of similar choices people have made, and are not sufficient to conclude that such behavior is determined. Our own uniformities in behavior, our habits and predictable patterns, are usually convenient ways we have found to satisfy our interests, or routine ways in which we function. Again, these often reflect choices and not determining causes.

What about characteristics or background predicting to behavior? While people do make similar choices in similar circumstances and given similar resources, they are also influenced by their environment to act in certain ways. To say we have free will is not to say that we exercise free choice, always; or even most of the time. It is to say that we have the potential to do so if we so wish. However, if we are weak-willed, if we allow ourselves to succumb to our handicaps or environment, and believe we are what the world has made us, this will be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Our background, personality, environment, and culture all influence our behavior, to be sure. They limit our choices, affect our perception, bias our expectations, prejudice our attitudes, and pervade our morality. But if we are aware of our personal power, of our freedom to overcome, then our destiny is in our own hands.

Thus, a blind student can get a medical degree and become a martial arts black belt (it happened); a person paralyzed from the waist down can become a good artist; a businessman can quit his company at age 40 and get a law degree; someone disgusted with his life can become a Buddhist monk; an individual with a weak heart can ease into jogging; and anyone upset about an injustice in a liberal democracy can petition, organize, rebel. Dislike your personality, lifestyle, culture, or government? Then change it. But, the chains we must first cast off are in our minds.

CHAPTER 8

The First Master Principle

While it is true that an inherently free and
scrupulous person may be destroyed, such
an individual can never be enslaved or
used as a blind tool.

—Albert Einstein, Impact

Consider. You go downtown for an appointment and decide to have lunch in a small, quiet restaurant, one of your favorites. You are seated at a table against the wall. Glancing around you spot your loved one, (whom you had no reason to believe was downtown), smiling and tipping glasses in a dim booth with an attractive companion. Both have that look of oblivious intimacy.

You stare. Your attention riveted; nothing else exists. Shock. Choking jealousy. You clench your fists. You breathe betrayal; your self-esteem is knifed. You want to run over and pour their drinks on them, to spit at them. But you have pride. You calm down; control yourself. Slowly you rise, your legs slightly weak, and begin to walk out. But your loved one sees you, smiles, cheerfully calls out your name, and summons you with a wave.

"Hey, Sweetheart, I'm glad you're here. I just bumped into my cousin. We haven't seen each other in years. Meet . . . ."

Less dramatic to be sure, Figure 8.1 displays the relevant elements for understanding one's behavior in this situation; and the interrelationship among the five principles for knowing oneself.

So, perception is subjective, we behave to achieve, we strive or self-esteem, expectations guide our behavior, and we are responsible for our behavior.

All that I have said so far can be put into a simple Master Principle:

Each of us is an individual.

This Master Principle has three corollaries that clarify its meaning.

Corollary 1: *Each of us is unique.*

Each of us is a class of one: a single, separate person with our own flavor, style, interests, and behavior. Of course, each of us shares commonalities with humanity:

needs, temperaments, attitudes, interests, sentiments. But we add our selves to these commonalities and thereby create the unique individual field that we are. And so, it is for each individual.

Figure 8.1
A Situation Of Extreme Jealousy

Loved one eating with another

PRESENT FUTURE

PERCEPTION

EMOTION SENTIMENTS

SELF EXPECTATIONS

NEEDS

CHOICE

ATTITUDES

INTERESTS

SELF-ESTEEM

diverse forces in your mental field

Corollary 2: *Each of us can best assess our own interests.*

Each of us has our own perspective on the world, our own perception, our own experience upon which to base our expectations, and our own insight. And this means that it is we ourselves who can best determine which of our interests to satisfy, what enhances our pride, what we want to sacrifice, what we must do. Others can help.

Experts can inform us. Friends and loved ones can advise us. They can point out our duty, our danger, our needs, and our opportunities. But only we can put it all together, mix in all the information, and assess what is best for us. And so, it is for each individual.

Corollary 3: *We cannot be unjust to ourselves.*

But others can be unjust to us. Only we can best make use of all the information available to us to satisfy our interests. And however one weighs the information, whatever choice one makes, we are doing it in terms of our needs, our interest. It is what we want to do.

> When a man decides on something in regard to another, it is always possible that he may do that other some injustice; but injustice is impossible in what he decides for himself.
> -Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysics of Ethics.*

This Master Principle and its corollaries are fundamental to understanding the relationship between freedom and conflict described in the next part. And they help to solve an age-old puzzle: if people are individuals who live in separate universes, then how do they ever communicate? How can they cooperate? How can they get along? The answer is: through conflict – a phenomenon that I shall describe in the coming chapters. But I should first conclude this Part by highlighting a significant possible misunderstanding of my First Master Principle – that we are individuals.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Individualism isolates people and creates loneliness, despair, and alienation. People are part of a community and society, not atomized individuals."*

This misunderstanding partly underlies the belief in the collective, the community, and the state over the individual. It is the basis for the belief of many in socialism and for their dislike of capitalism and of individual freedom. And it is one of the major roots of totalitarianism, with all its consequences. Yet the fundamental error of this belief can be readily stated.

To point out that a man is an individual is not to rob him of his love for others; his sense of belonging to the family or a group; his feeling of unity, of oneness with a community. Keep in mind that a community or society does not exist as a physical thing. It is a state of mind among individuals: a sharing of mutual love, common values, beliefs, security, and a sense of fulfillment. The loss of identity, the isolation, the estrangement that people can feel, even in a crowd, is not due to individualism, but to its opposite: the emphasis on group membership, collective performance, equality of merit, and coercion to contribute to the community; of paternalistically refusing to allow people to make their own decisions; or of taking away people's rights as human beings and making them subordinate to some abstract concept called society, social justice, or equality.

Instead, it is individualism—the realization that each of us is an individual—which has given humanity its greatest advances in human freedom and welfare. And it is individualism which has fuelled the belief in human rights above government: that all are equal in and have a right to freedom of speech, religion, occupation, mobility, association, and the pursuit of happiness; that no group of people, no matter how large or powerful, should have the power to squash these rights of a single human being.

PART II

INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS

Untwisting all the chains that tie
the hidden soul of harmony.

John Milton, L 'Allegro

CHAPTER 9

The Communication Principle

There's language in her eye, her cheek, her lip,
Nay, her foot speaks; her wanton spirits look out,
At every joint and motive of her body.

—Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida

Each of us is an individual among other individuals. Each a subjective universe; mind hidden. Each perceiving personally, behaving singly, with intentions unique and self-esteem dominant. Each his own, free star.

Such an assertion might well prompt the popular critique of the collectivist—that individualism atomizes and isolates people. In response, I simply invite readers to consider their own personal experience with loved ones, friends, and favorite social groups. Surely, we are both individual and social beings. The question, then is how we actually bridge the subjective chasm between our fellow humans and ourselves? In short, how do we *communicate*?

We do so through trial and error, through a variety of conscious and unconscious, verbal and nonverbal languages, through a field of expression.

The Communication Principle is:

We communicate as a field of expression.

Its elements are:

- Trial and error
- Languages
- Field of expression

True, we can never can know another's mind. But through trial and error we can develop a sufficient understanding of someone for us to work or live together—to even love and enjoy each other's company. We relate to other people through the deliberate or unconscious signs and cues they transmit and their context. And others similarly relate to us. This mutual reading, this mutual signaling, is always a continuing conversation between what each of us expresses as a totality.

As an example, assume you are male, waiting to cross a downtown street in a large American city. A somewhat portly man with a confident look and head high, strides up and looking you directly in the eye says, "I am sorry to bother you, but can you give me the time?"

Further, assume he is dressed in a tailored, blue, pinstriped suit, with a maroon tie, buttoned coat, and well-shined shoes. His face is scrubbed, his graying hair neatly cut and combed. His voice is well modulated, his accent Northeastern American. You would immediately and unconsciously read this man as a banker, or high business executive or government official. He is obviously very successful, very important. Consequently, by his tone, gesture, and stance, you probably will be disposed to answer with deference and respect.

Now, imagine the same scene, with the same portly man initiating the exchange. Only this time he ambles up to you in loafers, an open, brown corduroy coat, and leather patches on the elbows. His shirt is rumpled and his obviously unfashionable tie reaches below the belt line of his faded slacks. His longish hair is slightly disheveled. With an easygoing voice he asks, "Pardon me, do you have the time?" Automatically you read him as a professional of some type, certainly unconventional, perhaps a professor or writer. You respond politely.

Same scene again, but this time the portly man shuffles up to you, head down, hair unkempt. No tie, no coat, his dingy plaid cotton shirt hangs out of his baggy trousers on the side. Tilting his head and looking through watery eyes, he asks in a raspy voice "Hey buddy, yagotda time?" Likely, you will be repulsed and probably curtly bark out the time, if you respond at all.

Consider. In each case, the other only said a few words, and yet you read enough about each to place him relative to yourself in terms of culture and status. At least enough to influence your probable manner and response.

Conversations between each of us are carried on in part through the verbal languages we all learn as children. There is also a subconscious aspect to verbal language, as in the combination of words we select and their emphases and tone, which convey class, education, regional origin, and the like. Or hate, distaste, interest; and of course, love:

> *Sighs are the natural language of the heart.*
> *-Thomas Shadwell, Psyche.*

Verbal communication always has the intended meaning overlaid by the unconsciously implied: two different languages intermixed.

Another language is of our actions, such as our manners, fulfilling promises, following through on threats, and helping others; and the consistency of our behavior with our expressed morality. What we do signals our inner character, our intentions.

> *There was speech in their dumbness, language in their very gesture.*
> *—Shakespeare, The Winter's Tale.*

Moreover, our actions mark our background and therefore, to others, our likely attitudes and interests. How we walk, sit, gesture; the television programs we watch or avoid, the music we listen to, the books we read, the food we eat, the beverages we drink, the car we drive; and, of course, the clothes we wear; all are clues others learn to read about us through trial and error as they grow up, and thus locate us in their universe relative to themselves.

That is, to others each of us is a field of expression, a totality. As they are to us. No word, no sentence, no sign, no language communicates by itself. Each is part of a whole; in the whole each gets its meaning. And that whole which is communicated is more than the sum of its parts.

Figure 9.1 displays the Communication Principle, and illustrates that your perception of another is in part a result of sensing them as a whole.

Figure 9.1
Another as a Field of Expression

eyes
tone
words
syntax
gestures
confidence
dress
cleanliness
behavior
posture
body language

ANOTHER'S
FIELD OF
EXPRESSION

YOUR
MENTAL
FIELD

foot, six inch 230 pound man walking toward us on a lonely street at night; an articulate, charismatic speaker claiming he can help make us rich; the stench of someone who in

summer has not taken a bath for a month. Whether one in fact perceives the other and whichever aspects of their field of expression become manifest to us still depends on our own mental field. Remember the Subjectivity Principle? Perception is subjective.

In subsequent Chapters, I will discuss how our conflict behavior helps define our field of expression for others. As will be shown, conflict is an essential ingredient in interpersonal communication among free people.

Before proceeding, however, I should discuss some important misunderstandings of communication.

Misunderstanding 1: *"People should communicate more."*

There is a belief that lack of communication between individuals lies at the root of their problems with others. "To communicate" means to open up verbally, to clarify, or state one's interest and point of view, to discuss mutual problems.

Now, it is often important to communicate in this sense to avoid misunderstanding and unnecessary conflict. But it must also be realized that people continuously communicate in many nonverbal ways. The lack of words itself can communicate, say, disinterest, irritation, preoccupation, or offense. Moreover, while verbal communication may help bring out the content of and reason for negative emotions or feelings, one should recognize that communicating verbally does not necessarily mean truthfully or clearly. Also, a person may not know what is bothering him, so that his nonverbal communication may be far more reliable, since it is often an unconscious expression of true feelings.

There is a time and place for verbal communication, for sure. But in some situations, it is better not to force verbal communication, for that entails conscious commitment and some kind of response on our part. In contrast, what is learned through nonverbal communication can be accepted without response or acknowledgment.

For example, through trial and error a wife comes to know her husband quite well after a decade of marriage. If he is having an affair she may be able to read him "like a book" through a variety of subtle and unconscious clues. Her problem is then whether to confront him with her suspicion, and to thus push him into making a verbal confession or lying, or to ignore the affair. If she confronts him, she would have to react strongly in some way to his confession or lie, especially to preserve her own dignity and pride. For the sake of her marriage or children, therefore, she may decide to quietly accept the situation.

Misunderstanding 2: *"Communication solves problems with others."*

If this means verbal communication, then it is misleading. Verbally and rationally, we may try to communicate, to open up. We could truthfully describe our interests, frankly divulge our feelings, and honestly express our point of view. Yet, frustratingly, we are

not getting through. The other seems simply unwilling to understand; even appears to be trying to misunderstand. And here we are, trying to communicate, to avoid miscommunication. What is the problem?

We are probably communicating something else in our nonverbal languages. In lack of eye contact, in distance (normal talking distance between Americans is about arms length; intimates converse at a closer distance, as do those speaking frankly—greater than arms length distance indicates aloofness, a status difference, or insecurity), in gestures, and in posture, we may be subconsciously telling the other that we are lying, or at least that our words are not to be taken seriously. Perhaps we have improperly learned these nonverbal languages; or perhaps we are communicating to someone from another culture, and thus our subconscious cues are unread or misunderstood.

Avoiding miscommunication requires aligning all our languages. Even, then, however, there is another mistake involved in the belief that verbal communication solves interpersonal problems. This is to overemphasize reason—to believe that we need only display the facts, explain, be honest, and conflict is avoided. This view neglects the real and basic opposition of interests, incompatible values, and diverse norms that may exist between others and us. To give an everyday example, it may preserve our relationships with some people if we purposely miscommunicate our perception and true feelings about their being fat, ugly, old, miserly, childish, spoiled, or the like. Moreover, at a party, family reunion, or church meeting; or in a committee, work group, or classroom; the occasion or the task may require avoiding communicating those status, religious, political, ethical, and philosophical differences which could be disruptive, cause an argument, and sour the atmosphere.

Communication, like everything else in human life, apparently, is an art. It requires a sense for the balance between what words can or should be said and what left unspoken.

> *"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things." "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all."*
> -Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass.

CHAPTER 10

The Power Principle

Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
These three alone lead life to sovereign power.

—Tennyson, Oenone

As individuals, each of us has an identity; we force reality to recognize us—to take us into account. Each of us is also a cause; we make waves. That is, we exercise power, making others adjust, compensate, balance.

The Power Principle is:

We produce effects.

Its elements are:

- Nonsocial powers
- Social powers
- Exercising power
- The power equation

Our power comes in many forms. Simply by existing, we have a power of *identity*, a power that unconsciously pressures the outside world to notice and compensate for us. We differ in the nature and amount of this power. Few can match the effects produced by a gorgeous woman, statuesque man, or magnetic personality. But in one way or another, each of us has an impact on the world—an unconscious impact, its effects unknown. This is our identive power.

Yet we also intentionally affect the world. We kill flies, fold paper, throw darts, saw wood, drive a car, and open a window. In such multitudinous actions we affect reality consciously, purposely; and we learn about our abilities and limits. Indeed:

"To know oneself, one should assert oneself."
—Albert Camus, Notebooks.

And by such assertion, we make reality adjust to us. This is our *assertive power*.

A special use of such power is on another's body. Loving, caressing, tickling, pulling, tripping, is causing physical effects on another. So is elbowing our way through a crowd, squeezing between people onto a bus, or helping a person up after a fall. So is cutting another with a knife in surgery, tackling him in football, or trimming his hair. This is our

physical power. It is usually exercised with another's consent or, at least, lack of willful opposition, as are lovemaking, surgery, or a massage. Even in boxing, tug of war, or football, where there is physical opposition, each party still agrees to compete according to certain rules.

However, there is a type of physical power we can bring to bear on another against their will. Slapping or punching is such power. So is shooting, physically restraining or drugging. This power is called *force*. It is one of the most visible and repugnant manifestations of conflict. Yet, all of us, in one form or another, have experienced it. But force is not all of violence and I will later point out that violence reflects coercion as well as, if not more so, than force.

So far, then, our powers are identive, assertive, physical, and force—our power of being and our power to assert ourselves on the physical world and the bodies of others. These are our powers to affect material reality. We are not directing these powers towards another's mental field to change, influence, and control, another's mind. We are not working to alter someone's will, but are consciously or unconsciously exercising power to affect physical reality, including possibly another's body—whether they like it or not, oppose us or not.

Thus, these are *nonsocial powers*, the first element in the Power Principle.

Our social powers are the Principle's second element. These are the forms of power we intentionally direct towards another's self. We are trying to affect their mental field, their beliefs, interests, and will. We are usually trying to get another to do or be something we want.

The first of these social powers involves the use of threats of pain or deprivations to produce the desired effects. It is the most widely recognized power. Its characteristic form is:

If you do not do x, then I will do y to you.

We have all used and all have been the target of this power. "If you kick the dog again, I'm going to spank you." "If you do not click your seat belt, you will be fined." "If you do not file an income tax return, you will go to jail." Making such threats of sanctions or applying deprivations (like twisting someone's arm) until they concede to do what we want is coercion. Our capability to apply it is our *coercive power*, the modus operandi of government, and many organizations as well. "If you fail the final exam, you will get an F for the course." "If you are late to work again, I'll have to let you go."

Coercion and force are often confused, for both can involve physical violence. Slapping or punching a person for revenge or retribution—just to hurt them—is force. Subduing them against their will and carrying them off to jail is force. Killing them is force. However, hurting another to make them willfully do what one wants is not force, but coercion. If a robber points a gun at me and says, "Your wallet or your life," it is

coercion. If he shoots me and takes my wallet, it is force. Rape is usually coercive, unless the victim is knocked unconscious; then it is forceful.

But coercion is just one social power. It has an opposite. Where coercion involves threats, the other involves promises; where coercion uses pain or deprivations, the other uses rewards. This other is the power we have to exchange. If we offer someone money in return for a radio, if we offer compliments in return for the same, or if we trade "Good morning," and smiles with a coworker, we are exercising this power. It takes the shape of:

"If you do x for me, I will do y for you."

This is one's *bargaining power*. It is the power of the free society, of the voluntary association, of the market place. It is the offer to exchange something we want for something we want even more. It is the power of reciprocity.

Coercion and bargaining are opposing ways of dealing with others. We can threaten them, hurt them. We can make them do what they do not want to do for fear of the consequences or because of the pain we cause them. Some human relations are built on coercion, as between guard and prisoners in jails, drill sergeant and recruit in the army, citizen, and dictator in nondemocratic countries. Or, we can promise and offer, and induce others to do what we want by making it worth their while. Such is the basis of the free market, of cooperative social relations, of the open society, of freedom.

Coercion and bargaining are only two social powers, however. Another is the power of the parent, judge, priest, teacher, and president. This is the power of social position: the ability to get others to do things we want by virtue of their belief in the right of the legitimate authority to so demand. This is *authoritative power*. Thus, our children may follow our orders because we are their parent. We may follow our boss's instructions at work because of his authority to so command (not all is done because of coercive threats). And a student may do the reading their teacher requires in a course because they believe in his right to make this demand. Authoritative power defines a third type of social relationship among individuals, the other two being based on coercion and on bargaining.

Most contemporary national societies are based on some mixture of threat, exchange, and legitimacy—of coercion, bargaining, and authority. However, we can point to some national societies in which one of the three powers dominates. Traditional laws rule Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan. These are societies steeped in custom over which a King has authoritative power. These countries are present-day examples of an ancient form of social arrangement—the society ordered by authority, whether it be king, emperor, or church.

By contrast, North Korea, Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, and China exemplify coercively organized societies ruled by their Communist Parties through pervasive coercion.

Noncommunist governments like those in Sudan, Iran, and Burma are also fundamentally based on coercion.

The United States, Germany, and Switzerland are societies mainly based on exchange and bargaining power. In all three, however, coercion through government intervention in individual lives and the market place has seriously eroded the free operation of bargaining power and voluntary association.

But, national societies are only larger examples of these powers, which operate at all levels of human relations. In our daily life, we can characterize some of our relations with others by the power that dominates. Perhaps at work it is exchange power (work in exchange for pay). Exchange power surely dominates when we go shopping. At income tax time or when we are driving our car it may be the implied coercion of the tax collector or the traffic court that dominates. When we go to church or listen to a presidential speech, authority might dominate.

Moreover, we probably know families that are organized through coercion, bargaining, or authority. The husband or wife rules some, in fact. Threats, punishment and fear characterize the interaction of family members, especially between the parents and their children, who must obey a hundred rules—or else. Other families are based on the authority of the husband and father, who as the head of the family is usually obeyed without question. Today, this is still the standard family across much of the world, but amongst educated and middle-class Westerners, the family based on the reciprocal exchange of benefits is becoming increasingly the norm. In such families, rules are few and founded more on the developing interests of family members. Some couples have tried to construct this pattern artificially by writing a marriage contract spelling out such rules, especially their mutual rights and obligations, and thus showing a basic misunderstanding of human relations. Such written contracts cannot anticipate what will evolve as couples learn about each other's values, interests, and dispositions, and thereby adjust, often through conflict, their expectations.

So far, I have discussed only coercive, bargaining, and authoritative social powers. But there are other social powers, which, depending on the context, are no less important. One is that which we exercise when we persuade someone to change their mind: when we convert them to our view, convince them our argument is correct, or win a debate. This is our *intellectual power*.

We can threaten, promise, or legitimately order another. But we can also persuade them. There are societies based on persuasion, ideally, at least. A college is supposed to be a community of teachers and scholars who gain acceptance of their ideas and knowledge through persuasion, not authority, or coercion. At its best, science is a society based on persuasion and organized around intellectual power. Besides being a means for discovering truth, the scientific method is also a complex of procedures for persuading others that one's discoveries and assertions are really true. Much of the opposition between science and religion is due to their different foundations of power, knowledge, and communication: science is rooted in persuasion; religion, in authority.

Besides our intellectual power, there is our ability to induce others to do what we want. Of all, this is the most written about, the most heartfelt, the deepest, most emotional, and most personal power. And it is the most ignored by scholars and scientists. Few academic books written on power mention it, but everyone recognizes it. This is our power of love. It is our *altruistic power*. Because another loves us, they will do what we ask. Indeed, they may beg to do things for us—even, perhaps, be our slave. This is not because we threaten them, or offer rewards; not because of our position, or because they are persuaded; but because this is what we want and they love us.

Intriguingly, altruistic power is a major factor in contemporary politics, for it is linked directly to the human need to help others, to protect those one cares about. Love for God, for mankind, for country, for a leader induces multitudes to personal sacrifice, terrorism, and war. This is well illustrated by Islamic terrorists and suicide bombers today. The motive of much mass violence is not selfishness, nor the desire for personal gain. Man is not always driven to violence and warfare by evil motives or by fear. Rather, the driving power behind violence is often the belief that one is achieving a Better World or defending what is Good or Right.

Finally, there is the power to control the situation and opportunities of another. By placing our children in a certain private school, we influence their future choices. By lying about our past, we invoke the desired envy or respect from our friends. By setting the agenda of a committee, we may influence the resulting decisions. By establishing certain family rules for our teenagers, we may help them avoid trouble. This is our *manipulative power*.

Such are our powers, the ways we produce effects. These are summarized in Table 10.1.

Nonsocial and social powers are two elements in the Power Proposition. A third is exercising power. Power is dynamic. It is producing, bringing into being, causing. It is our pushing-pulling-forcing-struggling-straining-trying-applying selves. Dynamic, our powers have a direction, a base, and determination.

Except for identive power that flows from our being, our interests direct our many powers. Our wants, purposes and goals, and their strength, intensity, and vitality direct and energize our powers. We exercise power to some end, for particular effects.

Each of our powers also has a particular base, as shown in Table 10.1: threats for coercion, promises for bargaining, and so on. But all these bases utilize and depend on one general base: our capabilities. These are our skills, abilities, and resources, which together enable us to exercise power. To threaten to sue a manufacturer over a leaky battery that ruined our radio assumes we, in fact, can sue. To offer to buy a house assumes we have the down payment and can meet the monthly mortgage. To advise a patient to get an operation assumes we have the appropriate medical knowledge.

Table 10.1. Forms and Bases of Power

Form of Power	Basis of Power	Object of Power	Example
Nonsocial			
Identive	being	reality	beautiful face
Assertive	capabilities	environment	cutting down a tree
Physical	capabilities	another's body	surgery
Force	capabilities	another's body against his will	killing another
Social			
Coercive	threats or deprivations	another's self	"If you don't eat your salad, you won't get any desert."
Bargaining	promises or rewards	another's self	"I'll give you $10 for that old radio."
Authoritative	legitimacy	another's self	"As President I am asking you to conserve energy."
Intellectual	persuasion	another's self	"Because its bad for your health, you should stop smoking."
Altruistic	love	another's self	"Sweetheart, could you do me a favor."
Manipulative	control over situation or opportunities	another's self	Sending your children to a private school.

But social powers are directed towards another self—affecting another's decisions, will, interests, and needs. Social powers are primarily psychological: they depend on the operation of another's perceptions and expectations in his mental field. The appearance of power is as important, therefore, as its substance. If we can make a person believe empty threats or promises, then their effects will be the same as though we were able to carry them out. If we can impersonate a physician, priest, or policeman, our advice or commands will have the same power over the other's will as though we really had these positions.

Our base for social power not only includes our actual resources and abilities, therefore, but our ability to project power—to make believable threats and promises, or

communicate authority and intellectual competence. What others believe or feel about us gives us our social power. Therefore, *the appearance of social power is its reality*. Even though we have the physical resources for exercising power, those resources are worthless if others disbelieve their existence. Without convincing the banker that we can meet monthly mortgage payments, we cannot buy a house, regardless of our actual ability to do so. Without convincing our child we will spank them when we so threaten, they will not be deterred.

So, our *interests* direct our power. And our *capabilities*, including the ability to appear powerful, give power its strength. Finally, our *determination* gives power its reality. Determination depends on *will*. We may want to discipline our child, tell our boss off, ask for a raise, stand up at a public meeting and express our view on an issue, get a college degree. We really may be so interested. And we may have the required capability. But, the pity may be that we lack the will. We simply cannot bring ourselves to punish our child, ask for that raise, and whatever. We lack resolution, determination, or courage. Without will, our capability is useless; our interests, idle dreams.

Exercising power, producing effects, is therefore an equation. It can be put simply.

Power = Interests x Capability x Will.

If our interests, capability, or will are zero, then our power is zero. This is the *Power Equation,* the fourth element in the Power Principle.

Figure 10.1 displays the power equation at work. Our social power is best pictured as a vector moving outward from our mental field toward another's self. A vector has magnitude (strength, potency, vigor). And it is dynamic, moving in a direction. Interests give it point and direction, capabilities give it strength, and will gives it existence.

Now, perhaps I have introduced too many terms here, too many distinctions. To be sure that the Power Principle is not thereby obscured, I will restate the theme. We produce effects, and our power to do so comes in many forms, the most important of which are directed at producing effects through other selves. These are our social powers, such as coercion, bargaining, and authority. By working through another's mental field, they are in essence psychological. And they are therefore subjective in their use and in their effects. This subjectivity is measured by the power equation, which applies to all power's social forms. Our social power is the product of our interest, times our capability to give power appearance and substance, times our will to exercise power. Through such we gratify our needs, achieve our interests, enhance our esteem. Our powers make others take us into account.

Of course, others have their own powers. They also want us to do things. In this lies the potential for a conflict of powers; and also a fundamental potential for cooperation between social powers, which together can perform what none can do alone. In cooperation, these powers can create the division of labor that makes society possible, and the spontaneous society that is the essence of freedom and the democratic peace.

Figure 10.1
Exercising Social Power

One's mental field

But this is anticipating the next chapter. Before moving on, however, I should clarify some major misunderstandings of power.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Man lusts for power."* (This is similar to misunderstanding 4 of Chapter 5.)

We all crave many things, but coercive and authoritative power (the forms of power meant by such quotes) are not always nor usually among them. We have a self-assertive need, a desire for status and respect among our friends and coworkers. We seek self-esteem and may have dominating and egoistic temperaments, all possibly contributing to our wanting power. But power need not be and often is not a central drive, by itself. People need, above all, to stand tall in their own eyes. They may achieve this by power over others, and thus "lust" after power. However, they may also enhance their esteem by withdrawal, self-denial, helping others.

Misunderstanding 2: *"An emphasis on power is opposed to love, cooperation, and understanding in human relations."*

If power means coercion or force alone, then I agree. Emphasis on deprivations and threats, on making people choose between two undesirable alternatives—that which we demand they do, and the punishment if they do not—is hardly a way of promoting relaxed and mutually rewarding and cooperative relations. However, coercion and force are only two kinds of power. Love is a power, as is an intellect, or respected status.

Power, unqualified, is a family of powers, the diverse ways we assert our selves. Through power we stand up, count for something; by our powers we shall be known. In this broader sense, then, power is the essence and foundation of cooperation and harmony in human affairs.

Misunderstanding 3: *"Power is coercion."*

This is the root misunderstanding underlying the above. Power is producing effects, and there are many ways to do so. An emphasis on coercion is a narrow and one-sided view of power, as is the emphasis on power as force. The choice is not between coercion or force and passivity, chaos, lawlessness, disorder, or submission. The choice is between coercion or exchange, or persuasion, or manipulation, or love.

On this, I do not want to create another misunderstanding. I do not deny the importance and, in some situations, the usefulness of coercion, such as in helping to provide a consistent and firm framework of rules for children or the enforcement of a common law and the protection of human rights. I am criticizing the identification of power with coercion or force and the emphasis on coercion as the primary way of ordering human relations. At the national level, the difference is between a tyranny based on coercion and a free society based on exchange, persuasion, and legitimate authority.

CHAPTER 11

The Conflict Principle

Now, who shall arbitrate?
Ten men love what I hate,
shun what I follow,
slight what I receive.

—Robert Browning, Rabbi Ben Ezra

We exercise power, we try to produce effects; we persuade, threaten, promise, command, request, and manipulate; we affect others. And these others are hardly passive—no simple dartboards for our powers. They are like us. To them, we are the other.

Thus, the Great Conflict. Threat may confront threat, or perhaps promises and force. Persuasion possibly opposes persuasion, or maybe authority and manipulation. And promises could counter promises, or conceivably love and persuasion. How do we ever produce effects then? Or do things through and with others, while preserving our individuality. Our freedom?

The answer is by balancing our powers against others. This is the Conflict Principle:

Conflict is a balancing of powers.

Its elements are:

• Balancing of powers
• Interests
• Capabilities
• Will (credibility)

Our social powers are active, dynamic. We exercise them toward some goal. But these powers often confront those of another, who also is trying to satisfy some goal. We both may wish to see different movies or television programs. We both may want dinner out at different restaurants. Or, we may dispute our boss on whether we deserve a raise, confront a neighbor about his trash in our yard, disagree with a teacher's grade on our examination, or argue over religion with our loved one.

Disagree, argue, debate, clash, dissent, dispute, scrap, war, quarrel, fight, battle, and revolt. These are just some of the words for expressing different kinds of conflict; that is, different kinds of struggle between social powers—different ways in which there is a *balancing of powers*. This is the first element in the Conflict Principle.

Note the active quality of this element. It is a balancing, an ongoing weighing of our powers against another's until some balance of powers is achieved. This is the outcome and resolution of our conflict, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Here my concern is the balancing itself.

That our social conflict with others is a mutual balancing of our social powers may seem clear enough. But, then, what precisely is being balanced when we refer to social powers? Threat against threat? Persuasion against persuasion? To answer yes and leave it at that is to allow words to substitute for a fundamental intuitive understanding of the process which underlies all social conflict. Each of our social powers has a direction, a base, and determination, as discussed for the Power Principle. *Direction is given by our interests, the base by our capabilities, and the determination by our will. Interests, capabilities, and will (in short, ICW) are the other elements in the Conflict Principle.*

When we engage another's powers, we are in reality confronting their ICW by our own. These are what we are balancing against.

Clearly, as we resolve to initiate or pursue conflict with another our will has an obvious role. Will, however, has another side to it that I should clarify here. From our perspective, our will is the determination, the ability to bring ourselves to act: to fulfill our threats, to meet our promises, to pursue our interests. But from the other's point of view, this is our *credibility*.

Another's assessment of our will is part of our appearance of power—our field of expression. If we have a reputation for keeping threats or promises, then these will suffice. Our word is as good as action. If, however, we make idle threats or empty promises, then we will be challenged. We then really need will. Thus, credibility is critical in balancing power. If we constantly must use our resources for power, (carry through our threats and promises), then we are weakened and limited in what we can do. Many know this at least intuitively. Thus, the concern for reputation, for one's word, for firmness, and for standing up for oneself.

Now, to pull all this together, conflict is a balancing of individual ICWs. *It is a simultaneous solution to two Equations of Power.*

Consider. In disagreeing with someone over how good a president George W. Bush is, we would be balancing three aspects of our intellectual power simultaneously. One is our interest in making and pushing our position and the strength of this interest. Are we trying to persuade the other, having fun, expressing our deep feelings, or trying to appear knowledgeable or smart? A second aspect of our disagreement is our capability, such as our memory of the facts, ability to marshal them, and cleverness in rebutting the other's points. Third, is our will, or determination to so argue, and the credibility of the points we make.

Consider another example. Assume that at a garage sale we find a beautiful rosewood desk priced at $1,000. We offer $500. The resulting confrontation of exchange powers involves our capability to pay and haggle; and our will to continue until we get the price we want, even if we feel embarrassed about dickering over what may end up to be a difference of a few dollars. Moreover, it involves the credibility of our willingness to pay and our determination to pay no more than our last offer.

And consider a last example. Suppose we buy a new car that breaks down frequently. One year and six trips to the repair shop later, we demand our money back or another new model from the local dealer who sold it to us. The dealer refuses, claiming that he has done all he can under our warranty. We can now try persuading the franchise distributor, or we can threaten to sue or advertise our lemon to deter other buyers. Or we can appeal to a consumer's agency, which might use its authoritative and coercive power. We have a number of option, but in all cases we must contend with the ICW of the dealer. We will be balancing our interests in rectifying a bad deal; our capability to aggressively pursue the ways open to us to persuade, induce, or coerce; our will; and our credibility to pester the dealer until we are satisfied.

In our conflict behavior, then, our will may balance another's interest, our desire may balance another's capability, our knowledge may balance another's authority, our love may balance another's force, and our promises may balance another's threats. The balance of powers, therefore, is not a balance of equal weights or like forces on both sides. It is not necessarily a balance between similar powers. Rather, it is a mutually satisfactory outcome between different and contending ICWs. What makes for this balance, this acceptable outcome, is that neither side has the further determination, purpose, or capacity to do what is necessary to improve the outcome.

In sum, conflict behavior—the yelling, threatening, fighting, arguing, slapping, punching, shooting—reflects an underlying engagement, a struggle, a confrontation; that is a balancing of powers, as shown in Figure 11.1. The outcome of this is cooperation, harmony, and peace. Before looking at this in detail, however, I should present some misunderstandings about conflict.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Conflict is bad."*

I grew up disliking conflict and only reluctantly was I persuaded of its useful functions. True, conflict can be violent, excessive, destructive, and counter-productive. But it need not always be, and indeed, in the total spectrum of daily conflicts, it seldom is. Through conflict, we assert and test ourselves and refine our interests. Through conflict, we must consider others, and come to accept the world of individuals outside ourselves. Through conflict, we communicate our ICW across the great, subjective divide between individuals (The Communication Principle). And as will be shown subsequently, through conflict we learn to cooperate.

Figure 11.1
Social Power Vs. Social Power

CONFLICT

will
interests
YOUR SOCIAL POWERS
capability

your mental field

ANOTHER'S
SOCIAL POWERS
will
interests
capability

another's mental field

BALANCING
OF
POWERS

Misunderstanding 2: *"Conflict is antagonistic struggle."*

Yes, conflict is struggle, confrontation. But not necessarily antagonistic or hostile. It can be friendly, as in a disagreement over whether the Dallas Cowboys or Pittsburgh Steelers is a better football team; altruistic, as when two lovers try to give each other the last piece of pie; emotionally neutral, or even fun, as in haggling over the price of a used bookcase; or interesting and engaging, as in a debate. Social conflict comes in as many forms as do our social powers. It is only coercion, and the nonsocial power, force, that may produce hostility, anger, and antagonism.

Surely, there are conflict situations that do not clearly involve coercion or force, even though voices are raised, eyes are narrowed, antagonistic stances are taken, and both parties may let angry words fly that they later regret. Family arguments often are this way. There may be some wrestling, a few slaps, and tears, perhaps even some thrown pictures or dishes. But each party is then expressing his unhappiness and letting the other know about it. Such conflicts are still a confrontation of powers—still a balancing of interests (which is what the argument is about), capabilities, and will. But the powers are mixed, for as the argument moves from one level to another in intensity, as it ranges over one accusation or another, it will move as a kaleidoscope of different combinations of persuasion, appeals, threats, authority, promises, and manipulation. Each participant

in these arguments is a conductor, often unconsciously orchestrating his powers in various combinations and intensities.

The next principle will point out that the outcome of such conflict is usually a new balancing, a clearing of grievances, and a basis for a new structure of expectations.

Misunderstanding 3: *"Conflict, or the balancing of powers, always involves observable behavior."*

Social conflict is a confrontation. It is a matter of coercing, promising, inducing, persuading another self, of finding a mutually satisfactory balance between two selves. Certainly, such conflicts often will involve visible behavior of some sort: words may be shouted, gestures exaggerated; faces may appear upset, stern, or serious; objects may be slammed about.

Often, however, we may achieve a balance of powers without visible conflict. The conflict is there, the opposition exists, but it remains wholly psychological. For one reason or another, we may simply concede to the interests of the other without making it an overt dispute. We may go along, agree, and accept another's demands, because we want to avoid a scene, do not feel up to squabbling, or do not think the issue is worth it. Or, the other may simply dominate the issue. He may be obviously stronger, more knowledgeable, or have greater authority, and thus able to have his way regardless. In this way, much balancing thus takes place beneath the surface of our behavior—in our heads alone.

Misunderstanding 4: *"Conflict always involves misunderstanding, misperception, or miscommunication."*

While such problems no doubt do promote conflict, they may also promote peace. That is, if two people really knew what each other was like, was saying, or thought, then intense conflict may result. Consider how many of our relationships would survive if everyone could suddenly read our mind. Conversely, it should be noted that many conflicts do involve genuine differences in interests, which are correctly understood, perceived, and communicated. Such may be a family conflict over a teenager using the only car, a community conflict over rezoning agricultural land for a housing development, or a national conflict over federally funded abortion.

Such is conflict, but not all is conflict. We cooperate with others more than we are in conflict with them. Then, what is the relationship between conflict and cooperation and how do we move from one to the other? This is the subject of the next chapters.

CHAPTER 12

The Cooperation Principle

Tho' all things differ, all agree.

—Alexander Pope, Windsor Forest

We assert ourselves, We conflict: ICWs clash. And we really communicate. We get through to the other, clear the air, compromise, and agree. We balance, and then we cooperate. Conflict thus turns into cooperation, disunity into harmony, disorder into order. That is, uncertainty turns into expectations.

The Cooperation Principle is this.

Cooperation depends on expectations aligned with power.

Its elements are:

- Balance of powers
- Structure of expectations
- Status quo
- Cooperation

The outcome of our balancing, trying to do something through another individual, is a balance of powers. For those used to thinking of power as only force or coercion, this may seem strange. But recall from the Power Principle that power is a family of powers, including intellectual, authoritative, and bargaining powers, among others. The balance of such powers is a particular balance between our ICW and those of the other (note especially that powers is plural to take into account that there are different powers involved). It is that outcome that each finally accepts, ceasing efforts to improve it. It is a mutual reading each makes about the other's field of expression: their wants, their ability relative to our own to pursue them, and their determination to do so. This reading is the *balance of powers*, the mutual perception of relative powers. This is the first element in the Cooperation Principle.

Assume that we have a fourteen-year old daughter who is beginning to date boys. Assume also that she asks our permission to go to a movie with a boy, which we give, with the understanding that she be home by 10:30 p.m. But instead, she returns at midnight, with very worried and upset parents waiting at the door.

Of course, an argument ensues. We strongly, pointedly assert the importance of her coming home at an agreed time, or calling to let we know she will be delayed; and we emphasize the importance of such rules at her age. Our obvious worry and anger, our

having waited up for her, our sharp words, and our intense movements form a field of expression, communicating to our daughter how important this is to us. Our sincerity and strong resolution about the time she comes home is evident.

She retorts, however, that we just do not understand how embarrassing and difficult it is to ask a boy to bring her immediately home after a movie. Her date was so nice and they only went to have a hamburger and coke and talk. None of her friends have to come home so early, she cries, and she is not a child anymore. Why can't we understand?

Thus, her anguish, tears, and words also communicate. They tell us how difficult the arbitrary 10:30 rule is, and we wonder whether a later time would be better. The next day after cooling down and some thought, we talk calmly with our daughter. The result is a new time limit of 11:30 p.m., and she subsequently makes every effort to come home by then.

This is a normal family conflict, not very serious, but which exemplifies the process and function of conflict. Our daughter's late return provokes the confrontation, the balancing of powers: our parental (authoritative) and, perhaps, implicitly coercive power versus our daughter's altruistic (she is partially appealing to our love for her) and intellectual (persuasion) powers. The balancing is a process of communication, of establishing a better appreciation of each other's ICW. The result is a compromise, a new expectation (11:30 curfew) based on our better, mutual understanding. That is, the conflict helped us both transform a rule (expectation) that failed into a new rule better suited to the situation.

Conflict achieves a new balance of powers. And this balance is the basis of a new *structure of expectations* determined by the conflict.

Remember the Expectation Principle? "Expectations guide our behavior." We order our lives according to our predictions about how others will respond to our behavior. These expectations divide into patterns associated with our different relationships, interests, and activities. Some expectations involve our family, job, church, and entertainment. Others especially involve our loved ones, friends, and relatives. There are expectations of who will do the dishes, the laundry, the family bookkeeping, discipline the children, or make the big decisions.

Each pattern of expectations may be a different set of understandings, agreements, and rules that we have worked out with others. Some are achieved through minor balancing; some through major arguments and fights; some through a recognition of a natural division of labor and responsibility. Each pattern is a mutual structure of expectations a structure in that the expectations usually remain relatively unchanged over months, or sometimes, years. A structure of expectations is the second element in the Cooperation Principle. It defines what another and we will do in a particular situation. It is an implicit and sometimes explicit interpersonal contract governing our mutual behavior.

Structures of expectations take many forms. Sometimes they are informal, even unconscious understandings that are rarely, if ever, put into words, but which help people to live or work together. As my children were growing up in my family there was one expectation governing who took out the trash. Sometime in the dim past, I began to do this when the trashcan was full and this became a habit. Then, in subtle ways (such as a heaping can, beside which was stacked another full bag waiting for me) my family showed their deeply held expectation that this was my job.

On the road, I share with others an informal structure of expectations governing our driving. By speeding up or slowing down, by my distance from the car ahead, by the way I move when approaching a left turn, I cue other drivers as to what to expect of me. Any experienced driver understands that knowing the traffic laws and how to drive a car is only a part of driving; knowing the informal "rules of the road" is also necessary.

Formal rules are also form many of our structures of expectations. Those include family rules for children, rules at work, and etiquette. A rule is simply a formal expectation about behavior that we share with others.

Laws are a type of rule that is backed by explicit coercion: police, courts, jail. Disobey the law and we are punished. In a democracy, traffic law, criminal law, corporation law, and so forth, are structures of expectations that are based on a balance of powers between different interest groups, voters, and government.

Formal contracts establish expectations as to the mutual obligations and rights of the signing parties. Examples are the contracts we sign when we borrow money from a bank, hire a firm to repair our roof, rent an apartment, consult with a business, or use a lawyer. Contracts are a written, formally agreed to structure of expectations based on a mutual assessment of ICW.

At the core of any structure of expectations is a *status quo*, the third element in the Cooperation Principle. The status quo defines our rights, obligations, and duties with regard to another. It defines what is OURS from what is ANOTHER'S. It defines what we own, our private property, the clothes, personal things, car, house, lands, and such, which belong to us. We have absolute command over them and can exclude others from their use. We can, if we wish, take a sledgehammer to our car, and smash its windows, demolish its body, destroy its motor. People will think that we are crazy, of course, but we still are free to do what we please with our car. But what defines such private property is not God-given. It depends on the rules of our family (such as whether one's room, letters, diary, and such, are personal or subject to the authority or interests of other family members), or our work place (such as whether a teacher's desk is subject to search at any time by school authorities), and of the laws.

Rights, obligations, duties, and property are the most important expectations to determine between individuals. Violence, when it occurs, is usually over a breakdown in such expectations over the status quo, as will be shown by the forthcoming Violence

Principle.

To review what I have said so far—through conflict, others and we communicate and engage our different and opposing ICWs; we mutually adjust. Conflict thus enables us to bridge the subjective gulf separating us from others and to establish reliable expectations (rules, agreements, contracts, laws, etc.) about them. The expectations we and another share form a structure of expectations congruent with our mutual balance of powers. This balance, to put a sharp point on it, defines a particular what, when, and how of our relationship. The totality of our relationships is then a complex of such different structures of expectations.

Now, for *cooperation* itself, the final element in the Cooperation Principle. Cooperation, collaboration, partnership, association, and the like, take place within and, indeed, require mutually reliable expectations. To cooperate assumes some agreement, some common basis for predicting each other's behavior. It assumes that we know when we are right or wrong, helpful or unhelpful, correct or incorrect with regard to the other. And this assumes shared expectations (a balance of powers).

For example, we can drive on a public road with reasonable speed and security because we and other drivers share common expectations, which are the traffic laws and informal rules of the road. Slower vehicles stay on the right, we signal our intention to turn, and halt at red lights and stop signs. Our confidence in these expectations is shown by the speed with which we drive through an intersection when our light is green.

The division of labor in society involves multiple and overlapping structures of expectations through which we cooperate with diverse, unknown individuals. Thus, garbage gets collected, mail delivered, food stocked in the markets for us to buy, roads cleared of snow drifts, electricity and running water supplied, music broadcast through our radio, and programs shown on our television. All this is cooperation within multiple balances of powers. This becomes most evident when one of these balances breaks down, as when the garbage men go on strike during hot summer days, and garbage piles up with the resulting stench; or when a transportation strike ties up the whole city; or when a shift in the balance of powers in the legislature produces a new building control bill that sharply depresses the market value of our property. Or, when our taxes are greatly increased.

Cooperation, then, requires mutually held expectations based on a balance of powers, which is usually established through conflict. But still the process is not completely described. I have yet to show what usually happens to these expectations, once formed. And the role of change. But first, I will present some relevant major misunderstandings.

Misunderstanding 1. *"Conflict and cooperation are opposites."*

True, conflict and cooperation are opposed kinds of behavior, one representing difference, disagreement, dispute; the other reflecting help, aid, collaboration. By definition, a behavior can be either cooperative or conflicting, but not both. But

something more is meant here, which is that when we have much conflict we cannot have much cooperation, and vice versa; that cooperation, the open hand, the disposition to help others rather than compete against or oppose them, drives out conflict. This belief is true neither in theory nor in fact. Rather, cooperation and conflict are complimentary, like male and female. Conflict facilitates cooperation by aiding communication. It establishes a solid basis for cooperation by defining a supporting balance of powers. And it helps to achieve that without which cooperation would be impossible—a common structure of expectations. Conflict behavior between individuals and within families can actually integrate them and be associated with close cooperation.

Of course, conflict can also be divisive and destructive. Words hurled may never be forgotten and thereafter embitter a relationship; people can be permanently injured or killed in quarrels. The possibility of cooperation can be destroyed forever. As with so much that matters in this world, conflict cannot be judged without reference to quality and quantity. Conflict can be helpful and, in some cases, necessary to the development of a relationship with another. But too much conflict or the wrong type also may destroy a relationship.

Misunderstanding 2: *"Cooperation reduces conflict."*

This is the belief that by increasing cooperation between antagonistic individuals their conflict will be reduced. Actually, the opposite may occur. In such a situation, latent conflict may well increase or become more intense and violent when it breaks out into manifest behavior. Cooperation must grow out of the balancing between individuals. Imposing an artificial cooperation between two people, or forcing our self to cooperate with another in order to avoid conflict is making eventual, indeed, inevitable, conflict more severe. This is because the cooperation is not based on common expectations and a mutually determined balance of powers. Therefore, dissatisfaction, a sense of injustice, a feeling of unfairness can from the start sour the cooperation. And mutual misunderstandings and frustrations can easily arise.

Misunderstanding 3: *"Suppressing or avoiding conflict encourages harmony, cooperation."*

This belief is closely related to the above misunderstandings. It is often an unconscious assumption held by parents who jump into every battle between their children. It reveals itself in the willingness of some to swallow their irritation or displeasure with another in order to avoid conflict; concern over the diverse group conflicts in a democracy; or belief that the United Nations should stop every violent conflict. Yet, it is "letting it all hang out," being open about one's disagreements, and allowing a conflict to take its natural course, which may well promote a greater cooperation and lessen future conflict. Conflict is balancing, defining an often-implicit contract. Assuming excesses are avoided, conflict may clear the air, make both parties feel better, and establish a deeper, more lasting harmony than existed before.

A personal example comes to mind. By the time, our daughters Lei and Dawn were nine and ten years old, the normal sibling conflict between them had become unpleasantly difficult for Grace and I to handle. They were constantly at each other. Doors would be slammed, things knocked about or thrown, screams and tears, and sometimes blows. The harmony of our household was disrupted regularly. We tried handling this, as we had done throughout the years, by quieting them, determining who started the fight, adjudicating the disagreement, and punishing the guilty one, perhaps by "one of daddy's lectures." Obviously, such adjudication was no task for mere mortals.

Finally, I realized that we ought to be applying to this situation what I had been learning about peace. I suggested a new stratagem to Grace, which she was also fed up enough to try. So the next time one of the girls, who happened to be Lei, complained about the other, we told her to levy a fine that she thought would fit the "crime." This took some repeating, for Lei could not believe at first that we were granting her this supreme gift. So fine her sister Dawn she did, and within minutes, Dawn rushed in to indignantly inform us of Lei's act. Once we explained to Dawn that she too had this right, she then claimed Lei had started the fight, so she would fine Lei in return. The escalating exchange of fines that day virtually destroyed their allowance for the week; the next day their mutually imposed fines decreased, and ended within several days.

Except for something obviously serious, when each complained to us about the other we told them to levy a fine or settle it between themselves. And we stayed out of their fights (watchfully, of course, to avoid any potentially dangerous violence), with one general exception. If their fighting disrupted what Grace and I were doing, we told them to go elsewhere and settle it or go to their different rooms. We thus generally interfered only to maintain our balance with the girls, and not to suppress their specific conflicts with each other. The result of all this was that over the subsequent months the conflicts between the girls sharply declined as they established their mutual balances. Our peace and harmony returned. And, most interesting to me, they began to cooperate more.

CHAPTER 13

The Gap Principle

The old order changeth, yielding place to new;
And God fulfills himself in many ways,
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.

—*Tennyson, Morte d'Arthur*

So, we balance, develop expectations, and cooperate. But only change is permanent: Interests shift, capabilities alter, and wills vary. Thus, expectations will soon hang in the air, unsupported; cooperation will collapse. And again, we will conflict.

The Gap Principle is this:

A gap between expectations and power causes conflict.

Its elements are:

* Change
* Gap
* Trigger
* Conflict

A universal process is involved here. We establish a balance of powers—an adjustment to another—that enables us to form mutual expectations. These are a framework for our cooperation. This much has been established, and were it all, our life would be simple.

But *change* must be anticipated. Our interests may shift; our views, beliefs, and values may change; old pursuits and games may bore us; our job may no longer inspire us; some friends may have become dull; and we get older. We change slightly each day, until the accumulated change makes it hard for us to believe, looking back, that we once actually were as we remember. It is like looking at an old photograph of ourselves. Change is thus the first element in the Gap Principle.

Of course, the balance we establish with another will also change as our mutual balance of ICWs alters. Where formerly we did not mind doing the dishes, we now find it drudgery; where before we took the bus, we now have a car; and where we were reluctant to complain about our working conditions, they have since gotten to us, making us now willing to speak out. Unfortunately, while the mutual balance of powers will thus change, the established structure of expectations usually remains largely the same. Informal expectations are like habits. They stay with us until something dramatic happens to change them significantly. Formal expectations, such as those defined by

contracts, organizational rules, or society's laws, change even less. What change occurs is through subtle and incremental reinterpretation, but even then the core expectations remain much the same until the contract expires, the rule is changed, the law is thrown out.

For example, say we contract to borrow $200,000 for a house for 30 years at 7% interest, committing us to pay $1,330 on the mortgage each month. That commitment will remain constant whether our need for the house changes, our capability to pay decreases, or our will to make the payments weakens as we desire to spend money on other things. As another example, our salary or wages constitute a formal structure of expectations, which never seems to keep pace with our increasing capability to contribute to our employer and our belief as to what we ought to receive. Or, a rule that our daughter comes home from a date by 11:30 P. M. will be increasingly strained as she gets older and involved in a greater variety of activities. Or, a work pattern that enables us to arrive late and leave early to beat the rush hour traffic will be under increasing pressure if the firm's president complains to our boss about falling productivity.

In other words, change in the balance of powers usually creates a gap between our mutual expectations with another and our underlying ICW. It is a gap caused by two different rates of change: the slow evolution of expectations versus the comparatively rapid change in what we want to do, can do, and will do. This *gap* is the second element of the Gap Principle.

Now, because of this gap, strain, friction, a pressure towards readjustment of power or expectations, builds up. Tension may be felt; something seems not quite right. Suddenly, some small thing, often unimportant by itself, occurs and triggers a disruption in our expectations. Our daughter rudely complains to us about the time she has to be home, a flood makes our home unlivable, or traffic causes us to be late for work. Any number of such possible events can break an issue open, provoking the required readjustment—a new conflict.

The *trigger* is simply the "final straw"; the excuse for "having it out." It is the immediate cause of conflict, and it is the third element in the Gap Principle. While some triggers, like the flood, may be huge and devastating, most may at first seem insignificant. We may shake our heads over how a small thing caused our big argument or fight. And months later we will remember the fight, but the trigger will be lost to memory. In over forty years of marriage, I can recall many good fights with my wife, but few triggers.

I can now introduce *conflict*, the final element in the Gap Principle, and by doing so, I can put together the whole process of conflict and cooperation. Through conflict with others we communicate and adjust, we learn to read another's field of expression; through trial and error we establish a balance of powers—manipulative, intellectual, altruistic, authoritative, bargaining, coercive; and through our control over a situation and opportunities, through persuasion, love, legitimacy, promises, and threats, we and another establish a new balance of our wants, capabilities, and wills. This supports a

new mutual structure of expectations—of reliable predictions about the other's responses to our behaviors. This establishes the framework for cooperation, and enables us to cross the subjective gulf separating us from other individuals.

But nature will have her way again and, as time passes, there will be further changes in the balance of powers. In Figure 13.1, I have pictured this process. At the left is a structure of expectations and its supporting triangular balance of powers, formed through conflict. From left to right is illustrated the change in the structure and our balance of powers. Both may change at different rates and in different directions causing a gap between what we expect of another and our mutually supporting ICWs. This gap is like an explosive gas. As it accumulates and inflates, it takes less to be ignited. A trigger—a spark—will eventually occur to persuade one of us that things cannot go on—to stimulate or provoke a willful decision to have it out and change the order of things. Expectations are thus disrupted, as shown in Figure 13.1. And that sets off a new conflict, through which we negotiate a new structure of expectations more in line with the changed balance of powers.

An illustration should make this process clear. Suppose, two people marry when the husband is a junior executive in a large corporation, and his wife is content to stay

Figure 13.1
The Gap Between Expectations and Power

home. During their first years they consciously and unconsciously work out a number of arrangements, understandings, and rules, governing their marriage and making their life together easier and more harmonious. However, as the husband slowly progresses up the executive ladder, there is a shift in his demands on the marriage. Increasingly, he wants a more attractive wife who is a charming hostess and will serve his social requirements for rising further in the corporation. He wants a partner who is active in community affairs, and who is prepared to accept his more frequent and sudden trips and late office hours. An increasing gap may then form over the years between his ICW and that of his wife. Still, there is no open conflict behavior, until, one day, some minor thing—perhaps a telephone call that he will miss dinner again, proves to be the last straw for the wife, who explodes in rage, like she has never done before. The fight thus triggered may end in divorce, in the husband's reevaluation of his career, or in the wife seeking an independent career. In any case, expectations will not be the same again.

No individual remains the same over time; not in wants, desires, beliefs, philosophy, capabilities, competence, self-control, or determination. And as we change, we adjust and readjust to another by lunges and lurches, starts and stops. That is, through conflict we negotiate change.

Conflict creates balance and balance creates order. From order comes cooperation. But cooperation resists change, while the supporting balance of powers shifts. Thus creating conflict. So, conflict creates cooperation, and cooperation entails conflict. Disorder, order, disorder. Is this the cycle of our lives? This is the concern of the next chapter.

First, some major misunderstandings.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Any change produces conflict."*

This is an over-generalization. First, only that change affecting what we expect, want, can get, or are willing to pursue is relevant to conflict. And then, only if this change is in a balance of expectations we have established with others. Second, only certain changes in the balance are relevant. If our expectations alter along with the change in our balance, then no social conflict should occur. Neither should conflict occur if we recognize the gap and reduce it by readjusting our ICW. Third, change in our situation or environment that brings us into contact with new people will require establishing new expectations regarding them. Thus, conflict. For example, an accident which forces us to be hospitalized for a month will require us to develop new expectations of doctors, nurses and other patients. A new job, or home; or a new club, committee or volunteer group also requires such an adjustment to new acquaintances. And fourth, sudden changes may occur in the conditions of our relationship to another. We may get a college degree and start the career we have worked toward; our home may burn down; a flood or other natural disaster may happen. Or, a baby may come into our family, or in-laws move in. In any case, these changes are shocks to our balance with the other person, and these will be discussed in the next chapter.

In sum, change may disrupt our harmony and peace with others. Or, it may not. It all depends on what change, and whether and what adjustment to the change we make.

Misunderstanding 2: *"That change that leads to conflict should be slowed down or prevented."*

This is hardly the case, especially since change may open up new vistas, new opportunities, new challenges; or it may bring better life conditions, a better job, more income, and greater esteem. Of course, change may also bring more problems, dissatisfaction, and grief. But the effect of change is an individual matter. It depends on our situation and us. To generalize that change is bad because it causes conflict is like saying a new job is bad because it requires personal adjustments. It may well do so, and probably will, but whether the resulting conflict is worthwhile depends on what we get from it.

CHAPTER 14

The Helix Principle

Not enjoyment, and not sorrow,
Is our destined end or way;
But to act, that each to morrow
Find us farther than to day.

—Longfellow, A Psalm of Life

Unrest turns into harmony; and harmony into unrest. We conflict in order to cooperate, but our cooperation ends in conflict again. Are we caught in a vicious circle? Fated to know only an ephemeral peace? No, we learn; we adjust to one another! Each round of conflict and cooperation makes the subjective gulf easier to bridge. Each round requires less adjustment. And each round of peace lasts longer; our harmony becomes more durable, cooperation more enduring.

Our conflict forms a helix. And the Helix Principle is this:

Our conflict becomes less intense, our peace more lasting.

Its elements are:

- Learning and adjustment
- Conflict Helix
- Continuity
- Shocks

I once had a video game that allowed me to play pong against a built in computer program. The computer won the first sets I played, but soon I saw that if the "ball" was hit at a particular angle and direction, the computer would invariably miss. I did not lose another game to it. Utilizing this and other patterns of error in the computer, my daughter Lei beat it 21 to 0, and I can clearly recall her photographing the screen as evidence for her triumph.

We are not such a computer. We err, of course, but we learn and adjust. And in our relations with others, through trial and error we learn to adjust to them. That is, we learn from past conflict and expectations. Here, I can borrow a useful term from the computer specialist (and mathematician). This is "iteration"—the process of convergence on a solution to a mathematical problem through successive applications of a technique, where the solution at one step becomes the input to the next.

The conflict helix is a process of iteration towards harmony and peace. The previous conflict and expectations are input to the current conflict. And this and the consequent expectations will be input to the next. And because of this learning and continual process of communication, our mutual adjustments with another and our mutual expectations come closer and closer to truly reflecting our mutual mentalities—to best fitting our mutual fields of expression. Periods of harmony, of cooperation, last longer; periods of confrontation and struggle become less intense.

Returning to the example of the married couple, it is something of a truism that the first years of marriage are the most conflictual, the most quarrelsome. Why should this be so? We now have the principles and elements for an answer. Consider that when two individuals live together for the first time, they have much to learn about each other and they must adjust to what they learn if they are to stay together. Though lovers, they are yet strangers. Therefore, the first year of marriage is that of the most rapid and profound adjustment. The couple learn diverse ways to live together—to compensate—often through conflict—for "little things", such as dirty clothes left on the floor, the cap left off the toothpaste, snoring, belching, reading the newspaper at breakfast, absentmindedness, and neglecting to mention when one is going to be home late; and for "big things", like sex, money, children, in laws, furnishings, and the division of family labor.

No wonder the first year of marriage is so conflict-prone. But if the couple survives this period, the marriage then settles down. Through conflict, both have communicated what they want, can, and will do. Through conflict, they have adjusted and coordinated their expectations of each other. And through conflict, each has learned to better predict the other's behavior and compensate for it. Conflict therefore lessens; over the years the couple grow so familiar with each other, so much in harmony, that they come to live with, around, and through each other, like a blind man moving around the house in which he was born.

Marriage—the process of two people learning to live together—is a conflict helix. Other situations could be similarly described. Our settling into a new neighborhood, into a new job or career, or developing a new friendship, are also conflict helices. The *learning and adjustment* involved in this process and the *conflict helix* are the first two elements of the Helix Principle.

To make sure this is clear, three figures may help. First, conflict and peace are a repetitive process as shown in Figure 14.1. Conflict creates peace; peace turns into conflict.

However, we learn from what went before. So, each turn of this process is at a higher level of experience, familiarity, and understanding. Thus, the helix. A helix is a spiral, like a spring as shown in Figure 14.2. Each turn of the spiral is at a higher level of learning and adjustment; each passage of the spiral through peace takes longer and involves a greater harmony; each successive passage through conflict is faster and milder.

In Figure 14.3, I unwind the helix to picture its progress through time. As shown, the periods of peace, harmony, and cooperation get longer as one learns more about the other. The circled portion of the figure is that conflict and structure of expectations illustrated in Figure 13.1 of Chapter 13.

FIGURE 14.1

Process of Conflict and Peace

FIGURE 14.2
THE CONFLICT HELIX

FIGURE 14.3
The Conflict Helix Through Time

Were our lives, from birth to death, a continuous helix, then we should have the most conflict when we are young, the least when old. But life does not so accommodate us. We seem, instead, to go through periods of more or less intense conflict; more or less durable periods of harmony. Some marriages, in fact, do seem to grow progressively harmonious. However, others seem to go through periodic crises and conflicts, with no long-term progress towards a lasting harmony. And after promising beginnings, some marriages suddenly deteriorate and end in divorce. Why?

The helix assumes that the framework within we interact with others remains fairly constant. Of course within this framework change will always occur. But presumably we remain in the same dwelling, same job; we get no large inheritance or windfall gain,

have no children; have no in-laws move in with us, require no hospitalization, suffer no severe illness, endure no disasters, no rapes, no robberies, and the like. Any such dramatic changes may require a whole new series of adjustments, a new rephasing of the conflict helix. Of course, we will not have forgotten the previous conflicts and expectations, but the changed situation may stimulate a radically different set of interests and demand capabilities that were dormant before. Simply consider the adjustments that would be necessary in your family life, no matter how harmonious now, were you to suddenly inherit a fortune or become paralyzed from the waist down.

Continuity in conditions is thus the third element in the Helix Principle. This continuity may be broken by any number of rapid changes impacting our structure of expectations with others. We may give up housework and start a new career; be promoted, requiring a move to New York; have our only child marry and leave home; start college or enter graduate school at a different university. We may go deaf, become blind, or get cancer.

A change in expectations is universally part of the aging process itself. From child to teenager to adult to middle age to retirement, we grow through a series of states and transitions. Each is a different season in our lives. As teenagers, we are flapping our wings, testing our independence, and sexually maturing. Soon we enter the world of adults, preparing and competing for jobs, finding our individual niche, learning the joys and sorrows of self-support, and seeking sensual pleasure. After thirty, we settle down, try to improve ourselves and rise in our job or career. Success is the keyword. In our mid-forties we take stock, redefine ourselves, face up to our inability to achieve our great plans or to the emptiness of those we have achieved. In the mid-fifties comes a greater acceptance of oneself, a mellowing, a greater concern with life's truths, with knowledge and insight, rather than sensual pleasure and material success. And then there is retirement, the crises in esteem, and the need to reorient time and goals. Each stage involves different interests; each requires new adjustments with others. No smooth continuous helix, then, but a series of new conflicts, new expectations. Yet, like a ship tacking into the wind, there is an overall direction. We do become wiser, more experienced in conflict and with others. We do tend toward a greater harmony with age: less radical, less idealistic; more conservative, more tolerant.

The helix, the progressive development of greater harmony, is most susceptible to *shocks*. These are sudden sharp alterations in the conditions of a relationship. Shocks shear the helix and initiate a new sequence of adjustments and balances. For example, a couple may adjust to each other in their first years of marriage. But let a first child come into their life, and a new sequence of conflicts is stimulated. New expectations must be developed. New kinds of cooperation are needed. The infant must be fed, bathed, clothed, its functions tended. It must be watched, played with, and loved. Therefore, the parents must determine a new division of labor between themselves, and although custom helps to define certain roles, in the United States much is left to be negotiated.

One other example may be helpful. Two college students meet, fall in love, and get married. Let us call them Dick and Jane. Dick goes on to seek a higher degree, while

Jane with a B.A. works as a waitress in order to support them. In this mutual effort, they probably will grow closer and conflict would abate after the initial period of adjustment. Assume Dick receives his degree, finally, and gets a good job earning a decent income in a multinational corporation. They move to New York, and Jane becomes a housewife. The conditions of this marriage have now sharply altered and a new series of radical adjustments are required. As a college professor, I often saw or heard about similar sharp changes in lives ending in divorce.

We are now at that point in this section where all this can be put together into a Master Principle, which will be done in the next chapter. But first, let me clarify a possible misunderstanding.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Some people never conflict."*

The implication here is that some people go through a process of adjustment without conflict. They seem to establish harmony with others by openness, verbal communication, or a cooperative attitude. However, this can be misleading. First, people can conflict in different ways. Some are violent, aggressive, and verbally abusive, or throw things and scream. Some become coldly rational and argumentative, or devious and manipulative. Others make promises or threats, appeal to authority or love, accept blame, admit being wrong, and apologize. This is all still conflict behavior.

Second, when a person says he never fights, he probably means he never uses violence or shouts or throws things. But he will debate with, disagree with, or try to persuade another over some issue. To say that all people conflict means that in their own way, they work through disagreements, issues, disputes, and such, whether violently or nonviolently, emotionally or rationally, aggressively or passively. And whatever their style, if the framework of their relations is stable, then the Helix Principle applies: their successive conflict will be less intense; their peace more lasting.

CHAPTER 15

The Second Master Principle

Can two walk together,
except they be agreed?

—Amos 3:3

My daughter Lei used to take a long bus ride to school beginning at 6:00 a.m. During one such trip, the driver had, as usual, turned the air conditioning on full blast. However, this morning was especially chilly, and Lei also was discomforted by a cold from which she was recovering

She began to shiver, felt as though her lips were turning blue, and got increasingly upset. She wanted to yell out a request to the driver that he turn down the air conditioning, but each time she tried, she could not do it. Her natural shyness on a bus crowded with people, deterred her. Finally, she decided to act, on a count of three. She counted quickly to herself and on three yelled out, "Will you please turn down the air conditioning before we all freeze to death!"

All her pent-up frustration came out at once, shaping and projecting her yell, making her sound quite angry. She did not recognize her own voice. All conversation on the bus stopped; heads turned; there was a loud expectant silence. And the air conditioner was turned off.

A second story. Many years ago, to save money, I bought speakers for a stereo component system from a New York mail order firm. One of the speakers that arrived was cheaper and older than the model I had ordered. It also was broken. In a polite letter I brought the shipping error to the firm's attention, but got no response. A second, less civil letter followed, again without reply. Suspecting that a meaningful pattern was emerging,, I put together duplicates of my correspondence, orders, and receipts, and attached them to a letter to the president of the firm. I demanded the proper speaker or a full refund of course, but I also informed him that I intended to forward copies of my correspondence to the Better Business Bureau, the New York regulatory board, and his bank. An immediate response by return mail, and prompt delivery of a new speaker rapidly followed.

One further personal recollection. A number of years ago Grace and I bought a teak dining table and placed it by the windows in our living room so that we could view Kaneohe Bay and the Pacific Ocean as we ate. Up to then we had eaten in a windowless breakfast nook next to our kitchen. Our teenage girls, whose task it then was to set and clear the table at mealtime, complained loudly about the distance they had to walk to the new table, the need to use a tray, and the inconvenience involved in

keeping hot things and liquids off the table top. There was a considerable disharmony at mealtime for a few days, until they adjusted mentally and procedurally to the change. Moreover, Grace and I also helped to set and clear the table more than we did before, and all learned to take something with them to the kitchen when they left the table for whatever reason.

These three examples reveal conflict as conflict is a process of mutual communication and adjustment, and show how through conflict, we learn to coexist. They illustrate the operation of the six social, or interpersonal, principles presented in the previous chapters, which are summarized in Table 15.1.

TABLE 15.1 SIX SOCIAL PRINCIPLES

	PRINCIPLES	ELEMENTS
COMMUNICATION	We communicate as a Field of Expression	Trial and error Languages Field of expression
POWER	We Produce Effects	Nonsocial powers Social powers Exercising power The power equation The Triangle of power
CONFLICT	Conflict is a Balancing of Powers	Balancing of powers Interests Capabilities Will (credibility)
COOPERATION	Cooperation Depends on Expectations Aligned with Power	Balance of powers Structure of expectations Status Quo Cooperation
GAP	A Gap Between Expectations and Power Causes Conflict	Change Gap Trigger Conflict
HELIX	Our Conflict Becomes Less Intense, Our Peace More Lasting	Learning Conflict helix Continuity Shocks

All this can be put into another Master Principle, this one about others and ourselves. It is this.

Through conflict we negotiate an interpersonal contract.

Conflict is a negotiation between us and another individual. It is a sometimes conscious, sometimes unconscious; sometimes formal, sometimes implicit balancing of what we mutually want, can, and will do. The outcome is our personal contract with another—a structure of conscious and unconscious, formal and implicit understandings and agreements that provide us with reliable expectations of another's behavior.

The nature and implications of this master principle can be further clarified through three corollaries.

Corollary 1: *Our peace is an interpersonal contract.*

That is, the peace and harmony we enjoy with another individual depends on the personal contract we negotiate with them. Peace does not just happen; it is not simply the absence of conflict; it is not passive. Peace is an active process of adjustment and adaptation to others.

Corollary 2: *Our cooperation is an interpersonal contract.*

Cooperation requires that we establish reliable expectations with others about the outcome of our behavior, and what their behavior will be. The contract we negotiate with another individual defines the structure of such expectations between us.

Corollary 3: *Our personal contract cannot be unjust to ourselves.*

I have been assuming throughout that we are freely, spontaneously, achieving a balance of power—an interpersonal contract—with another. The contract is not forced on both of us by a third party, such as our parents, boss, or government. As a freely determined contract, the balance we achieve with another, the structure of expectations, is one that best fits our mutual natures, wants, desires, and values; and relative to our mutual capabilities and what we both are willing to accept. The contract ends the conflict. The confrontation over, we are unwilling, unable, or uninterested in getting a better deal and will live with what we have. Then, this contract cannot be unjust to us. Not when we accept it.

What if the other lied or manipulated us without our knowing it? To a third party the contract may then seem unjust, but he is not us. He does not know our intentions, our interests, our resolution, or how we see our capabilities. Even were we to discover that we were lied to or manipulated, we may under the circumstances shrug it off. "Well, John is that way," we may say. Another cannot really know what we believe or feel is unjust. However, even were we to assert beforehand that lying would be unjust in negotiating a structure of expectations, in the particular situation and given the contract determined, we may still be willing to live with it. But of course, new information (as about the other's lies), a change of heart or values, may cause us to feel the contract is

in fact unjust, in which case we will try to change it. A new process of conflict will then result, the outcome of which should be a more agreeable, interpersonal contract.

It is now time to review. Through conflict we cross the gulf between our unique mental field and that of other individuals; we communicate, adjust, negotiate an interpersonal contract, and we establish a more lasting peace. Conflict and cooperation, strife and peace, are essential aspects of our learning to coexist with other individuals. But these six principles of interpersonal conflict and Second Master Principle not only enable us to understand the conflict in our own day-to-day lives. They also serve to explain the roots of collective and international conflict, of war, and of peace.

PART III

SOCIAL RELATIONS

Dust as we are, the immortal spirit grows
Like harmony in music; there is a dark
Inscrutable workmanship that reconciles
Discordant elements, makes them cling together
In one society.

—Wordsworth, The Prelude I

CHAPTER 16

The Universality Principle

All the world's a stage
And all the men and women merely players.
They have their exit and their entrances;
And one man in his time plays many parts.

—Shakespeare, As You Like It

We establish mutually reliable expectations with people we know: with loved ones, relatives, friends, and coworkers; with priest, teacher, mailman, salesman, and butcher. With them we coordinate and harmonize. And, there are people we do not know with whom we also indirectly conflict, balance, and cooperate. This is because we all form a society, a group of people who share common rules and are interdependent, bound by some division of labor.

Societies have many forms. There is the corporation, factory, university, or church; the modern nation, state, or city; the professional society, neighborhood association, bowling league, or bridge club; or the free market, international system, friendship group, and the family. We simultaneously belong to many such societies, the largest being that of international relations. The next largest are regional associations of which our state (nation) is a part. And the third largest is likely our country. The smallest society is our family.

All societies have a division of labor—the performance of different jobs or services that contribute to a mutual dependence among their members. This, then, is the Universality Principle:

Our interpersonal principles apply to all societies

Its elements are:

- Society
- Balance of Powers
- Structure of Expectations
- Spontaneous Society
- Gap
- Conflict

The first of these, a *society*, consists of individuals in varying relationship to each other, such as buyer and seller, minister and congregation, president and treasurer, foreman and worker, producer and consumer, or teacher and students; it involves a

communication system, such as newspapers, telephones, mail, radio, and gossipers; and it has a division of labor, such as between husband and wife, salesman and secretary, and teacher and carpenter. Diverse balances of powers among individuals connect these relationships, communications, and occupations. And their associated *structures of expectations*. These comprise the second and third elements in the Universality Principle.

Just as we form mutually reliable expectations with certain individuals, they in turn form their own expectations with others. Who in turn. . . . And so, these expectations spread out among large numbers of individuals to form common norms, values, and meanings. These become common rules that enable people to perform different tasks for different purposes, and which facilitate communication, coordination, and cooperation between people, although their ends may differ. Some expectations become custom; others become the common laws of a society, violation of which means certain sanctions from its members (such as ostracism) or authorities who guard these laws. Some expectations are public laws, decreed by the government of the society, and backed by police, courts, and jails. Regardless of the society, however, and the nature of the common mutual expectations—implicit rules, customary norms, common or public law— all are based on balances of powers among individual members, either in their own capacity or as authorities representing groups within the society. What I am describing is a s*pontaneous society*, that which naturally occurs among a free people.

A group is defined by a particular structure of expectations, such as a charter or constitution, which establishes how authority for the group is determined, the group's purposes, and the obligations and rights of members. But a group is still a collection of individuals with a specific structure of expectations that authorize some individual to act on behalf of the others. To refer to groups instead of individuals, therefore, does not reduce the importance of the individual. It simply recognizes that in societies some individuals act authoritatively on behalf of others forming a group.

Now, large societies usually contain a variety of groups that provide different services and functions, help satisfy different individual needs, and represent the different interests of their members. Labor unions, corporations, colleges, churches, political parties are such, as are a variety of labor, consumer, educational, conservation, business, farmer, and professional groups formed to further a particular interest of their members. Such groups compose the balances of powers that structure a larger society—which support its private and public laws, undergird its status quo, determine who gets what, and demarcate rights and private property. Social balances of powers are primarily among diverse groups; and underlie different contracts, different institutional arrangements, and different rules. All at different levels.

Society is more or less criss-crossed and layered by these diverse expectations among different groups and individuals. But one dominant balance of powers and associated structure of expectations—one overall status quo—usually sits above all. Such is the Constitution of the United States; the constitution of each American state; the accumulated common and statute law under which the House of Commons functions in

the United Kingdom; the informal and formal rules and procedures under which a university operates. This most general and dominant balance is not necessarily a product of all groups, contributing to it more or less equally. Some may have more power than others, or one group and its leader may be supreme with the power to dictate the status quo. In this case, the status quo may depend on balancing among individuals within the dominant group, as a result of which one may rise to absolute supremacy in the group, as did Stalin, Mao, and Hitler, and thus in society as well.

In the United States, many different determine the dominant status quo groups, but playing a large role in this are the national Democrat and Republican Parties, which themselves are coalitions (balances) of state-level parties and interest groups. The President of the United States, the single most powerful individual in the country, achieves his position by first defeating (balancing) contenders in his own party and then the chief contenders from the other parties.

Of course, much of this is obvious and I appear to have said nothing new. However, I have placed the obvious in a perspective that sees (1) society as a balance of powers and associated mutual expectations among individuals and groups, and (2) the highest expectations of a society and related balances as similar in process and form to what we personally achieve with others. This view enables us to better understand social conflict, peace, and justice through our own experience. And especially, it helps us to avoid the mystical trap of seeing society apart from individuals and their actions; or the rational trap of believing all societies are the product of human will or intelligent design.

In sum, then, societies are multiple, connected, intersecting structures of expectations. These define a society's norms, customs, laws, groups, institutions, statues, and division of labor, and as in our interpersonal relations, they are formed and reformed through conflict. In the larger societies conflict is usually between groups; that is, between individuals representing them or their members; but it no less reflects a balancing of powers.

As illustrations of the kind of conflict between groups that we find in contemporary democratic societies, I might mention labor strikes, consumer boycotts, corporate suits against other businesses, and election campaigns. Yet these engagements of rival parties are so often regularized and institutionalized, and so deeply channeled by rules (such as strike laws or election rules) that we may not even think of them as conflicts, but as contests or competition. Only when the parties go beyond established rules and beyond what is deemed permissible or warranted do we perceive a conflict, as, for example, when strike violence breaks out, or there is an anti-globalization riot, or produce trucks are turned over in a consumer boycott, or white police are shot by a sniper in a black neighborhood, or a reformist candidate's house is set on fire.

It is important to note that all such conflict, whether institutionalized or not, contributes to a new structure of expectations within society. The more important the expectations to the society, the more they define the general status quo—rights (such as property) and obligations—, the more likely violence is involved in their formation. Large-scale urban

riots, political assassination, revolutions, coups d'état, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and the like, reflect balancing over the general status quo. Recall that the American Constitution grew out of the Revolutionary War, that the fundamental interpretation of state's rights within the Constitution was settled by the American Civil War, that the wide-scale black rioting and demonstrations of the 1960s in the United States led to the civil rights and affirmative action legislation and rules of the 1970s, and that the intense anti-Vietnam War demonstrations and violence led to legislation curtailing the war powers of the President and the activities of American intelligence agencies. All examples of new structures of expectations arising out of conflict.

Yet, as in our personal relations, the expectations determined by conflict may in time themselves become outdated; a status quo may eventually no longer fit the reality of group and individual ICWs. New groups may rise, dominant groups may wither, and strong individuals may take over group leadership or be replaced by weak, incompetent successors. Thus, a gap may form between a social structure of expectations and the balance of power, as shown in Figure 13.1 of Chapter 13. Eventually, if the gap continues to widen, some trigger event - an assassination, a riot, a crooked election, a police strike - disrupts the structure, crystallizes opposition, and provokes confrontation. And social conflict erupts. Both this gap and the resulting conflict are the last elements in the Universality Principle.

Social conflict thus serves to readjust the status quo to the reality of social powers (ICWs)—to create a new framework of social peace and cooperation.

To summarize the logic of this, a society at any one time consists of a balance of powers among diverse groups and individuals. This balance supports a particular structure of understandings, rules, norms, laws, and the like—most centrally, a status quo, as shown in Figure 16.1 for labor-management relations in Honolulu. I will discuss this type of illustration further in Chapter 19, but note the following here: the wiggly lines represent structures of expectations among individuals and groups; the coordinates—bold lines—represent the general structures of expectations and the central status quo making Honolulu a society. Note also that the Honolulu city government is centered among these expectations, because of its dominating position in the city.

This balance frames and permits cooperation and coordination among groups and individuals. Social peace is this balance. But this peace breaks down when expectations no longer match supporting ICWs—when underlying power changes. Peace is then re-established when a new alignment is created. That is, the conflict helix operates at all social levels.

Much involved here needs detailed clarification, and I will provide them in the following chapters. But first, as usual, I should discuss some possible misunderstandings.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Societies have purposes or goals, such as satisfying the needs of its members, maintaining peace or survival."*

Figure 16.1
Labor-Management Relations (Expectations and Status Quo) in Honolulu

The belief that societies have goals comes mainly from confusing society as a general concept, with one of its types: an organization. As will be discussed in the next chapter, organizations do have a purpose: to achieve some task for which it was formed. But most societies are not so organized, most have no purpose. They spontaneously evolve, unplanned, as a totality of the interlaced, multiple structures of expectations formed out of the diverse balances between its members. Such is usually the family or clan.

Misunderstanding 2: *"We have an obligation to society."* or *"Society has an obligation to us."*

As pointed out above, society is constituted by the multiple expectations that have evolved from the mutual adjustments of diverse individuals and groups of individuals. To say that we have an obligation to these expectations (or they to us) is like saying that the rules of the road have an obligation to the driver; or that the prices determined in a free market have an obligation to the consumer. The widespread belief in an obligation to society or of society may be due in part to a misidentification of society in general with an organization in particular. Only in an organization are obligations specifically defined, as when an official on behalf of a corporation contracts to pay us a salary for our services. But, most societies are not organizations. Unless a dictator tries to create one by force and coercion, that is.

Misunderstanding 3: *"Social conflict is an aberration."*

This is simply wrong. Social conflict is normal. It is an aspect of all societies, from international relations to families. Through conflict, members of a society adjust to changes in social reality and ensure that their mutual expectations are reliable. Disharmony and peace, conflict and cooperation are complementary. They are two sides of the social human coin.

CHAPTER 17

The Trisocial Principle

Untwisting all the chains that tie
The hidden soul of harmony.

—John Milton, L 'Allegro

Some societies we form naturally with colleagues, friends, or neighbors. Some we are born into, as with our family, and perhaps our city, county, and state. Some we join, such as our church, professional association, business, factory, and university. Some we are coerced or forced into or prevented from leaving, such as our primary and secondary school, military service during wartime, or, if we have committed a crime, prison. And some societies we create, as possibly our bridge club, tennis group, bowling league, or new family. Regardless, there is a uniformity in all these societies.

The Trisocial Principle is that:

Societies are generally trisocial.

Its elements are:

- Three powers
- Three societies
- Three political systems
- Three conflict dimensions
- Three structures of peace

All individuals exercise a variety of social powers to a greater or lesser degree (see Chapter 10) Some of these powers are especially conducive to forming societies, particularly large ones comprising thousands or millions of individuals. In the main, larger societies are glued together by some combination of authority, bargaining, or coercion.

Authority is the right (according to the customs, rules or laws of a society) to command, and to be obeyed because it is believed legitimate. Authority thus plays a role in society to the degree that we and others follow custom, rules, and laws because these are right and proper. We pay dues or taxes, obey the chairman, submit to authorities or police, not for fear of sanctions, but because we feel or believe that we should. Because we want to.

Some societies are dominated by such authority and can be called authoritative societies. In such communities, behavior is regulated by holy texts or revered prophets,

or by widely and deeply accepted custom and norms. Truth is written or revealed by holy men, or handed down by each generation. Tradition is law; philosophy emphasizes intuition, essence, and principles; art is spiritual. And morality is right behavior. A church is such a society, and so is a religious commune or monastery. Many small, rural towns have the flavor of authoritative societies—highly moral, with good and bad ways of doing everything; and regulated by custom and a few authoritative figures, perhaps a judge, sheriff, or banker.

Some nations also are highly authoritative. One such nation is Saudi Arabia, which is ruled by a monarch who enforces one religion and one tradition throughout the land. Centuries ago most national societies were authoritative, governed by monarchs. Custom and tradition dominated and it was custom and tradition that determined the right and wrong way of behaving. Even for the king, queen, or emperor.

Families also can be characterized as more or less authoritative. In some, the division of labor is a matter of tradition. There is one job for the man, such as supporting the family; another for the woman, such as housewife. And the children have their place—a time to be heard, to be seen. Rules are accepted as the way things always have been done. No justification is offered, nor expected. These orthodox family rules are simply right, to be obeyed without question. Families are so structured in traditional, authoritative national societies. But even in non-authoritative cultures, such as in the United States, we can find families in which the relationship and appropriate behavior between husband, wife, children, and in-laws has been handed down and followed through the generations to the present day.

All authoritative societies are based on authoritative power—the legitimacy of commands or requests. A second type of society is based mainly on bargaining power. This an exchange society, in which individuals generally relate on the basis of their mutual ability to satisfy each others' interests, rather than in terms of traditional expectations. Individuals in an exchange society participate in relationships because they gain satisfaction from so doing, and not because they are compelled to do so.

The most extensive exchange society is the free market, through which millions of individuals are interrelated by multiple exchanges of products, goods, services, currency, and labor. Each individual is free to use his own knowledge and skill to his best ability and in doing so unconsciously contributes to the welfare of all. And resources are most efficiently distributed in terms of the needs and interests of society's members. This is because the price of something is the balance between multiple wants, resources, and wills. A price is itself a specific structure of expectations, the amount being a continual adjustment to the various balances (conflicts) between buyers and sellers.

The free market is integrated by general expectations that coordinate diverse individuals in pursuit of different ends. To return to a previous example, we might liken market expectations to the informal rules that enable many cars to jointly use the same roads. Even though each car is driven for different, and possibly opposing, purposes by drivers

unknown to each other, they yet coordinate their movements cooperatively and peacefully.

In the main, the exchange society we call the free market has three basic, general expectations that emerge from the multiple balances among its members and establish the status quo. One defines our sovereign domain, or what we own—our private property. The title to our car or home, the sales slip for our clothes or television, declare these to be ours, with the right to do with them as we please. Second, these general expectations define the procedures for transferring private property to others, such as in selling our car. And third, these expectations define promises or commitments, that is, contracts that establish mutual agreements enforceable by the courts.

Yet exchange societies exist in many forms aside from the free market. Indeed, any group of individuals voluntarily interrelating on the basis of mutual needs and interests in which expectations (rules, laws) form spontaneously to facilitate exchange (mutual satisfaction) is such a society. Bridge or poker clubs, bowling leagues, discussion groups, book seminars, are usually exchange societies. So are families whose expectations grow out of the free interplay and adjustment of family members to changing conditions. Keep in mind, therefore, that an exchange society is not necessarily a product-money-exchange market. People also exchange love and salutations. The scratch each other's backs, stroke each other's emotions, and caress each other. They exchange ideas. Even a conversation may be a trade of stories and attention, as when two people are totally absorbed in a moving, conversational exchange.

Exchange societies are a product of bargaining power ultimately based on promises, but the third type of society has a very different foundation. This is the coercive society based on threats.

In a coercive society, expectations integrate us with others through our mutual fear of disobeying commands. And these commands are not random. They are meant to organize the society towards some goal or end, towards satisfying particular interests. Thus, a prison is a coercive society. So is an army. And so are many primary and secondary schools. There are also corporations in which coercion plays a significant role, disobeying commands mean being fired, reassigned, or demoted. National societies also can be primarily coercive. North Korea and Burma are just two examples of societies in which coercive commands and fear of the consequences of disobedience tightly regulate most phases and aspects of each individual's life.

And of course, some families are coercively organized. The husband, or sometimes the wife, rules tyrannically. Interaction is guided by fear; threats are common, beatings frequent. And expectations mainly satisfy the interest of the tyrant. Recent studies have drawn attention to the fear and terror in such families, and have highlighted the continuous violence and sheer brutality of some men against their wives and children, which in extreme cases has driven the victims to finally strike out and kill their tormentor.

In summary, then, the Trisocial Principle means that the structures of expectations that form society can be understood in terms of *three types of power*, and for most societies, one of these forms of power is dominant. Such are the authoritative, exchange and coercive societies. These three types of power and their associated *societies* are the first and second elements of the Trisocial Principle, as listed above.

Consider each of the three types of societies as a circle of individuals. Then the range of major alternative societies available to us and to which we belong is shown in Figure 17.1, along with an example of each in parentheses. The overlapping areas between the circles define mixed types of societies that are significant combinations of the social powers involved. For example, the overlap between exchange and coercive societies defines those that are based on both coercive and exchange powers. Such is a factory

FIGURE 17.1
Major Types of Societies (Social Structures of Expectations)

EXCHANGE

(free market)

(factory)   (club)

(university)

(prison)   (church)

(primary
school)

COERCIVE   AUTHORITATIVE

for its personnel, where the hire and continuing employment of a worker is a matter of mutual exchange between the employer's offer of a wage and the worker's labor. However, the factory is also organized hierarchically and workers are threatened with sanctions for disobeying the rules or commands of their bosses.

Note also the position of the university at the central intersection of all three types of society. Many people still believe in the university as the embodiment of pure intellectual power, but in the United States at least, power within the universities of today is transmitted by a combination of coercion (grades, the threat of non-tenure for younger faculty, and the coercive demand that faculty pay a fee to a union), authority (the ability of many professors to influence students, colleagues, and policies through their status and reputation), and exchange (the free interaction and balancing between colleagues and students over ideas, facts, personal support, recommendations, and affection).

The third element in the Trisocial Principle concerns the *three different political systems* that we shall find to be associated with the three kinds of society under consideration. It will be readily appreciated that all national societies have some central individual or organization for at least maintaining particular core expectations that structure the society. This is, of course, the government. And the government plus the rules and laws it maintains and its procedures define the political system.

One type of political system is libertarian. The composition and leadership of the government is determined freely through open contest for power. Laws and rules are the outcomes of competitive, political balancing of powers among diverse interests and groups, and therefore reflect immediate and prevailing needs. Libertarian political systems are thus oriented to the present.

At the national level, these systems are also limited by individual rights and checks on their growth in coercive power, such as the checks and balances system in the United States (each branch of government—the legislature, judiciary, and administration—has constitutional powers that check and balance the others). Typically, libertarian political systems are concerned with maintaining a few fundamental principles, especially the rights of private property, its transfer to others, and of freedom and legality of individual contract; as well as civil and human rights, equality before the law, and due process of law. A pervasive belief in individual freedom provides guidelines and sets limits for governmental action within these principles. The most libertarian political systems in the world today are the liberal democracies.

Most of us have belonged at one time to a group or groups with libertarian systems—free choice of chairman or president, debate and votes on issues, equal participation, and the like. Some families are also libertarian. Considerable freedom is allowed; rules are few, consistent, and help coordinate activities; and rules grow out of the open, non-coercive interaction (balancing) of family members.

A second type of political system is authoritarian. At the national level, birth, class, or status usually determines leadership; government is by an aristocracy. Laws are passed

and enforced according to tradition. Government power dominates over individual rights; civil rights are few, if any. An authoritarian government does not try to reflect current needs and interests, but to maintain a traditional culture, orthodox principles, and ancestral rules. It is backward looking. And law is what is Right: that which is legitimated by history, culture, or religion.

Examples of nations ruled by such authority are Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, Morocco, and Nepal.

Numerous societies have this type of political system, among them many religious organizations, such as the Catholic Church. So too do some small private Universities and colleges, which are governed by tenured professors, appointed deans, and presidents within a dominant academic tradition and ritual. There are also some businesses, where ownership and control is passed from father to son, and traditional products and operations are firmly maintained.

Finally, of course, there are families with an authoritarian head. Customs and rules are passed down from parent to child:

"But, Dad, why?"
"Because I told you."
"But . . . ."
"Look, what was good enough for me when I was your age, is good enough for you."

So we come to the third type of political system—the totalitarian. Under such a system, government manages and controls most significant aspects of society. Leadership is determined by appointment from above or by the violent or forceful overthrow of those in power. Rules and laws neither reflect prevailing interest nor try to maintain tradition, but are used by the government to transform society and achieve some future goal, such as wealth, power, glory, or a communist utopia. Any participation in the political system is narrowly channeled and tightly controlled. Open, wide-ranging criticism, especially of the leadership and of government goals, is usually unwise, if not illegal. Order is maintained by fear.

Totalitarian national governments, particularly the communist variety, have been reduced to only North Korea, Cuba, China, Vietnam, and Laos. But many non-national societies also have totalitarian governments, which govern to achieve a specific, future purpose, whether it is producing automobiles, selling hamburgers, building a bridge, or supervising the insane. In such societies, things are done by command; rules established from the top to achieve the organization's goal. Participation in top decision-making by the rank-and-file is usually minor. Leadership is determined by appointment and personal power.

And, of course, there are families with a totalitarian government, where typically wife and children are regimented by a tangle of formal and informal rules dictated or determined by the husband. Some rules are arbitrary, some tyrannical, some invented

for one reason or other. The family is tightly organized: spontaneity within is severely limited.

The three types of governments are the points of a political triangle, as shown in Figure 17.2. Political systems are located in this triangle in terms of their mixture of these types. The figure also includes political labels for the most important types or varieties of governments. Each label really specifies an ideal political formula, an -ism. Let me take a fast jog around them, beginning with socialism.

Socialism approaches the totalitarian corner of the political triangle, since it requires a totalitarian government and a coercively organized society. It is the belief in the unrestricted use of government to control all segments of society towards some ideal, usually some kind of social equality. A socialist variant called democratic socialism, is antiauthoritarian and professes anti-totalitarianism. Nonetheless, democratic socialists believe it is it possible to mix what is best about totalitarian and libertarian governments in order to maximize social equality and justice. Unfortunately, once government is given unrestricted, coercive power over some activities, services, or functions, this power tends to grow and dominate. Such is Robert Michels' iron law of oligarchy: oligarchy is inevitable because of the need for leadership, the leaders' consolidation of their power; the gratitude of the followers, and the general inactivity of a population.

Communism is another socialist variant. Based on the doctrinal belief in the writings of Karl Marx and Vladimir Illich Lenin, it has led to the most extreme, repressive and bloody totalitarian governments that have murdered tens of millions of their own people

A welfare liberal (or plain "liberal" in contemporary American usage) believes in using government to change society, redistribute wealth, and achieve social justice while maintaining libertarian rights and freedom. Yet the controls and big government required to achieve such objectives necessitates the mixing of some aspects of totalitarianism with the libertarian government to which liberals subscribe.

Anarchism (not anarcho-socialism, which is a belief that government and private property can both be abolished) is a faith in no government, or at most in a very limited one on the order of what we now have in international relations with the United Nations.

Classical Liberals, who follow in the footsteps of Adam Smith or John Locke, believe in a minimum, limited government that exercises necessary janitorial functions for society, maintains public morality, and provides for protection against foreign foes. They emphasize freedom, human rights, private property, and the restriction of the power of democratic majorities over minorities. Their type of government is best labeled liberal democracy

Conservatives (in current American usage) believe like the welfare liberals in a libertarian system, but oppose policies using government to further "social justice." However, conservatives believe in government supervision of individual conduct and personal choices through such policies as the legal prohibition of gambling, abortion,

prostitution, drugs, pornography, and the like. The conservative thus straddles the borderline between an authoritarian emphasis on what is right and traditional and a libertarian belief in limited and free government.

FIGURE 17.2. Major Types of Political Systems

(democratic variants: libertarianism, excluding anarchism; welfare liberalism; classical liberalism; classical liberalism; conservatism; and perhaps democratic socialism)

Monarchism is a belief in tradition, especially as symbolized and reflected in a royal, inherited leadership that observes the historical ideals and norms of society.

Fascism is a trust in an absolute Leader who embodies traditional, nationalistic, or group ideals, and uses personal command of government as an engine of welfare (socialism), glory, and national power. It differs from communism in emphasizing the Leader and national ideals; it differs from pure authoritarianism in employing government to create a new society and in the totality of its controls.

Finally, there is democracy. It really comprises a number of different political formulas that share a belief in an open society, and in free competitive elections. The differences among democrats revolve around the proper role and powers of democratic government, the power of voting majorities to override minorities, and the extent of human rights. Generally, there are two types of democracies. One is electoral democracy with regular competitive elections, and universal franchise, and secret ballots. Then there is the aforementioned liberal democracy, the most libertarian, which adds to electoral democracy the rule of law and guaranteed human rights, such as the freedom of speech, religion, and association.

Such are the major political formulas shown in Figure 17.2. All reduce to three types of political systems or their combination. So, we can identify three types of political systems with three types of societies. Is there a connection? Yes, there is, and it is shown in Figure 17.3. The political triangle is pictured overlaying the types of societies, along with the approximate location in this space of illustrative national societies.

The three political systems reflect the operation of the three types of power shown in the figure. And each system is imbedded in an associated society. That is:

- exchange societies have libertarian political systems.
- authoritative societies have authoritarian political systems.
- coercive societies have totalitarian political systems.

Were this all to the Trisocial Principle, then while important and interesting to some social scientists at least, it would be irrelevant to the related issues of conflict and peace. But there is more. Since power shapes society and politics, power also shapes conflict and peace. Indeed, three powers, three associated societies, and three congruent political systems, create *three conflict dimensions* and *three structures of peace*. These are the last elements in the Trisocial Principle.

One conflict dimension of society is spontaneous, pluralistic conflict. Demonstrations, riots, strikes, protest meetings, minor spontaneous violence, and the like, reflect the ongoing adjustments among our diverse interests. Exchange societies generally display this form of conflict. These societies are in constant movement, as balances of power and expectations form and reform constantly between individuals, and within a multitude of different groups.

Freedom means diversity and pluralism. It means new ideas, new knowledge, new products, personal mobility, and great change. This freedom creates a constant hubbub of conflict, like bubbles rising to the surface of a society heated up with our varied individual and group activities. But the heat and intensity of this conflict is constantly vented. Like an open pot of boiling water, the openness of an exchange society with its nested, interlaced, overlapping structures of expectations, allows social steam to escape before pressure can build up and a society-wide explosion of violence occur.

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FIGURE 17.3. Societies and Their Political Systems

Moreover, we are cross-pressured. We have many different interests and to satisfy some means giving up others. Seldom in an exchange society are all or the most important of our interests involved. Seldom is it a win-all or lose-all situation. We therefore have no incentive to push conflict to an extreme, as when all our major interests and values are at risk, or our lives at stake.

There is an exchange structure of peace associated with this conflict dimension and society. In this structure we freely coordinate our activities (means) with others in a mutually beneficial way without necessarily agreeing to each other's purposes (ends) or morality. That is, the exchange structure of peace is end independent. To return once again to the illustration of the motorist on the road, recall that we and other drivers pursue diverse, sometimes opposite, destinations. Yet we all mutually coordinate our

passage through informal rules and traffic laws. There is no agreement on destinations (ends); none on each driver's morality. Only our relative movements (means) are structured by our mutual expectations.

Turning now to the second conflict dimension, it is one of communal/traditional conflict. This involves social violence among different racial, ethnic, religious, or language groups; civil war; and revolution. The violence level may often become high, with thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands, killed, as have occurred in Indonesia, Iran, Burundi, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. This kind of violent conflict occurs most in authoritative societies; it is a conflict over authoritative power.

There are largely three principal reasons for authoritative societies having this kind of conflict. First, where change in top leadership is hereditary or appointed, there may be more than one heir to the throne, or forces may be balanced between two candidates for appointment. In these circumstances, internal war becomes the mechanism for deciding the succession. The history of many countries, especially those of medieval Europe, has been little more than a bloody sequence of such wars of succession.

Second, social change is inevitable. Old ways of doing things—tradition—will become outmoded. New views will emerge; morality will alter. In an authoritative society, the major way of adjusting to change is similar to some people's adjustment to their increasingly dirty and messy room or house. Tolerate the mess until it is too much to stomach; then spend a whole day or week cleaning up, perhaps even rearranging furniture. In an inflexible, tradition-bound society such a sudden massive "clean up"—an adjustment to a long period of incremental change—often can occur only through violence. Thus occurred the American, French, Mexican, and Russian Revolutions; and the deeds of numerous contemporary revolutionary movements that seek to break the crust of tradition, overcome an entrenched aristocracy, and open the society to development and modernization.

And third, in traditional societies there is often a caste, racial, religious, or tribal division between those who have wealth and power, and those who are poor, weak, and nameless. Often this division is geographic as well, where a certain region is the source of the ruling tribe, or elite. In any case, as for the Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, or Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, the division becomes a storm front of violent conflict when the out-group tries to achieve certain rights, benefits, autonomy, or independence at the necessary expense of the in-group.

We can term such conflict communal/traditional. And the balance of powers resulting from such conflict can be termed an authoritative structure of peace. This is a peace that requires the acceptance of common ends and purposes—a common morality, a common religion, and a common truth. Under such conditions, a life of peace involves holding the proper beliefs and behaving properly.

Finally, there is the third dimension of conflict—that of elite repressions and purges. In exchange societies government is like a traffic director, simply coordinating behavior, or

mediating conflict between us and other individuals and groups when it occurs (such as in the rules governing strike behavior). In authoritarian societies, government is the object of conflict and violence in order to determine a new leader or change the traditional status quo. But in coercive societies, the totalitarian government turns on itself through purges and coups, or on the people through terror and repressive violence.

Totalitarian governments maintain themselves by eliminating opposition leaders, controlling all media, and preventing antigovernment criticism, demonstrations, and protests. Mass executions, imprisonment, intentional mass starvation, torture, and other devices are used to manage and control the people. The totalitarian governments of Nazi Germany, Stalin's Russia, Mao's China, and Khmer Rouge Cambodia have killed more civilians, for example, than the 24,000,000 who were killed in battle in both World Wars I and II.

Anti-government opposition is therefore difficult to organize and spontaneous demonstrations are rare, unless there is a wide-scale factional fight within the government itself (as happened in China's Cultural Revolution during the 1960s). Therefore, what conflict surfaces does so among the governing elite contending for power, or when one political faction or individual achieves dominance and purges all elite opposition. All totalitarian governments show periodic and often violent purges against possible sources of dissent or opposition among the people.

The result of such conflict is a coercive structure of peace. This peace demands that all agree on means and ends. Coordination is by threat, cooperation is enforced, and harmony is commanded. This is the peace of the slave, a political-social order based on fear.

In sum, then, we find that power, politics, conflict, and peace blend together into a whole that we call society. What shapes this whole is the kind of power that dominates. Regardless of the society we belong to, regardless of its level, regardless of its pretensions or its ideology:

- Dominant bargaining power creates an exchange society with a libertarian government, a balancing of power through spontaneous conflict, and an exchange structure of peace.
- Dominant authoritative power creates an authoritative society with an authoritarian government, a balancing of power through communal/traditional conflict, and an authoritative structure of peace.
- Dominant coercive power creates a coercive society with a totalitarian government, a balancing of power through elite repressions and purges, and a coercive structure of peace.

Table 17.1 summarizes the Trisocial Principle.

Table 17.1. Summary of the Trisocial Principle

Power	Society	Political System	Conflict	Peace
Bargaining	Exchange Society	Libertarian	Spontaneous	Exchange
Authoritative	Authoritative	Authoritative	Communal/ traditional	Authoritative
Coercive	Coercive	Totalitarian	Elite repression/purges	Coercive

Keen readers may have noted that, in all the above, I have not mentioned capitalism. Yet, the terms socialism and communism are often used widely in opposition to capitalism, especially with the academic world. So where does capitalism fit in to the picture I have painted?

Capitalism is a belief in a free market economic system. It assumes a monetary system; private investment, corporations; private ownership of capital and goods. Where such economic conditions exist, we call the society capitalist.

Such an economy flourishes especially in exchange societies—all such national, developed societies are capitalist. We should not, however, confuse capitalism and exchange societies. Some such societies may use barter, or have an agrarian economy, or be based on an exchange of social favors. Thus, one does not refer to families, clubs, or professional associations as capitalist, even though they are based on exchange.

Authoritative or mixed societies also may be capitalist, as were South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, and the Dominican Republic before they became democratic. This is because government may use its power only to maintain social customs and traditions and prevent competition for political power, while leaving the economy to free market forces. No coercive society has a capitalist economy, however. Pure socialism and a free economic market cannot coexist. The overlap between types of societies and capitalism is shown in Figure 17.4.

Now, the trisocial principle and its elements that I have described provide the foundation for considering the Social Violence Principle in the next chapter. But after, as you may now suspect, considering some possible misunderstandings.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Societies are made; they are the result of design."*

This is, perhaps, one of the most pernicious and enduring, social fallacies. It is a belief that societies must have been constructed by either a divine or human intelligence. How else can we explain the marvelous working and integration of society, where stores are

FIGURE 17.4. Major Types of Societies and Capitalism

EXCHANGE

CAPITALIST
SOCIETIES

COERCIVE   AUTHORITATIVE

stocked with goods, money circulates, traffic flows, jobs are allocated, and a billion and one interrelationships are coordinated? This argument is akin to that faced by Charles Darwin when he argued that species develop through evolution and a process of natural selection (nature's trial and error). How, he was asked, could he then explain the human body with all its marvelous, coordinated organs and function? Such organic structures could only have been designed by a God.

The similar belief that societies are made underlies the willingness, indeed the zealotry, of so many to construct a new society; to plan society and its activities, and to use government as an engine of change. And thereby create a coercive society. But large societies, as well as many small ones like families, usually grow; they are not made. They generally evolve from the spontaneous balancing among numerous individuals, and consist of diverse, interlaced structures of expectations, all developing unplanned. But, by virtue of this evolution of multiple adjustments, of diverse trials and errors, the resulting society well fits the varied interests of its members, as does a species that

evolves through generations well fits its environment. Therefore any attempt to plan and control a society, especially on a national scale, will necessitate large scale coercion, produce violent conflict (as will be explained subsequently), and only result in less, not more, overall welfare. The creation may well resemble a human body designed by some committee, the possible outcome of which I leave to the imagination.

Misunderstanding 2: *"Societies are formed only by three powers: exchange, authoritative, and coercive."*

I have emphasized these three because they are the major ones structuring larger societies (city, province, state, international relations), and I have shown this empirically in my research, particularly in my *Understanding Conflict and War.* However, other social powers shape smaller societies. Science as a society of scientists is shaped by intellectual power; many families, communes, and religious orders, by altruistic power (love). And others by manipulative power (such as a city or corporation run through the manipulations of its mayor or president; or the kingdom ruled by the machinations of Machiavelli's Prince).

While any social power may shape society, with regard to conflict and violence the most important societies are based on bargaining, coercion, or authority.

Misunderstanding 3: *"Political beliefs can be located on a left-right scale."*

This is a widely-held belief, expressed in English by such terms as leftist or left wing, rightist or right wing, moderate, extreme left, etc. As the political triangle of Figure 17.2 shows, however, there is no single left right scale, but three different scales, depending on which side of the triangle we emphasize.

The commonly assumed left-right scale usually places communism as extreme left, fascism as extreme right. Comparing this common belief to the political triangle, however, we can see that it fits no side or line across the triangle. Instead, fascism is a socialist, totalitarian ideology close to communism, except for its nationalistic or racial spirit. Under fascism there may be private, industrial ownership, but wages, profits, and business decisions are rigidly controlled by the government. In effect, the owner is a manager for the state.

And on the common left-right scale, where can we place the anarchists, who reject socialism, welfare liberalism, conservatism, and fascism? They also will not fit. The major political "isms" form a triangle, not a left-right scale.

CHAPTER 18

The Violence Principle

To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven;
A time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted;
A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up;
A time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance;
A time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together;
a time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing;
A time to get, and a time to lose; a time to keep, and a time to cast away;
A time to rend, and a time to sew; a time to keep silence, and a time to speak;
A time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war, and a time of peace.

—Ecclesiastes 3:1-8

Within all social conflict lurks the potential for violence, whether it be a picket line in Detroit, a union demonstration in front of the White House, a national consumer boycott of high priced meat, or an anti-war rally in Boston. And this is what we most fear about social conflict—not the yelling, swearing, anger and heat, but the possible bruising, maiming, and bloodletting; the latent mass violence, riots, revolution, and civil war; and the ultimate possibility of losing our property, our family, and our lives.

Fortunately, not all social conflict escalates to violence. The balancing of powers is not always a violent process. But social violence does occur, and too often, as any scan of the daily news will readily attest. For instance, when, on August 21, 2005, I carried out a simple Google search for the keywords "violence" and "dead," there were these news headlines that were just a few of the 151,000 results that I found:

North Hollywood teen killed by gang violence (*LA Canyon News*)

Riverside boarding-home owner Mostafa Shirazi was killed in racially motivated gang violence (Press-Enterprise, California)

The fans of Preston Lions Football Club have been involved in violence during a State Premier League match (SBS, Australia)

Drug cartels battle for control of trafficking corridors across the river (*Houston Chronicle*)

A night of violence in East Belfast (*Citybeat*, Ireland)

Harrowing accounts from Uzbeks who fled violence (Scoop Co., New Zealand)

Three police officers killed in troubled Russian region (*Unison*, Ireland)

Gun violence in Toronto (GhanaWeb, Ghana)

Disco night bid to end estate gang violence (*Scotsman*, United Kingdom)

Violence, frustration mount (*Anchorage Daily News*, Arkansas)

Coming to grips with violence (*Pottstown Mercury*, Delaware)

Israel settler shot and killed four Palestinians from Nablus (Palestine News Network, Israel)

Why all this violence? The Violence Principle helps us to understand. The principle is as follows:

A gap between the status quo and power causes violence.

Its elements are:

- Status quo
- Three types of violence
- Class
- Class power
- Class leadership
- Class consciousness

Violence occurs over a *status quo*. This is the first element in the Violence Principle. Remember that the status quo is the core of a structure of expectations. It delimits what is ours and what is theirs. It defines our rights, obligations, and property, and thus, our most fundamental values, our most basic interests. No wonder, then, that a breakdown in this status quo can cause violence. Since a dispute over the status quo involves bedrock values and goals most difficult to compromise, the conflict can easily escalate to a test of might. When issues are so vital, violence is the ultimate means for deciding who prevails or what compromises will be made. By risking freedom, body, property, or life, we communicate a supreme interest in the outcome and our most resolute will.

We can all recall childhood situations of personal violence in the form of a neighborhood or schoolyard fights. We may remember slapping, thrown objects, or wrestling. Social—collective—violence is no different in principle. Its origins lie in a disrupted status quo, and usually involve individuals organized into groups or merged into crowds or mobs. Such violence can involve religious or ethnic groups, political parties or factions, trade unions, street groups, and families, and whole national societies.

All societies have some sort of social violence, more or less organized, intense, and scattered. This violence can be divided into *three types*, defining the second element of the Violence Principle. These are spasmodic, intergroup, and class violence. The first is unorganized, spontaneous. It is over some loss (as in an athletic event), slight (as in a racial slur), grievance, or need (as in a food riot during a famine). Unpremeditated, this low-level violence occurs from time to time in all national societies. Its outbreak is triggered by a breakdown in some specific status quo expectations relevant to the individuals involved, but usually not the central status quo of the larger society. There are exceptions, however, as when large-scale rioting in several cities or areas is provoked simultaneously by some incident (such as the assassination of Martin Luther King) or when such spasmodic violence is part of a pattern of general unrest. When the central status quo is at issue, even initially unorganized violence can be transformed into a revolution.

The second type of violence is intergroup, an organized violence involving planning, preparation, leadership, and a decision to risk or use violence. It involves warfare between different groups within a society, as between street gangs, families, religious or ethnic groups, political factions, geographic regions, nations.

The third type of violence is class violence, which is also an organized form of violence. More than any other form of violence, class violence is concerned with a society's core status quo—its general structure of expectations—and is therefore most intense. Wide-scale rioting and unrest, general strikes, revolution, guerilla war, terrorism, civil war, and rebellion are the manifestations of class violence over the status quo. This is the kind of violence that poses the greatest threat to life and property, and I will focus on it here and in the next chapter.

To understand class violence, I should make clear my understanding of *class*, the third element in the Violence Principle. Now, class is one of those concepts burdened with a variety of meanings and considerable emotional baggage. For example, it is a Marxist sword swung against capitalism ("Capitalism is a system in which the working class is ground into poverty by the profit-hungry capitalist class," say the Marxists). We need not involve ourselves in all this here, for I can give class a simple meaning lying at the center of differing definitions (and ideologies). Consider that all groups have an internal status quo more or less explicitly dividing members into two ranks. One rank consists of those with the authority in the group to give commands that are backed up by legitimate sanctions; the other comprises the remaining members who can only obey. A class is then simply the rank that commands in a group, or the larger rank that obeys.

We should have little doubt about our own class status in the groups to which we belong. Without exception, groups divide into command and obey classes. If the group is an organization, the division will be defined by its organizational chart, which shows who is president or chairman, who has authority directly under him, who is under these people, and so on down to the least authoritative. At the bottom, off the charts, are the mass of workers, members, staff, and the like, who follow orders. Such a class division is shown in Figure 18.1.

For example, a university has a president, vice-presidents, deans, and department chairmen. The faculty is, organizationally, at the bottom. And students are not even officially part of the organization, simply bodies passed through the educational assembly line. As another example, any large corporation has its chairman of the board, president, diverse vice-presidents, and executives, all with various authority to command according to neatly-drawn lines on an organizational chart, as shown in the figure. At the bottom, we find the secretaries, salesmen, clerks, laborers, janitors, watchmen, and other workers.

Of course, the class division is not so precise or elaborate in all groups. Many have a simple authoritative division—a chairman, secretary, treasurer, and perhaps a dozen to several dozen members. Decisions may be democratic, sanctions implicit and rarely used. And "commands" maybe framed as requests or favors. The class structure is latent and seldom taken seriously, since the group status quo rarely touches fundamental, core interests. Bridge, tennis, or poker clubs are examples, as are small, local chapters of professional associations. Very different, however, are organizations like prisons, concentration camps, convents, armies, boarding schools, criminal gangs, or dictatorships, in which the command and obey classes are sharply separated and defined. In such organizations, severe sanctions follow serious disobedience; and the associated status quo involves vital goals and values.

We all are concerned about the class structure of a group we newly enter. Our first questions concern who is in charge—and what are our authority or obligations; and by so identifying the class division of a group we can locate ourselves mentally among others, especially strangers; and align our expectations with those centrally structuring the group—its status quo.

Since class is thus the authoritative division of power in a group, the class structure of a group separates those who gain most from the status quo from those who gain least. The larger and more organized the group, the more the command class will have greater salaries, perquisites, authority, coercive power, independence, and freedom than the obey class. Most of us know this from personal experience of organizations in which we have been involved, typically our past and present employers. But what may be less obvious is that a group's class structure partitions potential supporters and opponents of the status quo. Therefore, the more central the status quo to a member's fundamental interests, the more the class division is the potential front for violence between group members.

Figure 18.1
The Class Division in an Organization

For example, a two-class structure is officially recognized in many organizations by dividing its personnel into union members and management (as shown to the right in Figure 18.1). Indeed, the formation of unions by workers represented a clear acceptance of their class identity and their realization that strength to alter the status quo (wages, hours, fringe benefits, work conditions) lay in class unity and organization. Clearly, this union-management division defines the potential for conflict over the status quo, and delineates the storm front along which violence in the organization occurs (such as strike violence or intimidation by violence of union members or management).

If class divisions in groups are the potential fronts of social (class) violence, what then causes the actual outbreaks of violence? In moving toward an answer, a fourth element in the Violence Principle must be introduced: *class power*. Collectively, each class has

certain powers relative to the other. In some corporations, for instance, there is a strong, highly militant, well-organized union controlling all workers. Other corporations exhibit organization only amongst management, with whom workers must bargain individually. This much can re readily accepted. Now, from The Cooperation Principle we know that the overall status quo in a group—the core of its general structure of expectations—is based on a balance of powers among its members. And through the Conflict Principle, we know that this balance is of mutual ICWs (The Conflict Principle).

We also know that class membership is latent in many groups, in which there are explicit authoritative roles, such as chairman, director, or supervisor, but whose group members do not consciously identify themselves as members of a class—as the "ins" versus the "outs," or "us" versus "them," or the "workers" versus the "bosses." That is, the interests shared by those on either side of the status quo are inactive. These potential class interests are present as attitudes, but they remain subconscious, merely dispositions (The Intentionality Principle). Interests and capabilities are therefore diffuse; the balance of powers underlying the status quo is fuzzy and loose; relations are informal.

And so may enter *class leadership*. One or more members of a class may recognize these common interests and try to organize their peers to get a better deal, to change the status quo. A first step then is to create a *class-consciousness* among fellow class-members. This surfaces their latent class identity: makes them see the shared interests that unite them against "those bastards." Class leadership and class-consciousness are the prerequisites for marshaling classes within organizations—the conditions necessary for turning potential class conflict into actual confrontation and violence over the status quo. These are the last two elements in the Violence Principle.

Where interests and capabilities are focused by organized class power, the status quo is formally and rigidly defined in a group. It will be written down: each word weighed, the t of every right crossed, the i of every obligation dotted. A single word in a contract may become a sore point for future conflict, and all concerned know which side of the class divide they are on. In many groups, especially organizations, such class identity is a matter of law, as in corporations with closed, union shops. But in all cases, an organization's general structure of expectations will be based on a balance of powers between the two classes. The power of each class, especially the intensity of its class consciousness and competence of its leadership, will then determine who gets what out of the status quo.

Thus, a breakdown in the group's status quo pits its two classes against each other; the class division is then the line of conflict in the formation of a new status quo. The more obvious and conscious this division, and the more central the status quo to the vital interests of each class, then the more likely conflict will lead to social violence. Violence occurs over a status quo. And class violence in a group is caused by a gap between class power and the status quo. This is the Violence Principle.

To make sure this is clear, I will outline the logic:

- There are three types of violence (spasmodic, intergroup, and class), of which class violence is potentially the most extensive, intense, and destructive.
- Every group is divided into two latent or manifest classes.
- Class leadership transforms a latent class into a manifest class by developing a class-consciousness in its members.
- The status quo structuring a group is supported by the balance of powers between the two classes.
- A change in class interests, consciousness, and leadership may create a gap between the status quo and class power.
- The larger the gap between the status quo and class power, the more likely some trigger will set off class conflict.
- A conflict over the status quo is a conflict over vital interests (property, rights, benefits, obligations).
- A conflict over these fundamental interests has the greatest likelihood of escalating to social violence.

But, we may ask, of what relevance is an understanding of classes within groups to, say, internal war within states? What has the division of General Motors into union and management to do with revolution? Be assured that my discussion of class is a necessary prologue to understanding national violence, which will be discussed in the next chapter. But first I must clarify the distinction between coercive violence and force.

Through coercion, one class often tries to get the other to do what it wants by threats ("Give us a twenty percent raise, or we will strike") or deprivations ("We will continue this strike until we get our raise"). Violence is then a coercive tool, a psychological instrument of class conflict in a group, regardless of whatever physical destruction occurs. Through violence, one class tries to intimidate the other into concessions; to deprive some of its members of life, limb, or property in order to scare the others into compromise or submission; to create the threat of an escalation in violence. Through violence, the leadership of one class tries to work on the will of the members in the other. The outcome depends on which class has the more intense interest in winning, the greater capability and credibility for violence, and the stronger resolve to fight it out.

Force, however, which is what many people think of as identical with violence, is actually the use of violence to bypass another's will. It is a purely physical effort to get rid of or defeat opposition. Thus, an obstinate leader of the opposition who cannot be coerced may be assassinated; a picket line may be broken by running a truck through it; rebels may defeat a dictator's army, take over the capital city and declare a new republic. Force is usually the most extreme and intense use of violence. And it usually results from a failure of coercion, or a desire to punish or destroy another class.

To understand social violence in a particular group, then, we must ask a number of questions.

- What is the class division in the group?

- Is it latent or manifest?
- What status quo has been disrupted? (What are the status quo issues?)
- What is the relative class power?
- Is the violence coercive or is it force?

Now, I can move on in the next chapter to consider how class conflict within groups becomes social conflict across the larger society. After, again considering some possible misunderstandings.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Class is economically determined."*

Class is not defined in economic terms nor is it determined economically. Rather, it is defined by authoritative and coercive power, from which may well flow wealth and economic status. However, although such status often comes from command, class still is not perfectly correlated with it. Many government officials or bureaucrats, for example, have considerable command over wealthier citizens. Simply reflect on the power of a tax collector over the rich. Moreover, in some organizations, leaders actually have less wealth than some of their subordinates who are independently wealthy, who are moonlighting, or who have a pension from a previous employment (as do retired American military officers). In the academic world, too, some professors earn more in total from their combined salary, royalties, speaking, and consulting fees, than the president of a university.

The insistence on an economic basis for class also misses the important power division in groups in which income, wealth, or property do not clearly or consistently determine the essential differences between members. Such are churches, colleges, government agencies, military organizations, and prisons.

Misunderstanding 2: *"The outbreak of social violence is emotionally supercharged and spontaneous."*

So it is, sometimes, as in spasmodic violence like riots. But the more serious social violence is always calculated. It is selected as an instrument to overcome others, either by coercing their will or destroying their ability to resist. It is part of the balancing equations of power.

No doubt, anger, fear, hate are often involved, and a violent situation is typically supercharged, as the historical accounts of revolutions reveal. But the emotional intensity of violence should not obscure its calculated nature, anymore than the joys of lovemaking should detract from the calculated seduction that may have preceded them. Indeed, those who choose violence must whip up the hate, hostility, and passion of their followers in order to overcome their natural fear and inhibitions about violence and to motivate them to supreme effort. Such are the flag-waving, nationalistic, anti-enemy, propaganda campaigns mounted both prior to, and during the course of war.

Certainly, the course of violence is uncertain. Violence can get out of hand. Furious emotion, once ignited, is not easily controlled. Limited goals can swell in ambition. But once again, none of this is to deny the instrumental nature of much social violence.

Misunderstanding 3: *"Social violence is due to man's aggressive nature."*

True, man could not fight without having the psychological disposition to do so. But whether he will in fact fight is another question. Social violence—violence between and within groups, or by mobs or crowds—is situational. It depends on a gap between the balance of powers and associated status quo (The Gap, Universality, and Violence Principles). It depends on the conflict helix (The Helix Principle). If people live in a settled area, insulated from outside influences, well stabilized by the power of custom and tradition, and well endowed with all the resources they need, then there may be no social violence at all over generations. For this group the conflict helix would have wound its way to extended harmony. On the other hand, where change in interests and capabilities are rapid among diverse groups and shocks to the structures of expectations are incessant, then social violence may be intense and frequent.

Of course, aggressiveness is partly a temperament that differs from one individual to another. Moreover, some individuals learn from others of their culture to react to a disrupted status quo violently; or they have been rewarded by violent behavior in the past and tend to choose violence as a natural behavior in conflict. Nonetheless, such behavior must take place in a situation, and where the status quo is solid, and the supporting balance of powers is consistent with expectations, then there is less violence generally.

Misunderstanding 4: *"Social violence is due to frustration."*

Of course, frustration can lead to violence, as when we kick a door or punch a pillow out of frustration. We know from our own lives how we sometimes behave when frustrated—irritability, temper outbursts, lashing out. No doubt, frustration can lead to spasmodic violence, as when people hot and tired from waiting hours in a long line for a rock concert find out that they cannot get in. But frustration does not automatically lead to aggression. Sometimes frustration can be worked off by activity, such as yard work, tennis, or jogging; or it may simply be absorbed by the self into an energy stream directed toward some goal, such as winning a fishing trophy, political campaigning, or scholarly research. Again, the role of frustration, as of aggression, is situational. If a large gap exists between the status quo and the balance of powers, then some frustrating event may trigger violence. But that gap must be there to begin with.

Misunderstanding 5: *"Social violence is caused by poverty."*

No, poverty itself does not cause conflict and violence. Nor is poverty necessary for conflict and violence, since well-off and elite members of societies have started many a revolution (witness the American and Russian experiences.) But it is true that poverty is

one source of alienation, which in coercive and authoritative societies, can fuel a class war.

To understand this, remember both the Subjectivity Principle that perception is subjective and the Expectation Principle that expectations guide our behavior. These and the other principles about our relations to others highlight the crucial importance of our mental field and how the balance we achieve with reality and others in achieved mentally. It is not some objective condition alone, such as poverty, overpopulation, or scarce resources that causes conflict and violence. What is central is the nature of the expectations between individuals, groups, and classes; and the nature of change in the underlying balances of their ICWs, and these can only be understood through the particular mental fields of the individuals concerned.

Poor or really deprived individuals may seem surprisingly uninterested in protest or making collective demands and may accept their condition as right or just. On the other hand, they may be seething with resentment and ripe for revolution. The difference depends on their consciousness of class exploitation, their sense of injustice, and the nature of their society (whether dominantly exchange, authoritative, or coercive).

Misunderstanding 6: *"Relative deprivation causes conflict and violence."*

Relative deprivation is the feeling that we are deprived in comparison to others or compared to what we feel we should have. The emphasis is on our perception and interests, rather than on objective conditions like poverty. There are two possible errors in emphasizing such deprivation.

One error lies in assuming that only the poor are objectively disadvantaged or deprived. Rather, anyone can feel deprived, even the rich or powerful. Indeed, whether rich, middle-class, or poor, a problem many of us seem to have is that the more we have, the more we make, the more we want.

A second potential error arises from neglecting to consider how people actually evaluate their apparent deprivations. Even individuals who do feel deprived may also be willing to accept their lot if they also feel it is just—the fair result of their own lack of will, or interest. We may well recognize that compared to our boss, lawyer, or doctor we earn less money and enjoy less status. But, we may also feel that they have invested time in school and made sacrifices to achieve their positions, and so deserve what they have. Or, with regard to the doctor, we may feel that his fee is a small repayment for the health he brings us.

However, if we believe that our position is undervalued and our pay too low, and that we are therefore exploited, then we may feel that our relative deprivation is unjust. This sense of injustice is the important ingredient in relative deprivation that turns it into an active interest and a will to "get the rich and privileged off our back." And thus to combine with others, organize, and attack the status quo.

It is this perceived, unjust relative deprivation that stimulates social conflict and violence, not relative deprivation alone. The creation of this sense of injustice among the "outs" is the aim of revolutionary leaders. A class-consciousness, a class belief among the masses that their deprivation is unjust creates a gap between the social status quo and class power. This is the condition for a social explosion, as illustrated by the American, French, and Russian Revolutions, amongst others.

CHAPTER 19

The Polarity Principle

Then every thing includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite;
And appetite, an universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And last eat up himself.

—Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida

As from group to group in a society we always are among the "outs"; as from situation to situation, we are always one down; as from issue to issue our interests always lose out; and as from dispute to dispute, we always confront the same "them"; then all depends on one status quo, one class division, one authority. Thus, all hangs on coercion or force.

The Polarity Principle is this:

The more government, the more violence

Its elements are:

- Cross-pressures
- Organization
- Centralization
- Polarity

I can best illustrate this principle by way of two pure types. Consider first a pure exchange society with a small, libertarian government, as illustrated in Figure 19.1. The wiggly lines represent the diverse expectations among different individuals, groups, and classes. The coordinates of the space are the most general structures of expectations (and status quos) defining the society. A limited government sits-off center, as one of many organizations in society. It is not (and therefore not at) the origin of the general structures of expectations. These rather grow out of the free and spontaneous interaction of society members. The figure shows only two such coordinates out of the many that extend in different dimensions from the center (the society is therefore multidimensional).

Now, as a member of such an exchange society we might note the following. First, the general structures of expectations and their central status quos largely evolve from our private relationships and those of other individuals, groups, and classes. Government

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Figure 19.1
An Exchange Society and Libertarian Government

AN EXCHANGE SOCIETY

General Structures of Expectations Forming Society

Corporation Z

Corporation X

Command Class

Obey-Class

LIBERTARIAN GOVERNMENT

Church Y

Particular Structures of Expectations

TED

MARY

has little to do with the balancing and expectations between Ted and Mary, a church Y, and corporation X, and obey and command classes in corporation Z, as pictured in the figure. What relevance government does have is by way of general laws that apply equally to all and serve only to facilitate our balancing. These laws dictate no particular result; they benefit no particular interests. Such are the now familiar highway laws, which ease our driving among other moving vehicles, but favor no particular driver or destination or purpose (emergency vehicles excepted).

Second, those formal laws that the government enforces are only a small part of the overall structures of expectations, as can be seen from Figure 19.1. That part of one coordinate contained in the "government box" represents official law backed by coercive sanctions. However, while central and important for society, such laws cover only a small region of expectations and behavior

Third, since everyone is free to establish his own balances, and since this is not an authoritative society with pervasive, compelling norms and customs, the prevailing power is that of bargaining. That is, our expectation of the outcome of our behavior towards others in the larger society is usually based on mutual exchange and adjustment. The free market operates socially and economically; a monetary and social price system allocates our products, benefits, and rewards.

And fourth, the society is pluralistic. There is a diversity of interests, groups, and classes: our different interests are pushed and pulled in different directions by different obligations, benefits, and opportunities; the satisfaction of any one interest usually requiring compromising or giving up some others. We may be top dog in one group, and in another, the under-dog. That is, our class memberships may well differ from group to group, and organization to organization.

The outcome of all this is to *cross-pressure* our interests and will. As a participant in multiple structures of expectations, of multiple groups, of multiple classes, we are a broker among our different interests, deciding which to satisfy, and which to ignore. Under such conditions, it is difficult to get excited about pushing any particular interest, for we know we will thus lose out on some others. In other words, "win some, lose some." This perspective is the hallmark of an exchange society and its libertarian government. And it is this perspective that is generated by cross-pressures and pluralism in an exchange society that minimizes social violence.

With diverse overlapping groups, differing class memberships, and cross-pressured interests, no conflict front can form across the whole society. Without such a front, what violence that does occur is either localized and contained; or is diverted into numerous channels and drained off before it involves many people, groups, or interests. Thus, a spontaneous and largely nonviolent conflict is associated with such free exchange societies (The Trisocial Principle). Cross-pressures are the first element in the Polarity Principle, as listed above.

Now, consider a totally different type of society into which we could be born, as illustrated in Figure 19.2. Government directs most of what goes on. The political elite maintains their power by coercion or force; all public news is censored and controlled, and there are no free or open elections. The society is at the origin of most structures of expectations, such as those between Ted, Mary and Jim, although some room will still exist beyond government control for our interpersonal balancing and expectations (even in prison, private friendship, and other relations do form), as shown by the arrow from Ted to Mary that is outside the government box. But organizations are completely under government control and operation, and it is government that dictates whether we are in

the command or obey-class. Thus, authoritative and coercive powers in the society are centralized; the society is an *organization*. This and such *centralization* are two additional elements in the Polarity Principle.

Figure 19.2
A Coercive Society and Totalitarian Government

These aspects of an unfree coercive society (and The Trisocial Principle) have great significance for social violence. In a coercive society, government controls most of what we do. Government is a supreme elite commanding all others, regardless of the organization or group involved (compare this to the United States where not even the President can tell the editor of The Washington Post what to print). The rule of the command-class is society-wide: over churches, farms, factories, schools; provinces, cities, and towns; families and individuals. The obey class, the mass of "outs", are always one-down.

The critical effect of this is to polarize class membership and interests. One central status quo, like the organization chart in Figure 18.1 of Chapter 18, determines our overall rights and benefits—what we own, eat, earn, and where we live and work. This splits society, creating a latent conflict front cutting across groups and organizations and unifying the classes in separate organizations into one society-wide, two-class division. Therefore, in Figure 19.2 the society is shown elongated along one coordinate—one dominant structure of expectations—that is mainly contained in the "government box."

Without numerous cross-pressured interests, we no longer can compromise and balance among them. And the polarization of society into one class system means that our most important interests, even our lives, are vitally affected by which side of the class front we are on. For this reason any development of leadership in the obey-class is a most serious threat to the governing elite and is harshly dealt with. And any political sensitivity and consciousness among the obey-class that might dangerously weaken the legitimacy of the elite is avoided through mind control, brainwashing, and propaganda; through selective isolation or elimination of dissidents; or through jingoistic, nationalist campaigns that call for political unity and support against a foreign evil.

Typically, the command-class control and manage the ever-present threat from the obey-class by means of executions, forced resettlement, mass imprisonment in concentration camps, forced labor, and internal travel controls. An extensive spy system and a secret police are weapons to maintain class order. Fear of violence and sanctions is the lot of the obey-class. But violence also exists within the command-class as well, where possible contenders for the top are eliminated or purged, where elite members who are possible or actual threats to policies are jailed or killed, and where elite member attempts to grab supreme power are more or less successful, and usually bloody.

Even aside from this actual violence of the government against the people or against itself (which by itself makes unfree coercive societies the most violent), there is the ever-present potential for class war. The sharp class division across society is like a geological fault line across the earth. Pressure builds up on both sides, until the stress is such that when the fault slips in one place, its whole length may be unlocked, producing a severe earthquake over a large area. And when violence occurs in a polarized society over one issue and in one place, it can trigger violence along the entire class front; thus, the social earthquake of mass violence, revolution, and class war.

By way of summary, Table 19.1 contrasts the two pure types of societies. Put simply, in a free society individuals have different statuses, belong to different and independent organizations, are in one or the other class from one group to the next, and largely ignore government. If social violence does occur, it is usually contained and drained off quickly. However, in coercive societies, who and what we are largely depends on our class relationship to the government, to the elite. This polarizes our interests and makes issues dividing "us" from "them" crucial to our life. Any social violence is then most likely a question of elite power and policies, and can thus escalate to a class war. However, even if a class war is prevented or suppressed, the elite must continue to use violence and terror to maintain their near-total control.

Table 19.1
Exchange Versus Coercive Societies

Characteristic	Two Contrasting Societies	
	Exchange Society	Coercive Society
basic power	bargaining	coercion
government	libertarian	totalitarian
classes	diverse and independent between groups and organizations	one class division across most groups and organizations
centralization	decentralized power	centralized
interests	cross-pressured	polarized
structures of expectations	diverse, overlapping, and multitudinous	one dominant
status quos	diverse, overlapping, and multitudinous	one dominant
violence	occasional, localized, and minor with regard to society	occasionally intense internal regime violence; continuous anti-obey class violence; high potential for class war.

To be sure, these two types of societies are pure types, although there are and have been societies, such as North Korea, Stalin's Soviet Union, Mao's China, and Pol Pot's Cambodia that deserve the pure coercive label; and some Western societies, such as the United States, are still in many ways (as in freedom of speech and civil liberties) exchange societies, in spite of the increasing dominance of central government. Most societies, however, lie somewhere between these pure types or between them and the authoritative type (as described under the Trisocial Principle). Regardless, however, of

type or mixture of types, the Polarity Principle applies: the more government, the more violence.

The above discussion now provides the mental tools for understanding this principle. The more government, then the more the satisfaction of interests becomes a government matter, the more a single division of ins and outs is created in society, the more authority or coercion determines balances of power, the more a single status quo determines who gets what. The more government, therefore, the more absolutely vital the status quo and the more likely there will be social violence in protecting or changing it.

We are now in a position to understand the rapid and alarming growth in social violence within, not between, contemporary national and urban societies. It is because of the huge growth and centralization of governments in all societies, and in particular the creation of unfree, socialistic governments in many.

Where does intense social violence most occur, then? Where governments most dominate society and people are least, free.

When is intense social violence then most likely? When a gap between the status quo and class power develops.

What is the consequence of intense social violence? It realigns the status quo with class power.

With the Polarity Principle thus understood, I can now present The Third Master Principle, but only after discussing some possible misunderstandings that may have arisen.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Coercion, repression, and control maintain social peace."*

There is a belief that strong, central control represses violence. Social scientists who collect data on such things point out that most social violence in societies occurs in the mid-range of governmental size and control, with less violence found both in free societies and totalitarian states .

The error of this view is primarily methodological. I have found that data collected by social scientists typically records only actual violence by the people against the government, such as anti-government riots, general strike violence, bombings, terrorist attacks, guerilla warfare, revolutions, and assassinations. This is a serious mistake, for two reasons.

First, most violence in coercive societies can be found either within the government (elite versus elite purges or coups), or in the actions of the government against its people. The latter is continuous and typically not reported as violence, except when a noted dissident is jailed or executed. The magnitude of this daily government violence

usually only becomes known through the reports and statistics that are published years or decades later by scholars, exiles, or refugees.

I spend eight years collecting data on democide (genocide and mass murder) for all nations in the 20th Century, and particularly for the Soviet Union (See my *Lethal Politics*), China (see my *China's Bloody Century*), and Khmer Rouge Cambodia (see my *Death By Government*). In the Soviet Union under Stalin alone the most conservative estimate of those who were executed, died from concentration camps, or from forced collectivization, is 20,000,000, a little less than half of what I calculate Stalin's toll to be. Even this conservative total is over twice the 9,000,000 combat dead of World War I for all participants. Moreover, Stalin had imprisoned or forcefully resettled tens of millions, millions died as a result

Thus, in the People's Republic of China since 1949, about 77,000,000 have similarly died. This far exceeds the approximate 15,000,000 who died in combat for all parties involved in World War II. And this fantastic number does not even take account of the tens of millions of broken families and lives, and the collectivized existence forced upon many of the survivors.

Thus, in Cambodia after the victory of the communist Khmer Rouge in 1975, all cities were forcibly evacuated of their inhabitants, whether healthy of sick, young, or old. Hospitals were emptied and those too sick to move were killed. The regime systematically executed members of the former government or armed forces, teachers and those with high school or college education, and professionals. Resistance meant death. Inability to work the fields from dawn to dusk meant death. A wrong background meant death. In a country of 7,000,000 people, in four years the Cambodian government had killed about 2,000,000 people. And yet, there has been no recorded social violence such as demonstrations, riots, strikes, turmoil, and revolutions. On these indicators, there has been "peace." Yet, in Cambodia we saw the most violent class war of the 1970s.

As the often brutal evidence of history confirms, a central flaw with the view that extreme governmental control represses violence is that it ignores violence by government or the elite.

A second mistake is that it also ignores the potential for a mass outbreak of violence by the people. True, there may be no major earthquakes along the San Andreas fault in California this year, or the next. Or the next decade. But pressure is building up. And the more it builds, the more time passes without a tremor to relieve the pressure, the more likely a very big event will occur. Yet, for the time being, on the surface the earth feels solid and stable, no different from other areas that have never recorded a major earthquake. Similarly, all may appear quiet today in many unfree societies, with seemingly less social violence than in democracies. But the class front is there, although momentarily balanced. And if class power becomes far out of line with the status quo, straining the balance, a trigger will set off a social explosion.

Misunderstanding 2: *"Social violence is determined by great historical or social forces."*

The so-called great social or historical forces, like the "Industrial Revolution," "Anti-colonialism," or "Nationalism," are really the accumulated interests and decisions, the balances, and expectations, of millions of individuals. The great forces of history do not determine us; rather they are labels for the aggregate outcomes of our behavior.

For sure, there is an interaction between the collective consequences of individual interests and behavior, and individual decision-making. The bumper-to-bumper traffic crunch at 7:00 a.m. on a workday along any urban American freeway is a result of individual expectations concerning work-time. But, this collective consequence can also influence individual decisions, persuading some drivers to change jobs to the suburbs, to move closer to work; or, encourage some employers to stagger work hours. The result is a balance between the collective results of those decisions and the impact of the collective consequences on these decisions.

So, it is with society. People get the society they generate: in their beliefs and attitudes, philosophy and ethics, interests and will. And this society will influence their tendency to decide on violence—to put their life on the line.

Misunderstanding 3: *"Social violence is inevitable."*

Yes, some social violence somewhere at sometime is inevitable. Violence is the ultimate tool for settling disputes over fundamental interests. And each of us will sometimes, in commitment to our own values and so that we can live with ourselves, risk or choose violence. Even the pacifist or follower of nonviolence may risk violence against himself to protect or further his basic values.

Aside from this limited social violence, though, is extensive and bloody social violence inevitable? Are revolutions, rebellions, and civil wars a necessity of the human condition? In answer, we must understand that extensive social violence, whether political, racial, religious, or regional, is largely a product of coercive government extending its control over the daily lives of individual men and women. Extensive social violence grows with governmental power and it wanes with its decrease. It is therefore true that if the all-encompassing growth of governmental power is inevitable, then so too is an increase in large-scale social violence. But a huge, centralized government is not a necessity of any society. Power can be made to retreat, as it did in Great Britain in the 19th century. Exchange societies with libertarian governments can be created, as in the United States in 1776, or in West Germany. Italy, and Japan after World War II. Governmental power can be limited for generations, as it was in the United States until recent decades.

On this, I do not want to create another misunderstanding. Free, exchange societies can have social violence. And it may become quite violent if the dispute is over the extension of centralized coercive power, as in the bloody American Civil War (note that this war was a product of the growth of the Federal Government and was fought over

such growth; that is, the issue of state's rights). What I am saying is that the limitation of governmental power also limits social violence. Extensive social violence is a necessity of totalitarian government; it is a product of authoritarian government. It is neither a necessity nor a product of democracy.

Some social violence is inevitable, then. But not violent revolutions, civil war, large-scale communal violence, or class war.

CHAPTER 20

The Third Master Principle

*Power tends to corrupt;
and absolute power corrupts absolutely.*

Lord Acton, letter to Bishop Creighton

If we were a threat to the government in one society, we may have been forced to stand in a line of political prisoners, where the second in line was ordered to smash in the head of the first with a hammer; then pass it back to the third to smash in his head, and thence to the fourth in line, and so on, all to save on the cost of bullets. Such was the Uganda of Idi Amin.

If in another society we had a Western education, we might have been hauled to a field by the militia, forced to kneel, and then beaten on the head with a hoe, until dead. Such was the Cambodia of the Khmer Rouge.

If in another society we protested political repression, we might be picked up by the secret police, beaten, and sent to a labor camp in Siberia to be worked to death. Such was the Soviet Union.

If in another society we happened to belong to the wrong elite faction, we may be arrested, forced to publicly renounce our views, and then executed. Such was the People's Republic of China.

If in another society our home was forcibly searched and Western books or a short wave radio found, we might have been summarily shot. Such was Marxist Ethiopia.

If in another society we chose to demonstrate as a child against wearing uniforms to school, we could have been rounded up by government troops and killed. Such was the Central African Empire.

If in another society, a society of today, we violate a royal law, we may have our head chopped off—perhaps after being heavily sedated. Such is Saudi Arabia.

Happily, in the world of today, the worries of ordinary people are typically more mundane—a malfunctioning television set, heavy traffic, our tennis serve, taxes, protecting the environment, or the killing of whales. This has certainly been the case in the United States, a country in which capital punishment is rare and the judicial execution of a confessed murderer who even demands his own death causes protest demonstrations; where President Nixon, who tried to cover up the bugging of the

headquarters of political opponents, is run out of office; and where President Clinton, the most militarily powerful leader in the world, can be impeached for perjury and obstruction of justice. But, the picture is clear.

The Third Master Principle is this.

Power shapes peace.

The dominant power in a society—whether it is bargaining, authority, or coercion determines:

- The diversity of interests among individuals, groups, and classes
- The degree to which individual interests and wills are cross-pressured or polarized
- The extent to which individual interests align with a society-wide, class front
- The intensity and scope of social violence
- The structure of peace
- Our personal security

All this has been laid out in the social principles summarized in Table 20.1. The meaning and implications of the Third Master Principle can be summarized by three corollaries.

Corollary 1: *Through social conflict individuals negotiate a social contract.*

Social or collective conflict among individuals, groups, and classes, such as protest demonstrations, strikes, riots, terrorism, and rebellions, has two faces. It signals a breakdown in a structure of expectations involving the participants. And it is a means of negotiating a new set of expectations.

To recap, conflict occurs when a social balance of powers between individuals and groups gets out of line with the underlying reality of their mutual ICWs. Then, eventually a trigger event will disrupt the unstable balance, unlocking the pent-up conflict, and precipitating a new balancing of powers. The outcome of social conflict is then a new social contract—a partly informal, partly explicit structure of understandings and agreements. One example of this is a factory strike that leads to a new, written contract; another is urban racial violence that leads to new civil rights laws; still another is a new constitution drawn up after a revolution.

A society's division of labor, with its distribution of benefits and deprivations, and an allocation of rights and duties, is a multiplicity of clustered, interrelated, and overlapping social contracts. All are based on multiple balances of powers, and define the static nature of society involving its norms and formal laws, as well as its institutions and organizations. These social contracts create periods of stability, consensus, and harmony.

Social conflict then reflects the dynamic, changing aspect of society: the constant formation and reformation of social expectations. This is to point out that in any given society, harmony may be short-lived. A fundamental shift in values or beliefs, a redistribution of resources, a loss of spirit by those who most benefit from the status quo, can compel the readjustment through conflict of who gets what, when, and how.

Corollary 2: *Peace is a social contract.*

Social peace does not just happen; nor is it simply the absence of conflict or violence. Peace is a mutually determined, mutually understood structure of expectations among individuals, groups, and classes. Peace is a specific balance of what individuals, groups, and classes want, can get, and will go after. Peace, therefore, will be only as permanent as the alignment between the social contract and its supporting ICWs.

Now, different forms of power determine different forms of conflict, and structure different forms of peace (The Trisocial Principle). The exchange structure of peace is that of diverse individuals, groups, and classes pursuing differing interests, all coordinated and facilitated by end-independent expectations. It is the peace of the free market, a peace constantly broken here and there by minor conflicts, disputes, confrontations; but a peace seldom broken by society-wide conflict and violence.

The authoritative structure of peace is the harmony of a consensus on values and purposes. It is the peace of a church; a peace that may see little conflict, until the consensus breaks down. Then conflict may escalate to engulf the total society. Even the most peace-loving churches have their schisms and holy wars over the formulation of the true creed.

Then there is the coercive structure of peace—the peace of the slave, the prisoner, the peace of the person who submits to intimidation, fear, and threats. This is a peace in which antigovernment conflict and violence are rare, while bloody purges among the elite periodically occur and government violence against the people is continuous. The coercive structure of peace is a social order maintained only by continuous elite violence.

Corollary 3: *Freedom minimizes violence.*

The more the social and personal freedom of the individual to run his own life, to establish his own balances, to adjust his expectations to others—in short, the more an individual can use his information and knowledge to achieve his own ends—the less social violence. But if individuals cannot freely determine their own social contracts, then all such contracts must be held in place by coercion or authority. And the more the same "they" fix these contracts in a society, the more a potential class front is created between "us" and "them." Under these conditions breakdown in coercion, a weakening of the legitimacy of authority, and extreme violence can engulf all (The Polarity Principle).

The keys to understanding the relationship between freedom and violence are then the concepts of cross-pressures, class polarity, and government. The more government, the more classes are polarized along one dimension and the less the cross-pressures that limit the intensity and scope of conflict.

In sum, power shapes peace. This Third Master Principle and its corollaries are shown in Table 20.1.

Table 20.1
Four Social Principles

Principles	Elements
UNIVERSALITY: The Interpersonal Principles Apply to all Societies	Society Balance of powers Structure of Expectations Gap Conflict
TRISOCIAL: Societies are Generally Trisocial	Three powers Three societies Three political systems Three conflict dimensions Three structures of peace
VIOLENCE: A Gap Between the Status Quo and Power causes Social Violence	Status quo Three types of violence Class Class power Class leadership Class consciousness
POLARITY: The More Government, the More Violence	Cross-pressures Organization Centralization Polarity

We can now turn to conflict and peace within a particular kind of exchange society, one with a minimal government and considerable freedom for the major actors, all within an

anarchic global society. This is international relations. However, there is one possible misunderstanding to clarify first.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Social peace is a positive good."*

In Western culture we praise peace and honor the peacemaker:

> *Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God —Matthew. 5.9.*

Peace, harmony, cooperation, order may, of course, be positive; a Good well worthy of devotion. But, peace can also be negative. Peace built on the overwhelming power of a few over the many is the peace of the slave or the prisoner; the subject or the captive. In such cases, conflict and even violence that would destroy such a coercive or authoritative structure of peace could be for the Good. Then we would say: "Blessed are the revolutionaries."

It is not peace alone, then, which we must seek. To choose to surrender all for peace may result in a worse and more violent fate for ourselves and our loved ones than choosing to fight—to the death—for freedom, independence, and justice. Peace as a Good must be joined with some positive idea about the content of the underlying social contract. That is, peace for or with what? And my answer is that a positive peace is a peace with individual freedom and dignity. This I will elaborate in Part V.

PART IV

International (or intergroup) Relations

The purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our own sentiments of hope or indignation; it is to shape real events in a real world.

—John Fitzgerald Kennedy

CHAPTER 21

The Field Principle

It is evident that there must be uniformities and regularities in social life, that society must have some sort of order, or its members could not live together. It is only because people know the kind of behavior expected of them, and what kind of behavior to expect from others, in the various situations of life, and coordinate their activities in submission to rules and under the guidance of values that each and all are able to go about their affairs.

E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology

We are individuals and actors: we act on our behalf and participate in diverse relations with others. But we can also act on behalf of a group. We might negotiate a contract for a firm, obtain a camping permit for our family from a city department, or deposit dues in a bank in the role of treasurer of a tennis club. When someone acts for a group in this way we usually say, in short, that the group acted. Thus, the firm negotiated a contract, the family got a camping permit, and the club deposited its money. In this way groups are also actors, participating in relations among each other (as when Exxon Mobile Oil sells gasoline to the local service station) and with individuals (as when the station sells gasoline to us at the pump.)

Society is a complex of churches, factories, stores, theaters, taxis, restaurants, colleges, schools, firms, clubs, and government agencies, etcetera. And individuals. All acting in light of their own interests and forming multiple interdependent and multi-layered structures of expectations. And the Field Principle governs all these actors and relations:

Free actors comprise a social field.

Its elements are:

- Actor
- Social field
- Antifield
- Sovereignty
- Independence
- Equality

The free and spontaneous interactions among *actors*, whether individuals or groups, form a spontaneous society, a social field. Balances and associated structures of expectations among actors are generally determined without outside coercion or force.

These balances depend largely on the ICWs of those involved. Thus, the exchanges among competing businesses and consumers in a free market, the interactions among voluntary group associations in a free society, the interplay between our relatives and friends, and the relations among our family members, are all social fields.

Out of the expectations spontaneously formed in the *social field* evolve the norms, mores, and customs that bond individuals together, without chains, into a coherent society and culture. Indeed, a culture should be understood as comprising those common expectations that have become so well established and are of such long standing, that they not only are followed automatically and unquestionably, but also are felt to be right and proper. Nonetheless, the fact that a culture is based on a particular, society-wide balance of powers, and can be altered radically if this balance of powers is destroyed, should not be forgotten. Too many sudden social upheavals—the most famous being the French and Russian Revolutions—make this clear.

The idea of field is opposed to that of an organization. Behavior within an organization is commanded, planned, in order to achieve some organizational purposes. An organization is thus an *antifield*. Relations among its members are hardly spontaneous or free: out of fear of sanctions or respect for authority they must conform to what someone above thinks is right and proper.

Unlike organizations, which are constructed and designed, social fields simply evolve. Their structure and change are unplanned, undesigned—simply a reflection of multiple balances and balancing. A social field among actors, therefore, is like a moving conversation, a changing language, and a growing family. Actor, social field, and antifield are the first elements in the Field Principle, as listed above.

Now, international relations are a social field. But this does not mean that all international actors interact freely. The field is mainly formed by the relations among states, which then more or less restrict the international relations among their citizens and internal groups.

Figure 21.1 is a picture of such an international field, as illustrated by four states and the United Nations (the nature of this type of figure is discussed in Chapter 19 with reference to Figure 19.1). The two coordinates in the figure are two general, international structures of expectations. The United States, China, Brazil, and Iran are included as societies (with their governments as inner organizations more or less dominating society) within the larger international field. But individual men and women are also part of the international field, and, in Figure 21.1, the individual is represented by an American consumer of Brazilian coffee, imported according to a treaty between the American and Brazilian governments. Note also the United Nations as a relatively small organization with only a marginal part in the international structures of expectations.

Figure 21. 1
International Structure of
Expectations For Four nations

An Exchange Society

General Structures of
Expectations Forming the
International Society

United States   treaty

Brazil

Govt.

Govt.

CC

buying coffee

China   Govt.

United
Nations

Iran

Govt.

A Coercive Society

Note: Govt. = government
CC = coffee consumer

Particular Structures
of Expectations

So we have an international field that is largely composed of states. What, then is a state? It is a specific type of politically organized society with well-defined borders. This means that it has a government whose leaders authoritatively represent, speak for, and commit the citizens of the state.

However, the international social field comprises more than states. For the states themselves may exist within a larger state, as do the fifty composing the United States of America; or, the states may have little independent power, as is true of China's twenty-three provinces. What make the relations among states (or any other actors) a social field are three crucial rights. The first, and most basic right, is that of *sovereignty*. Each state has exclusive control over its domestic affairs. No state has the right to interfere or intervene in another, except by treaty. This is a fundamental principle, a normative keystone within the core structure of international expectations. All states recognize this principle, even when they violate it as in intervening to stop genocide (Rwanda, Bosnia, Sudan).

And, of course, in reality, powerful states do intervene in the affairs of weaker states, even going so far as to turn them into puppets, as did the Soviet Union, in its relations with of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia. Nonetheless, most states are in fact sovereign over their internal affairs, as are the United States, France, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, India, and Argentina.

Sovereignty is one right creating a social field among the states, *independence* is a second. In principle no state dictates to another what its foreign relations should be: all states ought to be free to establish and follow those international relations that best satisfy their own interests and capabilities. Again, a difference exists between principle and fact. While a satellite of the Soviet Union, Hungary hardly exercised an independent foreign policy free from Soviet control. Nor are small, poor states whose trade and security are dominated by the United States free from American "arm-twisting." Yet, in the main, most states do individually and more or less freely adjust their mutual relations.

The third right is *equality*. That is, ideally each state should have the same legal weight or privilege in international affairs. In fact, in international councils and organizations each state usually does have only one vote. The smallest state in the United Nations General Assembly has the same vote as the United States or China. In the United Nation's Security Council this principle of absolute equality is breached by each of the five major powers (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and U.S.A.) having the power to veto substantive legislation. But such power is rare in international bodies, where usually the equality principle is religiously observed.

To be clear again, this is legal or formal equality—an equal standing in international law for all states, an equal right of states to protect themselves or pursue justice against another state, and equality in international diplomacy and institutions. Obviously, in fact, states are grossly unequal in wealth, power, size, and resources.

The concepts of sovereignty, independence, and equality are the third, fourth and fifth elements in the Field Principle. They make a social field possible among states, and create an international social field.

Sovereignty, independence, and equality are like the human rights that each American has in principle: the right to freedom of religion and speech, of due process before the law, of petition, and so on through the Bill of Rights. In other words, in law each American has a certain sovereignty (over his property, religion, and speech), independence (in petitioning government, in running for office, or voting), and equality (in rights and before the law). These human rights help make for a social field among Americans. However, states as international "personalities" are actually more free than American citizens, since no strong, central international government monopolizes coercive power over them; thus making international relations far more of an exchange society (as will be discussed in the next Chapter) than is the United States.

In sum, then, international relations are among states, each with formal sovereignty, independence, and equality. This means that most states more or less mutually interact based on their own interests, capabilities (including their ability to get support from more powerful or wealthier states), and wills. Therefore, they achieve their own balances and their own structures of expectations as in a free market, where prices (expectations) evolve out of interactions among diverse interests. All these expectations are in one way or another related to a central status quo forming an equilibrium in the field, the much-hallowed balance of powers (to which I have given a special meaning applicable to all levels of human interaction). Globally, this balance now involves one superpower—the U.S.—and a combination of regionally powerful states, such as China, Japan, and Russia in Asia, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia in Europe; and Iran, Syria, and Egypt in the Middle East. If a regional status quo breaks down, then the structure of expectations undergoes a major readjustment, through crisis diplomacy if among democracies, and possibly through war if involving nondemocracies.

For over 360 years (since the Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War in 1648), the principles of state sovereignty, independence, and equality have stood at the core of the global status quo. Their acceptance by most states has hinged upon a balance of powers amongst the strongest. Whenever power has shifted to favor those seeking to overthrow these principles and subordinate the others, the most bloody and extensive wars have resulted.

Consider the tumultuous events in Europe in the early years of the 19th century, when Napoleon Bonaparte rode a surging wave of French nationalism and spirit growing out of the French Revolution to establish a European empire. Massively successful at first, only his disastrous failure to extend his domain to Russia marked the beginning of Napoleon's decline. He was eventually defeated for the last time at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 by a coalition of conservative states fighting to reassert the status quo he had sought to destroy.

In a similar vein, Adolf Hitler sought to create a pan-European Empire over almost the same ground covered by Napoleon until weakened by defeat in Russia. Eventually, in 1945 Hitler lost to the combined forces of a United Nations. Also struggling to create a far-flung, Asian-Pacific Empire, Japan similarly was defeated in the same year.

The subsequent Cold War between the Soviet Union and the democracies was also over a central status quo issue. The aim of the USSR was to replace the sovereignty, independence, and equality of states with a global, communist system controlled from Moscow—in effect, to turn the international field into an international organization, whose board of directors would be the Politburo.

Interestingly, World War I was not caused by an attack on the basic principles of international relations, but by an effort to maintain the European, political status quo against disintegration. Austro-Hungary went to war in 1914 to defend the status quo in the Balkans, especially her control over subject nationalities. Russia's mobilization on Serbia's side, which triggered the general war among the major powers, aimed to prevent Austro-Hungary from advancing into the Balkans and thus weakening Russian influence there. Germany then mobilized in support of Austro-Hungary and France did likewise to aid Russia, since neither could risk a major defeat of its ally. Finally, Great Britain joined the war on the side of France because of its policy of maintaining a certain balance of power in Europe, especially against Germany; its agreements with France; and Germany's violation of Belgium neutrality.

These have been the great general wars of modern history, and all have been characterized by both major changes in the central status quo involving the major powers, and attacks on the fundamental principles of sovereignty, independence, and equality. So far these principles have been defended successfully, and so long as future status quos continue to accept the relative freedom of states to follow their own interests, to establish their own balances, then the international field will continue to exist and evolve, especially as the number of democracies grow to dominate the field. And this evolution will be a series of slow, incremental changes, possibly interspersed with violent surges in Asia, the Middle East, or Africa, as is now going on with the American-led War on Terror.

This War is direct result of a pan-national group of Islamofascists rejecting the status quo based on sovereignty, independence, and equality among states, and aiming in its place to create an international caliphate among Muslim nations, and subdue to its power all infidels—non-Muslims. Their stated aim is to create a new Islamic empire like that of early medieval times, but on a global scale. I shall return to this in later chapters, but for now, I should consider two particular misunderstandings about international relations.

Misunderstanding 1: *"International relations is unpredictable, chaotic."*

This is the belief that because international relations lacks a strong central government able to enforce international law, state actions are unruly and idiosyncratic. This belief

stems from the myth that societies need a designer and director—that someone in control must maintain order. But consider. In a free society, nobody directs our interactions with loved ones, friends, and relatives. We establish meaningful and well-ordered relationships without a "Big Daddy" or, worse still, a "Big Brother." Moreover, in the larger society, buyers and sellers, producers and consumers, bankers and borrowers, employers and employees, can all establish interdependent and mutually beneficial relationships without dictation or control by government. Indeed, government intervention in this free market creates dislocations, misallocations, inequalities, and shortages. The grim experience of socialist states like North Korea, Burma, Cuba, and Vietnam proves this amply.

The keys to order, harmony, and cooperation without a strong central government—that is, a free society—are the Expectations and Cooperation Principles. Individuals, groups, and states are all capable of defining structures of expectations—social contracts—among themselves. And they are capable of living by these expectations so long as the supporting balance of powers is stable. In time, some of these expectations evolve into norms and practices, creating a society-wide regularity and predictability among social relations and interactions, all guided by the invisible hand of custom. Those who believe that the alternative to government control is anarchy fail to appreciate the unifying and regulating function of culture and associated structures of expectations.

Misunderstanding 2: *"International relations are unique."*

This widespread conception of international relations as different from any other kind of social relations is incorrect. Dig beneath the terms used to describe international relations (such as state, diplomacy, war), and one finds that these relations do not differ in essence from those found within a social field. All free groups, whether relatively autonomous within states or states themselves, define their territory, negotiate, conflict, trade, communicate, sign treaties, establish diplomatic practices. One clear example can be seen in the criminal gangs found in urban areas. They form a field outside of the law and establish and conduct their relations as though sovereign, independent, and equal states. Even to the point of gang wars.

International relations simply demonstrate at the level of states the general tendency among all free actors to establish a social contract that is based on a mutual adjustment of what they can, want, and will do.

CHAPTER 22

The Exchange Principle

The greatest meliorator of the world
is selfish, huckstering trade.

—Emerson, Society and Solitude

Today, millions of Americans will eat foreign food, watch foreign television programs or movies, read books or articles by foreign authors, listen to foreign music, buy foreign automobiles, television sets, radios, clothes, or furniture, and meet foreign tourists.

Today, American businessmen will engage in negotiating international trade agreements, setting up international projects and companies, traveling to international conferences, and making international investments.

Today, the federal government of the United States will negotiate state-to-state trade treaties and agreements, security arrangements, arms transfers, economic and military aid, cultural and scientific exchanges, while officials travel to all points of the compass to talk to this or that foreign official about matters of common interest, big or small.

International relations are a complex of all such diverse, voluntary, and cooperative interactions, today, yesterday, and tomorrow. They involve a global system of communication, and a global division of labor. They reflect a central structure of expectations and core status quo. They form, in short, a society.

Now, this society is dominated by states that are generally free actors. International relations, therefore, obey the Exchange Principle. It is this.

Free relations form an exchange society

The six elements in this principle are shown below, with the society just described as the first element.

- Society
- Exchange
- Sovereignty
- Minimal Libertarian government
- Spontaneous/pluralist conflict
- Exchange structure of peace

That the international *society* is based on *exchange*, and not on authority or coercion, can be understood from the dense system of international exchange interaction as illustrated by the opening paragraphs of this chapter. International activities primarily involve the exchange of goods and services; the movement of students, migrants, workers, and tourists; the communication and transportation of information, people, and goods.

All this activity is usually voluntary, governed at the source by the mutual promise to satisfy some interest of another if reciprocated. Such is the promise to pay a certain sum of money for a foreign car (or radio, or television set), the travel to a foreign university because its catalogue explicitly and the foreign culture implicitly promises a specific education, the American offer to sell fighter planes to a certain Middle East state if it will support the American war in Iraq, and the Ford Motor Company investment in a particular Asian state because of the profit its government guarantees.

Now, of course, there is much conflict in international relations; much violence, many wars. Look at today's newspaper and it will mention some such conflict somewhere, perhaps in Iraq or Afghanistan. International conflict always attracts attention. And it is the potential of war that makes significant a threat, mobilization, or border clash, in comparison with, say, statistics on foreign tourists in New York.

Yet what is less likely to be reported are the ongoing cooperative exchanges and behavior among nations—trade, tourists, meetings and conventions, telephone calls and faxes, internet usage, newspapers and magazines, television programs and movies. Because these cooperative interactions are regular ongoing, they are not considered newsworthy, at least not in the mainstream media.

In contrast, conflict is not a continuous flow of such exchanges and behavior, but an event that often suddenly breaks out. Like a dish of food falling on the floor, conflict snatches attention. The communications media latch on to the story and unfold its actions, progress, and meaning for us. Were our knowledge of international relations to be drawn entirely from such reports, we might consider the international system to be one only of conflict and coercion. Yet when we consider the interaction of states in its entirety, over time, we find it is characterized more by peaceful, voluntary exchange.

To be clear, international relations comprise a society based on exchange and not on authority or coercion because:

- Relations between actors (states) are normally free and voluntary
- Bargaining power dominates (more relations are based on promises than threats or legitimacy)
- Coercion plays a dominant role for some regions at some time (such as currently in the Middle East) and in some relations (as between North Korea and the U.S.), but overall is secondary to bargaining power

- Authoritative power is involved here and there (such as for the international relations of the Catholic Church, the Communist Party of China, or the United Nations), but lacks global legitimacy

As an exchange society, international relations has a *minimal libertarian government*— the third element in the Exchange Principle. That international relations, this presumed anarchy, this perceived chaos, this arena of states supposedly in need of world government, already has a world government may be surprising. But through the General Assembly (lower legislative house) and Security Council (upper legislative house), the Secretariat and Secretary General (the executive), the International Court of Justice (judiciary), and the Trusteeship and Economic and Social Councils, subsidiary organs and related agencies (the administration), the United Nations already is a federal world government.

This is a quite limited government, for sure—a confederation, really. It has no significant monopoly of coercive power. Remember, each state is legally sovereign and independent. Each retains the power to ignore resolutions passed by the UN. Each may or may not abide by decisions of the International Court, if indeed it agrees to be a party to a case before it. Nonetheless, the UN provides services to the international society, such as in the areas of economic development, education, and health. It does try to help (although not too successfully) to ameliorate and resolve conflicts by providing an international forum for discussion and negotiation, a legislature for focusing and voting on international issues, an International Court for legal decisions, and mechanisms (UN peace forces) for intervening between and separating states engaged in violence. And in conjunction with the UN, a dense network of several thousand international organizations provides an administrative system that meets a multitude of interests and needs.

Still, this world government lacks clout. It cannot command states to act against their perceived interest. But a society does not require a government with such centralized power. International relations are already regulated by freely formed, multifold structures of expectations. After all, states usually only enter into contracts (agreements, treaties, etc.) to their advantage.

And moreover, even after the advantages of such social contracts have faded, states may be reluctant to violate them because of a concern for their reputation and the possibility that other states may then reciprocate. Besides, while no international policemen enforce a contract between states, each state does have means available to sanction those who violate their contracts with it, such as expelling the other's diplomats or citizens, closing the border to trade, refusing to allow its commercial planes to land or its ships to dock, freezing its assets, and severing diplomatic relations. Of course, the violator can respond in kind, thus initiating an expensive, perhaps, dangerous escalation that could end in violence if neither is a democracy. But the risk of such an escalation is itself a deterrent to violating contracts.

Certainly, a state wishing to violate its contract with another could be the much stronger and thus have little to fear from retaliation. Yet, the potential conflict may not be worth the possible material gain, or loss of reputation. Often it is better to keep a contract; unless, of course, it becomes far out of line with one's ICW (The Gap Principle). Then a unilateral abrogation and consequent conflictual renegotiation may be worthwhile.

There is nothing strange about all this. It is simply the detail of human life, no different to what we find in our everyday relationships as individuals. Our understandings and agreements with friends and relatives are kept or violated depending on the consequences, the advantages, and our sense for what is right and wrong. Police or courts generally have nothing to do with it. Just consider how little of our daily interaction with others in a democracy is determined or even influenced by our fear of the police, courts, jail—that is, the coercive paraphernalia of government.

Because international relations form an exchange society and have a minimal libertarian government, we find that conflict between states is, then, *spontaneous and pluralistic*, just as we should expect from the Trisocial Principle. It often breaks out without prior planning and involves a variety of behaviors, such as the following nonviolent actions:

- Unofficial anti-foreign demonstrations (such as mass protests; union or consumer boycotts of another's goods; attacks on its embassies, nationals, or property)
- Negative communications (such as warnings, threats, diplomatic protests, accusations)
- Negative (non-violent) actions/ sanctions (such as expelling or recalling an ambassador, severing diplomatic relations, cutting aid or trade, canceling state visits, embargo)

And if both parties are non-democracies:

- Warning or defensive actions (such as troop movements, alerts, mobilizations, showing the flag, over flights of the other's capital)
- Low level violence (such as border clashes, shooting down an aircraft, limited military action)
- Intense military violence, or war

International conflicts are often limited to specific states or regions; and usually, if non-violent, they are settled rather quickly. Given the sovereignty and independence of states and their capability for extreme violence, there is much less violence between states than people generally believe. Indeed, there is less violence than in the internal affairs of states.

In the twentieth century, for example, more people have been killed or have died from internal social and political violence and government repression and terror than from all the wars between states. First, consider the two most violent wars humanity has ever suffered. Our best estimate of combatant deaths in the First World War is 9,000,000; for the Second World War, the corresponding figure is 15,000,000.

These figures represent the grim toll of war at its absolute worst, but consider the following. As mentioned in Part III, about 43,000,000 citizens of the Soviet Union perished during the reign of Stalin alone. This is actually a conservative estimate, yet it represents a death toll greater than the combat dead of both World Wars.

There is worse to come. My own estimate of those killed by all Soviet rulers since 1918 is 61,000,000 citizens and foreigners, but we know now that the Soviet government was not the greatest murderer of its own people during the 20th century. Incredibly, in Communist China, Mao Tse-tung and his successors murdered about 73,000,000 Chinese.

In total, in just two states, at least 134,000,000 were murdered - not killed, as in combat - but murdered, in internal repression alone. Yet the governments of Communist China and the Soviet Union were only the worst 20th century offenders, I might also mention the civilian death tolls of those murdered by Nazi Germany (perhaps 20,000,000), North Korea (over 2,000,000), Iraq (1,000,000), North Vietnam (over 1,000,000) and the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia (perhaps 2,000,000), and so on.

I detail all this and much more in my *Death By Government*. Here, I need only record my perhaps surprising conclusion that international relations are relatively non-violent. There is much conflict to be sure, but this is a spontaneous, diverse ferment, ever waxing and waning in the formation and dissolution of ever-evolving varied structures of expectations. Rarely does this conflict reach the level of violence. And even more rarely—even at its greatest extreme of 15,000,000 combat dead in World War II—does international violence approximate the death toll within the most violent states. But this is only to be expected, since international relations form an exchange society.

Finally, and also following from the Trisocial Principle, we should note that cooperation and harmony in international relations take place within an *exchange structure of peace*. This is a peace dependent on mutual interests and exchange and a mutuality of adjustments among participants. The exchange structure of peace and the pluralistic/spontaneous conflict through which such peace is negotiated are the last two elements of the Exchange Principle.

The Field and Societal Principles provide a basic view of the relations between any free actors and thereby of international relations. The remaining two Principles in this Part will focus on war, that most significant and destructive aspect of such relations. For I have yet to explain why wars should occur at all in an exchange society.

But first, as usual, I should consider some important misunderstandings.

Misunderstanding 1: *"International relations are a state of nature."*

Because there is no strong international government, some believe that states live like individuals in primitive and barbarous natural conditions. The "law of the jungle" is

presumed to govern: each state, a prey for others, and each on its own, with no state secure in its property or existence.

But such a "law of the jungle," which presumes a chaotic, fang-and-claw reality, is a myth, whether applied to animals, humans, or states. Animals and humans develop in nature social expectations that guide their behavior; many different animals live together and share the same wilderness peacefully. Indeed, people can and have lived harmoniously together without much government. And so can one live in relative peace with our friends, our neighbors, our associates; the grocer, the butcher, and the paperboy without a government commanding or overseeing these relations.

Misunderstanding 2: *"International relations are a state of war."*

Newspapers and other media always focus on the most dramatic and exciting events. Such are conflicts, and especially wars. These are mass historical dramas, the stuff of literature and poetry, where the best and the worst of human behavior may be found. By contrast, the constant, cooperative activities among states are boring, monotonous background, and tend to be ignored. It is for this reason that many people see international relations as an arena of conflict—a perpetual state of war. But, we have seen, as discussed previously, international relations are usually more peaceful and less violent than are the domestic affairs of many states. In fact, international relations are not a state of war, but a free market of states, an exchange society.

Misunderstanding 3: *"All states are insecure, since they must rely on their own defense."*

True, states must protect themselves—or seek allies. But at least states through their own resources and alliances usually can develop means to protect themselves and deter aggression.

Compare this security problem of states (called the security dilemma) with that of the citizens of totalitarian countries, who are defenseless against the secret police or execution squads. Indeed, insecurity of life and possession is more the condition of many citizens of societies than of states in international relations.

Misunderstanding 4: *"International relations are driven by power."*

Power is basic in all social relations, of course, but this belief is that international relations are dominated by coercion and force. Surely, these two powers play a role in much conflict, and they are the essence of violence and war. But again, such conflict is a small part of interstate relations, which are typically based on positive reciprocity—mutual back scratching. That is, on exchange power.

Now, no doubt, many expectations based on exchange have coercive ingredients. Certainly, the threat of sanctions or even violence underlies some trade treaties. But this is not the case for all or even a majority of relations. Consider the web of commercial,

cultural, and intellectual bonds among the peoples of the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Now, sometimes, the governments of these nations do twist each other's arms, indulge in some negative words, and fire off a diplomatic protest or two. But in no way are their many diverse relations based on coercive power or force. Mostly, they are due to exchange power, with a measure of intellectual power (such as in scientific and academic affairs), authoritative power (as in Great Britain being the leader of the Commonwealth), and altruistic power (as in economic and technical aid). War, or even violence, among these liberal democratic states is now unthinkable. But this is to anticipate the next chapter.

CHAPTER 23

The Freedom Principle

Among free men there can be no
successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet.

—Abraham Lincoln, letter to James C. Conkling

Free actors form a field; their relations create an exchange society. And these relations are more peaceful than those found within totalitarian or authoritarian states. But is this not puzzling? Since the lack of freedom within states causes so much internal violence, should it not also have an external effect on international relations? Should not the Polarity Principle operate outward from authoritarian states? That is, the more government, the more foreign violence? Yes, but in a way reflecting a related but different principle. This is the Freedom Principle:

Violence does not occur between free and democratic societies.

Its elements are:

- Limited government
- Cross-pressures
- Polarity

At time of writing in 2006, there are 122 democracies out of 192 nations, 89 of the democracies being liberal ones—free—with open, regular, and competitive elections, and in which human rights are respected and guaranteed. Such, for example, are Germany, Switzerland, Barbados, Canada, USA, Costa Rica, New Zealand, and Japan. The 33 remaining nonliberal democracies like Bangladesh, Bolivia, Indonesia, Nicaragua, and Turkey, are electoral (or procedural) democracies in that they hold regular elections, but repress some human rights.

Of the 70 nondemocracies, 30 are partially free, authoritarian states like Malaysia, Zambia, Armenia, Jordan, and Morocco. The 40 remaining nations are unfree, totalitarian ones such as Burma, Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and Turkmenistan.

Imagine a political map of the world on which all democracies are colored white, nondemocratic partly free nations are colored gray, and the unfree are colored black. Such a map would go far beyond simply classifying the extent of freedom and democracy in the world. By virtue of the Freedom Principle, this map would also define the regions of potential war and international violence.

The democratic, or white areas, are regions of nonviolent, international relations: no state located in a white region will be involved in violent conflict with any other state similarly located. That is, democratically governed people do not act violently toward each other. However, the gray and black areas are regions of violence, the black being the most probable area and source of violence. In other words, states that are nondemocratic, either partly free or nonfree, usually fight each other, with the latter being the most likely combatants.

This does not mean that violence is limited to the gray and black regions. Often violence aggressively crosses into the white zones, as in World War I and II. Nonfree or partly free states make war not only on each other, as with Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Iran, Cambodia and Vietnam, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, China and Vietnam, North and South Korea, but also on democracies. Democracies are not violent among themselves, but if attacked or threatened they will use violence to protect themselves or their interests against partly free or unfree societies.

One can easily test the Freedom Principle. Consider the states that recently have been at war or are so now. Among what kind of states does the violence occur? To answer this question historically, see the two tables below. Table 23.1 shows that among the 353 pairs of nations who have fought each other, in a war, no pair were democracies.

TABLE 23.1

Wars 1816–1991

Belligerents	Wars*
democracies vs. democracies	0
democracies vs. nondemocracies	155
nondemocracies vs. nondemocracies	198
	353

*Defined as any military action in which at least 1,000 are killed in battle.

Even considering violence between countries in which at least one is killed, there are no cases of such violence between free nations (liberal democracies) in three decades, as shown in Table 23.2. There were 17 cases of violence between free nations and

partially free or nonfree ones, and 29 cases of violence between those partly free or nonfree.

TABLE 23.2

INCIDENTS OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE OF ANY KIND 1973-2003

DYADS	Violent Incidents
F-F	0
F-PF	6
F-NF	11
PF-PF	5
PF_NF	4
NF-NF	20

F=liberal democratic
PF=Partly free/authoritarian
NF=Nonfree/totalitarian

SOURCE: Freedom House; Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr

Thus, the Freedom Principle. Violence does not occur between free and democratic societies. But why should this be so? First, violence is costly in lives and property. It requires singular commitment and interest. Prime values must be at stake. But in exchange societies driven by diverse interests and groups, government and its foreign policy establishment play a relatively small part. And while certain interests and groups may create conflict over, say, trade with other exchange societies, no group or elite can find the deep, society-wide consensus or sufficient control to foment violence against other democracies, or easily use such violence to achieve their foreign desires. In a relatively free society, not enough people are willing to pay the cost in lives, property,

and taxes to make war. Besides, a democratic people's fundamental sympathy for other democratic societies and a variety of shared interests (in trade, for example) both work against any deep society-wide hostility against a fellow democracy.

Second, cross-pressures and decentralized governmental power inhibit violence between states, just as it does within them. No one expects violent clashes—not even one death—among, say, Great Britain, the United States, Norway, Canada, France, and the Netherlands, among others. And no one will as long as these states are democratic.

Still, exchange societies—states, in international relations—do go to war. When their freedom or that of others is directly attacked or threatened, free people will unite. Their differences in interests become secondary in the defense of their common freedom. Moreover, democratic people do fight when outraged by the perceived immorality, tyranny, or repression of totalitarian or authoritarian states.

This point can easily be misinterpreted. Democracies do not always go to war for good and just causes. Jingoists can arouse them; nationalism can generate hostility; propaganda can mislead and arouse the public. The actions of other states can be misunderstood, of course. However, even if such forces toward violence were to be aroused, they are severely weakened and segmented if the other state is a democracy. But if the other state is a dictatorship, an absolute monarchy, or a totally coercive society, perhaps with a deserved reputation for aggression and immorality, then the basic fear of such states held by democratic peoples may well serve as fertile ground for violence and war.

In sum, then, democratic societies are largely non-violent in their internal relations, and wholly non-violent in their mutual international relations. The explanation is that government is limited, even in partly free democracies, and cross-pressures defeat any tendency towards violence. These are the first two elements in the Freedom Principle.

There is another element in this Principle, however, that explains why wars may become particularly intense and widespread, like the Napoleonic Wars, World War I and World War II. This is *polarity*, and as the term implies, it is related to the Polarity Principle.

Any larger society of states or groups always has a central structure of expectations and core status quo. This status quo defines what states have what rights and receive what benefits. It defines the core values, which for states include sovereignty, independence, equality, and their historic borders. Moreover, a core group of states, including some Big Powers, always benefit most from the status quo and therefore have an interest in its maintenance. These are called the Status Quo Powers. There may also appear a group of states that seek passionately to change the status quo for whatever reason. These are Anti-Status-Quo, or Revolutionary Powers.

There is always some kind of conflict between states over some aspect of the core, international status quo, as well as regional status quos specific to particular groups of

states. This makes for a dynamic international relations and an international society constantly evolving with the changing capabilities and interests of states. Therefore, a relatively constant background of international conflict exists and, as long as democracy is not universal, some interstate violence and small-scale wars (such as the Libyan-Egyptian 1977 border war, and those between Pakistan and India) are inevitable.

Sometimes, however, a cleavage develops between states over the core status quo that cuts across most international issues and involves all Big Powers and many small ones, with democracies all on one side. At stake will be their vital national interests and even the survival of many states. This cleavage becomes a class conflict over who will dominate international relations. Then war may become global, general, and total. For international society, it is similar in genesis to revolutionary war within societies.

With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, one such class conflict came to an end, leaving the victorious United States as the world's only superpower. But this may be a temporary state of affairs. While the United States remains a superpower, militarily unbeatable by any dictator, or by any aggressive alliance among them, communist China is growing in power and focusing on building up its military for no apparent defensive reason. In time China may grow in power enough to encourage its dictatorial elite to try to overthrow the fundamental status quo favoring the United States, other Western democracies, and the independence of democratic Taiwan.

As during the Cold War, if China replaces the Soviet Union in a new Cold War, what will keep the peace is the deterrent strength of the West, particularly the United States. In any future conflict over the core status quo, weakness in the American interest in protecting freedom, its capability—especially military and political—to do so, and the will to use this capability, will heighten the risk of this conflict breaking into a hot, global war. When Status Quo Powers confront Revolutionary Powers, the status quo can be maintained only through the deterrent power of the former. Weakness begs war or surrender.

To explain why such weakness risks war, I must invoke the War Principle. I will present this in the next chapter, after discussing some further possible misunderstandings.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Capitalism causes foreign violence and war."*

The logic underlying this belief is that capitalism needs foreign markets for its goods, thus creating competition for foreign markets or imperial attempts to dominate them, leading to warfare between capitalist states or violent intervention in weaker states. But history weighs heavily against this theory. In fact, capitalist states—those with a modern economy and a fair degree of internal civil freedom and human rights—have been more peaceful in general than socialist or feudal systems. Most capitalist states are actually democratic societies, and such societies do not make violence on each other.

Even during the period of colonial expansion and wars in the 17th to 19th centuries, which are often blamed on capitalism, authoritarian governments generally controlled

markets and foreign trade. Usually the trader followed, not preceded, the soldier and flag into foreign lands. And colonial wars were often political, fought for state or royal purposes, rather than on behalf of the businessman.

The irony of the belief that capitalism causes war is that it is most strongly held and argued by socialists—the professed enemies of capitalism. Yet, it is the socialist state, with its overwhelming dominance of government, which is most violent. The totalitarian, socialist state—the communist states—have been the major source of international violence in the world, including guerilla war and international terrorism; not capitalism.

Ah, you may argue; "Remember Nazi Germany. It had state capitalism and it caused World War II." Indeed, Nazi Germany should be remembered, but it should also be recalled that Hitler's ideology was National Socialism, a blend of nationalism, racism, and socialism. He implemented this ideology through the National Socialist German Workers Party (abbreviated to Nazi), which ruled Germany from 1933 to 1945. Both ideology and party were anti-free market and anti-communist. The economy was tightly controlled: government ministers and bureaucrats set wages, prices, and profits. And while large corporations were privately owned, the German government effectively made business decisions. Nazi Germany was a totalitarian socialist state; hardly was it capitalist.

Misunderstanding 2: *"Democracies are not aggressive."*

This belief simply does not bear up under historical examination. Democratic people can be fired up against other nations. Nationalism is a powerful force and jingoists in high position exist in all societies.

No, the people of democracies do not differ as individuals from those controlled by authoritarian or totalitarian governments. They are as subject to misperception, propaganda, emotional upheavals, and the herd instinct. And democracies have occasionally succumbed, as did the American people in launching the Spanish-American War of 1896. This was a very popular, but unnecessary war against the attempt of a corrupt and authoritarian Spanish government to suppress a rebellion in Cuba. The war was triggered by the accidental (we know now) blowing up of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana, with the loss of 260 men, and "Remember the Maine" became the popular battle cry and mass media frenzy.

What keeps free people in check is not that they necessarily differ as individuals (although people subject to or ordered to carry out systematic brutality, terror, and killing may themselves become degraded and brutal), but that the field within which they exist creates forces that work against collective violence. These forces become especially powerful if the other state is also democratic. Trade, commerce, common interests, diversity in groups and politics, and civil and human rights, are all forces that create cross-pressures within individuals and groups and make unchallenged propaganda, misperception, and elite control difficult and unlikely.

Misunderstanding 3: *"There is no correlation between democracy and war."*

History over the past two centuries does show that democracies are involved in war, almost as much as any other kind of state. Since 1816 the United States has fought eight wars, England twenty, and France nineteen, while nondemocratic Germany (Prussia) fought six, Russia fifteen, China eight, and Japan seven. However, these statistics do not take into account the kind of societies engaged. In no case have established democracies fought each other. Moreover, the severity of war cannot be ignored. The wars with the highest casualties are generally wars fought between totalitarian states. Democracies suffer the least casualties in war.

Misunderstanding 4: *"There have been relatively few democracies in the world, so that there would be no democracies that would fight each other is likely on the basis of chance alone, like that no states whose name begins with the letter A would fight each other."*

There in fact have been more democracies than people realize. As mentioned, there are now 122 democracies in the world and yet there is no violence or war between any of them. But this argument can be handled statistically. If one calculates the odds of finding by chance no democracies having war, given the number of states and wars that have occurred, it is always small enough for the scientist to reject chance as explaining why democracies have not made war. And if one takes into consideration that different social scientists using different data and different definitions of democracy and war have found equally that democracies to not make war on each other, then the chances of this finding for all must be in the millions to one.

CHAPTER 24

The War Principle

Now tell us all about the war,
And what they fought each other for.

—Robert Southey, The Battle of Blenheim

Even though democratically free states do not fight each other, war does occur among unfree states, and between them and free states. As long as unfree states exist, therefore, war will always be a possibility, with the potential to involve the citizens of all societies. Whether it actually does so is governed by the War Principle:

A gap between the international status quo and power causes war.

Its elements are:

- Balance of powers
- Status quo
- Disruption

This is the Violence Principle of society applied to, humanity's largest society—international relations. War results from a gap between an interstate *status quo* and the *balance of powers*—what the states can, will, and want to do. The larger this gap, the more likely some trigger will *disrupt* the status quo and set off a war.

Now, war is generated within a field of values, meanings, and norms. Presidents and prime ministers, rulers and dictators, kings and queens (in short, leaders) see things their own way, and all have their own interests and expectations. No matter what their power over their state, they are individuals, each presenting to other heads of states a field of expression (The Communication Principle). The primary cause of war—the gap between the status quo and power—therefore operates within a field of other causes and conditions. All these are interrelated and relative to the wealth, power, and political systems of states. War is consequently contextual, situational. The War Principle should therefore be understood within this context of other causes and conditions. These are given in Table 24.1, and I want to discuss all of them, at least briefly.

To begin, any answer to the question "What causes war?" requires first stating the conditions that must be met for war to be possible. These are the necessary causes of war, without which war would not occur (as gravity is a necessary cause of slipping on ice—without gravity one could not fall).

TABLE 24.1. Causes and Conditions of War

Necessary causes
   contact and mutual salience
   opposing interests
   war capability
   at least one party is nondemocratic
   will-to-war
   both parties expect some kind of success
   disruption of the status quo

Aggravating Conditions*
   aggravates nonviolent conflict, violence, and war
      social and cultural dissimilarity
      status dissimilarity
      conflict with another party's allies
      Big Power involvement
   aggravates violence and war
      polarity of the international system
      Big Power intervention
      weak Status-Quo-Power
      honor at stake
      credibility at stake
   aggravates war
      power parity
      presence of international class conflict

Inhibiting Conditions**
   inhibits nonviolent conflict, violence, and war
      social and cultural similarity
      status similarity
      mutual allies
      no Big Power involvement
   inhibits violence and war
      strong Status-Quo-Power
      cross pressures
      one, not both, parties is democratic
      world opinion
   inhibits war
      power disparity

*These increase war's likelihood, given
the necessary causes are present.

** These decrease war's likelihood, given
the necessary causes are present.

For war to occur, the leaders and people of two states must have some contact and mutual salience, some awareness of each other. They must also have some opposing interests—something to fight about and the capability to fight. What these opposing interests are depend on the actor and situation. But one related characteristic can be defined. At least one of the potential combatants must be non-democratic. Shared domestic restraints, cross-pressures, social bonds, and a liberal ideology, preclude war between democratic states. This is the Freedom Principle.

War does not occur, however, unless three additional conditions are present, the most important of which is a significant change in the balance of powers supporting the status quo must have changed sufficiently for leaders of a state to feel that it is unjust, threatened, or ripe for readjustment. Such a change will have created a gap, resulting in a tense, cold, or hostile climate between the leaders of the states involved. It will be obvious to informed observers that unless something is done, violence and possibly war will break out.

Second, the leaders must have a will-to-war. That is, they must have a will to fight either to defend or to change the status quo. Appeasement and concessions can avoid war, at least in the short run. But this may eventually cost more in lost honor, benefit, or freedom than a leader and his people are willing or able to bear, and thus stimulating a subsequent will-to-war.

Finally, the leaders of a state must expect success as they define it. That is, they must believe that if they go to war or if war comes to them, then they can achieve their war aims, whether they be the annexation of a desirable slice or territory, an end to border encroachment, force the intervention of a Big Power, or solidify domestic support, etc.

These, then, are the rock bottom, generally necessary causes for war: contact and salience, opposing interests and capabilities, non-democratic enemies, significant change in the balance of powers underlying the status quo with a consequent gap between power and status quo, a will-to-war, and a belief in success if war occurs. Wherever present between states, these causes demarcate the war potential zones, the possible arenas of extreme violence.

Yet, war may not occur. For a final necessary cause also must be present. This is the disruption of the status quo (The Violence Principle). A change in the balance of powers will have created tension, a recognition of the possibility of war over a status quo. Then some, perhaps surprising, event will communicate injustice, threat, or opportunity in a way to crystallize the conflict situation and provoke the will-to-war for one or both parties. Such was Saddam Hussein, dictator of Iraq, invading Kuwait, or the Taliban leaders of Afghanistan sheltering Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist group that carried out the 9/11 attack on the United States.

Such are the necessary causes of war shown in Table 24.1. However, it should be clear that all these requirements may indeed be present, and yet war does not break out. Moreover, if war does occur, it could be a short, intense confrontation on a border; or a

full-scale military confrontation between the parties or a general war involving many states.

Three groups of aggravating conditions increase the likelihood of war, given the presence of the necessary conditions, or tend to increase the intensity of war once it has begun. One group is of those conditions that worsen conflict behavior generally. These include the social and cultural dissimilarities between the parties, their dissimilarities in international status (wealth, power, prestige), their having conflict with each other's allies, and at least one party being a Big Power. All these exacerbate opposing interests and with regard to war, tend to strain the status quo and increase the likelihood of military conflict.

A second group of aggravating conditions uniquely influences violence and war. One of these is the polarity of the international system (The Polarity Principle), which defines the generality of the status quo and increases the probability that a state's violence, wherever it occurs, will involve Big Power interests. A second aggravating condition is Big Power intervention itself, which may inject into local conflicts larger status quo interests and resources and provoke violence or its escalation. Another such condition is the weakness of the Status Quo Power (The Violence Principle). Given the presence of the necessary causes, if the leader of the Status Quo Power displays a reluctance to defend an already unstable status quo, then this makes more likely its disruption and the escalation of violence and war, once they occur. Finally, there is the matter of honor and credibility of the rival parties. If these are at stake in a conflict, the situation is potentially more explosive, with violence and war more likely, with any actual fighting likely to be more intense, and more difficult to resolve.

The third group of aggravators is unique to war; given the necessary causes, they make the escalation to war more probable. One is power parity, or a sufficient equality of coercive power and force such that the leader of each state may believe that he can successfully oppose the power of the other. The second aggravator is class conflict (The Polarity Principle). Class in international relations defines the authoritative, status quo rights of the parties. When there is a consistent division of states separating those who have wealth, power, and prestige, from those who are poor and weak, then the status quo reflects a clear class divide. Under these conditions, conflict across this divide is worsened and war made more likely,

In total, the three groups of aggravating conditions provide momentum toward war. But, singly or collectively, they will not in general cause war by themselves. The necessary causes must always be present; the status quo always must be disrupted. However, the aggravating causes can turn potential into disposition and disposition into a war seeking an excuse to happen.

In any conflict, however, there are always two sets of conditions present. Those promoting confrontation; and those discouraging it. These latter are the inhibiting conditions that oppose the occurrence and escalation of conflict in general. These also

comprise three groups, depending on whether they operate on all conflict behavior, only violence (including war), or only on war.

The first group comprises those aggravators that when reversed act also as inhibitors. Thus, social and cultural similarity, similarity in international status, the sharing of allies, and the absence of Big Power involvement restrain the tendency toward conflict behavior, violence and war. The second group contains a number of inhibitors that act on violence, only one of which is the reverse of an aggravator. This is the strength of the Status Quo Power. If in spite of a change in the balance of powers, the leaders that support the status quo appear willing and able to defend it, then this tends to work against its disruption. But even so, disruption and consequent violence or war may still occur, as the Anti-Status Quo leader may still believe that he can successfully challenge the status quo, despite the resistance of another state.

Another inhibitor is cross-pressures (The Polarity Principle). These involve diverse interests that may segment the particular opposing goals of the parties. Violence or war may be desirable for these goals, but other interests may thereby be compromised or lost. Some interests may push toward war; some pull away from it. Related to this is internal freedom—a democratic political system (and exchange society)—as an inhibitor of violence and war (The Freedom Principle). Leaders of democratic states do commit violence and go to war. But reluctantly, always against totalitarian or authoritarian states, and often with considerable domestic opposition. A final inhibitor in this second group is world opinion, the pressure that allies and neutrals bring to bear on leaders to prevent or check their violence and war.

The third and final group is of those conditions uniquely inhibiting war. It has one member: power disparity. While power parity increases the likelihood of war, power disparity restrains it. War still may occur, in spite of a gross inequality in military forces and resources between those involved. Other factors, such as honor, credibility, survival, or determination may make the difference, as in the Israeli-Arab Wars. Success may be pegged to the potential for Big Power intervention; or leaders may measure success not in terms of winning, but in actually having fought the other to a standstill or in unifying a nation. Or a leaders may calculate that the enemy will use only a portion of its power, as small North Vietnam correctly did in fighting a Superpower, the United States.

These then are the causes and conditions of war. They are forces of the international field within which state leaders mutually adjust their vital interests and establish a new balance of powers through war, as shown in Figure 24.1. In sum, a gap between the core of the structure of expectations—the status quo—and the balance of powers created by a change in the balance of powers (necessary cause). This assumes mutual contact and salience, the opposition of interests and capabilities (necessary causes), and the involvement of totalitarian or authoritarian states (necessary causes). The war then determines a new, balance of mutually recognized powers, and a congruent status quo. This occurs within the context of diverse aggravating and inhibiting conditions listed in Table 24.1.

Now for some possible misunderstandings.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Bad leaders alone cause war."*

It is true that aggressive leaders start wars, but the potential for war must be there to begin with. Leaders choose within situations and under conditions that more or less promote or inhibit war. Even the most aggressive of men cannot launch a war without followers; nor can he do so without some prospect of success. If democratic leaders, for example, tried to make war against other democratic states, they would seriously risk

Figure 24.1

International Field of the Causes and Conditions of War

legislative rebellion as well as loss of office. Even for dictators, such as President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, it would be personal suicide to launch an attack on American troops fighting in Iraq.

However, when the potential for war exists, when a state is not a democracy, and when war might plausibly be profitable, then a leader's personality and interests may make a difference; one may seek compromise and nonviolent resolution, another might seek glory and power through war.

Misunderstanding 2: *"Some factor X causes war."*

Some believe that a particular factor, like overpopulation, resource depletion, economic imperialism (as for oil), arms merchants, an aggressive instinct, misperception, militarism, nationalism, or national impoverishment. No doubt, such factors do aggravate some interstate conflicts, and may even be a major source of some disputes. However, these factors must operate within a context defined by the status quo between states and its alignment with the balance of powers, the type of societies involved (whether exchange societies or not, for example), their relative power, and so forth for the other causes and conditions set out in this chapter.

CHAPTER 25

The Fourth Master Principle

War is therefore a continuation of policy by other means. It is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a conduct of political intercourse by other means. What remains peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar character of the means it employs.

—Karl von Clausewitz, On War

Leaders of states (or other groups) present to each other a field of expression—words, deeds, and character. They try to communicate and satisfy their own interests. But each leader sees the world through his own cultural matrix and this colors reality his own way. Each leader is also an individual with his own unique perceptions, expectations, and goals. As individuals everywhere must learn to get along and cooperate, so do state leaders. They must mutually adjust. And conflict is the noise and mechanism of such adjustment.

The Fourth Master Principle is this:

Through conflict states negotiate a social contract.

Its elements are:

- International peace is a social contract
- International cooperation depends on a balance of power
- The less government, the less international violence

International (or intergroup) relations are either a social contract, or the process of determining one. The essence of this is captured in the Four International Principles listed in Table 25.1.

Three corollaries follow from these principles, and need only be briefly discussed.

Corollary 1. *International peace is a social contract.*

The essence of peace is not a negative—an absence of conflict, violence, or war—but the positive existence of an implicit or explicit social contract between the leaders of states: a structure of expectations.

TABLE 25.1

Four Principles of International (or Intergroup) Relations

Principles	Elements
FIELD: Free Actors Comprise a Social Field	Actor Social Field Sovereignty Independence Equality
EXCHANGE: Free Relations Form a Social Field	Society Exchange Libertarian government Spontaneous/pluralistic conflict Exchange structure of peace
FREEDOM: Violence Does Not Occur Between Free Societies	Libertarian government Cross-pressures Polarity
WAR: A Gap Between The International Status Quo and Power Causes War	Balance of powers Status quo Disruption

Corollary 2: *International cooperation depends on a balance of powers.*

Cooperation, the most important aspect of which is the international division of labor, assumes that the leaders and people of states have similar expectations about the outcome of their behavior. The consistency and constancy of these expectations in turn are supported by the equilibria the leaders and people of states have negotiated between what they want, are able to get, and are willing to pursue—the balances of powers.

Corollary 3: *The less government, the less international violence.*

Freedom within and between states or groups minimizes violence. To be sure, freedom from international government dictation among states does not necessarily avoid the

violent deaths of masses of human beings, but it does reduce the amount of violence in international relations. As we have seen, during the 20th century, there were fewer violent deaths in the whole global system of states than within a handful of totalitarian states—less, even than in China, or the U.S.S.R. alone. Moreover, international violence and war are ruled out entirely between states that are exchange societies with democratic governments. Free states are oases of nonviolence in a violent world.

Now, for some possible misunderstandings.

Misunderstanding 1: *"International peace is unitary, of one piece."*

This is the belief that for a state (or a group or an individual), peace either exists or it does not. It is a one-dimensional view. Peace, however, is far more complex than this. The leaders and people of states are involved in multiple structures of expectations with others—leader-to-leader, business-to-business, group-to-group, and person-to-person. These structures may overlap (as do the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization), be nested one within another (as the International Court of Justice is within the United Nations), or independent (as the International Criminal Court is independent of the United Nations). Each such structure is a social contract creating a sector of peace in international relations.

Some expectations may break down, disrupting the associated peace, while other expectations are firmly in place. Thus, the United States and Iran can exchange harsh words, threats, and sanctions over Iran's attempt to develop nuclear weapons, while simultaneously pursuing business-related disputes peacefully under the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. Thus, multinational corporations carry on commercial relations with Sudan, while their home governments ostracize and sanction the Sudanese regime for genocide in Darfur.

Peace at any time is a complex of its separate sectors. While each may break into its own conflict, all sectors are ultimately dependent on the central international status quo. As this breaks down, so are disrupted the diverse expectations—social contracts—and so ends peace in general. Such are the total wars between two states, or the general wars in international relations involving all the Big Powers.

Misunderstanding 2: *"Intergroup relations are in essence different from international relations."*

On the contrary, all the principles of international relations apply equally to relations between groups, so long as the groups comprise a field—that is, they are behaving freely and spontaneously. This will be the case when the groups are relatively sovereign internally and in their behavior, and independent of each other (as are Mafia families or primitive tribes in some isolated regions). Keep in mind that states are simply groups of a special and legal kind, whose complex interrelations form what we call the international system.

PART V

Peace, With Freedom And Dignity

Peace hath her victories No less renown 'd than war.

John Milton, To the Lord General Cromwell

CHAPTER 26

The Commonality Principle

Peace puts forth her olive everywhere.

—William Shakespeare, Henry IV

In our interpersonal relations, we relate to family members, friends, fellow workers, clerks, store assistants, among others. In our social relationships, we join groups, hold a job, vote in an election, attend church, see a movie, buy a hamburger, etc. And in our intergroup or international relations, we, and the groups we are in, interact with other individuals and other groups. Although at separate levels of behavior, these interpersonal, social, and intergroup or international relations are unified in the flow of our lives. They display our stream of individuality and consciousness. And by virtue of this identity, they manifest common principles. Thus follows the Commonality Principle:

The peace principles apply to all relationships.

Its elements are the three levels of human relationships:

- Interpersonal
- Social
- Intergroup or international.

This principle is the peace counterpart of the Universality Principle (Chapter 16), which states that "our interpersonal principles apply to all societies." There is a fundamental reason for this generality: regardless of society or intergroup relations, only individuals behave, not groups, institutions, organizations, or states. True, the contexts of behavior and relations change. Our work and home environments are different. Negotiating an international treaty or a labor management contract is not the same as arranging a picnic with a friend. The bedroom *is* different from the boardroom.

However, just as dissimilar physical substances composed of common basic elements (such as iron, nickel, sodium, and zinc) display common chemical principles, so do our situations share certain elements. These are our perception, mental field, and psychological balance; our needs, attitudes, interests, and sentiments; our superego, ego, self, and will; our expectations and dispositions; and our free will, morality, and choice.

All our behavior, relationships, and that of others manifest the principles of Part I. To recap:

- Perception is subjective

- We act to achieve
- We strive for self esteem
- We guide our behavior by expectations
- We are responsible for our behavior

All are summed in the First Master Principle: Each of us is an Individual.

Common elements and common personal principles working at all levels of human relationships mean that certain fundamental interpersonal principles are involved throughout. And so they are: whether a family quarrel, a strike, a protest movement, or international violence; hiring a babysitter, paying school tuition, increasing a corporation's inventory, or buying a foreign television set; manifest are the Principles of Communication, Power, Conflict, Cooperation, Gap, and Helix. That is, as embodied in the Second Master Principle: Through conflict, we negotiate an *interpersonal* contract.

Now, of course, *social* and *intergroup or international* relations still do differ in context from interpersonal relations. Moreover, at these more general levels, societies and intergroup relations are the consequences of the behavior of thousands or millions of people. Further principles are therefore required that describe societies as a whole and generalize to the collective outcomes of interpersonal relations—of our personal principles. At the social level, these are the Trisocial, Violence, and Polarity Principles, encapsulated in the Third Master Principle that: Power shapes peace. And at the intergroup or international level, those are the Field, Exchange, Freedom, and War Principles, which combine in the Fourth Master Principle: Through conflict, states negotiate a social contract.

Basic to all these principles at all level is that behavior begins in the minds of men—in their perception, expectations, means, values, goals, interests, and so on. To understand human behavior fundamentally, then, is to understand what all these elements are for a particular individual.

As with the interpersonal principles, certain peace principles are fundamental to all human relationships. This is because, again, whether in interpersonal, social, intergroup or international relations, all individuals share common elements and display the same personal principles. That is to say, *peace, as a particular kind of behavior, always begins in the minds of men.*

These peace principles will be presented in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 27

The Peacemaking Principle

The arts of peace are great,
And no less glorious than those of war.

—William Blake, King Edward III

When considering peace, we must understand at the outset that peace is not an absence of something; not a void, a negative. It is a specific achievement—a social contract. And we create peace, it does not just happen. The Peacemaking Principle is this.

We make peace by balancing powers.

Conflict between people, groups, or nations is a confrontation of what each party wants, can do, and will do (The Conflict Principle). It is a balancing of our different powers (The Power Principle). To make peace, then, is to achieve a balance of powers—an interlocking of mutual ICWs (the Second, Third, and Fourth Master Principles). One's means to accelerate, ease, or facilitate this process must therefore be focused directly on the balancing of these elements or the conditions influencing them.

Now, of course, any particular conflict is a unique event. It involves unique individuals in a specific situation resulting from the breakdown in their particular expectations (The Gap Principle). It would seem, then, that peacemaking must be a balancing process entirely particular to the life histories of those involved and probably little appreciated or understood by outsiders. However, there are certain common aspects to peacemaking, just as there are commonalities to conflict and expectations. And these commonalities allow us to define a variety of common means to reduce the intensity of conflict, accelerate the achievement of peace, and make the resulting interpersonal, intergroup, or international peace more enduring.

These means are diverse and involve a number of considerations, which I have organized into the nine peacemaking subprinciples listed in Table 27.1, and which I shall discuss in the order shown.

Peacemaking Subprinciple 1: Clarify The Conflict Situation.

Conflict is a dispute over something, whether it is a teenager's curfew, whose turn it is to wash the dishes, a new work contract, the role of religion in governing a state, or the location of an international border. All such conflict is within a situation defined by each party's underlying goals and beliefs; the facts involved; the mutual perception of these goals, beliefs, and facts; and the mutual communication about them.

Table 27.1. *Peacemaking Subprinciples and Rules*

Subprinciple	Rules
Clarify the Conflict Situation	Uncover the underlying hidden goals and beliefs Determine the facts Put yourself in the other's shoes State the other's arguments and demands
Define a Yesable Interest	Focus on the decision to be made by the other Clarify the outcome of a decision Divide a big interest into smaller ones Avoid making principle an issue Leave self-esteem intact
Invoke Overriding Interests	Invoke a paramount common loyalty Invoke a superior common goal
Focus on an Exchange	Seek to make attractive offers Reward agreement
Emphasize **Legitimacy**	Seek precedent for a solution Recognize a conflict's legitimacy Consider a legitimate third party
Keep Issue and Power Consistent	Make power proportional to the interest at stake Make power relevant to the interest at stake
Display Commitment	Be credible Protect your reputation for power Show a readiness to react or respond to the other's decision
Create Distance	Consider withdrawal Consider separation
Resist Aggression	Gauge different power responses Respond in measure

Now, conflict itself is a process of communication—an engagement of fields of expression. Passions and beliefs become evident; the nature and intensity of hidden interests surface. Mutual perceptions rub against each other and assumed facts are engaged (The Conflict Principle). In the process of achieving a new structure of expectations, conflict integrates these hidden goals and mutual perceptions into a balance among the central interests at stake, the relevant capabilities, and the will of each (The Cooperation Principle). This balancing process can be shortened, the intensity and possible antagonism lessened, and the resulting expectations made more realistic by following in the beginning four rules for clarifying the conflict situation.

1. *Uncover the underlying or hidden goals and beliefs.* Look beneath the state of disharmony, tension, argument, dispute, opposition, clash, fighting, violence, battle, or war. It really may be not over a teenage daughter coming home late, but about parental authority. A contentious dispute in a legislature over people's democratic right to create a new law by means of initiative and referendum may really be over the status quo dominated by a union-business coalition. And democratic rule may not be the real aim of guerrillas trying to take over a dictatorship in Africa, but a cover for trying to impose an Islamic regime.

A conflict may simply reflect latent beliefs about who should dominate a marriage, the relative role of husband and wife in raising their children, the feeling of sexual inadequacy, the fear of union or business power, or the hatred of capitalism. Or the conflict may manifest the hidden, perhaps even unconscious, belief that the other threatens one's self image, job, status, or country. Whatever, one should be always sensitive to the two possible levels of conflict: the surface issue, and the hidden issue.

2. *Determine the facts.* Fact-finding is an essential part of resolving conflicts, for often conflicts are generated by a misperception or misunderstanding of the facts involved (The Subjectivity Principle). Moreover, an objective assessment of the facts often can provide a basis for resolving a conflict. It is especially helpful if fact-finding is a mutual effort, for involving all parties makes the conflict more a rational and mutually collaborative, and less an hostile and emotional process.

3. *Put oneself in the other's shoes.* Try to see the conflict through the other's eyes. How does the other see the facts? What are the other's interests? Especially, how does the other see one's demands or offers? Resolving conflict is partially developing an ability to empathize with the other, to be sensitive to the other's frame of reference, and to see oneself as a field of expression (The Communication Principle).

4. *State the other's argument and demands.* Miscommunication and misperception can play a large role in conflict. One way to reduce them is to seek mutual agreement on the issues and arguments. And this requires one to sum up in words the position and justification of the other, to the satisfaction of the other. A simple statement of the issues and arguments will often cut through layers of misunderstanding and help establish firmer expectations.

These four rules—look underneath, look at the facts, look at oneself, and look at the other—alone will not make peace. These help reduce the emotional content by focusing on the real issues.

Peacemaking Subprinciple 2: Define A Yesable Interest.

Peacemaking partially involves separating what we want the other to do from the self-assertive and emotional aspects of a conflict. It is true that strength, and intensity of expression—our assertiveness—communicate our true feeling and interests (The Conflict Principle). But this should not confuse those involved in conflict about each other's specific demands, requests, or desires. Moreover, unless the conflict is simply a contest of force rather than wills, each side should know what the other wants. And the best way to communicate this is to phrase our wants (interests—see The Intentionality Principle) in such a way to elicit a simple "yes."

"Do you really love me?" "Will you help me with the dishes?" "Will you give me a raise of $50 a month?" "Do you officially recognize our revolutionary government?" "Do you agree to mediation of our border differences?"

In making a yesable demand (request, offer, appeal, claim, and the like), there are five helpful rules.

1. *Focus on the decision to be made by the othe*r. In conflict, and with the exception of using force, one is working through the other's mental field (The Power Principle). One is trying to get the other to do or not do something. That is, one wants the other to make some kind of decision. One should therefore clarify and focus on this decision in a way to allow for a simple "yes" response.

Of course, in some conflicts, trying to elicit a verbal "yes" may create more heat or difficulty than necessary, especially where saying yes may concede a moral victory to the other, or involve pride or esteem. Therefore, a yesable response need not be verbal: it may only involve the other clearly doing or desisting from something. Thus, a request that our son start coming home in time for supper may require no verbal yes. Only that he henceforth be home in time. A demand that a state refrain from aiding rebels in a neighboring country may get no official "yes," but the rebels may clearly stop getting supplies.

2. *Clarify the outcome of a decision*. We should not only focus on the other's decision that is required, but also on its outcome (The Expectation Principle). What will happen if yes? Or no?

In coercive situations, an unambiguous threat should make clear the outcome of a no as well as the consequences of a yes. "You will be fired if you botch another contract, but if you hook a big one you can expect a ten percent bonus." "Continue to picket against the housing development, and you will be arrested; but if you desist a park will be

included in the development." Indeed, a demand is more effective if coupled with an offer—an inducement to respond yes.

In a bargaining situation, an explicit promise, an offer, should make clear the result of a "yes" response. If the offer is accepted, then an exchange will occur. However, what is often neglected is to make clear the consequences of a negative response. Such may be done, and without making this outcome seem a threat. "If you don't buy the television set before the sale ends next week it will cost $100 more." "If you don't sell us this military equipment, for our own security we must buy it elsewhere."

3. *Divide a big interest into smaller ones*. In some conflict situations it is easier to agree on a number of small issues than on a big one. Concessions on some issues can then be traded off for gains on some others. And smaller, separable interests are less likely to raise resistance than a big one.

For example, a family dispute may be over whether to move into another house closer to work (or to shopping, or to the city)—clearly a big issue. If the new house is only a means, however, and not an end in itself, the issue might be resolved by considering a number of smaller questions. Perhaps a new, more comfortable car, a change in work hours to avoid the worst traffic, or remodeling the present house may satisfy the original interest and still provide sufficient compromises for agreement among family members.

4. *Avoid making principle an issue*. It is less conflictual to make concrete demands or requests that involve specific behavior or things, than to push for an agreement on a principle. A husband likely will be more amenable to helping with the housecleaning, cooking, and dishes, if the wife simply asks for help at a particular time, than he will be to accepting the principle that men also should do the housework. It is easier to pass a law providing the aged, disabled, and poor with free medical care, than one that asserts the right of all to national health care. The most intense, social, and international conflicts—the bloodiest massacres, revolutions, and wars—have occurred over religious and ideological principles.

5. *Leave self-esteem intact*. Whatever our demand or request, it should be phrased such that the other's self-esteem is not affected. Demands that lower the other's self esteem, such as any which would implicitly concede our superiority or demean the other, invite intense and antagonistic opposition (The Self-Esteem Principle). Offer enough money and people will happily sell many things, including the shirt off their back—but usually not their self-respect. Nations may fight a bloody war to the very end rather than suffer ignoble defeat. If esteem-related, yesable demands must be made, then these should be coupled with face-saving yesable offers.

Peacemaking Subprinciple 3: Invoke Overriding Interests.

The presence of an overriding interest between parties in conflict tends to reduce it, and make what conflict that does occur easier to resolve. Two rules are helpful.

1. *Invoke a paramount common loyalty.*

2. *Invoke a superior common goal.*

A paramount loyalty may be to family, club, political party, company, church, or country. This loyalty is especially powerful when our common family, group, or nation is under threat or attack. A common goal serves the same functions as loyalty. The more important this goal, the more likely conflict that might hamper it will be suppressed or avoided. Thus, the communist Soviet Union allied with the capitalist Great Britain and United States to defeat Hitler's Germany in World War II.

The identification of individuals with their group and with a common cause is a major psychological force. Self-esteem becomes embedded in the group or invested in a common goal; we become sensitive to what other members think of us or our efforts; keeping up group appearances and not letting others down becomes compelling. Thus subordinating an issue to a common goal and purpose dampens a conflict's tendency to escalate and helps resolve it. A family dispute over the husband accepting a new position in faraway New York may be resolved by linking such a move to the future stability and survival of the family. A faculty fight in the history department over a tenure decision may be rapidly resolved by pointing out that the continued independence of the department from intervention by the dean is at stake. As dictators know so well, they may end anti-regime unrest and agitation by raising (or creating) the threat of foreign intervention. Arguing that the team's ability to win can be compromised may end a fight with a teammate. And a union may finally agree to a lesser contract if the company shows that the union's demands will put it out of business.

Peacemaking Subprinciple 4: Focus On An Exchange.

Ultimately, we will achieve more by the carrot than the stick. Two rules help in this:

1. *Seek to make attractive offers.*
2. *Reward agreement.*

These rules define an exchange (The Exchange Principle)—both parties to a conflict are satisfying their interests. This allows for a contractual or friendly resolution to a conflict. And it will provide a more durable balance of power for subsequent cooperation. The best assurance of peace is mutual satisfaction.

Peacemaking Subprinciple 5: Emphasize Legitimacy.

Legitimacy is the foundation of authoritarian power (The Power Principle). The more we can establish some legitimate reason, explanation, or justification for the decision we want another to make in a conflict situation, the more likely we are to induce a yes. Not because the other fears the consequences of a no; nor because the other desires what we promise for a yes, but because the other believes a yes is right. It is proper.

Of course, not all issues can be resolved by invoking legitimacy. Nonetheless, emphasizing legitimacy can influence a conflict and help avoid harmful confrontation and escalation. Three rules should be useful.

1. *Seek precedent for a solution.* If we can show that what we want or will settle for has been agreed to before by the other, or by those the other respects in a similar conflict situation, then this tends to make our demand or request legitimate. Precedent can exist in previously made formal decisions (as in judicial settlement), previous agreements (as in contracts), or in previous behavior (as in previous practices or procedures). My two daughters were skilled at this way of settling an argument with me. "But Dad," Dawn would respond to my "no." "You went to see Lei's soccer game last week. Why can't you go to see my volleyball game?"

2. *Recognize a conflict's legitimacy.* Consider the First Master Principle: each of us is an individual; each of us sees things in our own way and we all have our own interests. It does no good to scorn, ignore, or ridicule another in a conflict. To say or imply that the other's demands or requests are meaningless or silly is unnecessary and intolerant. It raises the heat of conflict and may prolong it. Recognize that what the other will argue or fight about is important to them. Accept the legitimacy of the issue. And accept the legitimacy of the other.

3. *Consider a legitimate third party.* A third party can help in objective fact-finding, surfacing hidden interests or beliefs, clearing up misperception and miscommunication, and proposing compromises. In marriage counseling, labor-management disputes, and international conflict the value of third-party help is well recognized. They can provide conciliation, mediation, arbitration, or judgment. In the United States, a pool of trained conciliators and mediators has been developed, and marriage counseling has now become a profession. Whether one seeks help from professionals, however, or from a mutual friend, parent, aunt, boss, priest, or a neutral outsider, the mutual acceptance of a third party playing some legitimate role and their subsequent ability to clarify conflict issues can themselves be the first and second steps towards conflict resolution.

Peacemaking Subprinciple 6: Keep Issue And Power Proportional.

We do not threaten to break our child's arm the next time we catch him in the cookie jar. Nor do we threaten to resign from a tenured faculty or civil service position if we do not get the parking space we want. Nor do we threaten to wipe out another state's cities with nuclear weapons if it commits aggression anywhere. That is, not if we wish to be believed and to avoid having our threat called. Extreme promises, threats, or appeals to authority can weaken one's credibility and defeat their use when a vital issue does come along that does merit extreme power. And even if successful, excessive, disproportionate power may bring only an expensive, temporary victory, creating resentment and sullen acceptance and storing up the potential for future conflict.

Whatever sanctions, threats, offers, or promises are made, they should be in line with the demand or request. That is, they should be consistent with the interests involved.

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Two rules formalize this important means for establishing legitimacy and justice, and easing conflict resolution.

1. *Make power proportional to the interests at stake.*
2. *Make power relevant to the interests at stake.*

So, when we catch our child with his hand in the cookie jar, we should explain why he ought not eat cookies without permission, and that the next time he will get no cookies for a week. So, to deter the leaders of another state from aggression in a protracted conflict, we should make sure that they know we are willing and able to respond with forces sufficient to defeat its aggression where it occurs and that by initiating aggression they have legitimatized (opened the door to) a similar move on our part in the same or similar area. Thus, it is made clear to North Korea that another North Korean invasion of South Korea should not only be repelled, but would legitimatize a counter-invasion of North Korea.

Peacemaking Subprinciple 7: Display Commitment

Attention to how another perceives our will is essential in a conflict (The Conflict Principle). Whether the other believes our promise or threat, questions our legitimacy, or accepts our intellectual credentials, will help determine their response or our demands, requests, or offers. Three important rules in this regard help to avoid unnecessary escalation and misunderstandings.

1. *Be credible.* Make the basis of a demand, request, promise, or offer believable. If we make a promise or threat, we should be clearly able and willing to carry it out. If we are depending on our authority, or credentials, these should be unambiguous. We should be clear about our official position, or whom we represent, or our degrees if relevant,

2. *Protect your reputation for power.* The image of power we project in a conflict is essential to the manner and speed of its resolution. We should not make demands, requests, or offers that call our power into question; remember that the strength and duration of the resulting peace and the nature of future conflicts depend in part on the image of power that we foster in conflict now.

3. *Show a readiness to react or respond to the other's decision.* If, for example, we threaten that the leaders of another state had better remove their troops from a disputed border area, or else, we can cancel leaves, partially mobilize troops, and reinforce opposing units in order to display our commitment to the threat. If we also have made an offer to provide financial or technical help after the conflict is resolved, then we can display preparations to provide such help.

Peacemaking Subprinciple 8: Consider Creating Distance.

Creating distance in space and time between parties to a conflict a conflict can help to resolve it the dispute. Two rules are appropriate.

1. *Consider withdrawal.* In some situations temporary withdrawal may be the best way to cool a conflict to gain a better perspective on the issue of concern. In a family fight, for example, it is sometimes wise to simply leave the house for a long walk or go to a movie. Of course, in collective social conflict, any withdrawal can concede moral and physical ground to the other side, and can seriously endanger one's interests. When an army garrison has mutinied or one's border is attacked, withdrawal except to regroup and counterattack can mean defeat. But where the sides are relatively equal, a mutual withdrawal may be possible, or a ceasefire in place may be negotiable. Also, a third party (such as United Nations peace-keeping forces) may be invited to interpose itself between the belligerents.

2. *Consider separation.* When conflict or violence explodes, separating the parties may help. Thus, when the rough and tumble of a football game turns into a first fight between two opposing linemen, team members will immediately separate the two. Separation and divorce are often the only solution to irreconcilable differences between family members, as well as the means of resolving fundamental conflicts between minority racial, religious, ethnic, and nationality groups and a majority. Groups should be free to form their own communities, and independently pursue their own interests. Self-determination for minorities is not only a principle of freedom, but also a way of resolving protracted and possibly violent conflict. For this reason voluntarily formed racial or cultural neighborhoods, ethnic reservations, or autonomous regions can serve a peacemaking function.

Separation as a technique of conflict resolution has worked well in my family. When they were teenagers, each of my daughters had her own bedroom over which she was sovereign—a sanctuary. By their late teens they seldom had big fights (The Helix Principle), but when they did have heated arguments that were getting too intense or disturbed the peace and harmony of the household, my wife and I would send them off to their rooms. A couple of quiet hours away from each other usually ended the dispute. Note, however, that we did not impose a solution. They were free to continue the fight later and less noisily.

In sum, conflict may be resolved simply by allowing it to fade out or by eliminating the conflict situation (as in divorce). This is achieved by withdrawal or separation of the parties, which allows the "heat of battle" to cool, perspectives on the issues to develop, the underlying interests to change; or which now gives each an opportunity to satisfy independently those interests that were in conflict.

Peacemaking Subprinciple 9: Resist Aggression.

The actual solution of a conflict may involve a negotiated settlement, mediation, a third party award to one side, or another. Or the conflict may fade away or be eliminated through withdrawal or separation. Or, and this has yet to be mentioned, one side may overpower—conquer—the other.

Conquest can involve beating up another, terrorizing the other into submission, physically overcoming the other, or as in the case of revolution or war, utterly defeating the opposing forces. Now, aggressive conquest as a means to conflict resolution is often wrong: using force to impose one's interests (values and goals) on another, aside from its immorality, can only create a resentment, grievance, and hostility that will fuel greater conflict and violence later. Where a deep dispute over a status quo exists, some kind of negotiated compromise should be worked out.

But there are situations in which the only resolution possible, desirable, or moral may be through conquest: a test of strength and the unambiguous defeat of the other side—as of Hitler, the Taliban, or Saddam Hussein. If a teenage gang at a remote camping site attacks our family, flight or fight may be the only alternatives and flight may be blocked. If a communist coup in a democratic country is attempted, violent defeat of the rebels may be the only choice other than surrender. And aggression against one's country should usually be resisted. To believe that conflict should always be resolved through negotiation, mediation, and compromise invites an aggressor to assume that what is his is his, but what is ours is negotiable.

On this, I do not want to be misunderstood. Resisting aggression does not necessarily mean meeting aggression bomb for bomb, tank for tank, or even slap for slap. What defense measures are taken and how aggression is discouraged depends on the situation and the victim's resources. Even a nonviolent response to violent aggression may be appropriate and effective.

In any case, standing up to aggression brings conflict to a head by forcing a test of ICWs - if the aggressor so wants it. And this may be a faster – and ultimately less violent - way of resolving conflict than conciliation or appeasement. Taking on the bully in the school yard may yield a black eye, but if we put up a good fight, he and others who saw the fight are likely to leave us alone thereafter; we may even become friends. And by not rewarding aggression, we make it easier to apply the other subprinciples of peacemaking.

Implicit in this discussion are two rules.

1. *Gauge different power responses.* Do not automatically respond to aggression in kind. The most effective response is one that shifts the power to bases that we can employ more effectively (The Power Principle) and lessens the risk of violent escalation. Thus, in the American South during the early 1960s, civil rights demonstrators met police and White violence with nonviolent, peaceful protests, sit ins, marches, and economic boycotts. The sheer number of the protesters involved and their leaders' manipulation of the media to create favorable, national publicity for the demonstrations, eventually defeated the violence, ended segregation, and won major improvements in the conditions of Blacks.

2. *Respond in measure.* Respond proportionally, although not necessarily in kind. To meet aggression in equal measure is legitimate. Over-reaction risks escalation and a

more extended and intense conflict; under-reaction gives the impression of weakness and risks continued aggression and defeat.

Such are major subprinciples of peacemaking. In sum, conflict is an engagement of what we and others want to do, can do, and will do in a situation in which previously established expectations are irrelevant or no longer suitable. Perceived situations, expectations, and ICWs are the elements of our conflict and peacemaking. Objective things—money, sex, weapons, words, and land—are only the tools or objects of conflict. And material conditions, like the distance between two people or a mountainous border between two states, only frame and physically limit conflict. *The essence of conflict is an opposition of minds (Chapter 2). The arena of conflict is the mental field. The principles and rules for its resolution are psychological.*

The presentation of these principles and rules may have created some misunderstanding, three of which are especially important to clarify.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Peacemaking is Good."*

Focusing on peacemaking may imply that our best and immediate response to conflict lies in trying to resolve it. This inference is wrong. No doubt, some conflicts are unnecessary. Moreover, some are needlessly intense and long lasting. But there are conflicts that are a real and necessary clash of vital interests, when conflict is the only way we can protect or further our goals and achieve a more satisfactory and harmonious peace.

The war against Hitler's Germany from 1939 to 1945 is illustrative of this. World War Two cost millions of lives. But consider the greater misery, the terror, the executions, and the cold-blooded murders that would have resulted if Hitler had consolidated his control of Europe and had been victorious in his invasion of Russia. No numbers can adequately measure the agonies he inflicted on his captive peoples (including many Germans), but the killing of 21,000,000 people, including almost 6,000,000 Jews, by Hitler's henchmen before and during the war is an indication of what to expect had he ruled Europe unchallenged. Said John Locke:

> *If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has, for peace's sake, to him who will lay violent hands on it, I desire it may be considered, what kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in violence and rapine, and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors.*
> *—Second Treatise of Government, 1690*

We can always end a conflict when we want. By total surrender. After all, one can have the peace of the slave or prisoner. Or peace may be bought by appeasing an aggressor or tyrant. That is, at least until our self-esteem can no longer suffer the increasing demands and indignities.

There are things more important than peace, then, like dignity, freedom, and security. Peacemaking is not necessarily our highest goal in a conflict. Achieving our interests with the least cost in the least time and creating a better and more enduring peace is the general aim. The peacemaking principles, subprinciples, and rules detailed above help to ease this process. They help avoid pointless escalation and aggravating conflict interaction. They speed up the trial and error adjustment of opposing interests. And they help establish a more acceptable, more stable peace.

Always keep in mind that peacemaking is a means, not an end.

Misunderstanding 2: *"Peace is constructed."*

I have used the term "peacemaking" here, since it is well established. Unfortunately, the verb "make" may imply that peace is laid out and constructed, as a house is planned and put up brick by brick, a bridge engineered, or a highway designed and built. This implication is especially seductive in this age when society is generally seen as man-made (rather than as having evolved) and when many accept the illusion that communities can be centrally planned and managed.

But peace is not made as one constructs a bridge. Peace emerges from the balancing of individual mental fields. What we honestly believe, actually want, truly are willing to get, or are capable of achieving is unknown to others. And perhaps only partially to ourselves. Nonetheless, only we can make best use of the information available to us to justly satisfy our interests. Therefore, for us or anyone else to try to construct in the abstract a peace involving us is foolhardy. We will make only an uncertain peace, forestall the necessary trial and error balancing, and perhaps even create greater conflict later. Peace is an outcome of balancing among the parties involved. At best, peacemaking eases the process.

Misunderstanding 3: *"It takes two to make violence and war, but one to make peace."*

Pacifists believe that violence and war cannot occur if people will lay down their arms and refuse to fight. If, of course, all parties do this, then by definition no violence can occur. But, the pacifist belief that freedom from violence is achieved by one side refusing to use violence, or submitting to the other, ignores unilateral violence. If in an argument the other person becomes belligerent, we can refuse to fight. We can try to calm the other, humor them, and pretend to agree with them. But they may still beat us up. Threatened by another state, our leaders may try to avoid war by accepting its demands. The result may be enslavement, systematic executions, and the elimination of leaders and "undesirables." In other words, to avoid violent conflict we might submit to the far greater unilateral violence of a tyrannical conqueror.

It is true that in some conflict situations, nonviolence may be an effective strategy for waging conflict, as in the successful Black civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s, or the civil disobedience movement for Indian independence from Britain begun by Mahatma Gandhi in 1922. Moreover, in some other situations, refusal to fight may avoid

unnecessary escalation and ease peacekeeping. However, there are also situations, especially involving tyrants, despots, and other such oppressors, in which freedom from violence or a satisfactory resolution of a dispute are not bought by trying to escape violence. But one can make a down payment on such a peace by accepting the possibility of violence and by a willingness to meet violent aggression in kind, if necessary.

CHAPTER 28

The Peacekeeping Principle

And it is a maxim not to be despised
'Though peace be made,
yet it's interest that keeps peace.

—Cromwell, Speech to Parliament, 1654

Born out of conflict, peace is a new social contract based on a new balance of powers. But peace eventually ages and, and overcome by change in this balance, dies as it originated, in conflict. And of its life, cooperative and productive, only that experience, will remain.

Thus the question: how to assure peace a long and healthy life, and to minimize the burden of its inevitable passing. The Peacekeeping Principle underlies the answers. It is this.

Peace depends on keeping expectations and power aligned.

Its subprinciples are given in Table 28.1, and will be discussed in order.

Peacekeeping Subprinciple 1: Start From The Existing Balance Of Powers.

We should begin with things as they are, the here and now, not some past situation or some future hope. But this assumes knowledge of what is presently important for keeping the peace. And this requires understanding of the nature and basis of peace.

It will not help, and may even contribute to conflict and violence if we simply see peace as the absence of any conflict behavior; and peacekeeping as avoiding any provocative, assertive, aggravating, contentious, antagonistic, or hostile behavior—in short, any behavior that may upset another. The first rule is:

1. *Understand peace.* The principles presented in this book provide a relevant understanding of peace. To review, each of us is an individual (The First Master Principle); each group to which we belong is unique. We come to live together in all our individuality and subjectivity through a trial and error process of learning to read each other's field of expression (The Communication Principle), and of mutual adjustment to what each can do, wants to do, and is willing to do. The noise of this adjustment is conflict (The Conflict Principle), out of which mutually reliable expectations are developed.

Table 28.1. Peacekeeping Subprinciples and Rules

Subprinciples	Rules
Start from the Existing Balance of Powers	Understand peace Know what kind of peace Recognize the interdependence of expectations Keep in view the balance of powers
Guard the Balance of Powers	At least maintain relevant powers At least maintain relative powers
Reduce Any Gap Between Expectations and Power	Reform the Balance of powers Negotiate incremental changes in espectations Adopt tacit incremental changes in expectations
Accept Some Conflict Now	Vent pressure for change in expectations Allow necessary mutual adjustments
Reduce the Probability of Successful Violence	Seek nonviolent alternatives Avoid rewarding violence

These expectations underlie interpersonal and social order, cooperation, and harmony. For reliable expectations enable us to achieve our interests, and satisfy our needs. A structure of expectations is, then, a reliable ordering of expectations to which individuals have implicitly or explicitly agreed. It may be composed of laws and norms, of contracts and understandings. It defines how each will react to the other's behavior. And it reflects the most acceptable balance among the ICWs involved. This is the balance of powers, which supports the structure of expectations. For as long as expectations are aligned with it, those involved have an interest in maintaining the associated order (The Cooperation Principle).

But this balance is set at a moment in time. Its components will change, but unequally. Expectations have the psychological inertia of habits and norms, while ICWs can change rapidly. A gap thus may develop between what others expect of us and what we

ourselves want to do, can do, and are willing to do. In such circumstances, a strain develops, a growing instability in associated relationships, a disposition towards a breakdown of expectations, conflict, and the development of a new structure of expectations (The Gap Principle).

Peace is a structure of expectations, a social contract (The Second, Third, and Fourth Master Principles). Peace will be kept so long as all of us involved, for whatever reason, find it in all our intersecting ICWs to do so. Thus, these additional rules follow.

2. *Know what kind of peace*. Peacekeeping must have in mind a specific peace—a particular structure of expectations. If we want to keep the peace, therefore, we should know what specific structure of expectations we want to maintain. Is it a marriage, the harmony of the household, or the division of household tasks? Is it a constitution, the laws regulating conservation, or the rights of the press? Is it multilateral trade arrangements, a security treaty with an ally, or the status quo in the Middle East? Peacekeeping must be shaped and fitted to the structure of expectations of concern.

There is another aspect to knowing what kind of peace. There are not only different structures of peace, but also different levels of peace. Does one want to avoid all conflict? Intense nonviolent conflict (yelling, extreme words, boycotts, sanctions)? Violence? Or just extreme violence (injuring another, revolutions, war)? The significance of this question is that different levels of peace are interrelated, and trying to keep the peace at one level may destroy it at another. Trying to avoid all conflict may put a lid on adjustment, cause pressure for change to build up, and risk an outbreak of violence. Indeed, avoiding war in a particular situation may require a willingness to engage in low-level violence. As will be discussed below, therefore, one peacekeeping subprinciple is to accept some conflict now in order to avoid more intense conflict later.

3. *Recognize the interdependence of expectations.* While we must keep specific expectations in mind when trying to keep the peace, we also should recognize that structures of expectations are interdependent. Our relations with others are a totality, a whole that divides into overlapping and nested structures. Our efforts to keep one kind of peace may spill over onto other kinds of peace, perhaps even creating conflict. Our accommodations on the job to keep peace with our boss, such as working overtime, may cause family quarrels; or a government's desire to avoid an open clash with strikers may communicate weakness and encourage a general rebellion. Therefore, while we must have a certain peace in view, we should also take into account the effect of our peacekeeping measures on other kinds and levels of peace. By avoiding one fight, we may create two.

4. *Keep in view the balance of powers.* Basic to a specific peace is its associated mutual balance of ICWs. How this balance changes will increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict. Starting from the existing balance of powers, therefore, we must have a sense for the nature of this balance and any changes in it.

Particularly, we should assess the relevant change in powers. Has there been a change in the specific interests involved in a structure of expectations? Have relevant capabilities altered? Has the will of one or more parties changed? For example, through diverse conflicts and crises during the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States and Soviet Union developed a balance of powers and associated understandings and treaties that allowed them to coexist with a minimal danger of war. However, for a number of reasons (such as the Vietnam War, generational turnover, fear of nuclear weapons, and a tactical Soviet emphasis on peaceful coexistence) the interests of Americans then shifted from primarily opposing Soviet expansionism to avoiding nuclear war. American capability to fight a war declined, and the will to oppose communism weakened.

During this time, Soviet rulers continued to pursue their primary aim of a Soviet-led, global communist victory and continued to increase her military capability to support this goal. Much change therefore occurred in the Soviet-American balance of powers relevant to the possibility of a Soviet-American war. This dangerous imbalance was not righted until Ronald Reagan became President. He strengthened American conventional and nuclear capability, initiated the development of a nuclear missile shield (popularly known as "Star Wars"), and displayed firm resolution in confronting Soviet power. This did much, not only to make a Soviet-American war more unlikely, but as it became obvious to Soviet rulers that they could not compete economically and militarily with the U.S., it led to the collapse of the whole communist system.

Also, we must not only assess what is the relevant change in powers, but also what changes we can make. Change in the ICW of one party may be offset by changes in the other. Through disarmament or arms control treaties, the leaders of two states may reduce the number of their weapons and hold constant their relative quality. Leaders also may mutually increase their armaments, with one maintaining a rough superiority. In the case of the United States and Soviet Union, from the late 1960s to the late 1970s the former was in effect unilaterally disarming while the latter engaged in a rapid build-up. Thus, in relative terms, the disparity in military capability during this period changed more rapidly than would be clear from looking at the capabilities of one side alone.

Peacekeeping Subprinciple 2: Guard The Balance Of Powers.

A particular balance of powers is essential to its associated peace. This balance is a matter of what psychological relationships have developed between individuals or groups. Knowing or sensing this balance is one aspect of peacekeeping. Maintaining this balance is another. Two rules apply here.

1. *At least maintain relevant powers.*

2. *At least maintain relative powers.*

We should know what ICWs are relevant to a specific peace; and their relative balance. At the very least, then, the relative balance of the relevant powers should be maintained

to keep the peace. This, however, may be a temporary effort until any significant gap that has developed between expectations and powers can be lessened.

For example, peace and harmony in a family may have been established (The Conflict Helix) through years of living in the same neighborhood (allowing stable friendships to develop) and evolving a satisfactory balance between housework, recreation, outside employment, and the family budget. Maintaining this peace, were this the dominant goal, would then mean avoiding any radical changes that would significantly alter what family members want, can do, and will do. It probably would mean staying in a neighborhood, with no radical change in job (such as working night shifts, which could require new family adjustments), keeping relatively the same division of labor (such as the wife not starting a separate career), and avoiding relatives moving in.

Certainly, such changes may be desirable and the resulting conflict a worthwhile adjustment. I do not argue in the abstract for peacekeeping above all, or even as a major goal. We have many interests to satisfy. And the weight peacekeeping should be given against, say, starting a new career, depends on our values and judgment. Nonetheless, watching the balance of powers helps us to better manage our life. On this, a third rule is important.

3. *Watch the status quo challenger.* The status quo is the core of any peace. It defines rights and obligations—who gets what from whom—and is based on a particular balance of powers.

Now, a party to the balance may not like or want the status quo, but accepted it because they lacked the power to get more. They may be dissatisfied, however, and simply be waiting for a favorable change in ICWs to challenge the status quo. Because status quo issues are so crucial, any conflict over these issues can result in intense violence and war (The Violence and War Principles). Therefore, it is vital to recognize a status quo challenger (whether it is a person who wants our mate, job, or status; or a country such as Islamofascist Iran); and to know the particular balance that maintains the status quo against the challenger. Usually a status quo is stable when the challenger is weaker in power, which, it will be recalled, equals interests x capabilities x will. Peacekeeping is then a matter of maintaining the relative power of those who support the status quo.

For example, the status quo in Europe so bloodily fixed by World War I and the 1919 Versailles Treaty depended on maintaining a politically and militarily strong Great Britain and France, and a relatively weak Germany. This was bitterly resented by many Germans. So when Hitler took power in 1933 and began to rearm, and when Britain and France subsequently showed confused interests and a weakness of will in keeping the status quo by appeasing Hitler's territorial demands, the balance of powers clearly shifted toward the challenger. The status quo became ripe for disruption, the situation ripe for war, which duly broke out in 1939.

4. *Be alert to warning signals.* Often we need not be a social scientist or seasoned observer to recognize that a balance of powers and expectations is becoming unaligned. We are all familiar with the signs: tension, growing hostility, insecurity, dissatisfaction, and irritability. These are atmospherics whose precise source may be obscure and do not consist of any specific behavior. Something is wrong, things are not right in our relations with another, and often we cannot put our finger on it.

Tension, insecurity about another, growing dissatisfaction and the like, usually reflect a growing gap between our balance of powers and a central structure of expectations. These feelings tell us that a significant gap exists.

We must not try to avoid tension or hostility, nor should we treat such symptoms directly; rather we must try to seek their source. What expectations or status quo are involved? Has there been a relative change in relevant interests? Have associated relative capabilities shifted? Is the will to maintain expectations still there? Perhaps we are no longer interested in doing household chores or commuting to and from work three hours a day. Possibly the middle class is no longer willing to shoulder the burden of inflation and taxes. Maybe a new regime believes that it can now realize its historic national goal of extending its border to the ocean.

Or, a wife could have "outgrown" her husband intellectually through her career. Shifting populations and upward mobility may have weakened the power base of a political machine. A change in relative military capability may have emboldened the status quo challenger. Conceivably, a husband may have lost that will-to-work and career ambition that his wife had admired. Members of a radical political movement may no longer be determined to risk imprisonment and death to achieve their revolutionary aims. Or a state's leaders may no longer have the will to do what is necessary for the their country's defense.

Peacekeeping Subprinciple 3: Reduce Any Gap Between Power and Expectations.

If a particular balance of powers and specific expectations get out of alignment, it is likely that conflict will occur. To reduce this risk, if indeed we want to do so, four rules are helpful.

1. *Reform the balance of powers.* If we can locate the relative ICWs that are unbalanced, then we can try to recover the original balance. Or, if it is a matter of the other having changed, we might make compensating changes in what we want, can, and will do.

2. *Negotiate incremental changes in expectations.* It may be easier to reduce a gap between expectations and power by appropriately changing expectations. Contracts can be redrawn, understandings discussed and redefined, and practices altered. Diplomacy is the art of keeping international expectations in tune with the changing balance of

powers among states. In interpersonal and social relations as well, we all can be diplomats.

3. *Adopt tacit changes in expectations.* Negotiating changes in expectations requires the agreement of all the parties involved, and is difficult to achieve in the absence of conflict (which sharpens interests and communicates intent and resolution). Sometimes, however, it is in our power to make gap-reducing, unilateral changes in a structure of expectations. If the other tacitly agrees by not opposing or adopting the changes in their own behavior, then an adjustment in expectations has been accomplished.

Much of the change in parents' expectations that occur as children grow into adults involves the parents allowing rules that the children have outgrown to fall into disuse— violated without notice. On the law books of every American city and state government are old laws no longer enforced, such as one requiring that all commercial businesses be closed on Sunday, or another making kissing in the public park punishable by thirty-days in jail They have been annulled in effect without being brought before a city council or state legislature for that purpose, which probably would have then brought out the zealots to demonstrate and argue their case for the continuation of these laws.

Peacekeeping Subprinciple 4: Accept Some Conflict Now.

Peace occurs along many dimensions and at many levels. There may be peace over a status quo while there is an intense dispute over some practice, such as who is responsible for replacing the toilet paper in the bathroom, an income reporting law for Congressmen, or landing rights for foreign airlines. There may be a peace from violence while lower-level conflict rages, with diplomatic and economic sanctions employed, warnings, threats, and accusations exchanged, but no seeming likelihood of the dispute becoming a war. Part of the problem of peacekeeping is knowing what peace is worth preserving and at what level, as the first subprinciple points out.

The recognition of this complexity of peace is a prerequisite to understanding how to use conflict, violence, and war to keep the peace. This is a notion that some readers may find difficult to grasp, but my meaning can be brought out by some analogies with the natural world.

First, consider how foresters create controlled forest fires to burn off competing underbrush, help the germination of new trees, and protect the forest against more severe fire. Fire to fight fire. Second, think of the medical procedure of inoculation, by which physicians introduce into the body weakened forms of disease producing viruses or bacteria in order to strengthen the body's defenses against the disease. Disease to fight disease. Finally, there is the well-known fact that herds of wild deer that are overcrowding food supplies are often protected against mass starvation by systematically killing a proportion of the herd. Killing to prevent greater death.

To fight something by purposely introducing that which one wants to avoid certainly is paradoxical, at first thought. Many readers may struggle to accept that to fight the

scourge of war – to wage peace - may well require vigorous prosecution of lower-level conflicts, sometimes even, involving violence, in order to maintain the greater peace. Here I am tempted to use another well-known analogy, that of the safety valve. But lower-level conflict does more than simply allow pressure to escape. It also enables a readjustment of expectations and power. Thus, accepting some conflict now produces the needed, continual adjustments to change in a relationship, and thereby prevents the emergence of a large gap that by its size and the adjustment required can break down into much more extreme conflict and violence.

Enabling such continual adjustments is one of the marvels of the exchange society and liberal democratic political system. Free societies are characterized by a diversity of relationships and by rapid change. But freedom also creates a variety of conflicts between individuals and groups. Were these conflicts prevented by a third party such as government, then as the mutual powers of individuals and groups push against outmoded expectations, the inevitable changes would eventually create wide scale disorder, rebellion, and internal war, as in nondemocratic societies. But the freedom of people to conflict brings about the necessary adjustments incrementally; and the prevalence of cross-pressures dampens any tendency for these conflicts to escalate (The Polarity and Freedom Principles).

The reader may now appreciate how low-level conflict can help to prevent more intense confrontations, but may still find it hard to accept that limited war may prevent a large scale or more general war. A war to keep the peace? It is always a difficult decision to make. But it is a fact that social calculations are often painful and difficult. We are often caught between two undesirable alternatives. Do we accept some pain or loss now to forestall more grief later; or do we avoid the pain now because the possibly greater future grief is only a probability and may not occur.

I do not argue that such decisions can ever be easy, but I do maintain that such choices are part of the warp and woof of the human experience, so long as it is the case that in local, national, and international societies, there are individuals and groups seeking change. If such parties challenge the status quo in minor ways and are not resisted (but are appeased) then this may invite a wholesale attack later. Such resistance is part of maintaining one's reputation for power—one's credibility (The Power Principle). Thus, the United States fought a war in Vietnam mainly to maintain the credibility of (1) American alliance and treaty commitments, and (2) of communist containment as the paramount objective of American foreign policy. American leaders believed that the loss of this credibility would increase the risk of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Simplifying to essentials, the Vietnam War largely was fought by Americans to maintain a stable nuclear peace (whether they were in fact correct in the particular application of this policy is beside the point here).

Surely, the principle of fighting now to avoid a bigger conflict later does take precedence over other peacekeeping principles. There is a time for reforming the balance of powers, a time for tacitly adopting changes in expectations, and a time for confrontation. Perhaps, as some argue, the United States should have let the North and South

Vietnamese fight it out themselves. (But this would have meant the South fighting alone versus the North heavily supplied and helped by the Soviet Union and China) What is timely and appropriate is, however, a matter of context and good sense. The only point made here is that a larger future peace may require the acceptance of some conflict, violence, or war now.

Two rules sum this up.

1. *Vent pressure for change in expectations.* Pressure for change increases with a growing gap between expectations and power. This pressure can be reduced before it reaches dangerous levels through lower level conflict.

2. *Allow necessary mutual readjustment.* It is often better to let conflict take its course, for the parties to work out their own adjustments, than to impose an artificial peace simply in order to avoid conflict. This applies to family and social relations just as much as to international relations. And in all cases, peacekeeping is contextual. As I have stated above, there are occasions when a conflict is resolved best by simple separation of the parties. If a dispute is a spontaneous, emotional episode, as between strangers bumping each other on the sidewalk, or two opposing football linesmen coming to blows, then we can understand that they are not working out basic expectations and separation is appropriate. Moreover, if two intermingled racial-cultural groups are engaging in protracted conflict over basic values and beliefs, then territorial separation also may be the best solution. Otherwise, if the parties to a conflict are seriously engaged in trying to settle their differences, then it is best to let the conflict run its course.

Peacekeeping Subprinciple 5: Reduce The Probability of Successful Violence.

Successful violence breeds more violence. If violence produces what we want, this not only encourages us to use this successful method again, but also encourages others to do likewise. Not only will this increase the general level of violence, but we may also find that our own interests are defeated by others using violence more effectively against us.

Two rules help us avoid violence.

1. *Seek nonviolent alternatives.* The reader will appreciate that I do not urge pacifism. My position is that, sometimes, violent aggression can only be met in kind, in order to defend higher values than peace, such as family, freedom, and dignity. But I also maintain that there are times when violence is unnecessary, and indeed, counterproductive in pursuit of a stable peace. I have already discussed under the Peacemaking Principles many nonviolent alternatives, such as separation and nonviolent resistance, which may better secure a stable peace, in some contexts.

2. *Avoid rewarding violence.* While nonviolent alternatives may be desirable, these should not reward the instigator of violence. For this simply encourages more demands.

Violence should be avoided, and rewarding of violence especially so. But if this is not possible, then violence may have to be met by strong and swift counteraction, as when a community suppresses the violence of criminals through police action when other means fail.

These, then, are five subprinciples of peacekeeping. We should know and start from things as they are, not from ideals or hopes. We should guard what balance of powers exists, and reduce any gap between expectations and power. But, in order to do this we may have to accept some conflict now. In any case, we must try not to reward violence.

So far, I have discussed making and keeping peace. My final concern is fostering peace, which I will consider after attending to some possible misunderstandings.

Misunderstanding 1: *"Avoiding conflict keeps the peace."*

This is true by definition—at one level of peace and regarding a specific structure of expectations. But peace is complex and conflict involves many levels of behavior. Avoiding nonviolent conflict may actually encourage violence. We may buy peace now and pay later in blood. Peacekeeping is partly a matter of relation and proportion: that between the present and future, between various kinds of peace, and various levels of conflict.

Misunderstanding 2: *"Preparing for war makes war."*

That armaments cause war is a popular but false, belief. From 1840 to 1941, there were twelve major arms races, only five of which ended in war. In fact, preparing for war may be the best way to keep the peace, as a Status Quo Power maintains peace through its superiority. Armaments and war preparations are either aspects of a balance of powers that supports a peaceful order—in this case, they contribute to peace—or they manifest a growing gap between expectations and power. Whichever depends on the situation of conflict. And it is this situation that determines whether armaments promote peace or war.

As mentioned previously, for example, while the Soviet Union engaged in an arms drive in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States in general had been unilaterally disarming during the late 1960s and up to the late 1970s. A clear dominance in American military power over the Soviet Union was then lost, and this ultimately raised, not lowered, the risk of a third world war. What eventually lowered this risk were President Reagan's rearmament, firm resolution, and credibility in the 1980s.

Misunderstanding 3: *"Peacekeeping demands ignoring or avoiding power."*

Only total submission to others lets us keep the peace by ignoring or avoiding power. If, however, we want to assert some interests, maintain or enhance our self-esteem, and protect our freedom, then confrontation is inevitable. For we achieve our own interests by working out adjustments with others—a matter of balancing our various powers. This

does not mean that we always or even often use force or coercion, for we have exchange, authoritative, intellectual, altruistic, and manipulative powers at our disposal (The Power Principle). Peacekeeping depends on understanding power and its proper, proportional use.

CHAPTER 29

The Peacefostering Principle

There is nothing permanent except change

—Heraclitus.

We can make peace. And we can try to keep it. But to foster peace is our primary goal. As illustrated in Figure 29.1, this means treating not a specific conflict and its resolution, but the whole ecology of peace: the general causes and conditions that produce and aggravate conflict and inhibit peace, as well as peacekeeping and peacemaking. Peacefostering means nurturing a healthy environment within which a happy, pervasive, and durable peace can evolve and flourish. It is encouraging the conflict helix.

The principle is this:

Figure 29.1
Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Peacefostering
and the Conflict Helix

Freeing adjustment to change fosters peace.

Change creates conflict, violence, and war. Specifically, change in our ICWs—interests (goals, purposes, aims, wants, desires, means), capabilities (resources, abilities, skills, knowledge, qualifications), and will (resolution, determination, dedication, devotion, persistence, fortitude, courage)—produces a gap between our structure of expectations involving others and our associated balance of powers (The Gap Principle). This gap is a measure of dissatisfaction with prevailing understandings, rights, benefits, or obligations. It is a pressure towards new expectations that are more in accord with what we and others want, can do, and will do.

The roots of peace lie in expectations, perceptions, and ICWs.

The more the growth and adjustments among these roots are facilitated through accepted procedures: the more these adjustments can be institutionalized, and thus embedded in a larger framework of agreements; and the more lower level conflict can create incremental adjustments; then the more likely that peace, especially nonviolent peace, will develop.

This understanding is formalized in the Peacefostering Principle and six subprinciples in Table 29.1. Each subprinciple will be considered in turn.

Peacefostering Subprinciple 1: Expect Conflict As Normal.

Essential to developing the conditions for more peace and harmony is the recognition that conflict is a normal process of communication and adjustment among human beings. It is inevitable, to a greater or lesser degree. Avoiding all conflict, unless one is a hermit or totally submissive to others, eventually creates more severe conflict later. Rather, our aim should be to minimize the intensity of conflict and to eliminate its unwanted side effects. We can do this by observing the following rules:

1. *Anticipate conflict.* If we expect conflict, then we can prepare for it. And lay the conditions for an easier peace. Various means to this end are organized and focused by the later peacefostering subprinciples listed below. Appropriate here, however, are two additional rules.

2. *Develop a disposition to compromise.* Compromise facilitates exchange and makes adjustments more acceptable. Both parties gain. But there is something more significant than just willingness to compromise, and thus the emphasis here is on a disposition, or an active leaning towards. Part of this disposition is the attitude "I want to find middle ground," but a part also is a perspective on others. It is an appreciation that we are all individuals who are seeking, through a subjective fog, to understand the world, to find dignity, to enhance our self-esteem, and to satisfy our needs. It is a recognition of our fallibility and the fact that truth, beauty, and justice are a matter of personal perspective. It is an understanding of the Personal Principles as presented in Part I.

Table 29.1. Peacefostering Subprinciples and Rules

Subprinciples	Rules
Expect Conflict As Normal	Anticipate conflict
	Develop an attitude of compromise
	Seek realistic grounds
Subject Recurring Issues To Fair Decision Rules	Make fair rules
	Define the four Ws
	Follow the four Cs
	Reward adherence
	Assure social approval or disapproval
Institutionalize Adjustment Procedures	Institutionalize consensus building
	Institutionalize confrontations of perceptions, expectations, and interests
	Institutionalize a test of strength
	Institutionalize settlement procedures
Promote Cross-pressures	Encourage diversity of interests
	Enable mobility
Develop Overriding Goals and Loyalties	Link self-esteem to a larger group
	Develop a common superordinate goal
Increase and Assure Freedom	Foster self-determination, sovereignty, and formal equality
	Decentralize power
	Guarantee basic rights

There is no inconsistency in believing ourselves right, defining our beliefs, and asserting our ethics, while at the same time realizing that we may be wrong. Belief in an absolute truth or justice that cannot be wrong has fueled the most violent upheavals in history, and now drives the Islamofascist enemies of freedom. The change from "You are wrong" to "You may be right" reduces the intensity of many a conflict.

To be clear, this does not mean that we should compromise all the time, suffer exploitation, or appease aggression. Nor should we split unreasonable demands down the middle. A disposition to compromise is simply a willingness to find common ground and a mutually beneficial exchange if the situation warrants.

3. *Seek realistic grounds.* An increasingly sound and stable peace will grow out of our interactions and adjustments with others if we make mutually realistic accommodations. That is, our agreements, understandings, and the like, should not be artificial or forced. A realistic peace is one built on the true ICWs of those involved. It represents the actual balance between the parties and will be kept so long as this balance is congruent with expectations. In contrast, an unrealistic peace is one forced from the outside, or constructed outside of a process of adjustment (as is a marriage contract establishing the obligation and rights of newlyweds yet to experience living together). Unrealistic peace is short lived. And its passing is often marked by intense conflict.

Peacefostering Subprinciple 2: Subject Recurring Issues to Fair Decision Rules.

There are often disputes that will continually crop up, such as among children over television programs, among unions seeking new members, or among states concerning a common border. Since the disputes recur, rules that will aid deciding who gets or does what can be determined.

For example, as disputes between my two daughters grew in intensity and regularity (over whose turn to do the dishes and a variety of other chores, take a bath first, or select a television program), Grace and I devised a system that the girls accepted and which soon markedly reduced their conflicts. It was keyed to who took her daily bath first. We asked them to alternate who went first each week. Then we suggested a schedule: bath first then did the dishes, set the table, got first choice of television programs, etc; bath second fed the cats, got the newspaper, and so on. Moreover, whenever an unusual dispute arose between the girls, say over who could use the telephone first, we often settled it by asking who took her bath first.

Of course, there were issues we could not subject to this system (such as one reacting to a perceived insult from the other) and had to leave for them to work out. But those disputes and potential issues the system did cover were resolved quickly, and after several months the girls followed the system automatically, with little conflict. It will be seen that this system exemplified five decision rules for easing recurring conflict that are as applicable to nations as they are to schoolgirl sisters.

1. *Make fair rules.* The rules should not be biased against any interest. Our "who takes a bath first?" system was completely fair, and seen as such by the girls. For every Sunday, without fail, the girls changed the bath schedule and the resulting allocation of duties and rights. Moreover, when we settled an odd dispute, it was not in the name of Dawn or Lei (unless one was clearly deserving or at fault and both knew it), but in terms of who bathed first, and each had the same chance to be first.

This is the virtue of settling minor issues by tossing a coin. Each has the same chance to win, so who gets what is seen as an unbiased decision rule.

2. *Define the four Ws.* The Ws are Who, What, When and Where. That is, the rules should be as specific as possible to avoid replacing one dispute with another, this time over what the rules themselves mean.

3. *Follow the four Cs.* These are Communication, Consistency, Credibility, and Correction. Rules always should be clear and well-communicated to those who are subject to them. Whether the rules are comprehended can be determined by asking those to whom the rules apply to give their understanding of them. The rules should be consistently applied. Rules erratically used are worse than no rules, for they confuse, tend to aggravate a conflict situation, and themselves create conflicts over the rules ("Well, I had to do it and now he doesn't want to!").

Rules should be also credible. That is, the rules should seem workable so that the parties involved will follow them. Moreover, if the rules are backed by sanctions these should be realistic ones that clearly will be applied if the rules are violated. Moreover, the correction (sanctions) should invariably and quickly follow violation of the rules. When Grace and I instituted our bath first system for our girls, we posted the duties and benefits associated with taking their bath first or second. We made sure they understood these, and then applied the system without fail. It was a credible system (to them, since it worked) and if one or the other tried to bypass the system, we immediately reasserted the rule.

4. *Reward Adherence.* While deviations from rules are often sanctioned, of even greater importance (and this is why it is brought out as a separate rule) is rewarding adherence. Rules obeyed only for fear of the consequences of disobedience create a coercive order, and a potentially violent one (The Trisocial Principle).

Rules should be positive: people follow them because they make sense (intellectual power), are right (authoritative power), or rewarding (bargaining power). One way to assure that rules are positive is to reward adherence. This does not necessarily mean giving candy or its adult equivalent, for rewards vary. It could be an occasional honest compliment, or some special award for, say, consistently following the rules for a month.

5. *Assure social approval or disapproval.* Peer groups and social groups are of special significance in maintaining rules. If rules are a part of a system of relations, and important people approve the rules and wish to see them followed, then social approval or disapproval will follow their obedience or disobedience. How we look in the eyes of important people is of great concern to us all. How we look in the eyes of important others is of great concern to us all. Rules that utilize this social need have a special force behind them.

Peacefostering Subprinciple 3: Institutionalize Adjustment Procedures

To institutionalize means more than just setting up an organization. It means developing norms (rules that are followed because they are felt to be right or proper, such as the norm of due process). It means establishing roles—authoritative positions with a

responsibility for doing certain things (such as the role of mediator, conciliator, or lawyer). It means developing particular procedures to be followed in making adjustments, as in suing a person or in collective bargaining. And it means creating organizations that embody these norms and roles and have the task of applying these procedures, such as a court, labor relations board, family counseling service, or election commission. Four rules help guide this institutionalization.

1. *Institutionalize consensus building.* There should be some means of finding or establishing common denominators among the diversity of individuals. Consensus building is a means of binding people together in spite of their disagreements. It may be an institutionalized process of consultation among all interested parties to a decision, a neighborhood or town meeting held every first Thursday of each month, a regular family meeting to discuss problems, or a multilateral commission among allies. It is a way of keeping communication open, avoiding misperception and misunderstanding, and giving people a feeling of having at least participated in a decision in which they may have some stake.

A central institution for consensus building across the diversity of American national society is the two-party political system. Republicans and Democrats both strive to build consensus among their multiple factions and diverse state and local organizations, to formalize this consensus in a national party platform and then personalize it through their nomination for President of the United States. While there are two parties competitively opposing each other, each acts as a broker seeking through various compromises to smooth over internal disagreements and tap what it perceives as the national mood. In doing this, each also works toward the ideological center. For sure, the platform and nominees of each party represent different views on and different solutions to current national problems, but they nonetheless reflect a national consensus on the boundaries within which the views and solutions should fall.

2. *Institutionalize confrontation of perceptions, expectations, and interests.* Conflict is a process of adjustment, which itself can be subject to procedures to contain and regularize conflict behavior and ensure a fair outcome. A judicial system is such an institutionalization: the adversarial relationship between defense and prosecution lawyers, the systematic presentation and questioning of evidence and witnesses in court, the intermediary role of the judge, and the verdict of the jury, all serve to regulate confrontation and nonviolently resolve conflict that could otherwise lead to violence among neighbors, families, and groups.

The formal debate is another type of institutionalized conflict over beliefs or ideas. Collective bargaining has also become institutionalized, and the procedures union and management must go through to work out their conflict and a new contract are now defined by law and regulated. And then, there is the formal duel. It is an institutionalized fight, often to the death, which protects friends and family from being involved, and serves to establish what conditions will lead to a duel (such as an insult to honor).

3. *Institutionalize a test of strength.* Capability and will are difficult to measure and assert in the abstract. There is much room for ambiguity, and misjudgment. Indeed, a central function of conflict, seen most clearly in violence, is to settle the question: "Whose capability is greater, and whose will stronger?"

When interests in society become polarized and the stakes involve the most fundamental values, there is no institutionalized replacement for revolution or war. War is and will remain the ultimate test of strength. However, even the process of fighting a war has through the ages developed rules and procedures, such as in declaring war, the protection of civilians, the role of neutrals, the immorality of certain weapons, and the treatment of prisoners. That these are often violated makes them rules no less, and even their violators will often show their recognition of the rules by trying to excuse their violation.

As long as the values involved are not critical and interests are unpolarized, however, tests of strength can be institutionalized. That is, the determination of who is more capable and resolute can be governed by procedures, overseen by those given that responsibility, and the winner certified in some manner. The conflict can be turned into a contest, like a football or baseball game, except that the outcome does not establish which team is better, but a new social contract.

Strikes by workers and their bosses' attempts to suppress such strikes have caused much social violence, with many injuries, and, occasionally, deaths. Yet the strike as a test of strength is now institutionalized as a step within a process of collective bargaining governed by certain laws. The strike is still permitted, but only after certain conditions required by law have been satisfied (such as a vote among union members). As a result, the strike today is usually nonviolent, rarely upsets the community (except when major industries or services are involved), and is commonplace.

Perhaps the most widely used and valuable decision-making procedure is the vote. It decides which alternative or candidate will win. But this should not obscure the test of strength involved. In social conflict, numbers of supporters are a critical index of capability, and their willingness to articulate their support, fight on one side or the other, man the barricades, and suffer injury or death, certainly measures their resolution. Voting simply enables social issues to be decided by counting supporters on each side to begin with, while bypassing the necessity to physically fight it out. It is an institutionalized test of strength: the ballot, and not the bullet, determines who is stronger or which idea is better.

Democracy is the institutionalization of free and fair voting, a nonviolent system for openly deciding who will govern and what conflicting policies will win. One way of institutionalizing adjustment procedures, therefore, is to democratize them.

4. *Institutionalize settlement procedures.* The outcome of a conflict is a decision, agreement, and contract. The final determination of this outcome, aside from the confrontation and tests of strength involved, can itself be subject to procedures and

institutionalized. Thus, establishing the right to vote on issues or competing candidates not only formalizes confrontation, but also establishes a settlement procedure. Other institutionalized settlement procedures are mediation and conciliation. So is the jury system for deciding legal cases, and the Supreme Court for deciding disputes over the meaning and applicability of the law. And so are procedures for settling grievances in an organization. In sum, the various aspects and phases of conflict can be institutionalized in order to avoid excessive conflict, while facilitating the adjustments necessary to achieve a more satisfactory social contract.

In the process of growth, all societies naturally evolve institutions for peacefully rebalancing power. As the society becomes more complex in its division of labor, size, and diversity of groups, many different institutionalized adjustment procedures develop. The point here is not to review these, but to emphasize that peace can be furthered by being aware of such a capability, making use of what institutions exist, and adopting new institutions to recurring conflict situations. Peacefostering is partly a process of extending such institutions.

Peacefostering Subprinciple 4: Promote Cross-Pressures

The institutionalization of conflict works most effectively when interests are diverse, the issues non-vital. When a society is polarized, all the formal routes for managing and deciding conflicts may break down, and raw violence—the final arbiter—may take their place (The Polarity Principle). Such dangerous polarization can be prevented by promoting cross-pressures, which by encouraging the diversity of interests creates a plurality of overlapping and autonomous groups and crosscutting ties among groups and individuals. This is what encouraging civic society means.

Moreover, mobility must be possible. Individuals should be free to change status, job, and residence. To move up, down, or sideways. High positions and great wealth, power (authority), or prestige should not be foreclosed by virtue of unchangeable characteristics (race, sex, family background, or ethnic group).

The two rules are:

1. *Encourage a diversity of interests.*

2. *Enable mobility.*

Peacefostering Subprinciple 5: Develop Overriding Goals And Loyalties.

In all our uniqueness and subjectivity, we still are gregarious; we need human companionship and to be part of a group. We also need to be respected and admired by people who are important to us. In other words, the rule is:

1. *Link self-esteem to a larger group.* This is done by developing a feeling of group belonging—a sense of "we." What the group loses, we feel we have lost ourselves. A

group achievement is our achievement and we feel proud, as we do when our football or basketball team is victorious. And we feel a special affinity for other group members. As a result, we will tend to avoid overt conflict that is scorned or disapproved by the group. And especially, we will tend to avoid conflict that can endanger or compromise the group.

Along these lines, another rule is helpful.

2. *Develop a common superordinate goal.* When people work towards an important common goal, they are less inclined to let conflict occur between them that might defeat their purpose. If this goal is also that of a group they identify with, then it is an even stronger inhibitor of conflict.

While group loyalty and group goals are potent forces towards peace within a group, this group "nationalism" can increase intergroup conflict. But so long as individuals are free to move among groups, groups are free to form and dissolve, and groups and individuals are free to form diverse relations, then group loyalty and group goals should, in fact, lead to an overall decrease in violence in the larger society (The Freedom Principle).

Peacefostering Subprinciple 6: Increase And Assure Freedom

I have already said much about the function, and role of individual and group freedom in conflict, violence, and peace (The Freedom Principle, Field, Exchange, and War Principles). What is most relevant here involves three rules.

1. *Foster self-determination, sovereignty, and formal equality.* Individuals and groups should be free to determine and pursue their own interests. They should be sovereign over their own affairs and property and free from external regulation and intervention consistent with the general laws and constitution of a state . And they should be equal in opportunity and equal before the law. That is, individuals and groups should have an equal right to follow their interests, express their beliefs, seek redress in court, and receive due process of law.

2. *Decentralize power.* Whatever coercive power needed by government to facilitate and service individual and group interests should be decentralized—that is, the locus of authoritative and coercive decision making by a government should be as close to those to be affected as possible—from the national government to the state or province, to the county, to the city or town, or to the district or neighborhood board.

3. *Guarantee basic rights.* The most fundamental limit on government is the guarantee of basic civil and human rights: freedom of speech, assembly, and religion, trial by jury, due process, and the like. These must be placed above government so that no voting majority, no perceived social problem, no government purpose, can override them. Only then is freedom and peace secured. To limit a government so that it does not override basic rights requires that its constitution—fundamental laws—divide government power

horizontally into independent judiciary, executive, and legislative branches that check and balance each other; and vertically into national, state or province, and local governments. In terms of the necessary political culture, the limitation of government must be supported by a widespread belief in freedom, in the rights of man, and of the individual. Only under such conditions can the necessary limitation of government power.

While these rules appear to apply to national societies, they in fact apply to all groups. As groups decentralize authoritative and coercive power, guarantee certain rights of members above the government or group, and foster the independence, sovereignty, and equality of group members, so will such rules decrease group-wide extreme conflict and violence.

Such are the major subprinciples of peacefostering. The fundamental idea is to free adjustment to change. This means, first, to see conflict as normal and to develop an attitude of compromise, especially one seeking mutually beneficial, realistic grounds for accommodation.

Second, it means to determining fair decision rules to cover recurring issues. These should define the who, when, what, and where of each conflict situation; and these rules should be consistent, credible, and enforced. And adherence should be rewarded, especially through social approval.

Third, it means institutionalizing procedures for adjusting to change, if possible. This involves establishing (or evolving) a system of norms, roles, procedures and organizations that foster a nonviolent confrontation of perceptions, expectations, and interests; facilitate consensus-building; provide a definitive test of strength; and apply settlement—peacemaking—procedures.

But, for all this, rule-making and institutionalization are treatments of the symptoms of conflict than the cause. To develop a solid and stable peace at the most fundamental level of causes and conditions, then, we should follow three additional subprinciples. One is to promote cross-pressures and crosscutting group membership and ties. This means encouraging a diversity of interests and enabling individuals to freely change jobs, status, group membership, residence, and country.

A second fundamental subprinciple is involves the development of overriding goals and loyalties, which means linking the self-esteem of individuals to interests of a group and encouraging a common, super-ordinate goal.

Finally, the most important subprinciple for peacefostering is that which increase and assures individual and group freedom. This is the fostering of self-determination, sovereignty, and formal equality; the decentralization of power; and the guaranteeing of basic rights.

A peace that is flexible enough to absorb and adjust to change and to changing expectations is not made overnight. Nor is it constructed like a building, nor cut out of whole cloth. At most, we can provide the best conditions for individuals and groups themselves to work out their own adjustments, and the rules and institutions to facilitate peacefully this process of growth. A durable peace should then flower of its own accord.

CHAPTER 30

The Positive Peace Principle

That government is best which governs least
—Thoreau. Civil Disobedience

They shall beat their swords into plowshares,
and their spears into pruning hooks;
nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they learn war anymore.
—Isaiah 2:4

Believed desirable in itself, peace has been the great goal of humanity. But, we also have other values. Truth and beauty. Justice. Love. And these values may be totally lost in the peace of the slave, the captive, and the oppressed.

We should keep in mind, therefore, that there are two kinds of peace. One is negative peace. This is peace, to be sure, but only at the cost of our dignity, or self-esteem or other vital interests: we may be tyrannized, or exploited, enslaved or downtrodden, broken or humiliated.

The other is positive peace. This is an order through which we can find happiness, satisfaction. Many of our central values will be gratified, especially our self-esteem. It is not only peace from violence, but also peace of mind.

Obviously negative and positive peaces are black and white opposites, while real life is often a gray blend. But the distinction is more than just academic. The citizens of the worst totalitarian states of the last century were really captives of gangs of thugs. Millions were enslaved in forced labor camps in the Soviet Union, and Khmer Rouge Cambodia was literally a border-to-border, slave labor camp. At the same time, in the democracies, many men and women could and did achieve peace with dignity, personal satisfaction, and happiness, just as citizens of democracies continue to do today. A fundamental question involved in making, keeping, or fostering peace, then, is how to improve or develop positive peace.

The answer is summed in the Positive Peace Principle:

Minimize the power of government.

The elements of this principle are:

- Positive peace
- Government

- Division and decentralization of government
- Limitation of government
- Social justice

Positive peace exists when individuals can best achieve their interests. Remember that we are all individuals, subjective, with our own mental fields, our own perspectives; and we each have interests that only we can know and evaluate. No one can presume to know our real scale of values (The First Master Principle). Positive Peace is then a peace that maximizes the ability of each of us to make the best use of our own talents to pursue our own interests (which may be egoistic or altruistic, personal or social), and thus to find our own happiness and personal satisfaction. Such a peace is one that best promotes individual (and group) freedom.

Now, in spite of its monopoly of force, *government* is not necessarily the enemy of freedom. Government may intervene little in the affairs of individuals and groups, acting more as a traffic director enabling individuals to arrive safely at their destination. Moreover, government can help make, keep, and foster peace in a world of ever-changing expectations,, such as through a competitive two-party system and open voting for nominees to the highest government authority.

One of the important problems of our age is to find that point where the curve of government power best facilitates the greatest overall freedom and happiness without too much increasing social polarity (and thus the potential for violence— The Polarity Principle). We need not solve this problem here, however. From what we can observe around the world, including in the United States, governments have become much too large for social harmony and peace. And much too large for positive peace. For example, the tax burden for the European Union (EU) is 39.3 percent of Gross Domestic Product. In some EU countries a single taxpayer pays on the average over 40 % of his gross earnings. Just consider the American Federal government's 1998 official listing of all its regulations, which amounted to 134,723 pages in 201 volumes.

The immediate problem, then, is to reduce the power of government (or what some prefer to call the state) so as to move in the direction of a more positive peace. And practical experience with the results of lessening the coercion and intervention of government should help us define how best to serve the needs of the people.

The reduction of government (or state) power has two aspects, both of which are elements in the Positive Peace Principle. One is to reduce power through the *horizontal division and vertical decentralization* of the machinery and authority of government. This is a matter of opening government to public participation, oversight, and control, but it also involves moving the process and decision-making of government closer to those who are coerced directly by government rules and laws. This means a horizontal division into separate governments, such as for the United States the city, county, state, and federal government, each of which has an exclusive domain of power suitable to the problems or issues at its level. And this means a vertical decentralization of power

as well—a reduction in the ability of any government to intervene in personal and group affairs.

The second aspect is to keep *government limited* once it has been reduced—that is, maintaining a positive peace. This is a central problem in political science, no less than when the writers of the Constitution of the United States tried to formalize constitutional limits on government. Although American federal, state, and local governments have since grown into Big Governments, it should be recognized that the Constitution still succeeds in keeping the American government among the most limited in comparison to others. This is done by dividing governing power and office holders into three competing branches—the executive, legislative and judicial—and by dividing power between the American states and the federal government. Most important, there is a Bill of Rights that guarantees certain individual rights such as the freedom of speech, upon which the government (federal, state, or local) may not ordinarily transgress.

While these limits have kept America relatively free in a world of absolute and authoritarian states, a vital question concerns why the Constitution has failed to prevent a growth in government which undoubtedly now exceeds in size, power, and intervention the greatest fears of James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton. The answer lies along three dimensions.

One dimension is the involvement of the United States in war, especially the two World Wars, but also the Korean and Vietnam wars. In time of war, governments centralize, extend and introduce controls, and mobilize resources and people. Massive intervention, coercion, and regulation are justified, and indeed accepted, in order to defeat the enemy, as we see now in the War On Terror. Unfortunately, such power, once accumulated at the center, is never completely dismantled when war ends. Through wars and threats to national security, governmental power takes two steps upward, but only one step down. Indeed, the state historically is the child of war.

The second dimension concerns the source of governmental power. Power that rests mainly on voting majorities has its source only in those majorities. Thus, what is a division of power institutionally becomes a unified power in direction. That is, since the legislators and executive win office by appealing to the same voters and judges appointed by the executive are confirmed by the legislature, Transient public opinion becomes paramount. This tends to submerge the interests of minorities. The problem here is that the democracies trend towards one man-one vote, which tends to override the constitutional protection of minorities and individual freedom.

There is no consensus on what should have been or can now be done about this problem of limiting the source of governmental power. One suggestion is to tie each branch of government to major social interests, such as religion, business, and labor, which would jealously guard their own power and check the growth in that of others. To be sure, this is now done in the American government through, for example, regulatory boards that really represent the interest of those they regulate. These include the Departments of Commerce, Labor, and Agriculture, which act in favor of and represent

their special interests. This produces a quilt-work, plurality of checks and balances. Nonetheless, overall it is still the final power of voting majorities that enable certain special interests to dominate, as do those supporting and benefiting from environmentalism, welfare, and corporate subsidies.

This brings me to the third dimension for limiting government—the dominant ideology of the people. If the people believe in freedom from government, in human rights, in individualism, in a limited government above particular interests, then largely their ballots will keep governmental power limited. If they believe in governmental power, then government will enlarge.

The growth in governmental power today is correlated with a growth in an ideology of governmental power. The public has come to see government as a means for applying reason and science to solving social problems and improving society. They view government as responsible for society and for rectifying all that goes wrong with it. They see law as mainly government-made; and believe that societies are designed and made by government. Especially, they view equality and social justice as higher ends than freedom, and government as the major tool for bringing tem about.

Of course, the public develops its ideology through opinion leaders. These are mainly intellectuals who teach, write, and, in this age of television news and commentaries, speak about social and political affairs and interpret them for others. Today, government generally captivates intellectuals. They are rationalists who believe knowledge and science can improve society and that governmental power is the means towards this end. Governmental planning, controls, and intervention in society are seen as the implements to create a better society.

This is socialism, of course. And in this first quarter of the 21st Century, intellectuals by and large have accepted some kind of socialist framework, which may be Marxist, neo-Marxist, anti-Marxist statist, totalitarian Islamofascist, or even democratic as in democratic socialism. Following their teaching and infused with their orientation, the public expects government to provide diverse services and solve social problems. The public also expects government to provide the means for achieving particular interests through special laws, regulations helping particular businesses and occupations, rules granting particular privileges, loans at low interest, grants in the form of welfare or subsidies, and tax exemptions.

Today, whenever a social problem arises in an American community, people ordinarily look toward government to solve it. But ironically, the source of the problem, such as inflation, is often governmental intervention itself. And more intervention to solve the problem generally makes it worse or creates other problems. Consider some major social problems and their cause.

- Inflation: caused by the government printing (or similarly creating) too much money. This is usually done to cover deficits or expanding governmental programs

- Depression: the deepest depressions, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s have been caused by government monetary controls and manipulation
- Unemployment: due to government laws and rules restricting the free flow and employment of labor, and by a mandated minimum wage
- Monopoly: Basically due to government favoring particular businesses, or laws that purposely create monopolies such as public utilities (the largest and most exclusive monopolies are government-run, like the post office)
- Crime: Basically a large percentage (perhaps as much as half) of crime is due to government intervention in personal or private affairs, such as prostitution, gambling and drugs; to government-caused unemployment; and to government controls on services or production that encourage violation, such as mandated prices ("fair trade laws") or licensing
- Social and political violence: Basically due to the growth of governmental power.
- War: Basically due to unchecked or absolute governmental power
- Famine. Ditto—democratically free states do not have famines—ever
- Genocide and mass murder (democide): Ditto—democratically free states never engage in mass murder of their own citizens

To be clear, not all social problems are government-created. In some areas, private group activities affect the larger society in a way that normal field (free market) mechanisms cannot solve, and therefore require some sort of limited government intervention. Pollution control and conservation are prime candidates for such consideration, as is the national defense. So is assuring equality of opportunity, particularly in education. After all, if there is to be a limited government, as opposed to no government, then it must have some useful functions to perform.

When government does intervene in society, it should be to restrict the means that can be employed by people and groups in pursuit of their ends, not to restrict the ends themselves. For example, murder, burglary, violating a contract, libel, and bribery are all specific means that government restricts by declaring them criminal and punishable under the law. But a government of free people should not favor one person's ends or goals over another's. To minimize violence and the social problems government intervention creates, and to foster a positive peace, government should be blind to purposes, and be concerned only with how individual and group interests are pursued. It should be like the traffic officer in the middle of a busy intersection. He does not involve himself with the purposes of the drivers, nor with their race, sex, religion, wealth, or education. His only concern is that they stop at the proper time or proceed through the intersection in whatever direction within a certain speed.

When government becomes concerned with why people do what they do, when government becomes end-directed, it begins to turn a social field into an organizational one, and a limited government imperceptibly turns totalitarian. When intellectuals see government as a rational tool for realizing their values, when the public sees government as responsible for all in society and the final source of benefits, and when the source of political power lies mainly in voting majorities, then in spite of constitutional limits the power of government will gradually engulf civil society. Society is

thus turned into an organization with a goal, ordered by an organizational chart, and divided into command and obey classes. It becomes a coercive society. And violence inevitably increases.

But, one may point out, I have stressed only the negative effects of excessive government growth. What are the benefits of minimum government? That is, if positive peace is minimum government, what aside from avoiding the negative is positive about it? Surely, freedom is good in itself and should need no further justification. Only those who have it, and can take it for granted, question its value. To those who have lost their freedom there is no substitute:

> *Oh, give me liberty!*
> *For were ev'n Paradise Itself my prison,*
> *Still I should long to leap the crystal walls.*
> *—John Dryden*

This aside, however, the question may still be pushed: what are the positive consequences of minimum government and its corollary—the maximum of individual and group freedom? A careful study of the history of freedom where it has developed and flowed would show the following consequences:

- Rapid economic growth and technological development of society (the Industrial Revolution was the fruit of greater individual freedom)
- A sharp increase in the material welfare of the common man and his standard of living
- An elimination of the possibility of famine
- A growth in the diversity and availability of choices (as between services, goods, and jobs) for the common man
- An increase in equality (a decrease in the disparity between rich and poor)
- The alleviation of poverty
- An increase in mobility and opportunity regardless of racial, religious, ethnic, and family background
- A decrease in discrimination
- Vigorous progress in knowledge, arts and sciences
- Peace
- Overall human security

But, one may still ask, despite all these benefits of a positive peace, does such freedom really promote *social justice* (the final element of the Positive Peace Principle)? Is a positive peace a just peace? To answer this some idea of the Good or Just society must be joined with that of peace. But, to pose this is to offer a Rubik Cube full of twists and turns and different colors. I have analyzed this puzzle in my book, *The Just Peace*, and will outline the approach and conclusion here.

To begin, let us ask this question. What would be the response if all people in the world were asked collectively what kind of political institutions they wanted to live under, given

that they lacked advance knowledge about their own initial status and rank in such a society and their resources and skills? And let us ask this question under conditions and in a manner that the answers would constitute the principles of a just political order (each person would have an equal vote and near unanimity would be required). Assuming we have surmounted the mere technological problem of instant communication with all, the first answers undoubtedly would reflect the diverse religions, secular ideologies, and cultures of the world's peoples. If pushed for unanimity, or even for a majority opinion, only deadlock could reasonably be expected; and it would be silly to propose that Moslems, Hindus, and Catholics; Marxists, Monarchists, and Liberal Democrats; Nigerians, Japanese, and Iranians would agree on any compromise system of political institutions. At this level, an agreeable answer would not be forthcoming.

The reason for this is that the question put to all is hypothetical. There is no strong motivation to find and agree upon an answer. So, let us add to this situation that:

- An intergalactic conservation society has determined that the earth will soon enter a warp storm whose radiation will destroy all life on earth.
- The conservation society wishes to save the human species from extinction by teleporting all to a hospitable planet in another part of the galaxy.
- Because their equipment cannot be precisely calibrated for alien life forms, it tends to mix up minds and bodies (thus, a human could not know how he or she would be favored by a particular set of institutions in the new world).
- The bylaws of the conservation society require near unanimity on the political institutions of the new world before human beings could be teleported there—no near unanimity, no teleportation, and no teleportation, death for everyone, and for the human species.

Given such conditions, we would have an intense motivation to agree upon a solution. The question would no longer be an intellectual exercise, for a stalemate would mean death for each and for all. Still, even then, given the life-centering values, consuming emotions, and basic certainties involved in the opposing solutions, we could only expect that there would remain deadlock over what the best institutions for all should be. But, I believe that the mortal demand for an answer would eventually squeeze out a procedural solution that people would grab as the best possible. Since there could be no agreement upon what the particular institutions should be like, nearly all would agree to all having a right to form and live in a community governed by those institutions they prefer, so long as (a) each person had a right to leave such a community (b) each community would be protected from other communities, aggressively enforcing their solution, and (c) a minimum and limited overarching republican world government would be formed only for securing and protecting these rights. These would then constitute the principles of a just order.

There would be much to develop and refine in such a solution, but I need to do no more than point out its meaning here. If the world's people were faced with a highly motivated choice over what kind of institutions they might want to live under, subject to the restriction that they would have no prior knowledge of how they would benefit from

these institutions, then their choice would be for a free society much like the limited government of classical liberals—one in which individuals could largely govern their own lives individually, and through the institutions they preferred. Most important, this would not be a substantive choice of what political order might be best, selected over and in conflict with all others, but a procedural means for the different and conflicting conceptions of the Right, Good, and Just to coexist in peace. Freedom so defined would be a meta-utopia, a framework within which competing utopias could be established and live together.

If this might be the solution to the question about what institutions people want and generally agree upon, then the prior question about what might be a socially just political order is also answered: at near-unanimity, a socially just political order is synonymous with the institutions of a free society. But, we have also found that freedom minimizes violence. Thus, the trajectories of two different arguments, for freedom *and* for social justice, actually intersect. Spreading and enhancing the institutions of freedom foster a global *and* just peace.

To sum up, I contend that, in our age, the creation of a positive peace requires limiting government, minimizing its size, and reducing its intervention in individual and group affairs. Because of the growth of governments during time of war, maintaining a positive peace requires developing the conditions for international (or intergroup) peace. Maintaining a positive peace also requires fostering public appreciation for the dangers of excess government and the subsequent need to limit governmental power. Taking appropriate steps to limit governmental power should enable everyone to best pursue their interests, form their own communities and best realize their values.

That is, positive peace is the empowering of us all to seek and discover our individual utopias in relative peace.

CHAPTER 31

The Grand Master Principle

But little do or can the best of us:
That little is achieved through liberty.

—Robert Browning, Why I am a Liberal

What final principle do all the previous principles, including the four Master Principles imply? Whether in reference to individuals and societies, to families, organizations, and nations, or to intergroup and international relations, what one Principle distills this book on waging peace? It is this.

Promote freedom.

Why? The answer is contained in the three corollaries.

Corollary 1: *Freedom maximizes the happiness and dignity of the greatest number.*

Each of us is an individual. We each have our own subjective world, our own perspective, our own unique interests, and values. No one can really know what we want and value, what affects our self-esteem. Our priorities, our ordering of desires, are personal. Only through interaction and trial-and-error adjustments can we estimate what another can do, wants to do, and will do; and establish thereby some kind of mutually reliable expectations—a structure of cooperation and of peace.

Thus, freedom is necessary. For freedom allows the maximum trial-and-error adjustments. It enables everyone to best use the information available to them to best satisfy among themselves their values and purposes.

This freedom to learn, to adjust to one's learning, to assert one's self, and to thereby establish one's balance with others, provides the greatest happiness and dignity. Happiness in that each is free to pursue and achieve in balance with others his own interests; dignity in that each is free to achieve to the limits of his capability and is largely responsible for his achievements and failures.

Corollary 2: *Freedom maximizes social justice.*

We cannot be unjust to ourselves, although others can do us an injustice. Freedom empowers us to best achieve our own justice. And minimizes the power of others to treat us unjustly, as may a religious, business, or intellectual elite who control the instruments of government coercion and force.

Moreover, freedom promotes social conditions that foster the welfare, quality of life, and equality of us all. Freedom drives social and economic development, reduces inequalities of wealth and rank, helps overcome discrimination, and furthers the progress of knowledge and understanding.

But, most important, freedom permits us to follow our own drummer: to form our own communities, pursue our own ideology, practice our own religion, and seek our own utopia, consistent under a liberal democratic government with an equal right for others. Indeed, the institutions of a free society are those that we would most likely choose to live under were this choice made in ignorance of our status, resources, and abilities—without foreknowledge as to what initial assets we would have in society. Given that no one could impose their utopia on others, then regardless of ideology, religion, nationality, race, or status, all would choose to be free to pursue their own Good Life. In this sense, freedom maximizes social justice. And a global libertarian (minimum) government would maximize global social justice.

Corollary 3: *Freedom maximizes peace from violence.*

And finally, freedom minimizes the likelihood of social violence. Freedom does not eliminate violence, but compared to societies in which freedom is constrained by authority or coercion, free societies have about the least that our understanding of man and his relations can realistically expect.

The conclusion of this book is that freedom best promotes justice and peace. The resulting prescription is the grand master principle: if you wish a positive peace, promote freedom.

Now for the last, and perhaps most important, misunderstanding.

Misunderstanding 1: *"To link justice to freedom is to relativize justice to make it selfish and egoistic."*

Perhaps the best way of responding to this misunderstanding is by analogy. Although each of us may believe in an absolute Truth about reality, as we may believe in an absolute Justice, many have come to understand that we have diverse views of reality and conceptions of truth. What we see partly depends on our meanings, values, and norms; our culture and experience. In short, on our perspective. What is truth to us is then the outcome of a conflict between what really exists and what you we are inclined to see and interpret. Truth as it then becomes established in society is a balance of diverse perspectives and intellectual powers.

How do we arrive at truth? By providing our grounds, by being public, and by being critical. But criticism implies conflict. Science, for example, is institutionalized conflict for the balancing of powers among diverse views and evidence. The norms of science (freedom to assert one's views, intersubjective testability, public data, precise methods) are the norms for a conflict helix directed at maximizing truth. The process of intellectual

and scientific growth is a particularization of the general conflict helix. The powers that are balanced are intellectual and authoritarian; the interests involve facts, theories, beliefs; the structure of expectations then is a settled paradigm, framework, or theory.

The outline of intellectual history as a conflict and balancing of different truths should not be too controversial. Most in the democracies now accept that knowledge grows out of diversity, critical interaction, and conflict. Moreover, once the meaning of intellectual power is understood, truth can be seen as a balance of powers.

Now comes the normative kicker. Because this process is so essential to truth, we must be absolutely free to assert our beliefs, free to try various approaches, free to criticize, debate, and disagree. We must be free in the realm of ideas. The government must not interfere with the freedom of speech and belief, censorship is bad, diversity of ideas is good, and the free conflict of ideas promotes truth.

A similar argument can be made for beauty. The conflict between aesthetic taste and demands, the balance between different conceptions of beauty and aesthetic power, the need and importance of artistic diversity in encouraging creativity, point to a process that is yet another particularization of the conflict helix. And of course, the intellectual chorus would agree, government must neither define what is beautiful nor interfere in the process.

Surely the process of establishing truth and beauty, the balancing of powers, conceptions, interests, and so on, that underlie them, are sensible and widely accepted. The invocation against government interference and the emphasis on maximal freedom should be no less accepted. My position on justice and government is precisely the same. The case for truth and beauty holds for justice. Justice is the outcome of a process of balancing of powers and government should not interfere. Interference always means some others imposing their conception of justice on us. A "majoritarian" democratic government makes no difference. If an assumed majority cannot legislate truth or beauty, how can they legislate justice?

From the perspective of the conflict process in the social field, justice is an outcome of a mutual adjustment of ICWs. Justice is a balance of powers, a balance of interests. That all should be free to so determine their own justice is social justice. Its consequence is the just peace.

CHAPTER 32

Vectors of Action Toward Peace

The end of man is an
Action and not a thought,
though it were the noblest.

—*Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus*

To wage peace we should foster freedom. But how? By encouraging democratic revolutions? Intervening in dictatorships to topple tyrants? Making war for democracy? No, nothing like this.

Rather, the Positive Peace Principle argues that people should be left alone to form their own communities or states, to live their own lives. If they prefer to live in authoritarian societies (as many Islamists do) or under totalitarian governments (as do communists and fascists), then that is their choice (given that one can emigrate, a point I will come back to later). Promoting freedom does not mean, then, forcibly converting others into accepting an exchange society and liberal democratic government; nor does it mean waging a crusade against other societies or governments or ideologies. Instead, fostering freedom means to facilitate procedurally and institutionally people making their own choices about how they want to live, whether with freedom or not, as long as they do not try to impose their choice on others. This is the socially just approach.

There are two levels at which peace may be fostered. One is within states. A state may constitute a homogenous culture, a single language and religion, and a single race or ethnic group—a nation. The people may prefer, then, an authoritarian government and society, with (as in Saudi Arabia and Iran) state and religion merged. Freedom, as understood here, may then be undesirable to the citizen—indeed, it may be perceived as a corruption intrinsic to sensory and materialistic cultures. Then, even if convinced of the principles given here about the negative relationship between freedom and violence, they may prefer their way of life with its much greater periodic violence than the greater peace of "Western" individual freedom. So, fostering freedom within states is a matter of communicating its value for peace and social justice and the manner in which it may be institutionally facilitated, but leaving its acceptance and implementation to the judgment of those within each state.

The second level is that of the international system of states itself. Here, fostering freedom is a matter of nurturing that environment and those institutions that permit the people of each state to live their own lives, free from the dictates of other states or communities. At this level an international government should

guarantee that people do have a choice in how they want to live, whether free or not, by making sure they can leave a state if they wish.

How then can freedom be fostered at the state, and international levels? The answers can be given in terms of general vectors (directions) of action toward peace, rather than by specific policies or institutions, which are a matter of context, culture, and politics. A *vector of action* is like the port towards which a sailboat is tacking. Currents, wind, and waves will affect the sailing tactics at any time, but the final goal, even if sometimes the boat seems to be sailing almost at right angles to its destination, is always in mind. Similarly, a vector of action is the destination of all the pragmatic and realistic changes in course that may be necessary to achieve it.

At the state level, five vectors of action can move us towards greater peace and social justice by incrementally reducing the restrictions on freedom that exist among individuals and groups. These are listed in Table 32.1 below.

One vector is to enhance and guarantee the freedom of choice and mobility of citizens and groups. People should be free to form their own communities, whether they conform to a majority's values and mores or not—as long as people are free to leave such communities. This means specifically that minority religious, ethnic, racial or language groups should be allowed to establish and build their own communities and to have the maximum autonomy possible within the state.

A second vector of action is toward decentralizing power downward and outward from central government to smaller and local communities closer to the citizen. Of course, there are functions which can only be carried out by national government, such as national defense and international diplomacy, but in all other areas, government decision-making should devolve toward those who will be most affected by a policy, have the greatest stake in it, and can best bring the relevant knowledge and values to bear on it: the local community and individual citizen.

A third vector is to expand the horizontal distribution of power among competing branches, divisions, functions, or groups. This will encourage countervailing and balancing powers—a checks and balances system. Although what specifically should be done will vary from one state's political culture and system to another, the idea is to prevent any group or branch from dominating government. This best can be done by setting up competing groups or branches with countervailing power that each jealously guards and uses to prevent others from increasing their power. A government so checked tends to remain checked, and thus limited.

The fourth vector is to increase the political participation of communities and peoples. The reasons for increasing open political representation in government

Table 32.1

Vectors of Action Toward Peace

State Level

Enhance and guarantee freedom of choice and mobility of citizens and groups

Decentralize government power

Expand the horizontal distribution of power

Increase the political participation of communities and peoples

Decrease government's social and economic control and intervention

International Level

Short run

Facilitate and guarantee through the UN a right to emigrate

Encourage and aid efforts through the UN for national self-determination and independence

represent people in the UN as well as states

gradually strengthen UN peacekeeping and peacemaking machinery

reconceptualize the UN caucus of the democracies as a Democratic Political Party

Long Run

Develop an Alliance of Democracies to take on the above goals where the UN fails

is to reflect the public's interests and to restrain arbitrary and irresponsible government violence; and to thus further limit governmental power. That people should be thus represented is widely accepted. To this we must add that communities, as freely formed semiautonomous bodies representing minority interests and values, should also have representation. What form this should take will depend on the state, of course. Perhaps it can be by election of community representatives, by appointment of community officials, or by referenda, so long as communities as well as citizens can express freely their interests and choice regarding public issues and policy.

Finally, the fifth vector of action at the state level is to decrease government's social and economic control and intervention—to provide a freer national market of ideas, goods, and communities. Such is the essence of an exchange society and freedom. This limitation of government intervention should extend to what goes on within communities. If people wish to set up a socialist, theocratic, or fascist community that is their own choice, so long as it is their right protected and guaranteed by government, they do not threaten neighboring communities, and they are not later prevented from leaving these communities. The key is to enable people to achieve their own utopias, no matter how undesirable to others. A state nonintervention policy best achieves this. An exchange society with a liberal democratic government may thus comprise many non-exchange, nondemocratic communities. But, this is what social justice is about.

Of course, the promotion of peace and social justice—freedom—naturally involves vectors of action at the international as well as the national level. While states generally have too much power for internal peace and social justice, the United Nations has too little. Especially, if there is to be the maximum global social justice consistent with minimizing international violence (that is, positive peace), then the UN will have to be strengthened along five vectors of action, as listed in the above table.

One is to move the UN, as our global political system, more toward facilitating and guaranteeing a right to emigrate. This is a critical right and freedom; its universalization would help weaken the power of dictatorships and moderate their excesses. Moreover, it would further international mobility and free choice, both of which would enhance the exchange nature of international society.

A second international vector of action is to encourage and aid efforts at national self-determination and independence. This is in line with enabling people to form their own communities, to realize their own interests, and thus to foster a greater global peace and social justice. This vector is already aligned with a strong international consensus for the national independence of colonies; but it has to be promoted also against the opposition of many governments to allowing the independence of internally, culturally distinguishable ethnic, religious, or language groups—really nations within states. Many civil wars are being fought precisely to achieve this, as happened in Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, and China, among others, and is now happening in Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, To facilitate such independence, avoid such bloodshed, and further social justice, the independence of subject nations within and between states should be global policy.

Another vector of action is toward representing people in the UN. Presently, only states are represented, giving tiny Fiji the same voting power as enormous India. While there is a political logic to this, as for the American Senate where only American states are represented, and all equally, people should also have representation, as in the American House of Representatives and all the

parliaments of other democracies. There should be a way for the people of each international state to make their views on global policy felt aside from what their governments or dictators wish. What form this "Global House of Commons" should take depends on future events, opportunities, and diplomacy, but something like this is necessary if our global government is to be fully representative and remain limited; and if the potential for global violence is to be minimized.

A fourth vector is to gradually strengthen UN peacekeeping and peacemaking machinery. Ideally, the UN eventually will be our global policeman, helping to prevent or resolve domestic and international violence. That the UN would evolve such machinery has been the fervent hope of many internationalists. But, so far, it has failed in this, largely because of the opposition of member dictatorships.

The democracies should recognize this problem and take a far greater role in UN deliberations, which can only happen if the democracies achieve a common voice and put unified pressure on nondemocratic members. To this end, the existing UN caucus among the democracies should reconceptualize and remake itself into a Democratic Political Party with a leader, whip, and party caucuses on pending issues.

But, all the above may fail. Attempts at reforming and improving the UN have not been successful so far, mostly due to the power of nondemocracies in the UN and their ability to block changes in procedures, or veto attempts in the Security Council to deal with democide, aggression, or threats to the peace. So, while trying in the short run to implement the vectors listed above, I also suggest that the democracies work toward a long run solution, which would be an Alliance of Democracies to do what the UN is presently prevented from doing. There is already institutional movement in this direction,

Activists, practitioners, academics, policy makers, and funders, from democracies have come together to organize the international promotion of democratic freedom. They call this a World Movement for Democracy (WMD). It has its own website (http://www.wmd.org/), publications, regular online *Democracy News*, courses, a steering committee, secretariat, and periodic assemblies. The Movement held its first and organizing assembly in India in 1999; and it just held its fourth assembly— involving nearly 600 participants— during April 2006 in Turkey. The stated purpose of the Movement is, "to strengthen democracy where it is weak, to reform and invigorate democracy even where it is long-standing, and to bolster pro-democracy groups in countries that have not yet entered a process of democratic transition." One can replace "democracy" with "freedom" in the above without loss of meaning, for what is usually meant is not only an electoral democracy, but one that also secures its citizens' civil and political rights and liberties.

As this Movement grows into a true Alliance of Democracies, with all the paraphernalia of a continually functioning international organization, I suggest that its purpose be not only to strengthen and promote democracy and human rights, but also to carry on the peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacefostering functions that the UN cannot. This is not to replace the UN, but to supplement it until nearly all countries are democracies, in which case the UN and an Alliance of Democracies will become one.

Overall, then, whether at the state or international level, we should promote the maximum freedom of individuals, groups, and states, consistent with a like freedom for others. This will maximize the happiness and dignity of the greatest number, social justice, and peace from violence.

Thus, the Grand Master Principle is:

Promote freedom.